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This thesis examines the British Commonwealth and Allied Naval forces operation on the west 
coast during the final two and a half years of the Korean War, particularly focused on their co-
operation with the anti-Communist guerrillas. The purpose of this study is to present a more 
realistic picture of the United Nations (UN) naval forces operation in the west, which has been 
largely neglected, by analysing their activities in relation to the large number of irregular forces.  
 This thesis shows that, even though it was often difficult and frustrating, working with the 
irregular groups was both strategically and operationally essential to the conduct of the war, 
and this naval-guerrilla relationship was of major importance during the latter part of the naval 
campaign. It concludes that, to the British Commonwealth Commanders and Allied Naval 
forces on the west coast, a large part of the relationship with the guerrillas during the Korean 
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The last two years of naval operations in the Korean War (June 1950–July 1953) have been 
defined as a classic example of the ‘static warfare on shore’ in that most UN fleets in Korean 
waters were engaged in various static tasks.1 This unspectacular and dull image of static warfare 
has led to the UN naval campaign being viewed with relative indifference. Unlike ‘the mighty 
drama of Inchon and Hungnam’ of the first critical year, the following two years of naval 
operation lacked dramatic fleet action. 2  Therefore, regardless of the actual value and 
characteristics of this fleet operation, the UN sea power’s involvement in the last two years of 
the Korean War has been poorly documented. This indifference, obviously, has restricted our 
understanding of a realistic picture of the UN naval forces’ operation in Korea. 
 Even though there were no major fleet actions, it would be wrong to conclude that naval 
operations were irrelevant. This thesis will argue that on the west coast, in particular, naval (and 
air) co-operation with guerrilla forces was of major importance. The analysis in this thesis will 
show that, although often difficult and frustrating, working with the irregular groups was both 
strategically and operationally essential to the conduct of the war.  
 
The naval operation in the Korean War differed from the pattern of previous wars in the Pacific 
area in that it entailed no severe clash of fleets. As North Korea had only negligible surface 
forces, except for a small-scale engagement conducted in early July 1950, there were no 
                                           
1 ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval Operations, 
Korea, 1950–53 (Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch, Naval, September, 1967), p. 4. 
2 Malcolm Muir Jr., ‘Sea Power on Call: Fleet Operations, June 1952–July 1953’, in Edward J. Marolda (ed.), The 
U.S. Navy in the Korean War (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2007), p. 348.   
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conflicts between fleets. 3  Other than mining and shore batteries, there was virtually no 
Communist opposition in Korean waters; even the possible threat from Soviet submarines never 
materialised.4  
 Based on the control of the sea that was accomplished early on, the naval operation was asked 
to increase its involvement in support of ground operations. This was particularly true during 
the first twelve months of war. This period involved radical changes in front-line positions, and 
was one in which the naval forces’ support role brought about very significant changes to the 
war situation.5 However, unlike the earlier period, the following two years of naval operations 
in Korea lacked dramatic fleet action. The need of naval force direct support for ground 
operations was largely reduced once the immediate crisis in the UN ground forces was relieved, 
and battle lines reached a stalemate roughly on the 38th Parallel in June 1951. This enabled the 
UN Naval forces to place more emphasis on the issues within the blockade areas, thus their 
operation became largely static.  
 To the US Naval forces who mainly conducted their missions on the east coast during the war, 
the latter part of naval operations particularly lacked spectacle. Due to its geographical 
configuration — a very steep coastline and very few islands off its shore — the US Naval forces 
were able to maintain a close blockade relatively easily. It was also advantageous for naval 
bombardment as its coastal area contains North Korea’s main road and rail communication lines 
to the front line within the reach of naval gunfire and air strike.6  
                                           
3 Regarding the engagement with the North Korean Navy, see James A. Field Jr., History of United States Naval 
Operations, Korea (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 61. 
4 ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval Operations, 
Korea, 1950–53, p. 4. 
5 Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 
1957), p. V. 
6 ADM 1/27269, Report of Experience in Korean Operations, January–June 1951, Flag Officer, Second-in-
Command Far East Station, 26 July, 1951, Part I: Historical Survey, para. 23; Norman Bartlett (ed.), With the 
Australians in Korea (Canberra ACT: Australian War Memorial, 1957), p. 127. 
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 Owing to the Communists’ unlimited manpower to keep the communication lines operating 
and their continued mine warfare, the UN sea power in this area was rarely diverted from their 
naval blockade, bombardment and mine sweeping tasks during the latter period.7 That is why 
this part of the campaign was commonly described by American sailors as a period of 
‘monotony and boredom’ with ‘a lot of gunfire and stuff but no running battle and no 
spectaculars’ and has received relatively little attention from American military historians.8 
Even one of the most influential and comprehensive accounts of the history of the naval 
operation in this war, James A. Field’s History of United States Naval Operations, Korea (1962), 
only dedicated one chapter to this vast period of naval operation. This chapter’s title, ‘Two 
More Years’, clearly revealed the American historiography’s low interest in this period.9 
 As the US Navy (USN) constituted the largest part of UN Naval forces and took the overall 
naval command in Korea, this American perspective has been established as a dominant 
discourse in describing the latter part of naval operation. This, undoubtedly, influenced the 
subsequent study of the UN naval campaign on the west coast even though this operation was 
conducted mainly by the Royal Navy (RN) and her attached Allied Naval forces. Therefore, 
distinguished characteristics of the west coast naval operation and its importance during this 
period were largely dwarfed. In fact, the British Naval Staff History, the only full-scale study 
of the west coast naval operation, defined this period as the last phase of the six naval 
operational stages in the Korean War and also paid relatively little attention to this extensive 
period.10 
                                           
7 Regarding the naval commitment for interdiction, see Richard P. Hallion, The Naval Air War in Korea (Baltimore, 
Maryland: The Nautical &Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1986), Chapter 4; John R. P. Lansdown, With 
the Carriers in Korea: The Sea and Air War in SE Asia, 1950–1953 (Wilmslow, Cheshire: Crecy Publishing 
Limited, 1997), Chapter 5; for mine sweeping activity, see Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, Chapters 4, 
5, 7.  
8 Muir Jr., ‘Sea Power on Call: Fleet Operations, June 1952–July 1953’, pp. 348–9. 
9 Field Jr., History of United States Naval Operations, Korea, Chapter XII.   




During the first year of the conflict, the west coast was regarded as a relatively less important 
area than the east. The western side of North Korea was mainly an agricultural area which had 
little industry, and there were no railways or main supply routes within naval gunfire range.11 
In addition, owing to the geographical characteristics of the west coast — high rise and fall of 
tide, very shallow water near the coastline and a large number of islands — close inshore blockade 
activities by large naval vessels were almost impossible.12 These operational environments 
largely restricted the west coast naval forces’ operation to the supporting role for US Naval 
forces’ special missions or to maintain a loose and ineffective naval blockade.   
 Unlike the general descriptions of the naval historiography, however, during the latter part of 
the war, the strategic value of the west coast area increased. Therefore, the role of the UN Naval 
forces in this area also became more significant. This was particularly due to the changed value 
of the UN-held islands in the northern area.  
 As a war of attrition had persisted along the 38th Parallel, the need to break this stalemate 
situation increased for the UN Command (UNC). To pressurise the Communists towards the 
truce talks and to effectively progress the negotiations, behind the front line operations became 
increasingly important. Also, these operations were encouraged to relieve pressure on the UN 
ground forces by dragging more Communist forces from the front line. Under these operational 
                                           
- Phase 1: 25 June–6 August 1950 (Initial invasion) 
- Phase 2: 6 August–14 September 1950 (The establishment and retention of a beach-head) 
- Phase 3: 15 September–25 November 1950 (The UN counter-attack) 
- Phase 4: 26 November–14 January 1951 (The Chinese came to the assistance of the North Koreans)  
- Phase 5: 15 January–12 June 1951 (The United Nations counter-attack) 
- Phase 6: 23 June 1951–27 July 1953 (Long, drawn-out truce talks, static warfare on shore)  
ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval Operations, Korea, 
1950–53, p. 4. 
11 Frederick Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951–1954’ (Study, Operations Research Office, Johns 
Hopkins University, 1956), pp. 18–19. 




requirements, it was the islands on the west which were selected and used as the main bases 
and launching points of the UN clandestine operations.  
 The UN-held islands became more significant when the UN Air Force set up Shoran 
navigational Beacons and early warning radars on several islands in this area.13 Under the 
continued air aggression from the Red Chinese, the west coast area became one of the more 
vital bases to the UN Air Forces in terms of the struggle for air superiority.14 As a consequence, 
the British Commonwealth and Allied Naval forces’ role, who were in charge of the west coast 
naval blockade, also became more significant during the latter period.  
 The value of the western naval forces operation was at its most important during the island 
defensive operation. From late October 1951, the UN-held islands on the northern area were 
utilised as UN Delegation bargaining counters at the cease-fire negotiation. To take the 
initiative in the negotiations, the Communist forces initiated an assault against these islands. 
As a British flag officer wrote, it represented the beginning of ‘the most critical period’ for the 
western naval forces. 15  To the UNC, the success of this naval defensive operation was 
particularly significant as the status of inshore islands became one of the major issues that 
decided the progress of the truce talks. The genuine value of the islands as operational bases for 
the clandestine and air operations also could not be overlooked. Therefore, to the UNC, this 
island warfare ‘assumed even greater importance’ than the ground operation for a while.16  
 This changed war situation, needless to say, heavily increased the importance of the 
western naval forces role who had to take the primary responsibility of this defensive 
                                           
13 Lawrence V. Schuetta, Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 1950–1954 (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air 
University, Aerospace Studies Institute, 1964), pp. 91–2. 
14 ADM 1/23906, Korean Naval Operations-9 January to 8 February 1952, Office of the Flag Officer, Second-in-
command, Far East Station, 104/FO2FE2/1209/1, 13 February 1952, pp. 1–2. 
15 ADM 116/6219, HMS Mounts Bay-Report of Proceedings from 1 to 9 December 1951, HMS Mounts Bay, 10 
December 1951, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 21 December 1951. 
16 Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, p. 129. 
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operation. On behalf of the UN Naval forces on the west, their latter part of the naval campaign 
was a more valuable contribution than during the earlier period. This is the reason why the 
latter part of the naval operation deserves greater academic attention.  
  
A prominent point to note is that large parts of this naval campaign had been conducted under 
a close co-operation with the UN guerrilla forces. Also, following the establishment of naval-
guerrilla relationships, the western naval forces operation became a lot more active and 
systematic, thus, they were able to carry out the critical missions more effectively. 
 The anti-Communist guerrilla groups, called Leopard and Wolfpack, were spontaneously 
formed irregular forces who mainly lived in North Korea before the start of the war. Most of 
them were students or peasants younger than twenty-three years of age who had conducted anti-
Communist activities since the establishment of the Communist regime in the North from late 
1945.17 As a consequence of the Chinese intervention and their subsequent reoccupation of the 
territory over the 38th Parallel in December 1950, the anti-Communists were compelled to form 
an exiled sanctuary on the west coast islands. With the sole motivation of liberating their 
hometowns from the Communists, they continued to conduct guerrilla activities, moving between 
the mainland and the islands.  
 To the UNC, the emergence of several thousand irregular forces who had the potential to 
conduct clandestine operations and guerrilla activity on the rear side of the enemy line was 
welcome news. Therefore, under the initiative of the Eighth US Army, Korea (EUSAK), large 
numbers of irregulars were reorganised and absorbed into American guerrilla organisations; 
                                           
17 Cho Sung Hun조성훈, 한국전쟁의 유격전사 [The Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War] (Seoul: Military 
History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK, 2003), pp. 164–70. 
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they actively conducted guerrilla raids, sabotage and intelligence gathering activities from early 
1951. 
 As the largest guerrilla forces controlled by the UNC during the Korean War, their emergence 
and start of activities on the west coast heavily influenced the western naval forces’ operations. 
In particular, the addition of large-scale guerrilla activity made the British Naval Task Group’s 
operation more distinctive from that of the naval forces located in the east; it was also more 
active and effective than in its earlier period.  
 The UN Naval forces’ direct relationship with the American guerrilla organisation began from 
early March 1951; right after the start of its guerrilla activity.18 As these guerrillas conducted 
operations mainly based from the islands on the west coast, for the defence of their bases and 
to make various guerrilla activities more effective, it was essential to have close naval gunfire 
and air support.19 As for the naval forces located in the west, who had long-desired a local 
intelligence team and island garrison forces for the naval operation, co-operation with these 
irregulars was also an inevitable choice.20 Subsequently, this new relationship significantly 
changed the pattern of naval operations.  
 Starting from their intelligence of Communist force coastal area movements, the western naval 
forces depended heavily on guerrilla intelligence for naval operations up until the end of the 
war. This greater dependence on intelligence enabled the naval forces’ active and effective 
attack against the Communist forces and allowed the maintenance of a close naval blockade, 
which were nearly impossible during earlier period. The naval forces also frequently supplied 
close naval air and gunfire support for the guerrillas’ amphibious landing operations. These 
raids were regarded as very advantageous by the naval forces, in that they would cause a large 
                                           
18 Regarding the start of a relationship with the guerrillas, see Chapter 4. 
19 Regarding the American guerrilla organisation’s early plan to co-operate with the naval forces, see Appendix 5: 
Copy of Operation Plan ABLE. 
20 Regarding the western naval forces’ intelligence and garrison forces related problem, see sub-chapter 3.2. 
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deployment of Communist troops from the front line, and they inflicted heavy damage on the 
coastal guard detachments.21 Therefore, from the early stage of their co-operation, a close naval 
support system for guerrilla activities was established and maintained. Beyond the passive 
intelligence collection and the naval support system, more active ways of utilising the irregular 
forces were also carried out. Under the initiative of the blockade ships, the guerrillas were 
utilised as naval gunfire spotters and special agent teams to support the various naval 
missions.22 Undoubtedly, this allowed the naval forces’ operation against the Communists to 
be more effective and bold. Even the routine patrols for the naval blockade mission were 
directly influenced by the guerrilla activities. As the performance of several thousand guerrilla 
activities could increase west coast blockade instability, it was essential for the naval patrol 
ships to know their intended movements and to have a proper identification procedure.23 This 
accelerated the development of a communication and co-ordination system between the two 
groups. As a consequence, this made the naval-guerrilla relationship closer. 
 These naval-guerrilla relationships were at their most important during the island defensive 
operation. As the defence of the UN-held islands needed to be given the highest priority by 
the ships in this area, to deter the Communists’ offensive operation, the value of co-operation 
with these irregulars increased considerably. In particular, as the only available local 
intelligence source and a sizeable garrison force, the close co-operation with the guerrillas 
was imperative. The intensified naval-irregular co-operation was maintained for most of the 
operational period of 1952, and, consequently, this deepened inter-relationship played a key 
                                           
21 ADM 116/6213, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 13 to 24 February 1951, HMS Ceylon, at Inchon, 27 
February 1951, para. 6. 
22 For several examples of the guerrilla use for naval operation, see sub-Chapter 4.4. 
23 ADM 1/22521, Korean War Reports of Proceedings No. 30 at Sasebo, 17 January and 6 February 1951, the 
Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East Station’s letter FO2FE/ 2960/11, dated 10 March 1951, pp. 5–6. 
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role in the defensive operation. Despite a lack of dramatic fleet action, the western naval forces 
conducted highly significant tasks successfully with the guerrillas. 
 
To the UN Naval forces in the west, the close co-operation with the guerrillas seemed to be a 
more valuable contribution than during the earlier period and, accordingly, deserves greater 
attention and appreciation. However, our current understanding of naval operations in the 
Korean War obviously fails to appreciate the actual value of the vast period of the west coast 
naval campaign. For a better understanding of the UN Naval forces’ operation during the latter 
period, it is essential to examine the UN Naval forces’ inter-relationship with the anti-
Communist guerrilla forces.  
 The main subject of this thesis concerns the naval operation on the west coast during the latter 
part of the Korean War. The research is particularly focused on the UN naval forces’ co-
operation with the anti-Communist guerrillas. The purpose of this study is to present a more 
realistic picture of the UN naval forces’ operation on the west, which has been largely neglected, 
by analysing their activities in relation to the large number of irregular forces. In so doing, the 
study contributes to and revises the current historiography by demonstrating that, owing to this 
naval-irregular relationship, the latter part of west coast naval operations became far more 
complex and valuable, thus deserving greater academic attention and appreciation. 
 
1.1 The Literature 
 
From early July 1950 to the end of the war, the responsibility for the west coast naval blockade 
mission was assigned to the RN and her attached British Commonwealth and Allied Naval 
forces, including Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, the Netherlands and New Zealand. In 
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addition, several United States Marine Corps (USMC) light carriers were also attached to 
British command from early 1951 and rotationally operated on the west coast to relieve the 
British Commonwealth carrier.24 Although they were not under direct British command, from 
late July 1950, several Republic of Korea (ROK) naval craft also supported this western naval 
forces’ operation.25  
 Under the command of a RN flag officer and several sub-element commanders, mostly British, 
they conducted various tasks on the west coast. Therefore, as an initial step to arrive at an 
understanding of naval co-operation with the guerrillas, it is essential to survey the literature 
documenting the RN’s operation in Korea.  
 Unfortunately, this topic has received very little attention from British military historians and 
specialists. To the British, the issues in the Korean Peninsula have been regarded as an area of 
very little direct interest.26 In addition, its naval operations, which lacked naval engagement, 
also seemed quite unimpressive. For these reasons, as Edward C. Meyers wrote, ‘the Korean 
War was a most un-English war’.27 As a research topic, these facts have made the naval 
operation in the Korean War less attractive. For despite the large number of vessels and 
personnel deployed in this conflict, no comprehensive full-scale study of this topic exists except 
for a British Naval Staff History, which was written for internal purposes only.28  
                                           
24 Regarding the list of the British Commonwealth and Allied Ships that served under British Command, see 
Appendix 1.  
25 ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval Operations, 
Korea, 1950–53, p. 33. Since early July 1950, the ROK Navy had been organised as a naval Task Group and 
conducted a naval blockade on the coasts south of latitude 37° N. Thomas J. Cutler, ‘Sea Power and Defense of 
the Pusan Pocket, June–September 1950’, in Marolda (ed.), The US Navy in the Korean War, p. 22.  
26 Kibata Yoichi, ‘Commonwealth Cooperation and Rivalry’, in Ian Nish (ed.), The British Commonwealth and 
the Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 165. 
27 Edward C. Meyers, Thunder in the Morning Calm: The Royal Canadian Navy in Korea 1950–1955 (St. 
Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 1992), p. 152. 
28 This literature is ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval 
Operations, Korea, 1950–53. 
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 As the only available study which comprehensively covered the British Commonwealth Naval 
forces operation in Korea, it provides a good starting point in understanding the latter two years 
of naval operations on the west coast. It also provides basic information on the relationship 
between the naval forces and the guerrilla organisations, including several roles and operations 
of Leopard and Wolfpack related to the British Commonwealth naval forces and some Naval 
Commanders’ evaluations of the guerrillas’ activities. However, like the American 
historiography, this book also focused more on the early part of the naval operations which 
seemed less important on behalf of the RN and her attached Allied Naval forces’ role in the 
Korean War. 29  Therefore, the guerrilla-related information was only scantily described. 
Needless to say, it fell short of mentioning basic guerrilla information such as their origins, 
characteristics and processes of co-operation.     
 Fortunately, several documents exist that focused mainly on the minor part of naval operation 
in this area, including the studies of attached Allied navies and the aircraft-carrier elements.30 
These are useful to acquire deeper understanding of the attached naval forces and the Fleet Air 
Arm’s activities and their different perceptions concerning the west coast operation, in 
particular with the guerrillas. A history published by the ROK Naval Headquarters is 
particularly useful in understanding the UN naval forces early relationship with the guerrillas 
                                           
29 Ibid. This study dedicated only four chapters amongst totally twelve to describing this vast period of naval 
operation, as could be seen in each chapter’s title; ‘8. Opening of Truce Talks’, ‘9. Beginning of Stalemate’, ‘10. 
Stalemate in 1952’, ‘11. End of Hostility’. This Naval Staff history was not concerned much about the increased 
value and complexity of the naval operation itself conducted on the west coast.  
30 For Royal Austrian Navy, see Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea.; for Royal Canadian Navy, see Meyers, 
Thunder in the Morning Calm; for ROK Navy, see ROK Navy Headquarters, 해군본부, 6.25 전쟁과 
한국해군작전 [The Korean War and the ROK Naval Operation] (Kyeryong: ROK Navy Headquarters, 2012); 
for carrier operation, see Lansdown, With the Carriers in Korea; Brian Cull and Dennis Newton, With the Yanks 
in Korea (London: Grub Street, 2000); Graham Thomas, Furies and Fireflies over Korea: The Story of the Men of 
the Fleet Air Arm, RAF and Commonwealth Who Defended South Korea, 1950–1953 (London: Grub Street, 2004); 
Lieutenant Colonel Pat Meid, USMCR and Major James M. Yingling, USMC, US Marine Operations In Korea 
1950–1953: Volume V-Operations in West Korea (Washington DC: Historical Division, Headquarters, US Marine 
Corps, 1972); Warren E. Thompson, Naval Aviation in the Korean War: Aircraft, Ships and Men (Barnsley, South 
Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2012); David Hobbs, ‘British Commonwealth Carrier Operations in the Korean 
War’, Air & Space Power Journal, 18, 4; ProQuest (Winter 2004), pp. 62–71.  
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when they were not controlled by any friendly authority.31 However, as they mainly focused 
on their own activity, they also lacked information on naval-guerrilla co-operation. This 
literature is only useful for complementary purposes in understanding the overall west coast 
naval operation.  
 Except for the above-mentioned literature, it is not possible to find any additional study 
covering the British Commonwealth and Allied Naval forces’ latter two years of operation. Thus, 
the state of the existing historiography is insufficient to fully understand the latter part of the 
naval operation on the west coast, in particular their co-operation with the guerrilla 
organisations. For a more thorough understanding of the topic in question, comprehensive 
archival research is essential to complement existing material and possibly revise any opinion. 
Therefore, to further enhance understanding, it is imperative to collect and analyse existing 
Naval Commanders’ operational records that cover the two-year plus period of the west coast 
operation; particularly focusing on naval-guerrilla relationships.  
 
However, as this research topic is about the inter-relationship between the naval forces and the 
guerrillas, this study cannot be completed without resources relating to the guerrillas themselves. 
Since the Naval Commanders had only limited information of the characteristics of the 
guerrillas, their internal affairs and higher command’s directions which decided their activities, 
it is not possible to study this topic meaningfully without additional literature regarding the 
study of anti-Communist guerrillas.   
 The topic of the anti-Communist guerrilla activities themselves, however, is also poorly 
represented in studies. As Major General John K. Singlaub (Ret.), who led the Central 
                                           
31 For more detailed information, see Chapter 4. ROK Navy Headquarters, The Korean War and the ROK Naval 
Operation. pp. 379–420.   
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Intelligence Agency's (CIA) intelligence operation during the Korean War mentioned, the 
guerrilla operations in the Korean conflict have been regarded as ‘the most unknown part of 
it’.32 This is largely due to a shortage of primary resources to record them. As they were 
irregular anti-Communists who spontaneously decided to join the American organisation, the 
guerrillas operated under the loose control and supervision of the American officers. 33 
Therefore, except for their intelligence or after activity reports, only limited numbers of records 
were produced during the war. This is typified by the fact that the lists of guerrillas under their 
command had not been maintained by the American organisations. 34  Moreover, as the 
existence and the operation of the guerrilla organisations were highly classified, relatively few 
resources were disclosed to researchers. Therefore, any studies on the anti-Communist guerrilla 
were mainly conducted by the military institutes or the participants of this operation, both in 
the USA and South Korea.  
 It was the US military institutes, and their civilian research contractors, who first conducted 
comprehensive studies of this topic; these studies were intended for the purpose of analysis and 
evaluation of the guerrilla warfare during the war. The first of these governmental documents 
was produced by the US Army Forces, Far East (AFFE) Military History Detachment in 1954. 
In this study, AFFE analysed the guerrillas’ characteristics and their ways of operations from 
1951 to 1952. This research is very useful in that they conducted several interviews with the 
guerrilla leaders, and significantly it contains detail on their motivation, forms of activity and 
records of several memorable operations. 35  The subsequent study was conducted by the 
Operations Research Office of the Johns Hopkins University (ORO study) in 1956. Under 
                                           
32 Ben S. Malcom, White Tigers: My Secret War in Korea (Washington DC: Brassey’s, INC., 2003), p. xi.  
33 Regarding the relationship between the guerrillas and the American advisors, see Chapter 5. 
34 Cho, The Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War, pp. 171–2. 
35 U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict, 1951–1952’, Project 
MHD-3, Tokyo (March 1954). 
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contract to AFFE, the ORO study analysed and evaluated the guerrillas’ activities from March 
1951 to July 1953. As a comprehensive working paper on this topic, this study is especially 
valuable in that it contained the most detailed data and extensive evaluation concerning guerrilla 
actions.36 In addition to these documents, the US Air Force also conducted research on the 
guerrilla activities in the Korean conflict. In his book of 1964, Lawerence V. Schuetta described 
guerrilla operations focused on their relation with the Air Force, and evaluated these from an 
Air Force perspective.37 
 These governmental documents are invaluable in understanding the anti-Communist guerrilla 
activity, in that they contain the higher command’s plans and directions for guerrilla deployment, 
which directly influenced the guerrilla’s actual operations. They also supply plenty of 
supporting documents which are useful for revealing guerrilla backgrounds, organisational 
structure, the changing pattern of various activities, and also their results.     
 However, these documents are essentially military policy reports to determine lessons for any 
future guerrilla warfare, rather than historical research; so they mainly focus on the results of 
guerrilla action. Although the US Army Military History Detachment’s research concentrates 
more on guerrilla characteristics and has a narrative of the guerrillas themselves, due to the 
limited period it covers, it is not possible to describe the last year of guerrilla activity from this 
source.38    
 The limitations of government-led studies, however, were partly complemented by several 
books published since the mid-1980s. As large amounts of previously restricted records and 
government documents related to the guerrilla actions were declassified in 1980 as a 
consequence of the Freedom of Information Act, some US participants of the guerrilla 
                                           
36 Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’. 
37 Schuetta, Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea. 
38 This research covers the guerrilla operation between 1951 and 1952. 
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operations published autobiographies based on personal experiences and newly released 
sources.39   
 These publications are also valuable in that they provide detailed accounts of the guerrilla 
activities, including the guerrillas’ relationships with American officers and the process and 
problems of their joint operation with the naval forces. 40 They also give insight into the 
guerrilla attitude to their activities, and also the American officers’ personal evaluation of the 
guerrillas; all of which has not been significantly revealed in the governmental documents. 
However, the descriptions in these autobiographies were restricted to the scope of the authors’ 
personal experiences, except for the accounts written based on the above mentioned 
governmental documents. Therefore, they were able to describe only a limited period and area 
of this topic.  
 In Korea, as a research topic, the anti-Communist guerrilla activities during the Korean War 
are similarly not popular. Although most of the guerrillas were transferred into the ROK Army 
after the end of the Korean War, and hundreds of them are still alive in South Korea, their 
struggle against the Communists has rarely received attention from either the Government or 
researchers. This was mainly due to the command and control over guerrillas during the period 
of the war, which was conducted by the US Army, and official records of the guerrilla activities 
were exclusively produced and accessed by American military organisations until the 
declassification of Far East Command (FEC) documents. Moreover, studies of guerrilla warfare 
                                           
39 Ed Evanhoe, Dark Moon: Eight Army Special Operations in the Korean War (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval 
Institute Press, 1995); Micheal E. Haas, In the Devil’s Shadow: UN Special Operations during the Korean War 
(Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2000); Malcom, White Tigers; Donald A. Seibert, The Regulars: An 
Account of the Military Career of Colonel Donald A. Seibert, USA Ret. (Victoria, BC, Canada: Trafford Publishing, 
2010). 
40 Ben S. Malcom’s book is particularly useful in understanding the process of co-operation with the naval forces.  
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have primarily focused on Communist partisan warfare in South Korea and not so much relating 
to anti-Communist guerrilla activities.41 
 Therefore, publications on this topic are mainly by the guerrilla members themselves, and, 
based on their memories and personal records, boosts their own public recognition for anti-
Communistic activities. Since the publication of The Flame of the Anti-Communism (1957) by 
Cho Donghwan, several autobiographies were published to introduce guerrilla activities.42 
Starting from former Donkey-15 members, one of the sub-units of Leopard, the guerrilla veteran 
associations also published history books of their guerrilla warfare respectively. 43  These 
resources are important, as they were written from the perspectives and experiences of the 
guerrilla themselves, with detailed narratives on their activities. These are particularly useful in 
that they contain the guerrillas’ reactions and morale as war circumstances changed, all of which 
directly influenced their co-operation with the naval forces. However, these accounts were 
produced mainly from their memories, hence the credibility of these books is questionable, and 
validation using official records is required.44  
                                           
41 Cho, The Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War, p. 5. 
42 Cho Donghwan조동환, 항공의 불꽃 [The flame of the Anti-Communism] (Seoul: Bomungak, 1957); Kim 
Jongbyuk 김종벽, 한국의 레지스탄스와 그 후 [The Korean Resistance and afterward] (Seoul: Seoul 
Publishing Inc, 1967); Kang Gi Chun 강기천, 나의 인생여로 [My Life] (Seoul: Kyemongsa, 1995); Lee 
Jongwoon이종운, 살아남은 자의 일기 [A Survivor’s Diary] (Seoul: Woongjin Publishing, 1966).  
43 Kim Eungsu김응수, 북위 40도선: Donkey-15 [The 40th Parallel: donkey-15] (Military History Compilation 
association of the White Horse Guerrilla Unit, 1974); Suwol Unit Military History Compilation 
association수월부대전사편찬위원회, 은율유격전사 [The History of the Guerrilla Warfare of Eunyul] (Suwol 
Unit Military History Compilation association, 1986); The Veteran Association of Wolfpack-3 유격군울팩 3 부대 
전우회, 유격전사 [The Guerrilla Warfare] (The Veteran Association of Wolfpack-3, 1990); The Veteran 
Association of White Tiger Unit백호부대유격군 전우회, 백호부대 유격전사, [The History of the Guerrilla 
Warfare of White Tiger Unit] (The Veteran Association of White Tiger Unit, 1992); Lee Yongjae (ed.) 이영재 
편저, 학도유격부대 전사 [The Military History of the Student Guerrilla Unit] (Seoul: Myungsung Publish, 
1992); The Veteran Association of Horim Unit호림유격전우회, 호림부대전사 [The History of the Guerrilla 
Warfare of Horim Unit] (The Veteran Association of Horim Unit, 1999); The Veteran Association of the Haeju 
Guerrilla Unit 해주유격부대전우회, 해주유격부대전사 [The History of the Guerrilla Warfare of Haeju Unit] 
(The Veteran Association of the Haeju Guerrilla Unit, 1992). 
44 Cho Sung Hun 조성훈, ‘증언자료의 비판적 활용: 6.25전쟁 시기 유격대의 경우’ [‘Critical Application 
of Witness Commentaries: The Case of Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War’], The Korean Journal of Archival 
Studies Vol. 12 (2005), pp.154–5. 
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 The full-scale study of this topic was published in 1994 and 2003 by the ROK Army Military 
History Detachment and the Military History Compilation Institute of ROK Ministry of 
National Defence (ROK MHCI), respectively.45 The latter is particularly useful in that it is a 
developed version of the previous study, which included additional resources. As the most 
comprehensive and detailed research regarding the anti-Communist guerrilla activity, the ROK 
MHCI’s study is one of the best publications for understanding the guerrillas themselves. It 
includes detail of each guerrilla unit’s respective origins, the process of reorganisation into the 
American organisation, major activities and also the process of their disbanding.    
 However, ROK MHCI’s study also has a critical limitation in describing the anti-Communist 
guerrilla operation in the Korean War. In fact, this limitation not only applies to this book, but 
also to all the above-mentioned literature regarding the guerrilla activity. That is, it contains 
little information on the guerrilla co-operation with the UN naval forces. This is due to most of 
preceding literature being produced based on AFFE sources thus excluding naval forces records. 
This fundamental limitation is clearly mentioned in the ORO study as follows: 
 
This analysis does not take into account the value of intelligence functions performed by the 
partisans [guerrillas] incidental to their overt operations, or whatever value they may have 
had as a defensive force for islands on which the UN command maintained radar and other 
installations. Some of these functions, especially the furnishing of target information for air 
strikes or naval gunfire, may have indirectly produced a considerable number of casualties 
and a considerable amount of damage and destruction of enemy facilities, though it is not 
possible from the data at hand to establish this. The performance of these two functions-
behind-the-lines intelligence and defense of island installations did not require the 
organization and support of a specifically partisan effort, of course, but there may have been 
real value in the partisan contribution to them.46  
 
                                           
45 ROK Army Headquarters 육군본부, 한국전쟁과 유격전 [The Korean War and the Guerrilla Warfare] 
(Kyeryong: ROK Army Headquarters, 1994); Cho, The Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War.  
46 Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 55.  
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Considering the fact that the ORO study was conducted based on the most comprehensive 
primary resources produced by AFFE, the authors’ confession of their fundamental limitation 
is very meaningful. This limitation once again substantiates the need for a study primarily based 
on the operational records of naval ships on the west coast. This also intensifies the need for a 
study of naval-guerrilla co-operation in that this reveals the unknown but one of the most 
valuable parts of the guerrilla activities during the Korean War.      
  
In order to shape a specific picture of the British Commonwealth and Allied Naval forces 
operation with the anti-Communist guerrillas, more archival sources should be examined. In 
particular, the naval forces’ operational records, which can be traced mainly via The National 
Archives (TNA), Kew are particularly important. As most of the British Commonwealth and 
Allied Naval forces on the west coast operated under the unified command and control of a 
British flag officer, most of their operational records were to be reported to this RN Admiral. 
Hence, most of these records are kept as TNA documents.  
 This study particularly focuses on the operational records produced by RN flag officers 
(Monthly and Interim Evaluation Reports), their Intelligence Staff Officer (Monthly 
Intelligence Reports), each sub-element Commander (Report of Proceedings and Turn-over 
Notes) and each patrol ship (Report of Proceedings and Summary of Daily Action).  
 Due to the disparity of naval aircraft’s main operational areas from that of the naval craft, its 
way of co-operation with the guerrillas had to be conducted quite differently. Thus, for the 
purpose of comparison with the naval patrol craft’s descriptions regarding the guerrilla 
activities, additional archival resources of carrier operation have to be examined. For this, in 
addition to War Diaries written by Carrier Borne Air Liaison Section (TNA documents), the 
archival resources of the Fleet Air Arm Museum in Yeovilton (Squadron Diaries) and the US 
19 
 
Internet Archive documents (USMC Carrier Action Reports) are consulted for the 
complementary purpose of the study of naval-guerrilla relationships.  
 For the study of the guerrilla activity themselves, the above-mentioned guerrilla-related 
literature is examined. In particular, this study concentrates mostly on the records in the 
literature of US and ROK military institutes and the retired US officers, which provide more 




This research rests on the belief that a more realistic picture of the latter part of UN naval 
operations conducted on the west coast cannot be properly drawn until more attention is paid 
to the naval-guerrilla co-operation which has been largely ignored. By examining the two 
groups’ changing relationship from the start of their co-operation to the end of war, this thesis 
attempts to revise the current historiography which has undervalued the latter part of the naval 
operation and invigorate academic attention on this untold western located naval-guerrilla co-
operation.     
 For this purpose, this thesis is organised as follows. The second chapter examines the 
emergence of the anti-Communist movement and its development in North Korea since the start 
of Soviet Military Government’s trusteeship in 1945. It describes the influence of several 
pivotal events, including the establishment of the Communist regime and its subsequent policies 
which invoked the emergence of the anti-Communist movement within the northern part of 
Korea. It then looks at the start of the Korean War and the changing war situations that heavily 
influenced early development and movements of guerrilla activity. Focusing on the anti-
Communist movement particularly in the western area of North Korea, this study also examines 
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the process of their final exile to the islands on the west coast. Such exile represents the anti-
Communist guerrilla’s conditions before any direct co-operation was secured with the UN 
Naval forces.      
 Chapter 3 outlines the first year of naval operations conducted on the west coast. It focuses on 
several pivotal incidents which totally changed the war situation and discusses the changing 
naval forces’ operations and challenges that occurred before the start of its co-operation with 
the anti-Communist guerrillas. For this purpose, this chapter tracks the process of the British 
Naval forces involvement in the Korean War and their early operation in Korean waters. 
Following this, newly emerging challenges in the course of conducting the naval blockade 
operation on the west coast, particularly focusing on intelligence-related problems, are also 
examined. The final section of this chapter discusses the influence of the Chinese intervention, 
which compelled additional duties and challenges to the UN naval forces on the west coast. By 
focusing on these challenges, this chapter will show the backgrounds of the naval forces’ 
subsequent decision to start co-operation with the anti-Communist irregulars.   
 Chapter 4 examines the start and development of co-operation between the UN Naval forces 
on the west and the anti-Communist guerrillas from mid-December 1950 to early July 1951. 
This chapter firstly focuses on the naval forces’ early relationship with the guerrillas when they 
were uncontrolled by any friendly authority. It then explores the guerrilla reorganisation process, 
mainly focusing on the establishment of the American guerrilla organisation, the Leopard. 
Subsequently, this chapter discusses the Naval Commanders’ changing positions regarding the 
guerrillas and the ensuing development of co-operation.   
 Chapter 5 examines the subsequent collapse of co-operation between the naval forces and the 
guerrilla organisation since the start of truce talks. The news of truce talks seriously undermined 
guerrilla morale and thus created a wavering allegiance. Therefore, from late July, several 
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problems emerged within the guerrilla organisation. This chapter explores these challenges 
which caused the Naval Commanders to increasingly doubt the reliability of guerrilla activities. 
 Chapter 6, which covers the longest but most critical period of this study, discusses the changed 
roles of the naval forces and the guerrilla organisations since the start of the island warfare. Due 
to the Communists’ new offensive operation, recapturing the west coast islands from early 
November 1951, the Naval Commanders were required to be the island defender. Faced with 
the imminent threat from the Communist forces, the Naval Commanders had to re-establish a 
close relationship with the unreliable guerrillas. Their relationship, then, became more complex 
in the course of conducting this defensive operation. This chapter examines the two groups’ 
changing relationship over the course of 1952. The nature of the required roles in the face of 
new challenges is detailed, along with the respective co-operation between the parties, albeit of 
diminishing credibility.  
 Chapter 7 examines the changed relationship of the UN Naval forces and the guerrilla 
organisations from December 1952 to the end of the Korean War. Although the Communist 
forces’ threat against the UN-held islands was largely relieved from late 1952, operational 
uncertainty still prevailed in the west coast area. This state largely originated from the 
increasing possibility of a signed truce. In particular, by late April 1953, when the signing of 
the truce was imminent, the west coast operation was ordered to be oriented for post-war 
preparations. In this transitional period, the relationship between the naval forces and the 
guerrillas was required to be changed once again; that is to a more distant relationship. This 
chapter explores the chronological events which influenced the lack of co-operation and 
inactiveness of these two groups from the beginning of the winter season.  
 Chapter 8 concludes by analysing the two groups’ relationship from the start of their co-
operation to the end of the war. It highlights the overall unreliability of the guerrilla 
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organisations as a co-operation partner and emphasises the UN Naval forces’ operational 
conditions, instrumental in forming closer relationships with this unreliable partner. Through 
this compelled co-operation with the unreliable partners, this chapter reveals the distinctive 





 The Emergence of the Anti-Communist Guerrillas on the West Coast 
 
 
The anti-Communist movement in North Korea during the Korean War largely originated from 
the result of the wartime Allied conferences regarding the liberation of Japanese occupied 
territories, which included Korea. In particular, the terms of the Cairo Declaration and its 
subsequent conferences directly influenced political change in Korea from mid-1945. 1  It 
provided the basis for the resolution of the Korean problem and subsequent independence, 
following several years of Allied Power trusteeship. 
 As a result of the wartime Allied agreements, Northern Korea (that is the territory above the 
38th Parallel) was placed under the Soviet Military Government’s trusteeship. To a number of 
Koreans who resided in the northern area, the establishment of the Communist regime was an 
unwelcome change. Particularly, the Communist Economic Reform and their conscription 
policy, which was carried out from late 1945, caused severe resistance from vested interests and 
the young generation. As an attempt to resist ensuing political changes, an anti-Communist 
movement was instigated by those antagonistic to Communist policies. Consequently, in the 
advent of the Korean War, this resistance movement became one concerned in an armed struggle, 
fighting for the liberation of their homeland.    
                                           
1 The Cairo Conference commenced on 22 November 1943 and closed on 26 November. It was attended by 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the United States, Prime Minister Rt Hon Sir Winston Leonard Spencer 
Churchill of Great Britain and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China. Korea Institute of Military History, The 
Korean War, Vol. I (Seoul: Korea Institute of Military History, 1997), p. 7; Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The British 
Part in the Korean War, Vol. I (London: HMSO, 1990), p. 2. Regarding the terms of its declaration and other 
conferences, see sub-chapter 2.1.  
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 This chapter outlines the emergence of the anti-Communist movement and its development in 
North Korea from the liberation from Japanese control in 1945. It describes the influence of 
several external pivotal incidences, including the establishment of the Communist regime and 
the changing war situations that prevailed. Focusing on these structural changes which acted as 
inducements to the anti-Communist movement, it covers the changing processes of the anti-
Communist movements particularly in the western area of North Korea.  
 For this purpose, this chapter refers to the Allied Powers’ war-time conferences which were 
held from the latter part of the Second World War. Regarding the liberation of Korea, a brief 
narrative is included on the process of the Allied Powers’ resolutions. It then describes the 
establishment of the Communist Regime that brought radical political and economic changes 
and, subsequently, the beginning of the anti-Communist movements. The process of 
establishing a Communist Government, and the details of policies such as the Land Reform Act 
and the Draft Act, are also briefly discussed.2 This context is important to the thesis as it 
establishes the reason why the resistance groups came into being and what motivated them to 
continue their actions during the war. 
Finally, this chapter examines features concerning the changing activities of the anti-
Communists’ during the early stages of the Korea War. Faced with radical changes in the war 
situation, within six months of its inception, their situation in North Korea correspondingly and 
dramatically changed. This chapter covers the anti-Communists responses, as a consequence of 
the progression of war and also their final exile on sanctuary in the islands on the west coast.  
Such exile represents the anti-Communist guerrilla’s conditions before any direct co-operation 
                                           
2 The Land Reform was one of the socialist economic reform programmes which was to be put into effect on 
March 1946. The Draft Act was effected on early 1947 to conscribe the People’s Army from all able-bodied men 
between seventeen and twenty-five. For further information, see Chapter 2.2. 
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was secured with the UN forces. This also shows the backgrounds of these North Korean 
irregulars’ need of support from the UN forces, including the western naval forces.       
 
2.1 From Liberation to Division 
 
The Allied Powers first discussed the issue of Korean independence in March 1943. In the talks 
with President Roosevelt in Washington on 28 March, Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary of 
Britain raised the matter as part of their discussion in dealing with Japanese occupied territories. 
In the course of preparing for the meeting in Washington, Eden’s staff noted that Japan had 
annexed Korea in mid-1910. As to the future of the overseas territories of Japan, he proposed a 
solution of international trusteeship for this area.3 This idea was actually discussed in the 
meeting. According to a telegram from Eden regarding the substance of his discussion with 
Roosevelt, they broadly discussed the topic of Korea’s independence as follows: ‘(3) 
intermediate cases like Korea and Pacific Islands […] Korea and French Indo-China would pass 
under international trusteeships; for the former the trustees might be the United States, the 
Soviet Union and China […]’4 However, this was no more than a suggestion as this discussion 
was held without the other two possible trustees.  
 As an extension of the discussion in Washington, the Allied Powers involved in the Cairo 
Conference (codenamed SEXTANT) in November began to discuss the issue of the Korean 
problem in depth.5 In this conference, the leaders of the United States, Great Britain and China, 
declared that 
  
                                           
3 Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War, Vol. I, p. 2. 
4 FO 371/35366, War aims and Post-war problems, (U1430/G) Washington 1470 to FO of 28 March 1943.  
5 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. I, p. 7. 
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Japan shall be stripped of […] all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. 
The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are 
determined that in due course, Korea shall become free and independent.6  
 
From an early stage of the Allied Powers’ plan, the immediate independence of Korea upon 
Japan’s surrender was not considered. This is exemplified by Mr Eden’s reference to ‘pass 
under international trusteeships’ and the Cairo Declaration expression ‘in due course’. These 
implied that Korea’s independence would be secured after a certain number of years. This was 
reconfirmed in the subsequent summit conference in Teheran (EUREKA), on 28 November 
1943. Also, Joseph V. Stalin, the Soviet leader, agreed to the declared basic principles of Cairo 
regarding the Korean problem. Thus, with the four great powers’ agreement, after Japan’s defeat, 
the terms of discussion in March 1943 and at SEXTANT became the basis for the resolution of 
the Korean problem. 7  However, by this time, there was no detailed plan for Korea’s 
independence.  
 It was at the Yalta Conference (ARGONAUT), in early February 1945, that a tentative plan 
was announced that concerned a trusteeship administered by the four powers; USA, the USSR, 
China and Britain. Although there was disagreement for the duration of the trusteeship, the fact 
that no foreign troops would be stationed on Korean soil after a certain period was broadly 
agreed.8 In this secret conference, the concessions to the Soviet Union as conditions for the 
Soviet forces’ entrance into the war against Japan were also agreed. 9  This meant the 
                                           
6 G. Bernard Noble and E. R. Perkins (ed.), Foreign Relation of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, 
China (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 257.  
7 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. I, p. 8. 
8 During the Conference, Roosevelt and Stalin broadly agreed that no foreign troops were to be stationed in Korea. 
However, as for the duration of the trusteeship, Roosevelt, drawing from the American experience in the 
Philippines, surmised that such an arrangement might last for twenty or thirty years, but Stalin suggested that the 
shorter the duration of the trusteeship, the better. Ibid., p. 9.  
9 James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 
1972), p. 7.   
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Communist forces were given direct deployment in Korea after the liberation, to disarm the 
Japanese. 
 Five months after ARGONAUT, the last Allied Wartime Conference took place in Potsdam. 
By this time, Germany had already surrendered, and only Japan was putting up final resistance. 
In order to hasten the ending of the war, the Allies at Potsdam discussed the timing of the Soviet 
entrance into the war and the necessary US-Soviet co-ordination.10 While discussing the Soviet 
entry into the war against Japan, the US and Soviet military representatives developed, to a 
considerable extent, a plan concerning the division of Korea. It was at this time that the military 
planners considered an operational boundary approximating the 38th parallel.11 With regard to 
Korea, Washington wanted the dividing line to be as far north as possible, but also needed to 
consider the US troops’ ability to advance and replace Japanese troops. Balancing these two 
factors, Washington settled on a plan to divide Korea into two occupation zones along the 38th 
parallel, which would secure for the United States the two logistically important cities of Inchon 
and Seoul.12   
 
To inflict the final damage on Japan, the US dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
on 6 and 9 August 1945 respectively. At the same time, the Soviet Union declared war against 
Japan. Therefore, to occupy northern Korea, under the command of Colonel General Ivan M. 
Chistiakov, various Soviet movements were deployed. This involved five divisions and one 
brigade of 120,000 troops of the Soviet 1st Far East Command, auxiliary forces of 30,000 and 
                                           
10 War History Compilation Committee, MND 국방부 군사편찬위원회, 국방사 [History of National Defence, 
Vol. I] (Seoul: War History Compilation Committee, MND, 1984), pp. 514–16. 
11 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 8. 
12 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. I, p. 11. 
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naval units from the Pacific Fleet.13 On 8 August 1945, the Soviet ground forces advanced 
across the Tumen River, which bordered the Soviet Union, China and Korea.14  
 Ultimately, as a result of the serious damage inflicted on Japan, the nation announced her 
unconditional surrender on 15 August 1945. Therefore, Japan signed the ‘General Order 1’, 
prepared by Washington and agreed by the Soviets, British and Chinese. It included the 
following provisions in regard to the surrender of the Japanese troops in Korea: 
 
(b) The senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within […] 
Korea North of 38 degrees North latitude […] shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of 
Soviet Forces in the Far East […] (e) The Imperial General Headquarter, its senior 
Commanders, and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the main island of Japan […] 
Korea South of 38 degrees North latitude… shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief, US 
Army Forces, Pacific.15 
 
Following Japanese surrender, and facing virtually no resistance from the Japanese army, the 
Soviets advanced rapidly towards the south. On 24 August, they reached Pyongyang, and 
occupied Kaesong the next day. By late August, the Soviet forces had continued to advance and 
occupy all areas north of the 38th parallel.16    
 Almost twenty days after the Soviet forces’ advance into the Korean Peninsula, the US 
Government designated the US 24th Corps in Okinawa to carry out the terms of the Japanese 
surrender in Korea. From 4 September 1945, under the command of Lieutenant General John 
R. Hodge, a total strength of 77,600 forces landed on and occupied the southern area of Korea.17  
                                           
13 The Soviet Far East Force consisted of the 1st and 2nd Far East army, Trans-Baikal army and the Pacific Fleet. 
As the right flank of the 1st Far East Army, the 25th Army carried out a supporting attack to penetrate the Japanese 
defensive position. US War Department Intelligence Division, Intelligence Review, June 20 1946. 
14 Institute of North Korea Studies 북한연구소, 북한민주통일운동사: 황해도편 [The History of Democratic 
Unification Movements in North Korea: Hwanghae Province] (Seoul: Institute of North Korea Studies, 1990), p. 
187. 
15 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. I, pp. 11–12. 
16 Institute of North Korea Studies, The History of Democratic Unification Movements in North Korea, p. 187. 
17 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. I, pp. 16–17. 
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 After the completion of the Japanese forces’ disarmament, Washington sought, within an 
established framework, to hold a meeting with other Allied Powers. On 27 December 1945, at 
the suggestion of the US Secretary of State, a meeting was held in Moscow of three Allied 
Power Foreign Ministers; namely, those of the US, Britain and the Soviet Union.18 Concerning 
the future of Korea, the three foreign ministers agreed to pursue the terms of the Cairo 
Declaration and set up a US-USSR joint commission to facilitate the creation of a provisional 
Korean Government after a short period of trusteeship. Following the agreement that trusteeship 
would not exceed five years, representatives from the US and Soviet commands in Korea started 
meeting to establish the Joint Commission and to select the main agenda.19 However, owing to 
the divergence of opinion regarding the establishment of a united provisional government and 
the rapidly deteriorating US-USSR relationship, on 21 October 1947, the Joint Commission 
was closed without tangible result.20 Thus, during this period, respective efforts to set up the 
civil governments were going ahead in the North and South. Therefore, the democratic 
Government in the South and the Communist Government in the North were established based 
on their own ideological beliefs.  
 
 
                                           
18 The representative of China subscribed later. 
19 Regarding the terms of trusteeship, see ‘The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of 
State’ (December 27, 1945), Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1945, The British Commonwealth, 
The Far East, Vol. 6 (Washington, D. C.; USGPO, 1969), 1150–1. 
20 Regarding the conflict that occurred in the course of the establishment of the separate government in the South 
and the North under the trusteeship, see Kim Chang Hee 김창희, ‘한반도 분단 형성과정과 남북한 정부수립’ 
[‘The Division Process of the Korean Peninsula and the Establishment of the North and South Korean 
Government’] Unification Strategy Vol. 14, No. 1 (2014), pp. 9–45.; Yoon Duk Yong 윤덕영, ‘미군정 초기 
정치 대립과 갈등 구조의 중층성’ [‘The Multiple-Structure in Political Confrontation and Conflict Structure 
in the early stages of the United States Army Military Government in Korea’] Korean History Studies No. 165 
(2014), pp. 255–300.; Sin Bok Ryong 신복룡, ‘해방 정국에서의 신탁통치 파동’ [‘A study of Disputes on 




2.2 The Establishment of a Communist Government and the Beginning of Anti-
Communist Movements in North Korea  
 
After the occupation of major cities in North Korea, the first step taken by the Soviet forces 
was to set up the Soviet Military Command in Pyongyang and establish a military government 
regime for all of northern Korea. The General Office for Civil Administration, under the 
command of Major General Andrei A. Romanenko, was charged with the responsibility to 
administer the military government. Subsequently, the Soviets began to organise People’s 
Committees, an administrative body in Communist countries. Upon the Japanese surrender, 
each People’s Committee was handed administrative powers relating to government bodies, 
including the police and economic organisations. The Military Government allowed a Korean 
to assume the chairmanship of the People’s Committees. However, they appointed a Soviet 
officer as advisor and placed Soviet-Koreans who showed loyalty to the Soviet Union in key 
posts.21 
 Subsequently, to consolidate the Communists’ control over northern Korea, the Military 
Government sponsored Kim Il Sung, who was then a captain in the Soviet Army, to be the new 
leader of northern Korea. On 18 November, the Military Government established the 
Administrative Body, responsible for the Five Provinces of northern Korea. It was responsible 
for supervising the operation of the People’s Committees. Almost one month later, the Military 
Government had Kim Il Sung assume the post of Secretary of the North Korean Communist 
Party. Therefore, four months after the establishment of the Soviet Military Government, Kim 
                                           
21 Ki Kwang Seo 기광서, ‘해방 후 북한 중앙정권기관의 형성과 변화 (1945–1948)’ [‘The Formation and 
Transformation of North Korean Power Organs After Liberation of Korea’] Peace Studies Vol. 19, No. 2 (October 
2011), pp. 336–9. 
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Il Sung, as a high-ranking official of the Party, began to develop the Communist system in 
northern Korea.22  
 The de facto establishment of a Communist government in northern Korea started from early 
1946. On 8 February, when the North Korean Interim People’s Committee was created, Kim Il 
Sung was designated as its chairman. Building on the foundation of the Provincial People’s 
Committees, this central government was dominated by pro-Soviet Communists. 23 
Subsequently, in early November, the first municipal People’s Committee election was held at 
province, city and county levels. According to the announcement of the Communist party, the 
successful settlement of communism in North Korea was testimony to a very successful 
People’s Committee launch. During this time, the Korean Democratic National Front 
nominated a single candidate in each district; and each received around 97% support from the 
North Korean populace.24   
 Despite the Communists’ official announcement, however, from the early stage of the 
establishment of the Communist regime, there had been widespread anti-Communist 
movements in northern Korea. The very fact that 3% of North Koreans opposed a Communist 
candidate implied the existence of reactionary movements. The municipal election in November 
was conducted by ‘black-or-white’ balloting. In this balloting method, those who are ‘for’ the 
candidate cast their ballot in a white box, and those ‘against’ cast their ballot in a black box. 
Considering the fact that this election was carried out under the supervision of election monitors, 
confidentiality was not maintained.25 Despite the totally non-democratic voting environment, 
                                           
22 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. I, pp. 14–16. 
23 Ibid., p. 30. 
24 Institute of North Korea Studies, The History of Democratic Unification Movements in North Korea, p. 198.; 
For more detailed information of the first Municipal People’s Committee Election, see Cho Sung Hun 조성훈, 
‘1946 년 11 월 북한의 인민위원회 선거연구’ [‘The North Korea’s election for People’s Committee in 
November 1946’] The Journal of Historical Studies on Korean National Movement, Vol. 22 (1999), pp. 439–75. 
25 Institute of North Korea Studies, The History of Democratic Unification Movements in North Korea, p. 199. 
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3% of North Korean voters clearly showed dissent towards the Communist regime’s 
establishment. In fact, even during the early stage of the Communist regime, several cases exist 
that show evidence of voting obstruction movements that clearly signified anti-Communist 
activities. Christians, who largely disagreed with the establishment of a Communist government, 
collectively declared their intent to boycott the election. 26 Organised efforts to defeat the 
preparation of the election, by anti-Communist youth groups, were also reported.27 Even ‘black 
box movements’ were organised to try to sway opinion to this voting option.28 
 This early stage of anti-Communist activity was largely a consequence of economic policies 
and the Communists’ form of compulsory mobilisation and military recruitment, which were 
carried out during 1945–1947. Right after the establishment of the North Korean Interim 
People’s Committee, on February 1946, the Communist regime embarked on a socialist 
economic reform programme. First to be put into effect was the Land Reform Act of March 
1946. During this reform, wealthy landowners were deprived of 85% of their land, resulting in 
the confiscation of 2.45 million acres; all without any compensation to the owners. Once land 
had been seized, the People’s Committee freely distributed it to peasants. Although this reform 
caused a positive reaction from the majority of peasants, it also yielded severe resistance from 
landlords.29 The Land Reform of March 1946 was followed in August by the nationalisation of 
major industries, which affected approximately a thousand industrial facilities. This also caused 
                                           
26 Park Won-Hong 박원홍, ‘북조선 인민위원회 선거(1946. 11. 3)와 북한 개신교의 대응’, [‘North Korea 
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Confrontation’] (MA thesis of Korea University, August 2009), pp. 39–44. 
27 Joong-ang Daily Special Report Team중앙일보 특별취재반, 조선민주주의인민공화국, 하 [Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, Vol. II] (Seoul: Joong-ang Daily, 1993), p. 258. 
28 Cho, The Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War, p. 39. 
29  Regarding the Land Reform, see Jang Sanghwan 장상환, ‘토지개혁과 농업협동화 과정의 특질’, in 
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capitalists’ resistance. 30  It followed that, by virtue of the Communist Government’s 
compulsory economic reform, the initial anti-Communist movement was mainly made up of 
deprived landowners and capitalists. 
 The compulsory regimentation, which began from the end of 1945 and affected the whole 
society, also increased the number of anti-Communists in northern Korea. As a part of 
Communist propaganda efforts, intellectuals and artists were mobilised, students and youth 
groups were integrated, and various mass rallies were held, to ensure that no one could exist as 
an individual outside a social organisation. Thus, every North Korean was compelled to join 
the Communist Party or one of its sub-organisations, and to carry a resident registration card.31 
Under such strict ideological circumstances, large numbers of students and intellectuals longed 
for ideological liberty and became anti-Communist activists.    
 In addition, the North Korean draft, initiated from early 1947 added young-generation 
dissenters to the growing numbers of anti-Communists protagonists. Hence, as the Communists 
increased conscriptions to the People’s Army to include all able-bodied men between seventeen 
and twenty-five, the resistance from such a demographic increased accordingly. 32  Large 
numbers of draft dodgers decided either to hide themselves or to join the anti-Communist 
movement. Lim Jong Duk, who conducted anti-Communist activities during this time, was 
interviewed in early November 1952 by an American officer. He explained the general 
responses of youths, who were against the compulsory draft, as follows: 
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Interim People’s Committee-the North Korea People’s Committee’] The Study of Korean Historical View, Vol. 54] 
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The Communists made an act called the “Draft Act” […] The people who didn’t like the 
Communist Army took action and escaped and went into the mountains. They also hide 
themselves in ceilings and houses and other places of hiding that they could find. They hid 
for a while and then re-grouped in the mountains.33  
 
However, under the Communists’ severe surveillance and control, any overt anti-Communist 
movement was largely restricted. Through the initiative of municipal Communist organisations, 
anybody classified as being from South Korea or anyone who showed reluctance to 
involvement, was put under surveillance and interrogated. According to the account of an anti-
Communist guerrilla leader, Lee Jung Hok, on visiting his hometown Ongjin in Hwanghae 
Province from Seoul, he was arrested by North Korean police ‘for the necessary interrogation 
which was required for anybody who came from South Korea’.34 Another guerrilla leader, Kim 
Yong Bok, protested that he was not able to be actively involved in Communist activities 
through an obligation to support his family as a householder. Therefore, the Communists 
constantly paid close attention to him.35  
 There were limited options left for the anti-Communists. The majority left their hometowns 
and crossed the 38th Parallel into South Korea. In fact, from 1946 to May 1949, up to 480,000 
North Koreans took refuge in South Korea.36 According to a US Military Government survey, 
between 25 July and 22 November 1948, almost 80% of all North Korean refugees in South 
Korea stated ‘dissatisfaction with the Communist economic policy’ or ‘aversion to Communism’ 
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p. 73. 
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as the main reasons of their border crossing.37 This figure showed the extent to which North 
Koreans rejected the Communist regime and its policies and preferred to live in exile.  
 The remaining anti-Communists situated in North Korea organised small underground groups 
based in their villages. They instigated intermittent quasi-guerrilla activities, by distributing 
anti-Communism leaflets, raiding local Communist party officials, and conducting 
demonstrations.38 According to the record of a former anti-Communist guerrilla, these types 
of activities were very common amongst youth groups. To acquire required materials, close 
contact with the anti-Communist organisation in South Korea was also maintained. Their 
underground activities were well accounted, as follows: 
 
After liberation on 15 August 1945 in North Korea I joined the Democratic Party in North 
Korea and went underground with the party under the Communist regime. We resisted the 
Communist government in every way possible. We also had contact with the North Korean 
Youth Group in South Korea, which consisted of North Koreans who went to South Korea 
and were under South Korean protection. We resisted the Communists’ political and military 
policies […] Anti-Communists were under consistent pressure. These anti-Communists had 
close contact underground with the people in South Korea. Sometimes the movements of the 
anti-Communists were discovered and […] many of our friendly people were killed by the 
Communists. Most of anti-Communist movements took place underground […] We killed 
North Korean policeman, ambushing and surprising them. We organized students in school 
in North Korea who were against Communism. These students helped us drop propaganda 
leaflets in the classrooms and in the field. We resisted from every direction, attacking, 
sabotaging, and raiding.39  
 
The movements against the Communists in North Korea were very active amongst the populace 
in the west side of North Korea, including three Provinces — Hwanghae, North and South 
Pyong-an. It was primarily an agricultural area which had comparatively little industry. 
                                           
37 According to the ‘G-2 Period Report’ on 3 December 1948, amongst the 371 North Korean refugees who 
responded to the survey, 48.3% cited their main reason for defection as ‘economic difficulties after the economic 
reform’ and 29.4% cited ‘aversion of Communism’: Ibid., pp. 42–4. 
38 Cho, The Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War, pp. 41–3. 
39 U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, p. 110. 
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However, it was a leading producer of Koreans’ staple food: rice.40 This meant that there were 
large numbers of landowners who had been deprived of their property as a result of the 
compulsory Land Reform.  
 The relatively large number of Christians in these areas was also an influencing factor in the 
support for anti-Communist movements. As could be seen in the Soviet case, due to the 
ideological incompatibility with the official belief of Marxist-Leninism which actively 
encouraged atheism, churches cannot be absorbed into the Soviet system. 41 The fact that 
religious organisations were not able to fit easily under complete control of the Soviet 
totalitarian regime also intensified the Communists’ antipathy against the believers. 42 
Therefore, under the policy of ‘comprehensive programme of anti-religious propaganda’, in the 
Soviet Union, millions of believers suffered, and outward appearance of religious life had been 
largely destroyed.43 
 At that time, the number of Christians in this area was about two thirds of the total number of 
Korea. As could be easily expected, this new Communist regime repeated the persecution of its 
sponsors.44 Therefore, this large contingency of Christian organisations within this area also 
contributed to the number of reactionary movements against Communism.    
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 The anti-Communist activities were particularly active in Hwanghae area, a Province on the 
south-west side of North Korea. At that time, it was considered not only the bread basket but 
also the ‘Cradle of Christianism’ of North Korea. Its geographical proximity to South Korea 
was also a reason for relatively enthusiastic resistance amongst the Provinces in the west side 
of North Korea. The people of Hwanghae Province were close to Seoul; the political, historical 
and cultural centre of Korea. Therefore, there were large numbers of its populace who had 
worked or attended school in Seoul. They were more informed than most about each side’s 
political stance. It made the Communists’ regimentation less influential.45  
 In fact, on January 1950, in Haeju, one of the largest cities in the Hwanghae Province, around 
1,300 anti-Communists were reportedly arrested.46 This record showed the high activity of 
anti-Communists in this area. Due to this area’s relatively enthusiastic anti-Communistic 
character and geographical condition, this area became the bedrock of anti-Communist guerrilla 
activities following the establishment of the Communist regime in the North.  
 
However, the initial anti-Communist activities were merely protests or demonstrations that only 
occasionally turned violent. They were also conducted by non-systemically organised North 
Korean groups. Therefore, it is impossible to regard these activities as the type of guerrilla 
activities which essentially entailed organised armed struggles.47 As the Soviet ambassador to 
North Korea mentioned in his report regarding the North Korea situation in mid-1949 that ‘the 
hostile activities of anti-Communist are not threatening the current political system’, to the 
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Communists, the anti-Communists activities were no more than light harassment.48 Although 
their movements were not that influential, however, these activities served as a stepping stone 
for the anti-Communist guerrilla activities during the Korean War.    
 
2.3 Anti-Communist Movements during the Early Stage of the Korean War 
 
On 25 June 1950, troops of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) crossed the border of the 
38th Parallel, with the intension of occupying South Korea. In the early stages of war, the 
Communist offensive was very successful. In fact, the Communist forces occupied Seoul, the 
capital of South Korea, just three days after the onset of war. Following this, the Communist 
offensive broke the thin Allied ground forces’ defensive line, which led to a series of retreats. 
On 1 August, UN forces were forced to be withdrawn behind the Naktong River. This is the 
natural south-east side barrier to Pusan, known as the ‘Pusan Perimeter’ or ‘Pusan Pocket’. 
 
Map 2.1 NKPA’s Advance from June to August 1950 
                                           
48  Kim Kwang Lin (trans.), Yevgeny Bazanov and Natalia Bazhanova, 김광린 (역), 예프게니 비자노프, 
나딸리아 바자노바, 소련의 자료로 본 한국전쟁의 전말 [(The) Most Mysterious War of 20th Century: 




(Source. Map taken from Encyclopedia Britannica at < https://www. britannica.com/ event/Korean-
War/images-videos>) 
 
As allied ground forces held on precariously to defend the Pusan Pocket, the anti-Communists 
were deeply affected. They witnessed returning refugees, who had previously crossed the 38th 
Parallel before the start of war. They heard of the current war situation from those returnees, 
and their morale severely deteriorated.49 Kim Chang Song, one of the anti-Communist leaders 
accounted their situation as follows: 
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The anti-Communists who went into North Korea were disappointed to see the United 
Nations forces as well as ROK Forces retreating as far as the Naktong River. We though the 
situation was hopeless […] There was a great difficulty with our decision which was to fight 
against Communism. The difficulty was Kim Il-Sung’s policy which was to draft every 
young man and have him join the North Korean Army or have him go to the mines and work 
as a laborer. As a result of that policy there was no chance for us to be organized as a certain 
group.50  
 
Under such an unfavourable war situation, the anti-Communist movement became less active. 
In particular, the introduction of the Communist Government’s new Draft Act, mentioned above, 
after the war broke out, increased the draft age ceiling to 35, which drove organised movements 
to become more restricted.51  
 Notwithstanding desperate conditions however, anti-Communist movements that had begun 
during the pre-war period continued. Their activities included distributing anti-Communism 
leaflets and raiding local Communist party officials. In particular, one remarkable change 
occurred regarding anti-Communist activities; following the outbreak of the Korean War, anti-
Communists’ underground activities developed into an armed struggle. Small numbers of anti-
Communist militia moved into the mountains and started guerrilla-type activities using 
weapons. They acquired rifles by various means; by capturing small numbers of Communist 
soldiers, through smuggling, or by self-assembly.52  
 These armed anti-Communists tried bolder raids such as attacking small groups of Communist 
forces. For instance, in mid-September 1950, around 90 armed guerrillas from Kyungsung in 
Hambuk Province attacked a coast defence guard post in the Ondae-jin area and captured 
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weapons.53 In early October, small numbers of armed guerrillas in the Sinchon area assaulted 
trucks carrying weaponry to the front line. They captured around 100 Soviet-made rifles.54  
 However, large numbers of attacks were still disorganised and their equipment was generally 
substandard for effective guerrilla raids against the Communist regular army. Except for the 
above mentioned very successful anti-Communist groups, by that time, only a small number of 
anti-Communists were able to be equipped with rifles. For example, even the guerrillas in the 
Gam-ak Mountain in Hwanghae Province, one of the most active anti-Communists domains in 
this area, were able to arm only five members with rifles. Considering the fact that they 
consisted of about 100 guerrillas in total, only five percent were actually armed. The shortage 
problem regarding proper ammunition was even more severe. 55  Therefore, despite their 
activities, they were not able to inflict significant damage on the Communists.   
 
2.4 The UN Forces’ Advance towards the North and the Changed Anti-Communist 
Movement  
 
As a result of a successful landing at Inchon, the tide of battle was clearly turning towards a 
favourable phase for the UN Forces. On 15 September 1950, under naval gunfire and air support, 
assault troops of the US 5th and 1st Marines, together with the ROK 3rd Battalion of the 1st 
Marine Regiment, landed on the beach of Inchon.56  
Following this landing, the UN ground forces situated on the Naktong River front, started to 
launch a massive counterattack. By 19 September, the landing troops captured Kimpo air base, 
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near Seoul. The UN Forces on the Pusan Perimeter also advanced north, and on 27 September 
linked up with the friendly landing forces. On 28 September, three months after the Communist 
forces captured Seoul, UN forces recaptured the Korean capital.57    
 As soon as the UN Forces reached the 38th Parallel, their march northward had to be delayed. 
The question whether they should cross the former border between the South and North became 
a controversial policy issue within the UN countries. At the beginning of the war, the UN had 
initially set the goal of restoring the pre-war condition. By approaching the 38th Parallel, the 
UN accomplished its early goal, but more justification was needed to continue the advance. The 
fact that crossing the line could cause a possible intervention by Chinese forces was also 
problematic. As a result of this controversy on crossing the 38th Parallel, on 7 October 1950, 
the UN General Assembly passed the resolution which indirectly allowed the UN Forces to 
cross the line.58 Hence, regardless of the potential danger of Chinese involvement, the UN 
Forces continued across the line and marched northward.  
 
Map 2.2 Inchon Landing and the UN Forces’ Advance 
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(Source. Map taken from Encyclopedia Britannica at < https://www. britannica.com/ event/Korean-
War/images-videos> 
 
A large number of anti-Communists also realised this changed situation through radio 
connectivity to the UN side. As the United Nations forces marched into North Korean territory, 
anti-Communists emerged from their mountain hideouts and attacked police stations, retreating 
North Korean People’s Army recruits, and fleeing Communist Officials. In some areas, such as 
Sinchon in the Hwanghae Province, the anti-Communist underground overthrew the local 
communist government and took control of government functions even before the UN troops 
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arrived. They also volunteered to provide quasi-government organisations.59 Lee Byong Gun 
and Lim Jong Duk, who conducted anti-Communist activities around the Mountain Kuwol in 
Hwanghae Province, explained their experience as follows:  
 
We were organized into a band which was a body of the partisan forces. We were in hiding 
in the mountains of Kuwol-san [Mountain Kuwol] listening to the radio beamed to the United 
Nations and Communist sides and getting the situation. We knew therefore that UN Forces 
were coming into North Korea and we were waiting for them […] On or about 17 or 18 
October 1950, the UN Forces advanced into the vicinity and just before they arrived there, 
we left the mountains and went down to the village and tried to cut the retreating route of the 
enemy. We surprised them. We had some rifles and that is all. Otherwise we fought with 
stones, rocks, lumber, bars, and anything we could use. When the UN Forces occupied the 
district, we became security forces, and we served under them until 5 December 1950.60  
 
After the UN Forces entered the north, a tragic civil war flared up in each area. In retribution to 
those offering services as police officials and government workers, the anti-Communists cruelly 
punished these local Communist party members and officials in their villages. Punishments 
were even extended to Communist party sympathisers and their families. In particular, after 
discovering the Communist forces’ massacre of anti-Communists, political offenders and draft 
dodgers in Pyongyang, Haeju, Hamheung and other areas, right before their retreat further north, 
retaliatory punishments against any Communist sympathisers became more violent.61 As one 
of the anti-Communist group leaders in Ongjin wrote, ‘In addition to the maintenance of the 
local peace and order, the first work had to be conducted was to solve the grudges of local 
peoples who had to endure the Communists and their sympathisers’ atrocities’. For most anti-
                                           
59 Evanhoe, Dark Moon, pp. 64–5. 
60 U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, p. 111. 
61 The Communists killed around 3,000 anti-Communist in Pyongyang, 12,000 in Hamheung and 3,000 in Ongjin. 
Kim Haengbok, 김행복, ‘북한군의 양민학살에 관한 연구’, 조성훈 (편), 한국전쟁사의 새로운 연구 
[‘A Study on the North Korean People’s Army’s massacre of innocent people’, in Cho Sung Hun (ed.), A New 
Study on the Korean War] (Seoul: Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK, 2002), pp. 322–39; Lee 
(ed.), The Military History of the Student Guerrilla Unit, pp. 102–16.  
45 
 
Communists, the execution of Communist collaborators was supported, or at least, tacitly 
permitted.62 
 According to a report written by the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, who 
visited North Korea in March 1952 to investigate the UN forces’ violations of international law 
during the Korean War, around 55,000 North Koreans were killed only in the Sinchon and Anak 
area between late October and early December 1950. This report wrote that large numbers of 
them were Communists, sympathisers and their families.63 As this report was written largely 
based on the Communists’ arguments, the credibility of such numbers is doubtful. However, it 
was revealed in the former anti-Communist guerrillas’ memoirs and by South Korean mass 
media that the massacre against the North Koreans was actually committed by anti-Communist 
North Koreans during the two months of UN forces’ occupation period.64 
 Whilst the anti-Communists concentrated on the execution of Communist sympathisers and 
the maintenance of local order, the UN Forces continued their advance northwards. On 20 
October 1950, the ROK 1st Division and the US 1st Cavalry Division entered Pyongyang, the 
capital of North Korea. By the end of the month, lead elements of ROK 1st Division had 
captured Chosan, the border town on the Yalu River, and a section of US troops had advanced 
to Chonggo-dong, just South of Sinuiju.65 Within only fifty days of the Inchon Landing, the 
UN Forces seemed to be on their way to winning the war. Amongst the UNC, including 
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MacArthur, euphoria had spread in that ‘the war was over, and that the only job left was a 
certain amount of mopping up’. Even amongst the troops in Korea, there was much talk that 
‘we are going home soon before Christmas’.66   
 
2.5 Chinese Intervention and Evacuations from the Mainland 
 
The participation of China in the Korean War impacted hugely on the military situation. The 
massive assault by the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) started from 25 October 1950, and 
was truly a disaster to both UN forces and anti-Communist North Koreans. 
 In fact, there had been several threats from the Communist leaders regarding the possible entry 
of China if the UN forces crossed the line. Considering any controversial UN advancement 
across to the north, Chou En-Lai, the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister warned that, 
‘Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate 
seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists’. 67  However the UNC 
regarded the CCF leader’s declaration as ‘probably in a category of diplomatic blackmail.’68 
 From mid-October, there had been intelligence reports of the fact that large numbers of CCF 
were gathered along the border awaiting a possible cross into Korea.69 On 25 October, the 
intervention of the Chinese was officially confirmed by ROK 15th Regiment on the Yalu River 
area.70 Even after the confirmation of Chinese deployment, General MacArthur seemed to 
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believe that the Chinese would never intervene with large forces, and in any case, through close 
support capabilities and interdiction by UN air power, CCF intervention would be effectively 
prevented. His optimistic perception was exemplified by his message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) that ‘I believe that with my air power […] I can deny reinforcements coming across the 
Yalu in sufficient strength to prevent the destruction of those forces now arrayed against me in 
North Korea.’71 
At that time, the UNC expected that the Communist forces’ strength would be at 82,799 North 
Koreans and between 40,000 or 70,935 Chinese. However, the actual strength of CCF alone 
was around 300,000 men.72 In the face of the numerical superiority of Communist forces, the 
recently advanced UN forces were compelled to a full withdrawal from North Korea. Between 
early November and the beginning of January 1951, the UN Forces retreated from the Yalu 
River to the 37th Parallel.73 
 
Map 2.3 CCF’s Involvement and the UN Forces’ Retreat 
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(Source. Map taken from Encyclopedia Britannica at < https://www. britannica.com/ event/Korean-
War/images-videos>) 
 
As the Communist forces reoccupied their territory over the 38th Parallel and pushed south, the 
anti-Communists were also forced to flee their villages. They knew the Communists would be 
unforgiving for assisting UN forces and killing Communist officials. Only a few options 
remained to them. One was to move to South Korea as a refugee by joining the UN forces’ 
retreat. Large numbers of the anti-Communists in the eastern side of North Korea were able to 
make their way to the south by the UN forces’ evacuation ships from Hungnam.74 In the west, 
                                           




however, only limited numbers were able to take refuge in the south safely as most were cut off 
by the rapid Communist advance.75  
 As an alternative, tens of thousands of anti-Communists and their families in the west side had 
to flee to the islands off North Korea’s west coast.76 As mentioned in chapter 1, there are 
approaching a hundred small and large islands on the west coast. Because of their proximity to 
the mainland and the shallow depth of the inshore area during low tide, large numbers of small 
islands were easily approachable. Refuge to the larger islands such as Paengyong-do and Chodo, 
which were some distance from the mainland, was possible by the support of ROK Navy patrol 
ships or their own ‘wiggly boats’.77 With the hope that the UN Forces would initiate counter 
offensives, and they could return home in near future, large numbers of refugees decided to 
move to nearby islands. The fact that it would be much easier to acquire food from their 
hometowns, because of proximity to the mainland, helped this decision.78 According to the 
operational records of the ROK Navy operated on the west coast, by late January 1951, there 
were around 62,000 refugees on Paengyong-do and its surrounding small islands.79     
 The other choice for the remaining anti-Communists in the western side was to return to their 
hideouts and conceal themselves or revert to guerrilla warfare. Therefore, some who remained 
took their captured weapons and ammunition and went into the mountains.80 The Kuwol area 
and the Tura Mountains in Hwanghae Province around Sinchon were common hiding places of 
anti-Communists in the western side of North Korea. In both the mountain areas, around 2,100 
guerrillas continued their activities, such as intelligence gathering, rescuing well-known anti-
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Communist and raiding the small numbers of NKPA troops.81 As they acquired more weapons 
during October and November 1950, some of the anti-Communist groups even boldly took the 
offensive against the Communist occupation forces.82 For instance, on the night of 15 January, 
a group of guerrillas from the Mountain Kuwol, successfully repulsed a NKPA unit approaching 
Wolsa-ri.83 Two days later, they even re-captured Eunryul, which had been in the hands of the 
Communists and conducted offensives against the NKPA troops in Songwha and Changyon.84 
 
Map 2.4 West Coast and the Adjoining Mainland 
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(Source. Basic map taken from Political Map of Korea at < http://www.nationsonline.org/ 
oneworld/map/korea-north-political-map.htm>) 
 
However, it was not possible for them to continue their guerrilla activities on the mainland for 
a long period of time because the Communist forces deployed more troops to reoccupy 
Hwanghae province.85 As these regular forces were better equipped than the anti-Communists, 
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it was unrealistic to expect these poorly equipped and inadequately trained resistances to 
successfully defend their hometowns.86  
 Faced with massive attacks from the Communist forces, most anti-Communists were forced 
to flee to the several islands around their homeland. The largest guerrilla groups from Sinchon, 
Eunryul, Haeju and Changyeon in the Hwanghae Province retreated to Paengnyong-do, Cho-
do and their surrounding smaller islands. The guerrillas from the South Pyong-an Province, the 
middle-west side of North Korea, mainly fled to Cho-do and Sokto. The smallest and most 
northern guerrilla groups from the North Pyong-an Province fled to Ae-do, Sin-do, Taehwa-do 
and Sowha-do, around the Yalu Gulf area. Before departing, large numbers of these groups left 
small units in their hometowns or mountains in the vicinity to obtain information on the enemy. 
This was, at least, a token of resistance against the Communists. Before the start of February 
1951, almost all of the guerrilla groups that had operated in the mainland of North Korea had 
completely moved to the islands.87 
 
2.6 Concluding Comments 
 
Since the establishment of the Communist Government, the anti-Communist movement, who 
were emphatically opposed to Communist policy, began to emerge amongst the North Korean 
populace. In particular, as a consequence of economic reforms and conscription, the number of 
anti-Communist activities increased in a controlled way. These activities were particularly 
pronounced in the western area of North Korea. However, initially, these activities were merely 
protests or demonstrations, which sometimes entailed violence. 
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 In the course of the Korean War, the anti-Communist movement experienced significant 
changes in its activities and operational environment. Firstly, anti-Communist movements 
started to develop as an ‘armed-struggle’ type of resistance. Equipped with small numbers of 
weapons, they tried to attack the small groups of Communist forces. Some of the large guerrilla 
groups even conducted offensive operations against the NKPA troops. Secondly, the anti-
Communists in the west side moved their main operational area from their hometowns to the 
islands on the west coast. During the UN Forces’ advancement towards the north as a result of 
Inchon landing, they officially supported the UN Forces and crucially punished the Communists 
in their own territory. By doing so, the anti-Communists disclosed themselves to and went into 
a more antagonistic relationship with the Communists. Therefore, it is easy to imagine their 
plight after CCF involvement and the subsequent UN Forces’ retreat. Faced with hostile 
Communist occupation forces, most anti-Communists eventually fled to the islands on the west 
coast.  
 As a result of this island exile, they suddenly became last-stand strongholds for the rear side 
of the 38th Parallel in terms of Communist resistance. Amongst tens of thousands of refugees 
there were several thousand North Koreans who were eager to resume the fight.88 However, 
even after the retreat to the islands, the anti-Communists’ plight continued. Although they were 
relieved from imminent threat by the enemy, because of the presence of friendly Naval Forces 
inshore, they faced a severe shortage of food, weapons and ammunition. Although there were 
sporadic supplies from the ROK Navy, they were far from sufficient. The guerrillas had little 
option but to capture war supplies from the Communists on the mainland, and this caused heavy 
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casualties.89 Moreover, the lack of communication equipment and the absence of command 
and control systems for their future activities were other significant obstacles.  
 Although friendly forces gradually gained knowledge of their existence and activities, no 
detailed plan to support and utilise these large numbers of irregulars was made within the UNC 
at this point.90 In the face of the numerical superiority of the Communist Forces, the UNC was 
not able to pay attention to a relatively unimportant area. Therefore, the anti-Communists had 
to continue their painful struggle against hunger with poor equipment, awaiting a UN Forces 
counter-offensive and support.
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The British Commonwealth and Allied Forces’ Naval Operation on the West Coast: 
From Inception to the End of 1950 
 
 
To the British Government, Korea had been regarded as an area of very little direct interest. 
Therefore, the attack from North Korea on 25 June 1950 was truly unwelcome news, as this 
called for British commitment in this area. As a permanent member of the Security Council, it 
was required to take a shared responsibility for the working of the collective security system of 
the United Nations.1   
 As the first British forces deployed in the war, a detachment of British naval forces from the 
Far East Station urgently responded and arrived in Korean waters. Without any proper 
preparation for the war, under the command of Rear-Admiral William G. Andrewes, they 
started a naval operation in Korean waters with the British Commonwealth and allied forces.  
 This chapter outlines the first year of naval operations conducted on the west coast. It focuses 
on several pivotal incidents which totally changed the war situation and discusses the changing 
naval forces’ operations and challenges that occurred before the start of its co-operation with 
the anti-Communist guerrillas.   
 For this purpose, this chapter tracks the British Government’s position on the Korean 
Peninsula from the latter part of the Second World War to the inception of the Korean War. 
Also, Britain’s involvement, albeit one of initial reluctance, is briefly explained. Following this, 
the main west coast mission, embarked on from an early stage of the war, namely the naval 
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blockade operation, is then discussed. Newly emerging challenges, particularly focusing on 
intelligence-related problems, are also examined. 
 Finally, this chapter examines the two incidents, that of the Inchon landing and the Chinese 
intervention and discusses their influence on the naval operation. In a situation that involved no 
conflict between fleets, the naval operation was more focused on the support of ground 
operations.2 In particular, the latter compelled additional duties and challenges to the ships on 
the west coast. Such involvement represents the naval operational situation before any co-
operation was secured with the anti-Communist guerrillas.    
 
3.1 Deployment of HM Ships in the Korean War 
 
Although the UK was one of the associates that decided the international trusteeship for Korea 
after its independence from Japan, the British Government was reluctant to become deeply 
involved in the issues of this area. From a British standpoint, unlike the part of Asia lying south 
of the Tropic of Cancer (including Hong Kong and Malaya) which was regarded as of ‘greatest 
importance and greatest urgency’, there was very little UK direct interest in the north of it. 
Therefore, Korea and neighbouring areas were regarded as under the United States’ 
responsibility and a ‘policy of non-involvement rather than active policy’ was required.3 
 This British policy of non-involvement was apparent even before the end of the Pacific War. 
On 22 July 1945, during their visit to the United States for the foundation of the United Nations 
Organisation when the Russian delegation proposed discussion of Korea by the Council of 
Foreign Ministers, the Foreign Office replied with its views that ‘our own direct interest is small 
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and if it proves necessary to oppose the Russian proposals we should leave it to the Americans 
to play the hands’.4 
 The British Government maintained its position after the Japanese surrender. When the issue 
of participation in the occupation of Japan and Korea was requested by the American Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the British displayed negativity in that ‘There are no British military interests 
in Korea and the provision of occupation forces for this area would, therefore, serve no military 
purpose’.5 However, as they recognised that the Americans might exert heavy pressure to this 
end, the British Government’s stance was that ‘it may thus become politically necessary for us 
to provide a token force, though on military grounds such provision would be a most 
undesirable commitment’.6   
 During this period, it was Australia who was keen to participate in matters concerning the 
peace settlement in this area. Since 1941, Australia had been actively participating in the Pacific 
and Europe, thus it had been declared that Australia, at least in the Pacific area, ‘possesses the 
right to the status of a party principal to every armistice and peace arrangement’.7 In particular, 
for the purpose of improving their international prestige under the leadership of an energetic 
External Affairs minister, Herbert Evatt, Australia focused more on enhancing its role in the 
Pacific area.8  
 Since the Japanese surrender, for the purpose of occupying Japan, the Australian desire was 
to send a separate force under Australian command.9 As a means of lightening the British 
burden in this area and to enhance the British Commonwealth’s position and status in north-
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east Asia, the British Government was in favour of this idea.10 Consequently, they allowed 
Australia to be the representative of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF). As 
a result of a Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting held on 30 August, it was agreed that ‘a further 
approach should be made to the Australians for the creation of a unified Commonwealth Force, 
and the proposal was that the inter-Service Commander-in-Chief of this Force should be an 
Australian’. 11  However, Britain required that the commander be jointly responsible to the 
United Kingdom and Australian Governments through their respective Chiefs of Staff 
and that HM Ships in Japanese waters remain under Royal Navy control.12 
 On 17 October 1945, Australia despatched the proposals of the BCOF, on behalf of the UK, 
New Zealand, Australian and Indian Government, as well as to the American Government.13 
The United States suggested no further contribution to the occupation force in Japan in addition 
to the proposed British Commonwealth joint force.14  
 Small numbers of advanced forces were deployed to Japan in February and larger forces 
landed two months later. For demilitarisation tasks in Japan, the BCOF was established in 
Japan under an Australian commander-in-chief, Lieutenant General John Northcott. 15 
From the four countries which constituted the BCOF, they supplied a military force of around 
37,000 at its maximum in 1946–1947. The British Government also deployed up to 10,000 
individuals, including some shore-based Royal Navy personnel.16 However, this quota tailed 
off from 1947 onwards, immediately after the completion of the Japanese demilitarisation. The 
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bulk of these withdrawn forces came firstly from the United Kingdom, and subsequently from 
New Zealand and Indian contingents. Therefore, by 1950, except for an Australian force, 
including a unit of the Royal Australian Air Force and one Australian battalion, there were no 
additional Commonwealth forces remaining in Japan.17 At least up to the start of the Korean 
War, the region was subject to Britain’s ‘policy of non-involvement’. As there was a new 
situation of major imperial involvement south of the Tropic of Cancer, in particular, counter-
insurgency in Malaya, it was hardly surprising that the early British desire toward the Korean 
War was ‘not to get involved’.18 
 As Washington decided to use United States forces to defend South Korea from the 
Communist attack, however, the prospect of British commitment became inevitable. Under 
American pressure, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution calling 
for a cease-fire and withdrawal of North Korean troops to the 38th Parallel. As the Communists 
ignored the warning, an additional resolution was made and approved calling for forces to be 
sent to defend South Korea. Sixteen countries gathered under the flag of UN; the British were 
one of them.19   
 On 27 June, the British decision to support the Security Council resolution was announced by 
Clement Attlee, the Prime Minister, in the House of Commons.20 Two days later, orders from 
the Admiralty arrived directing Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), 
Far East Station, to ‘place the Royal Navy at present in Japanese waters at the disposal of the 
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19 Thomas, Furies and Fireflies over Korea, p. 9. 
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United States Naval Commander for Korean operation in support of the Security Council 
resolution’.21 
 Although there was no joint headquarters for the UN forces, there was a ready-made high 
command; that of the United States General Headquarters (GHQ) in Japan. Under the command 
of Supreme Commander, General Douglas MacArthur, Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN, 
commanded the naval forces in Japanese waters. Therefore, as they arrived, the naval forces 
provided by the British Far East Station naturally came under the operational control of Admiral 
Joy’s command.22 
 At that time, there was a detachment of the British Far East Fleet under Rear-Admiral 
Andrewes in close contact with the US naval authority in Japan. Through a directive by Admiral 
Brind, this detachment was temporarily deployed to Japanese waters to escape the heat of Hong 
Kong and Singapore during the summer months. Admiral Andrewes, Second-in-Command, Far 
East Station, with his flag in HMS Belfast, was in northern Japanese waters. In addition to the 
Belfast, HM Ships readily became available for service for the Korean War; those being a light 
carrier (Triumph), a cruiser (Jamaica), two destroyers (Cossack and Consort) and three frigates 
(Black Swan, Alacrity and Hart). There were also some fleet auxiliaries, such as the HM 
Hospital Ship, Maine.23  
 As a result of orders from the Admiralty, on 29 June, the HM Ships under Admiral Andrewes 
naturally joined the UN naval forces. Without any proper preparation for the Korean War, the 
British naval forces in Japanese waters started a naval operation with American forces.  
 In the first UN naval plan, which was issued on the same day, the HM Ships were disposed 
into two groups; the US Seventh Fleet in Okinawa (HMS Belfast, Triumph, Consort and 
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Cossack) and the East Coast naval force (HMS Jamaica, Alacrity and Black Swan). The frigate 
Hart was ordered to take the role of a communication ship between Admiral Joy and the HM 
Ships.24  
 On 30 June, as the first British Forces’ deployed to Korea, the light carrier HMS Triumph 
arrived in Korean waters accompanied by two cruisers, two destroyers and three frigates. On 
the following day, the Essex-class carrier, USS Valley Forge, a heavy cruiser and eight 
destroyers also took up station on the west coast. Under the overall command of USN Vice-
Admiral Arthur D. Struble, Commander of the US Seventh Fleet, this Anglo-American force 
began their operation under the designation ‘Task Force 77 Striking Force’.25 At dawn on 3 
July 1950, Supermarine Seafires and Fairey Fireflies from HMS Triumph, and F9F Panthers, 
F4U Corsairs and AD Skyraiders from USS Valley Forge initiated their first strikes on airfields, 
railways and bridges in the Haeju and Pyongyang areas, respectively.26  
 While the carrier forces were proceeding to the west coast, HMS Jamaica, Alacrity and Black 
Swan were sent to the east sea to join the East Coast Naval Force group. Under the command 
of Rear-Admiral John M. Higgins, USN, they started gunfire support for the ROK Army and 
also conducted patrols to deny the landing of the Communist forces south of 38th parallel.27 It 
was the start of almost three years of UN naval force operations in Korean waters.   
 
3.2 The Start of the West Coast Blockade and Emerging problems 
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During the first week of naval operation in Korean waters, no difficulty was experienced by the 
British ships in working with the Americans. This was largely due to the experience of many 
Royal Navy officers who had undergone joint operations with US partners in the previous war 
and also due to two recently experienced joint naval force manoeuvres.28 Therefore, after the 
first co-operation with the Seventh Fleet, Admiral Andrewes wrote that ‘It all seemed so 
familiar [...] as it was just what we had done so often during the exercises in March with very 
similar forces. We didn’t feel out of things and were already getting back into the easy use of 
American signal books.’29 
 However, from early July 1950, after the west coast blockade conducted by Rear-Admiral 
Andrewes and his newly assigned British Commonwealth and Allied Naval forces, various 
unsatisfactory situations started to emerge. 
 It was five days after the start of the war that the naval blockade plan conducted by the UN 
Forces was first suggested. On 30 June, to deny the Communist use of the Korean waters for 
resupply and reinforcement, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, USN, 
recommended a blockade of Korean waters. President Truman agreed this the next day, and 
Operation Order 8-50 was issued to establish the blockade.30 It was on 3 July that Admiral 
Andrewes received a signal from Commander Naval Forces, Far East (COMNAVFE) regarding 
the establishment of the blockade, and by this order, the west coast north of 37° was assigned 
to the British naval forces operating in this area. This force was named as the West Coast 
Support Group (Task Group 96.8). Concurrently, the coasts south of latitude 37° N became an 
area responsible to ROK naval forces (Task Group 96.7) whilst north of 37° on the east coast, 
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blockading responsibilities were assigned to the United States Navy (East Coast Support Group, 
Task Group 96.5).31   
 
Map 3.1 Blockading Areas under Responsibility of the UN Naval forces (July 1950) 
 
 
[Source. Basic Map taken from ‘INITIAL NAVAL OPERATION’ by The War History Compilation 
Committee, The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, Vol. II (Seoul: The Ministry 
of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, 15 December 1981), p. 665.]   





On 7 July, after further talks and arrangement with Admiral Joy in Tokyo, it was decided that, 
other than the American ships and ROK Navy, all allied ships including New Zealand and 
Canadian warships approaching Korean waters would join the TG 96.8. 32  The next day, 
Admiral Andrewes issued his first operation order to his ships in which he outlined his 
intentions for operations mainly focused on the west coast blockade. His direction was as 
follows: 
 
a. Enforcement of blockade of the coast occupied by North Koreans. 
b. Prevention of infiltration by sea on coasts held by South Koreans. 
c. Provision of naval support as required against North Korean maritime forces or land 
targets.33  
 
To carry out these duties, Admiral Andrewes divided his blockade naval forces into three task 
units, viz., 
 
TU 96.8.1.  Belfast, Cossack, Consort, under Rear-Admiral Andrewes 
TU 96.8.2.  Jamaica, Black Swan, Alacrity, under Captain Salter (Jamaica) 
TU 96.8.4.  Kenya, Cockade, under Captain Brock (Kenya)34 
  
Each of these units carried out patrols in the blockade area in rotation, as ordered and worked 
separately. Each Task Unit arranged the details of its own patrol. From the morning of 9 July, 
as Admiral Andrewes sailed for the west coast in the HMS Belfast with the Cossack and Consort 
in company, the blockade was inaugurated.35   
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With the start of the blockade of the west coast, Admiral Andrewes had to deal with many 
problems in connection with logistics and the administration of his forces. Sasebo, the base for 
the UN Naval Forces, is 1,079 miles from Hong Kong and about 10,580 miles from the United 
Kingdom. Furthermore, the British naval forces were involved in this war without any 
preparation or any expected defined length of time in Korean waters. Due to the distance from 
the British Naval bases, Admiral Andrewes immediately faced difficulties in logistic supply 
and, in particular, was short of ammunition. Several administrative problems in Sasebo, such 
as shortages of repair and docking facilities, and a limited number of amenities, also emerged.36  
 However, the most problematic situation faced by the west coast blockade naval forces was 
the poorly organised intelligence co-ordination system within the UN Forces and the limited 
sources of intelligence for their operation.  
 As mentioned above, to the British Government, Korea was a territory which held no military 
interest, and therefore, Britain had no direct intelligence sources in this area when the Korean 
War was initiated. The primary way to procure the required intelligence was to depend on the 
supply from General Macarthur’s intelligence staff (G2) in Tokyo, Japan. This fact could be 
seen in Air Marshal Elliot’s signal to Lord Tedder on 27 June 1950 as follows: 
 
Most of our information on the situation in Korea comes from the UK Liaison Mission in 
Tokyo as the result of an unofficial arrangement with G2. Without this we should virtually 
know little more than appears in the Press.37  
 
Therefore, Admiral Andrewes and his ships in the west coast, which did not have any proper 
dedicated intelligence team for their operation, also had to heavily depend on the Americans 
for their intelligence. However, due to the absence of a joint intelligence organisation within 
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the UN forces, which would have suitably conducted the role of co-ordinator and 
disseminator of all collected information, it was difficult to have proper intelligence for the 
naval operation. From the onset of war, the US Army, Navy and Air Force had their own 
agent parties for intelligence gathering. In addition to these set-ups, there were a number of 
other involved parties, such as the CIA, that were responsible directly to Washington.38 The 
problem was that these US Intelligence organisations appeared to lack any co-ordination, so 
all units had to operate and rely on their own intelligence organisations.39  
 Since North Korea had no proper navy and air force during 1950, there were little maritime or 
air engagements. Therefore, the focus of naval and air operations concentrated more on the 
support of ground operations. In particular, during the first twelve months of war, a period that 
involved intense fighting and dramatic changes in front-line positions, ‘the three services were 
pretty constantly mixed up in each other’s affairs’.40 For more effective support for endangered 
ground forces, the establishment of a theatre-level intelligence organisation was required. 
However, notwithstanding the strong necessity, there was no proper authority given for this until 
late 1951.41  
 Under a poorly organised UN Forces’ intelligence system, it followed that Admiral Joy and 
his Naval Staff’s role was very significant, acting as an intelligence centre for all naval groups 
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in Korean waters. However, the intelligence co-ordination between the UN naval forces was 
also ‘fragmentary and confusing’.42 As mentioned above, since the outbreak of the war, any 
ship that arrived in Korean waters came under the unified command of Vice-Admiral Joy. As 
a result of the US Joint Chief of Staff’s (JCS) decision that the Seventh Fleet would be placed 
under MacArthur’s control if required, Vice-Admiral Struble (though senior to Admiral Joy) 
and his Seventh Fleet, were ordered to be under Admiral Joy’s control. Because US military 
culture was that ‘seniors normally did not report to juniors’, and additionally due to Admiral 
Struble’s fleets’ separate command and responsibilities; the Seventh Fleet were allowed to 
operate nearly independently under Admiral Joy’s broad directive.43 Therefore, each naval 
force, such as the Carrier Task Force, the Escort Carrier Group, the Amphibious Group, and the 
Escort Group were controlled separately, although operating ‘in the same waters’. This 
separated the command and control of naval forces, which not only caused considerable 
overlapping, but also raised difficulties in the co-ordination between the friendly ships during 
the war.44      
 In addition to this, Admiral Joy’s burdensome role during the early stage of war, diverted him 
from accomplishing effective co-ordination. He was required to deal with so many policies and 
inter-Service problems; such as evacuating the Americans, the blockade in North Korean waters, 
supporting friendly ground forces, and also protect Formosa, to mention just some of his duties. 
However, there was a very limited number of naval staff in Japan. By the end of June, the total 
strength of the Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE) under the Command of Admiral Joy was only 
188. Therefore, he was not able to pay sufficient personal attention to daily movements and 
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operations of ships under his command; the co-ordination of which suffered until November 
when a significant reinforcement of staff took place.45  
 Under these unfavourable conditions, unsurprisingly, Admiral Andrewes and his naval forces 
experienced a lack of intelligence, in particular, from the start of the operation on the west coast. 
In such a situation in which Admiral Andrewes lacked dedicated intelligence sources, he was 
obliged to initially depend on NAVFE sourced intelligence. In fact, there had been a certain 
amount of general information from the NAVFE office in Tokyo in the form of Intelligence 
letters and summaries. Except for these cases however, there was little contact between the 
Naval Intelligence Office and the blockade ships.46 Therefore, even the supply of maps of the 
Korean water channels, coastal lines and the mainland, which had to be supplied by the 
Commander of NAVFE, was subsequently delayed. Acquiring the various maps, thus, had to 
be done by the blockade naval forces who depended on their own ‘ingenuity’ and 
‘resourcefulness’.47     
 The distance between Sasebo and Tokyo intensified this problem. As the majority of United 
Nations Naval Forces were operating from Sasebo, a port in southern Japan, most Naval 
intelligence of the Korean War was concentrated in Tokyo, almost 600 miles from this naval 
base. 48  This situation disrupted communications between sea-going commanders and the 
Naval Intelligence Office. It was also unrealistic to expect Admiral Joy, who had many difficult 
and varied tasks, to improve contact with the Blockade Commanders.   
 Furthermore, even the intelligence supply gained by radio communication between friendly 
ships on the waters was problematic, as it was often clogged, due to the ‘sudden expansion of 
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high-precedence of traffic’. In particular, British naval forces experienced difficulty in 
receiving signals from their US partners. 49  Therefore, Admiral Andrewes hoped the 
establishment of a local intelligence centre in Sasebo would improve the situation, collecting 
and disseminating intelligence directly with all of the UN ships. This could be seen in Admiral 
Andrewes’s report as follows: 
 
The United Nations Naval Forces have been organised into Task Forces and Task Groups and 
operate almost entirely from Sasebo. These units have their own Intelligence organisations 
working for their own particular elements, they rely entirely on their own resources and co-
operate with each other well but they have no local central department to refer to. This lack 
of a local intelligence centre has been keenly felt, there is nowhere outside the Task Force or 
Group that ship’s Intelligence can turn to, either to procure information, give information or 
to be briefed before sailing for patrol.50 
 
Notwithstanding this ambition, there was no active movement within the NAVFE to establish 
a local intelligence centre. As an alternative, the British Commonwealth ships had to rely 
mainly on Admiral Andrewes’s Staff Office, Intelligence [SO(I)] afloat for Intelligence Liaison. 
The Royal Navy’s Headquarters ship, HMS Ladybird, was used to accommodate the 
information centre and conducted a liaison role, usually afloat in Sasebo.51   
 For Admiral Andrewes and his naval forces, acquiring the intelligence of the Communist 
movements within the designated operational area, namely the west coast, was even more 
problematic. Unlike general information, which was expected to be gained from Tokyo, and 
various local intelligence irregularly supplied from other naval groups, the information of 
enemy activities in the blockade area had to be obtained mainly by the naval forces operating 
in this area. In this situation of having no proper British naval forces’ intelligence team for 
gathering local information, most of the required information had to be collected by blockade 
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ships or naval aircraft’s patrols. Owing to the geographical characteristics of the west coast 
however, naval forces intelligence gathering was largely restricted.    
 As mentioned in chapter 1, the east coast is steep, with very few islands off it; features that 
were advantageous for US naval forces in maintaining a close blockade of inshore traffic.52 On 
the other hand, due to the extensive mud flats and silting, the west coast is very shallow near its 
coastline. With the large range of tides rising as much as 32 feet, its geographical characteristics 
consequently create an almost impossible situation for close inshore blockade activities by 
large naval vessels. Consequently, these surroundings largely restricted any large blockade 
ships’ patrols for intelligence gathering, and for screening enemy activity in acquiring supplies 
provided by shallow draft junks navigating inshore routes.53 Needless to say, this geographical 
configuration significantly restricted the western naval forces’ effective conduct of their missions.    
 To solve this problem, from an early stage of the blockade mission, several measures had 
been taken. For example, by late July, as a result of co-ordination between the British blockade 
forces and the ROK Navy, some small ROK patrol vessels were used for west coast inshore 
patrols.54 Also, from early August, with the carrier HMS Triumph moving to the west coast, 
it became possible to examine and attack the Communist inshore traffic during the daytime 
using its aircraft.55 However, due to this reinforcements’ limited capability, night-time inshore 
traffic was still impossible to screen, and thus only meagre information of the Communist 
forces’ mainland movements was gathered.  
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 What made the blockade mission more difficult and dangerous was that the west coast is 
fringed by lots of small islands which provided armed enemy forces’ the locations for 
occupation. In fact, at that time, a large number of islands on the west were conceded as likely 
to be sheltering Communists, but due to the little intelligence available, the correct detail of the 
Communist-held islands was not known. Such ignorance was not just about extent of strength 
but also whether batteries had been mounted on any of them.56  
 Since there were no available forces to land on these islands, no alternative existed to verify 
the Communist garrison forces’ strength and equipment other than that of asking local North 
Korean fishermen found in the patrolling area. Owing to the language difference, however, this 
could not be done by Admiral Andrewes’s naval staff. Significantly, one of the officers of HMS 
Cossack stated that ‘the value of having a Korean aboard who spoke reasonable English 
enhanced the value of our intelligence gathering fivefold’. Hence the role of ‘a Korean liaison 
team’ aboard blockade ships was very important.57 However, to find an able Korean interpreter 
in the ROK Navy who could adequately speak and understand spoken English was very 
difficult.58    
 The credibility of information collected from local North Koreans was even very dubious. On 
11 July, it was known that Paengyong-do had been captured by the Communist forces ‘armed 
with light weapons only’ from a report from a fisherman.59 The next day, however, it was 
confirmed that this information was just partly correct. Early in the morning of 12 July, when 
HMS Cossack patrolled in the northern area of Techong-do, she was engaged by shore batteries 
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on Paengyng-do. Although those batteries were silenced after a short engagement, and there 
was no damage on the HM ship, this highly surprised the Naval Commanders as they were 
unaware of enemy field artillery on the island.60  
 Although there was no further shelling from the Communist-held islands following that 
occasion during 1950, the possibility of further attacks from batteries caused great anxiety for 
naval patrol ships. To rule out the threat from the islands within the blockade area, in addition 
to the need of a local intelligence team, the reinforcement of sizeable forces to conduct the 
amphibious raid and the island garrison role was also required.  
 
By late July, substantial naval reinforcements were arriving in Korean waters, thus Admiral Joy 
directed a reorganisation of his naval forces. Under the command of Rear-Admiral Hartman, 
USN, he placed all blockade and support ships in a single task group which was called TG 
96.5.61  As before, the west coast blockading task was the responsibility of Rear-Admiral 
Andrewes, and all British Commonwealth and Allied (other than US and ROK) forces were 
under his command. However, his blockade forces were renamed as TE 96.53 and were subject 
to a reinforcement.62 These additional naval forces, along with the appropriate reorganisation, 
notably increased the available west coast operational strength of TE 96.53. Therefore, in 
addition to the initial HM Ships which had conducted the blockade mission under Admiral 
Andrewes’s command, HMAS Bataan and HM Netherland Ship Evertsen also joined in mid-
July. From 30 July, TE 96.53 was further enlarged by the arrival of the three Canadian 
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destroyers (HMCS Athabaskan, Cayuga and Sioux), two New Zealand frigates (HMNZS 
Pukaki and Tutira) and one French frigate (La Grandiere).63  
 Despite the sizeable reinforcement in the west coast blockade unit, there were no initiatives 
ordered to solve the intelligence-related problem, and this factor was a significant influence in 
limiting operational effectiveness and even causing great danger to the blockade ships. Needless 
to say, no reinforcement of garrison forces was also made. Due to the precarious ground 
operational situation, it was not possible to expect any such reinforcement. At that time, the 
west side of Hwanghae Province was not a prioritised operational area for the UNC. 
 
3.3 Successful Landing at Inchon and the Reduction of the Naval Forces 
 
While the British Commonwealth naval forces were experiencing difficulties in the course of 
conducting the blockade on the west coast, totally different types of joint operations had been 
planned within the UNC. With a strategic aim of crushing the Communists in a single blow, the 
UN forces had been secretly planning a landing operation.  
 To gain overall victory, MacArthur keenly felt the necessity of an amphibious landing at the 
rear of the Communists. Their forces had mostly concentrated against the EUSAK on the front 
line and had negligible numbers of trained reserves. Since the North Koreans had neglected 
their rear defence and were depending on a thin logistical line, MacArthur thought a landing 
assault could play a decisive role in crushing the Communists.64 To MacArthur, this landing 
should be conducted once sufficient UN forces had accumulated on the Pusan Perimeter; thus 
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enabling a break out towards the north. By landing a large force on the enemy rear and forcing 
them to move eastward, he thought the UN forces would trap the North Korean Army.65    
 Therefore, he instructed the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) to study 
potential locations for such an operation. Under MacArthur’s instruction, JSPOG conducted a 
study for an effective landing site. As a consequence, this short study recommended Inchon as 
the optimum location and General MacArthur concurred.66  
 Although there were controversies concerning the selection of the landing site due to 
Inchon’s unfavourable geographical configurations, by late August, the JCS formally 
approved MacArthur’s suggestion to landing at Inchon. The landing was planned to be 
conducted on 15 September.67 
 After attaining approval, General MacArthur accelerated the organisation of the UN forces for 
this amphibious operation. It was to be under the overall command of Vice-Admiral Struble 
(Commander 7th Joint Task Force), whilst Rear-Admiral Doyle, the commander of the 
Amphibious Force, took the responsibility of the naval side’s assault (TF-90), and Major General 
Oliver S. Smith, Commander of the 1st Marine Division, was assigned to take the responsibility 
of the military side (TF-92). Duly, the date of landing was fixed for 15 September, and the size 
of operation decided at some 70,000 men to be landed and 260 ships to be involved.68    
 
During the actual assault planning stage, Admiral Andrewes’s TE 96.53 continuously carried 
out their main mission; maintaining the blockade of the west coast of Korea. Once the planned 
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event at Inchon became imminent, Admiral Andrewes’s naval forces assumed Blockade and 
Covering Force responsibilities (Task Force 91) and were assigned tasks in addition to their 
blockade mission as follows: 
 
a. Conduct special reconnaissance and covering missions prior to D-day. 
b. Provide cover for units of the attack force en route to the Inchon area. 
C. Perform interdiction mission on D-day and thereafter. To this was added air spotting for 
the Jamaica and Kenya.69 
 
The landing operation was carried out on the planned date. For the preliminary movement, 
Admiral Andrewes proceeded to the west coast on 12 September in HMS Triumph and initiated 
his blockade and covering mission for the Inchon landing. On the second day (D-2 day), HMS 
Triumph began blockade patrols in the Mokpo and Kunsan areas and then provided air cover 
for the landing forces on their way to Inchon. On 15 September and following days, she carried 
out an anti-submarine (A/S) screen operation with HMS Ceylon and provided spotting duties 
for HMS Jamaica and Kenya. Simultaneously, the north, south and the west side of Inchon was 
covered by the remaining British Commonwealth ships. Admiral Andrewes’s TF 91 continued 
their tasks on the west coast until 20 September and, with the pleasing news of the land 
invasion’s great success, returned to their normal mission.70    
      
On 25 September, with the completion of the Inchon landing, the Blockade and Covering Force 
(Task Force 91) was dissolved. Therefore, Admiral Andrewes’s naval forces became Task 
Group 95.1 with the same general blockading duties as before the landing. 71  Unlike the 
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spectacular movement of the ground operation, TG 95.1 had to continue a total holding role on 
the west coast.  
In fact, the blockade ships’ immobility was intensified by a new complication which appeared 
in this area from early September; that of the Communists’ surface mines being laid. On 7 
September, HMS Jamaica reported a number of mines near to the approach of Chinnampo, and 
the next day, HMS Ceylon also reported similar types of mines on the Fankochi point, north-
west of Haeju. These mines were easily laid using North Korean sampans safely out of the reach 
of friendly ships. As the threat of mines necessitated the blockade ships’ more precautious 
movements, the naval forces patrol area had to be more restricted.72 If the Chinnampo and 
Haeju areas were occupied by the Communist forces, at least for the safety of the naval blockade 
forces, the need to acquire intelligence regarding the Communist activities on the nearby 
mainland and inshore area became more vital. However, there was no significant change in the 
blockade ships’ way of gathering intelligence before and after the landing. As a passive response 
against the surface mines, HMS Whitesand Bay was joined by five Japanese minesweepers 
for the mine-sweeping task. However, due to the complication of searching and sweeping, 
this task proceeded very slowly.73  
 Admiral Andrewes was not pleased with the current situation, as expressed by his comment ‘I 
was disturbed lest the British and Commonwealth forces should have been given a purely 
holding role on the west coast’.74 To him, putting his naval forces in a vulnerable position in 
relation to mines for blockade purposes was an ineffective and misguided commitment. In his 
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opinion, the importance of the west coast blockade had significantly decreased since the Inchon 
landing, and it was not sensible to subject the blockade to the potential risk of mines. 
 As a result of the landing at Inchon, the UNC accomplished their initial purposes; cutting the 
enemy’s logistic line and trapping them between the UN forces. Then, by late September, UN 
forces finally recaptured the Korean capital, Seoul.75 Moreover, the UN Forces continued their 
march northwards, following the decision of the UN General Assembly to authorise their 
crossing of the 38th Parallel. The crossing was in early October, and by 13 October, coupled 
with the advance of the UN troops towards Haeju, it was clear that the majority of the 
Communists had evacuated from the Haeju-Ongjin area. On 21 October, Pyongyang fell into 
United Nations’ hands.76  
 Due to the UN forces rapid progress northwards, the reason of maintaining the blockade patrol 
became significantly weakened. Therefore, Admiral Andrewes detailed HMS Ceylon and three 
destroyers under his command (HMS Cockade, HMCS Athabaskan and HMAS Warramunga) 
to work with the Gunfire Support Group on the east coast. Subsequently, HMS Mounts Bay, 
HMNZ Ships Pukaki and Tutira and the French Ship La Grandiere were also directed to join 
the part of the Minesweeping and Protection group under Captain Sponfford, USN. As a result, 
there were only nine ships remaining on the west coast for the blockade, including HMS 
Theseus who had recently relieved Triumph.77  
 This favourable war situation also largely relieved the commanders of TG 95.1’s concern of 
intelligence-related problem. Despite the newly emerged threat from enemy surface mines, 
faced with seemingly imminent victory, the lack of intelligence for the naval operation seemed 
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to have become a needless worry. Undoubtedly, no additional endeavour to get better 
intelligence within the blockade area was attempted during this period.     
 
When UN victory seemed imminent, Admiral Joy and his NAVFE staff gradually turned their 
attentions to the issue of post-war preparation. In fact, on 19 October, even before the 
occupation of Pyongyang, Operation Plan 114-50 was issued by COMNAVFE, detailing ‘naval 
missions in support of the pacification of North Korea’ and ‘an annex on the homeward 
movement of forces’.78    
 This atmosphere within the NAVFE also influenced the operating naval forces on the west 
coast. On 22 October, when Admiral Andrewes arrived back at Sasebo after west coast 
operations, it appeared that the end of war was in sight, and a considerable reduction of naval 
forces in Korea would soon be carried out. Therefore, he signalled Admiral Sir Patrick Brind 
regarding the need to plan the return of the British Naval Forces from Korea to Hong Kong. On 
Admiral Brind’s approval, he visited Tokyo to confer with Admiral Joy and General Robertson 
(C-in-C, British Commonwealth Occupation Forces) regarding the reduction of British and 
Commonwealth Forces in Korean waters.79 In this meeting, Admiral Andrewes proposed that, 
with the exception of a new task group consisting of one cruiser, five destroyers, three frigates 
and a corvette under the command of a captain’s rank, he and his staff and remaining British 
ships would move to Hong Kong as soon as the war situation permitted.80 As both Admiral Joy 
and General Robertson agreed to his proposal, the run-down of British Commonwealth naval 
forces in Korean waters was implemented.81    
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By late October, the news that lead elements of ROK 1st Division had occupied the border 
town on the Yalu River was delivered. To the UNC, it was deemed that the time had come to 
reduce the naval forces; and from late October the US carriers Valley Forge and Boxer departed 
for their homeland. 82  On 15 November, Admiral Joy signalled to Admiral Andrewes, 
authorising the reduction of British Commonwealth naval forces. Hong Kong and Japan were 
chosen as locations for Commonwealth and Allied ships, rather than a directive for them to 
return home. This allowed for emergency contingencies, and so they were to be kept at short 
notice if a quick recall was necessitated. Therefore, this transfer commenced with HMS 
Constance, which left Sasebo for Hong Kong on 20 November, and other ships under Admiral 
Andrewes’s command also were then redeployed. Accordingly, Admiral Andrewes sailed for 
Hong Kong on 25 November in HMS Kenya, after relinquishing command of TG 95.1 to 
Captain Lloyd-Davies of HMS Ceylon.83  
 Under the command of Captain Lloyd-Davies, TG 95.1 was regrouped into seven destroyers 
(HMAS Bataan and Warramunga; HMCS Cayuga, Sioux and Athabaskan; HMS Cossack, H. 
Neth MS Evertsen); and four frigates (HMS Cardigan Bay, Morecambe Bay, HMNZS Tutira 
and Rotoiti).84 With the optimistic expectation that ‘the war would be over by Christmas’, the 
remaining naval forces continued routine blockade patrols on the west coast.85  
 
3.4 Chinese Intervention and the West Coast Operation  
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By late November, it became clear that the UNC underestimated the CCF’s strength and 
intention. It also became apparent that the reduction of naval forces from Korean waters had 
been premature. Immediately after the departure of Admiral Andrewes and his forces to Hong 
Kong, from 25 November, the CCF launched a massive attack against the EUSAK on the north 
of the Chongchon River, the 1st Marine division and lead units of the 7th Infantry Division in 
the east.86  
 This had disastrous consequences for UN ground forces, and in the face of the massive assault 
by the Communist Forces, they were forced to retreat from northern Korea. In the east, the 1st 
Marine Division had been cut off by seven Chinese divisions near the Chosin reservoir and was 
fighting its way south toward Hungnam to join up with the remainder of the 10th Corps. 
Preparations seemed to be made to evacuate the 1st Marine Division, and probably the entire X 
Corps.87 In the west, a rapid retreat had to be made by the EUSAK to the Taedong River area. 
As Pyongyang was just about to fall into the Communist forces’ hands, they were likely to be 
cut off west of the Taedong River. The only remaining evacuation route open for them was by 
amphibious lift through Chinnampo, a port that lies 24 miles north of the Taedong Estuary. In 
addition to that, preparation for the withdrawal from Inchon, a location employed as the 
EUSAK supply base, also had to be made.88  
 On 28 November, Vice-Admiral Joy warned Rear-Admiral Doyle, the Commander of TF 90, 
that his Amphibious Force would probably be required to lift UN ground forces out of North 
Korea and redeploy them further south. On receipt of this direction, Admiral Doyle at once 
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started a preliminary plan to redeploy his amphibious forces; half of them for the west coast 
under the command of Admiral Thackrey, USN and the other forces for the east coast.89    
 An urgent call to hurry the return of the RN stationed at Hong Kong was also implemented. 
On 30 November, Admiral Joy signalled to Admiral Brind the request for the return of Admiral 
Andrewes and the immediate availability of HM ships. This reversal was administered only two 
days after Admiral Andrewes’s arrival at Hong Kong. Therefore, on 1 December, Vice-Admiral 
Andrewes, who was promoted on that day, hoisted his flag on HMS Theseus, and, with HMS 
Constance in company, he sailed for Sasebo.90 This time again, due to the shortage of time and 
resources, Admiral Andrewes and his ships had to return to Korean waters without any 
additional preparation.     
 He arrived at Sasebo on 4 December and took the duties of Commander, TG 95.1 from Captain 
Lloyd-Davies. As before, Admiral Andrewes’s Task Group had been assigned the responsibility 
for all west coast areas. The first task of TG 95.1 was to support the evacuation of units of the 
EUSAK from Chinnampo.91  
 As a result of continued mine-sweeping operations, its channel had been opened to the 
amphibious ships, and the responsibility for the evacuation was assigned to the US amphibious 
forces.92 Therefore, the TG 95.1 ships’ primary task was to defend the evacuation process. For 
the support of the evacuation, a plan was implemented to provide naval gunfire support and to 
escort the transports out of the port with CAP, air spot and A/S patrols over the area by aircraft 
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from HMS Theseus. Simultaneously, a blockade of the west coast was to be maintained to 
prevent any Communist movements by sea.93 
 On 4 December, under the command of Captain S. G. Kelly in USS Bayfield, the amphibious 
forces sailed towards Chinnampo from Inchon, with the intent of lifting forces and stocks.94  
Fortunately, the intensity and speed of the CCF’s pursuit of the retreating EUSAK decreased at 
some point in the northern Pyongyang area, and thus most of the surviving UN forces decided 
to move south via the main highway rather than by the seaway.95 This significantly relieved 
the burden placed on the amphibious forces. Throughout 5 December, evacuation operations 
proceeded smoothly, and by 17:00 that afternoon, 5,900 ROK troops and 1,800 US Army and 
Navy port personnel had been evacuated. HMS Theseus covered the ships engaged in the 
evacuation, and in the course of the next day, all forces of Commonwealth and American ships 
had withdrawn from the Chinnampo area and moved south towards Inchon.96  
 On his arrival at Inchon on 5 December, Admiral Andrewes instructed the duties of Task 
Group 95.1 as follows: 
 
a. West Coast blockade 
b. Anti-aircraft defence of Inchon and naval gunfire support 
c. Air cover over the task group and armed reconnaissance north of the Bomb-line.97  
 
Admiral Andrewes thought that the CCF would never restrict their efforts to land operations, 
and considered it highly probable that they would strike at naval forces by aircraft and 
submarine. In particular, this fear was substantiated in early November, when MiG-15 fighters, 
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the Communists’ new jet, appeared and attacked friendly bombers operating in the Yalu area, 
increasing his concern of threats from the air.98 As a further precaution against air attack, 
Admiral Andrewes stressed the importance of anti-aircraft defence of operational areas. 
 To conduct these duties, his Task Group was reorganised into the following Task Elements; 
 
TE 95.11   To operate west of Inchon – HMS Theseus (flag of Commander TG 95.1),  
           Cossack, Constance, Concord. 
TE 95.12   West Coast Blockade – HMS Ceylon (Commander TE 95.12), HMCS Cayuga,  
           Sioux, HMAS Bataan. 
TE 95.13   At Inchon; available for various duties as required – HMS Cardigan Bay (CTE  
           95.13), Morecambe Bay, HMNZS Tutira, Rotoiti.  
  TE 95.14   At Inchon, primarily for A.A. defence – HMS Kenya (CTE 95.14), HMAS      
            Warramunga, H. Neth. MS Evertsen, HMCS Athabaskan.99 
 
  
For the remainder of the month of December 1950, TG 95.1 operations were based on the 
above-mentioned instructions. The blockade patrol was maintained between Inchon and the 
Yalu Gulf by TE 95.12, and task element ships were periodically exchanged with those of the 
Inchon Gunfire Support Element. Operations in the Inchon area involved covering by air and 
surface blockade for the seaward flank of the EUSAK, conducting strikes over north-west 
Korea, and carrying out armed air reconnaissance.100  
          
To the UNC, the west coast area was not a high priority operational area at that time. Therefore, 
when they were forced to retreat from Chinnampo in December 1950, the UNC even decided 
to abandon the control of the northern islands situated above the 38th Parallel. By the request of 
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Admiral Andrewes, who pointed out the importance of retaining possession of several islands 
to provide vigilance against enemy mine laying, only a few islands were secured.101 
 Owing to the higher command’s neglect of this area, the intelligence and the island garrison-
related issues largely had to be dealt with by the blockade ships’ own resources and ingenuity. 
Faced with imminent challenges, however, the ships of TG 95.1 were not able to pay attention 
to these issues. After the returning from Hong Kong, Admiral Andrewes and his naval forces 
had to immediately support the naval evacuation operation. Subsequently, due to the seemingly 
precarious UN ground forces and newly introduced threat from the air, blockade naval forces 
were required to direct more attention to gunfire support for the EUSAK and anti-aircraft 
defence. Therefore, these issues still remained as ongoing problems to the western naval forces. 
 Although during the last few weeks of the blockade operation ‘Little occurred to break the 
monotony’, there was a totally unpleasant calm.102 As the Communists reoccupied the north 
side of the 38th Parallel, the recommencement of enemy mine laying in the Chinnampo and 
Haeju areas was expected. Even though cold weather and unfavourable ice on the inshore area 
temporarily hindered this objective, it seemed highly possible that from spring, mine laying 
would be reintroduced in earnest.103 The Communist forces’ threat against the islands on the 
rear side of the battle-front was also problematic. Although large numbers of those were 
occupied by refugees and anti-Communists, being unarmed and poorly organised, they could 
not guarantee the safety of the islands in the blockade area.104    
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 With this pessimistic prospect, the naval forces first year in the west coast passed by with 
Admiral Andrewes’s hope addressed to each active ship member that ‘next year they may be 
able to enjoy peace and be in their homes and with their families’.105 
 
3.5 Concluding Comments  
  
During the first six months of operation in the Korean War, Admiral Andrewes’s and his naval 
forces’ operation could be broadly described as carrying out a blockade of Korea’s west coast. 
As the Korean War continued in earnest using ground forces, and also because North Korea’s 
naval forces were negligible, Admiral Andrewes requested his naval forces to concentrate more 
on the blockade to deny the Communists’ use of inshore traffic. Even during the Inchon landing 
and the evacuation from Chinnampo, this intransigent mission persevered as a major duty. 
 However, as the operation commenced without adequate preparation, various problems 
emerged immediately following the naval blockade’s inauguration. In particular, limited 
sources of intelligence for the blockade mission often meant operational ineffectiveness and 
increasing exposure to dangerous situations. Under the unique conditions of the west coast, 
which has a large number of islands and limited access to the inshore area, and with the 
commencement of the Communists’ surface mine laying, the intelligence related problem 
intensified. However, as the west coast area was not a prioritised operational area to the UNC, 
except for reinforcement of naval craft, no proper measures were provided by this higher 
command.   
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 After the Inchon landing, this unpleasant situation was temporarily reduced. As the UN forces 
marched northwards, a large part of the enemy territory came under friendly hands, and this 
significantly decreased the need of the naval blockade. However with the Chinese intervention, 
the war situation totally changed. Due to the UN ground forces’ retreat to the 37th Parallel, the 
importance of the blockade mission became once again significant. Consequently, the 
Communist forces’ reoccupation of northern Korea reintroduced the threat of the Communists’ 
surface mines and possible attack against the islands on the west coast.  
 The most disappointing aspect for the Naval Commanders was that there had been little 
improvement in the TG 95.1’s capability of intelligence gathering. Except for the increase in 
naval patrol ships to collect information in the course of their patrol, there was no fundamental 
change in the way of intelligence gathering, either by the North Korean civilians on the islands 
or by naval aircraft patrols.106 As 1951 approached, a pessimistic outlook prevailed with regard 
to an early end to the war. What was essentially required was a fundamental change in the 
intelligence collecting system to gain more effective information and a safer way of conducting 
the naval blockade.
                                           
106 In fact, from mid-December some changes in the blockade ships’ way of collecting information had begun. As 
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The Beginning and the Development of Co-Operation:  
From Mid-December 1950 to Early July 1951 
 
 
TG 95.1’s relationship with the anti-Communist guerrillas started from mid-December 1950, 
in a very indirect way. Collecting some intelligence from the ROK naval craft, who had 
contacted and collected intelligence from several guerrilla groups, was the only connection 
between the two groups. At that time, the Blockade Commanders were not able to pay deep 
attention to the anti-Communist activities emerging within their operational area due to the 
heavy involvement in supporting ground forces who were retreating south of the Han River. 
Therefore, to TG 95.1, the large number of guerrillas were just the uncontrolled North Korean 
irregulars which had potential as a useful intelligence source. 
 From early February 1951, a more active step in the development of guerrilla co-operation 
was taken by the Blockade Commanders. After the start of the UN forces’ successful 
counterattack and steady advance to the North, TG 95.1 was able to concentrate more on the 
naval blockade. At the same time, friendly authorities commenced a guerrilla reorganisation to 
get the guerrillas under their command and control. These situations caused a more favourable 
environment for better relationships with the guerrillas. In particular, the establishment of the 
American guerrilla organisation, the Leopard, which successfully reorganised a large number 
of guerrillas, accelerated blockade ships’ close co-operation with these anti-Communist 
irregulars.     
 This chapter explores the start and development of co-operation between Task Group 95.1 and 
the anti-Communist guerrillas from mid-December 1950 to early July 1951; just before the start 
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of the truce talks of the Korean War.1 It focuses on the guerrilla reorganisation process, which 
was conducted by the ROK Navy and EUSAK. It then discusses the Blockade Commanders’ 
changing positions toward their relationship with the guerrillas and the ensuing development of 
co-operation.   
 For this purpose, this chapter tracks the beginning of co-operation between these two groups. 
The early stage of their relationship, which commenced from mid-December 1950 by the ROK 
Navy’s liaison, is also briefly explained. Following this, the small-scale guerrilla reorganisation 
process, which was led by the ROK Navy, is then discussed. New accomplishments achieved 
in the course of co-operation with partly organised guerrillas and the emerging limitations are 
also examined. 
 Finally, this chapter examines the emergence of the Leopard organisation as the single 
authority of all guerrilla activities. It subsequently discusses the various developments in the 
naval-guerrilla co-operation, which was rapidly accomplished during their four months’ 
relationship. By focusing on this accomplishment, this chapter will show the changed naval 
operations brought about by this co-operation and the benefits gained by the western naval 
forces. It will also show that, despite the benefits, there had been a potential risk remaining in 
their relationship as this co-operation started without any confidence in the guerrilla 
organisation’s reliability. Such risks presented the limitations that underpinned the naval-
guerrilla relationship during the Korean War. 
 
 
4.1 The Beginning of Co-Operation with the Guerrillas 
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During his patrol as Commander of Task Element (CTE) 95.12, between 4 and 18 December, 
Captain Lloyd-Davies, the Commanding Officer (CO) of HMS Ceylon, acquired some very 
valuable and up-to-date intelligence in regard to the Communist activities. This was supplied 
by Captain Choi Hyoyong, the CO of ROKN PF 61, who was operating a rescue attempt for 
refugees from the mainland. Captain Lloyd-Davies was impressed with the value of intelligence 
supplied by the ROKN frigate, which had been previously unavailable.2  
 This intelligence was mainly collected by the North Korean anti-Communists, who were 
evacuated to the west coast islands by the support from ROK craft. In the course of supporting 
various North Korean refugees and anti-Communist irregulars, the ROK Navy was able to 
maintain contact with some of the guerrillas and collect up-to-date information regarding the 
Communist movements.3     
 ROK Navy’s gaining of new intelligence sources was welcome news for the blockade ships 
who had wanted to develop their intelligence collecting system. Therefore, Captain Lloyd-
Davies made arrangements with the ROK Navy on the west coast to make collecting 
intelligence a major part of its activities. Captain Choi agreed to detail one of his officers to act 
as an intelligence officer. In addition, he also arranged to send North Korean guerrillas onto the 
mainland to collect information, and, if any particularly valuable information was gathered, he 
was ordered to signal a request for a rendezvous.4 This indirect relationship continued during 
the subsequent blockade patrol. HMS Kenya (Captain P. W. Brock), who relieved HMS Ceylon, 
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frequently met the CO of PF 61 on Techong-do and received information of the Haeju and 
Chinnampo areas.5  
 However, except for this intelligence gathering, no further attempt was made for a while by 
the Blockade Commanders to build a closer relationship with the irregular anti-Communists. 
This position could be seen in the Blockade Commanders’ responses regarding the ROK naval 
crafts’ requests for the guerrilla support.  
 On 29 December 1950, HMS Kenya received information from the CO of PF 61. It stated that 
‘in the whole area south and west Pyongyang and east of Haeju, there were only about 2,000 
men of the North Korean Strugglers Army’.6 It also wrote that ‘these could be contained by 
ROK sympathizers if the latter [North Koreans] could be given arms and more ammunition’.7 
This short update was the first official report requesting the support for anti-Communist 
guerrillas to Task Group 95.1.8 As they could be used as a local intelligence team for the 
blockade naval forces, if properly supported and organised, Captain Choi reported the need of 
the anti-Communist support firstly to CTE 95.12.  
 This information, however, generated little interest at that time in Captain Brock, because he 
was not able to ensure that the ‘Struggler Army’ from North Korea truly were in the ‘right 
hands’.9 To Captain Brock, any direct relationship with these irregulars seemed dangerous as 
he had no basic information of their nature and activities.  
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for a message sent to HMS Kenya. Regarding the detailed information of this message, see sub-chapter 4.3.  
9 ADM 116/6218, HMS Kenya-Report of Proceedings from 1 to 31 December 1950, Appendix II. 
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 The fact that the operation of several thousand guerrilla forces on the west coast seemed very 
ineffective at that present time also influenced him.10 Since the EUSAK’s rapid retreat to Seoul 
in early December, there was no contact with the Communist forces on the west during last 
three weeks of December 1950. However, faced with the seemingly imminent Communist 
forces offensive, blockade naval forces were required to direct more attention to gunfire support 
for the EUSAK.11  
 
From the first day of 1951, the wartime situation of the west coast became less conducive for a 
closer relationship between the blockade ships and the anti-Communist guerrillas. Since the 
Chinese counter-offensive started on 31 December 1950, the UN Forces were compelled to 
withdraw from the 38th parallel area. Therefore, blockade naval forces’ main effort was required 
to focus more on the support of ground operations. Outnumbered by Communist forces, the 
EUSAK carried out an extremely rapid withdrawal south of the Han River. Seoul was once 
again occupied by the enemy on 3 January, and Kimpo airfield and Inchon followed suit two 
days later. During January 1951, the main naval interest on the west coast had to be centred on 
gunfire support for the friendly army, especially on Inchon and Pyongtaek, where the final 
stages of evacuation were in progress.12 For additional reinforcement of gunfire support, on 13 
January, Admiral Andrewes temporally decided to reduce TE 95.12 to one cruiser and two 
small ships.13 Due to this reduction, blockade ships were not able to pay attention to the early 
stage of guerrilla activities within their blockade area.  
                                           
10 Ibid. 
11 Field Jr., History of United States Naval Operations, Korea, pp. 307–8. 
12 Ibid, pp. 314–6; ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval 
Operations, Korea, 1950–53, pp. 109–10. 
13 Ibid., p. 112. 
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 At the same time, an additional problem emerged within the blockade area; the increase of 
unauthorised movement of small craft. This was directly related to the uncoordinated activities 
of various friendly clandestine organisations and irregular anti-Communists.14 As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, clandestine organisations began to appear soon after the war began, for 
the purpose of intelligence gathering based on the friendly islands. Although these were 
controlled by friendly forces, they were considered so secret that they were unknown to anyone 
else or, indeed, to each other.15 These clandestine activities increased following the Chinese 
forces’ intervention. To collect more Communist intelligence, inspired and overseen by the 
UNC, uncoordinated friendly movements in the blockade area doubled at that time.16  
 Additionally, large numbers of refugees and anti-Communist movements emerged in the 
blockade area. As mentioned in the latter part of Chapter 2, since the Chinese intervention, 
around 62,000 North Koreans took refuge in the Paengyong-do and the nearby small islands. 
In this area, there were also collectively almost 4,000 young guerrillas who were conducting 
amphibious anti-Communist activities. Large numbers of them continued their movement 
between the islands and the mainland for collecting food or guerrilla activities by using their 
sampans without knowledge of the Blockade Commanders.17    
 From an early stage of war, Admiral Andrewes had been worried about the clandestine 
activities that were operating without any notification of their movements to allied naval forces 
and with negligible or unreliable means of identification. As the performance of their missions 
necessitated breaking the blockade, it was essential for Admiral Andrewes to know how many 
organisations, including friendly ones, were operating on the west coast. However, he was not 
                                           
14 Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War, Vol. II (London: HMSO, 1995), pp. 301–2. 
15 ADM 1/27269, Report of Experience in Korean Operations, January–June 1951, Flag Officer, Second-in-
Command Far East Station, para. 57. 
16 Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War, Vol. II, pp. 301–2. 
17 ROK Navy Headquarters, The Korean War and the ROK Naval Operation, pp. 386–8. 
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able to acquire any information of such and he was dissatisfied with the current blockade 
situation.18 Therefore to Admiral Andrewes, the recent increase of uncoordinated movements, 
particularly the emergence of large irregular forces, created additional problems that could 
increase the instability of the west coast blockade. His concern over these activities is clearly 
revealed in his Report of Proceeding No. 30: 
 
Recently there have been numerous cases of small boat and other parties operating on the west coast 
of Korea without my knowledge. […] Apart from the lack of knowledge about the prospective 
movements of small craft off the coasts of Korea, it also seems that there is likely to be difficulty 
in recognising them as friend or foe.19 
 
In the situation where there was no proper friendly authority to organise and control these 
irregulars, to the Blockade Commanders, the issue of supporting the uncontrolled irregulars 
was regarded as increasing the confusion of the blockade situation. In addition to the guerrillas’ 
credibility-related problem and the naval forces’ heavy diversion from the blockade mission, 
the guerrillas’ uncontrolled movements within the blockade area became an additional 
challenge for the development of naval-guerrilla relationship. 
 These unfavourable conditions for closer relationships with the guerrillas intensified the 
Blockade Commanders’ negative position regarding the issue of supporting guerrillas. 
Therefore, when the ROK Navy’s requests of the guerrilla support were sent again during 
January 1951, CTE 95.12 had to reply with a flat refusal. For instance, in the meeting with 
Captain Choi on 9 January, Captain Lloyd-Davies was asked once again for ‘support for the 
                                           
18 ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval Operations, 
Korea, 1950–53, September 1967, pp. 121–2. 
19 ADM 1/22521, Korean War Reports of Proceedings No. 30 at Sasebo, 17 January and 6 February 1951, the 
Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East Station’s letter FO2FE/ 2960/11, dated 10 March 1951, p. 5. 
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friendly guerrillas still operating […] and arms and ammunition for the large numbers of recruits in 
these friendly islands’.20 This request, as before, was not supported.  
 On 15 January, an additional request was made from Captain Choi for the loan of several boats 
of TE 95.12 for the evacuation of small numbers of mainland guerrillas and refugees. This was 
a less demanding task for the Task Elements compared to the previous case. Invariably, the CO 
of HMS Kenya declined to help. This was because Captain Brock ‘did not feel justified in 
offering these hostages to fortune for an operation of uncertain duration and doubtful value’.21  
 Apart from their reluctance to support guerrillas, however, within the frame of the indirect 
relationship, the Blockade Commanders maintained attempts to utilise the guerrilla activities 
during January 1951. For instance, after returning from gunfire support for ground forces in 
Inchon, HMS Ceylon’s first destination as CTE 95.12 was Techong-do. This was to make 
contact with the senior officer of the ROKN for information gathering.22 
 On 19 January, a more active attempt to use the guerrilla activities for the blockade ships’ task 
was tried by Admiral Andrewes. He received a signal from CTF 95, stating that the enemy was 
operating a night-time train between Haeju and Ongjin and instructing him to ‘catch that train’. 
Admiral Andrewes decided to use the guerrillas known to operate on the mainland, and 
therefore he sent instructions to HMS Kenya to find out whether the guerrillas could destroy 
the train.23 In addition to passive intelligence collecting, Admiral Andrewes tried to use the 
guerrillas for this operational purpose.  
                                           
20 ADM 116/6213, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 19 December 1950 to 13 January 1951, HMS Ceylon, 
at Inchon, 2 February 1951, paras 19–20. 
21 ADM 116/6218, HMS Kenya-Report of Proceedings 1 to 27 January 1951, HMS Kenya, 29 January 1951, 
Appendix I. 
22 ADM 116/6213, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 19 December 1950 to 13 January 1951, paras 19–
20. 
23 ADM 1/22521, Korean War Reports of Proceedings No. 30 at Sasebo, 17 January and 6 February 1951, p. 4. 
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 This trial, however, did not yield any subsequent guerrilla activity due to the guerrillas’ 
incompetence in demolition and the ROK Navy’s limited contact with them. In the meeting 
with senior ROKN officers to determine whether the guerrillas could dispose of the train, 
Captain Brock was told by the CO of PC 704 that ‘he was not in communication with any 
guerrillas in the south of Hwanghae Province’ and ‘very much doubted whether there were any 
with training in demolition’.24 Therefore, Captain Brock reported to Admiral Andrewes that ‘it 
was unlikely that the guerrillas could carry out the necessary demolitions’.25   
 Whilst this could be regarded as evidence of the Blockade Commanders’ willingness to use 
the guerrillas more actively if needed, it also clearly showed their lack of understanding about 
guerrilla capability, nature and operational area. It meant that, at least until late January 1951, 
they had been largely ignorant of the anti-Communist activities within their blockade area. To 
the Blockade Commanders who had to be largely diverted to the support of ground forces and 
who were unsatisfied with the guerrilla’s chaotic movements within the blockade area, the 
guerrillas were no more than the uncontrolled North Korean irregulars which had potential as 
a useful intelligence source. This caused the Blockade Commanders’ indirect relationship with 
the North Korean irregulars at least until early February 1951.  
 
4.2 The Development of Co-Operation with the Guerrillas Controlled by the ROK Navy 
 
From late January, the mainland situation was changing. After the successful retreat to 
Pyongtaek, south of the Inchon area, the Communists began building an additional offensive, 
                                           
24 ADM 116/6218, HMS Kenya-Report of Proceedings 1 to 27 January, Appendix I. 
25 After which, this instruction was deemed incorrect by a report from USS Bataan. In this report, CTE 95.11 
mentioned that his aircraft had cut a track several times earlier, and this track between Haeju and Ongjin was in a 
poor condition. Hence the recent report about its use seemed unlikely. ADM 1/22521, Korean War Reports of 
Proceedings No. 30 at Sasebo, 17 January and 6 February 1951, p. 4. 
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but UN forces successfully counterattacked. By the end of January, the initiative had passed to 
UN Forces. Starting from 6 February, friendly forces steadily advanced toward the North and 
were able to recapture Inchon on 10 February.26  
 Throughout this period, the naval forces’ were heavily involved in the left flank ground 
operation. HMS Ceylon and two HMC ships, Nootka and Cayuga were used as reinforcements 
from the blockade patrol for gunfire support, interdiction and harassment fire. HMS Belfast 
subsequently took this responsibility from Ceylon. TG 95.1’s involvement continued until UN 
Forces recaptured Inchon. As the immediate crisis on the left flank was relieved and UN ground 
forces progressed steadily north, TG 95.1 was able to concentrate more on their main mission, 
the west coast Blockade.27 Eventually, a more favourable environment allowed them to focus 
on the issue of co-operation with the guerrillas.   
 With the gradual change of the war situation, there was also a remarkable change in the 
guerrilla organisation on the west coast islands; especially from Paengyong-do. Paengnyong-
do is the island located approximately 15 miles from the mainland, southwest of the Hwanghae 
Peninsular and two miles south of the 38th Parallel. It was large enough —almost 18 square 
miles — to support large numbers of troops, with prominent hills where radar and radio 
antennas could be installed. It also had a lengthy beach of hard-packed sand running northeast 
to southwest from the harbour. The depth of water was such that an Landing Ship Tank (LST) 
could moor on the beach at mid to high tide.28 There were around 4,000 young guerrillas on 
and around Paengyong-do who continued anti-Communist activities. 
 From mid-January, an early step in reorganising these irregulars commenced on this island, 
and the ROK Navy was the first to try to organise and utilise the guerrillas. Under the direction 
                                           
26 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. II, pp. 449–64.  
27 ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval Operations, 
Korea, 1950–53, pp. 114–9. 
28 Malcom, White Tigers, p. 19; Evanhoe, Dark Moon, p. 41. 
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of ROK Navy Headquarters in Pusan, a company of ROK Marines and 30 ROKN personnel 
were deployed to Paengyong-do, and Lieutenant Colonel Lee Huijeong, ROKN was ordered to 
command them. Although their main duty was island defence from enemy threat, Colonel Lee 
was also instructed to organise these guerrillas.29 In order to use them as a raiding, intelligence 
gathering and garrison party, Colonel Lee and his staff selected several hundred loyal anti-
Communist youths in Paengyong-do, and then, provided them basic military and 
communication trainings.30 War supplies such as rice, ammunition and weapons were also 
provided.31 After training, these anti-Communists were regrouped as thirty to fifty members 
into guerrilla units, with some employed as garrison forces, whilst others continued in 
intelligence gathering and guerrilla activities on the mainland.32  
 Simultaneously, the ROK Navy tried to expand the number of guerrilla groups which were in 
close communication. By supplying gunfire support and ammunition for guerrilla groups 
operating in the Chodo-Sokto area, additional contact lines were maintained in the area further 
north. For example, as a consequence of close support by the ROKN craft, No. 303 and No. 
304, quite regular contact was made with the largest guerrilla group from the Mountain Kuwol. 
Under the command of Captain Kim Jongbyuk, the ROK Army, around 2,500 men fled to the 
Chodo-Sokto area on 21 January.33 As they left a small group on the mainland and actively 
conducted amphibious operation, they supplied very valuable up-to-date enemy information.34 
                                           
29 ROK Navy Headquarters, The Korean War and the ROK Naval Operation, pp. 386–8. 
30 Ibid., pp. 388–9. 
31 These war supplies were supported by the EUSAK staff who were preparing to use the guerrillas for their large-
scale guerrilla operation. Evanhoe, Dark Moon, p. 37; for more detailed information of the EUSAK’s plan of the 
guerrilla operation, see sub-chapter 4.3.    
32 ROK Navy Headquarters, The Korean War and the ROK Naval Operation, pp. 388–9. 
33 Cho, The Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War, p. 266; Lim Jong Duk, the sub-leader of this guerrilla group 
reported that their strength was about 3,700 in his interview with an American Officer in 1952. U.S. Army Forces, 
Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, p. 112. 
34 In January 1951, they even attacked the enemy coastal area garrison under the 26th Brigade, IV Corps and 





Admiral Andrewes had been paying attention to the changes taking place with the guerrillas in 
Paengyong-do. As the deployment plan of ROK Marine garrison forces’ on Paengyong-do was 
started by Admiral Andrewes’s request on December 1950, for the defensive purpose of several 
important islands, the garrison reinforcement procedure had been conducted in close 
communication with the Blockade Naval Task Group.35 Therefore, Admiral Andrewes had 
information regarding the ROK garrison forces’ movements and their missions; which included 
ROK Navy’s plan to use ‘large parties of young men’ in the operation.36  
 As the ROK Navy was able to organise only a small proportion of the guerrillas on the west 
coast, it was not possible to expect it to adopt a role as a unified authority to command and 
control all the guerrilla activities, as yet. However, this early stage of guerrilla reorganisation 
sparked the Blockade Commanders’ interest. By watching the current changes in Paengyong-
do, they came to recognise additional availabilities of these irregulars, if they were controlled 
and trained by a friendly authority. In addition to their potential value as a useful intelligence 
source, the guerrillas’ availability as raiding and garrison forces for naval operation were also 
recognised by the Blockade Commanders.     
 With the war situation change that now allowed the Naval Task Group to focus more on the 
issues of blockade area, and the emergence of a friendly authority able to organise at least some 
of the guerrillas, the relationship with the guerrillas developed rapidly. This change began 
during the patrol period of Captain Lloyd-Davies as CTE 95.12 between 13 and 24 February. 
He had been interested in the activities of the guerrillas since December 1950 through 
                                           
35 ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval Operations, 
Korea, 1950–53, pp. 112–3. Regarding the detailed information of Admiral Andrewes’s request for the garrison 
forces, see Chapter 6.  
36 ADM 116/5794, Korean War Reports of Proceedings No. 29 at Sasebo, 6 January and 17 January 1951, the 
Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East Station’s letter FO2FE/2960/11, 18 February 1951, p. 12. 
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intelligence from the ROKN. He was particularly impressed by the guerrilla organisation 
operating from Paengyong-do under ROK Navy’s control as he realised the potential 
advantages that might accrue from raids by the guerrillas, supported by TE 95.12 and the ROK 
Patrol craft.37  
 The whole area from Inchon to Chinnampo seemed to be lightly held by North Korean troops. 
These troops were employed in a police role rather than a defensive one. Moreover, there were 
many beaches and places for amphibious landings, therefore, there was very little to prevent 
UN forces from walking ashore in that area.38  
 After returning from Inchon, Captain Lloyd-Davies initiated some actions to give shape to his 
idea. He immediately held several meetings with the CO of PC 704, PF 62 and some of the 
ROKN officers in command of the guerrillas. As a result of these, one guerrilla raid was actually 
planned. In his Report of Proceedings, Captain Lloyd-Davies described in detail his first plan 
of co-operation with the guerrillas as follows: 
 
It was agreed that a raid should be made on the village of Kujin-ni (XC 6240), where 150 
North Koreans had been reported with one or two field guns, which we intended to capture. 
If suitable, a follow up attack would be made on Hongga-ri (XC 6523), where there was a 
further batch of the enemy. The raid was to be conducted in three phases; the first was to land 
at night some guerrillas with Type 68 sets lent from Ceylon, for bombardment spotting; the 
Second was the landing of 200 guerrillas in two parties one either side of the town at dawn, 
followed immediately by the attack, supported by Ceylon, Consort and Amethyst. The whole 
raid was to last about 3 hours. CTE 95.11 had agreed to support the raid and the necessary planes 
were laid on.39 
 
                                           
37 ADM 116/6213, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 13 to 24 February 1951, HMS Ceylon, at Inchon, 27 
February 1951, para. 6. 
38 ADM 116/6211, HMS Belfast-Report of Proceedings 22 February to 6 March 1951, HMS Belfast, 6 March 
1951, p. 5. 
39 ADM 116/6213, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 13 to 24 February 1951, para. 6. 
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Unfortunately, this plan had to be called off owing to an unexpected, strong south-westerly gale. 
However, it provided a model for future co-operation to support guerrillas, involving naval 
support gunfire and air strikes.  
 Interestingly, in addition, Captain Lloyd-Davies tried a more developed way of co-operation. 
This involved organising a gunfire support team for guerrilla raids. He based the instruction on 
the Royal Navy’s bombardment procedure, in the operation of a Type 68 wireless telegraphy 
(W/T) set. This support team consisted of a small number of guerrillas under ROK Navy’s 
control. The training, on Techong-do, was conducted by his Signal Communication Officer and 
the Second Gunnery Officer. Because these guerrillas all had local knowledge of the west coast, 
Captain Lloyd-Davies planned to land them before their attack with the Type 68 set. He had 
intended to use them as gunfire spotters, but owing to the short time available to instruct the 
men, this plan did not result in a tangible outcome. However, he was satisfied with the 
progression of their training, stating that ‘they appeared to be coming along quite nicely, and 
it might be worth following up’.40 
 The most impressive part was his plan for ‘improving the arrangements’. In his report to 
Admiral Andrewes, Captain Lloyd-Davies suggested not only the need of guerrilla raid support 
and the continued training of the gunfire support team, but also the immediate supply of arms, 
ammunition and landing craft for the guerrilla operation which had been declined by the British 
Task Group. Moreover, he also suggested the need of an appropriate communication system 
and the detailing of a liaison officer to remain with them for better co-ordination and 
communication with the guerrillas. Captain Lloyd-Davies’s suggestions were specifically 
recorded in his last report during the Korean War as follows: 
 
                                           
40 Ibid., para. 7. 
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a. The immediate supply of arms and ammunition to Paengyong-do. The 4,000 recruits already 
there should then be capable of holding the islands against anything except a major amphibious 
attack, which the enemy is not at present capable of mounting, owing to lack of suitable craft 
[…]  
c. The provision of a few LCM’s or other suitable landing craft. These could be manned 
by ROK’s, and kept at Paengyong-do and would be used for raids on the mainland […]  
d. The detailing of a liaison officer (American or British) to be with the guerrillas and act as 
a permanent link between TE 95.12 and the guerrillas. 
e. A final “tie up” of communications with the ROK’s, guerrillas, Shoran and TE 95.12. […] In 
Ceylon, it was found we could compete with all stations by either having certain routine calling 
times, a constant loudspeaker listening watch, and one wave, permanently manned, to the 
principal ROK patrol craft for emergency. 
f. The training of guerrilla bombardment and reconnaissance team, who could land at night with 
Type 68 Sets lent from TE 95.12, prior to combined operations or for obtaining information. These 
are local men who know the country and there may be quite good possibilities in this. Techong Island 
makes a suitable place for training them. 
g. The provision of a suitable code for communications with the ROK’s and Paengyong-do. This 
code could be changed frequently and only used during operational periods. 41 
 
Although this was written as a form of suggestion, strictly speaking it was more than that. In 
fact, it was more akin to a master plan for the direction of future co-operation with the guerrillas.   
 However, Captain Lloyd-Davies seemed not to consider the provision of above mentioned war 
supplies should be made by the TG 95.1. He recognised the EUSAK’s plan to support the 
guerrillas, and he also helped with the transportation of ammunition for the guerrillas by request 
from the American organisation during this patrol period.42 Therefore, it seemed more proper 
to regard this suggestion as to draw more attention from Admiral Andrewes and other TE 
Commanders concerning the current ongoing issue of guerrilla support and reorganisation 
before Captain Lloyd-Davies’s departure from Korean waters. This was his last patrol in the 
Korean War.43  
                                           
41 Ibid., para. 12. 
42 For more detailed information regarding Captain Lloyd-Davies’s recognition of the EUSAK’s plan, see sub- 
chapter 4.4.  
43 HMS Ceylon was relieved as CTE 95.12 by HMS Belfast on 23 February and arrived at Sasebo the next day. 




 Unfortunately, Admiral Andrewes was not able to pay attention to this suggestion at that time. 
On 19 February, as directed by Washington, Admiral Andrewes took over the command of Task 
Force 95 from Admiral Allen E. Smith.44 Therefore, from that day, Admiral Andrewes assumed 
responsibility for the overall direction of operations on both coasts of Korea as CTF 95. This new 
command caused Admiral Andrewes a large amount of extra work. In fact, during the first 14 days 
of his command as CTF 95, his staff officers had to deal with 3,050 signals. As Admiral Andrewes 
commented, ‘Although […] not more than a small percentage of these signals reach me personally 
I find that the work of reading those that pass through the sieve is very large’.45  
 Due to this naval command change, the issue of co-operation with the guerrillas had to be handled 
based on each Blockade Commanders’ discretion for a while. Since Captain Lloyd-Davies’s 
last patrol, the Blockade Commanders concurred that the co-operation with the guerrilla could 
yield a more effective result for TG 95.1’s operations. Captain Sir Aubery St. Clair-Ford who 
relieved HMS Ceylon, reported on the possible value of the guerrillas’ amphibious operation 
after his patrol between 22 February and 6 March: ‘to prevent this would necessitate the enemy 
making a major effort and would cause a large deployment of troops, guns and transport to be 
made to that area.’46 Captain Brock who had declined the initial request of the ROKN regarding 
the guerrilla support, also agreed with the potential value of their co-operation, writing ‘It is 
clear […] that the ROKs [Guerrillas], with their offensive spirit and our control of the sea, could 
                                           
44 Since his promotion in December, Vice-Admiral Andrewes had been senior to Rear-Admiral Smith, at that time CTF 
95.1, and it was somewhat anomalous that he should be serving under the operational control of the junior officer. 
Therefore, Admiral Andrewes regarded the reason of this surprising appointment as ‘purely because of my own and 
Admiral Smith’s relative rank.’ ADM 1/22521, Korean War Reports of Proceedings No. 32, 16 February–15 March 
1951, the Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East Station’s letter FO2FE/2960/11, 31 March 1951, p. 3. 
45 Ibid., pp. 4–5. 
46 ADM 116/6211, HMS Belfast-Report of Proceedings 22 February to 6 March 1951, HMS Belfast, 6 March 
1951, p. 5. 
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represent much more than a pin prick to the enemy on the west coast, given proper training, planning 
and logistics’.47  
 Based on these positive positions, Captain Lloyd-Davies’s early endeavours to develop more 
active co-operation with the guerrillas were continued by subsequent CTE 95.12s. A prominent 
result was gained, firstly in their intelligence gathering. HMS Belfast was able to contact more 
guerrilla groups via ROK Navy and collected more target information. In particular, intelligence 
from Captain Kim’s guerrilla group on Chodo-Sokto area was very useful, and as a result of 
extended intelligence sources, HMS Belfast could get much target intelligence. On 28 February, 
Captain Sir Clair-Ford reported some of this received intelligence in his Report of Proceedings, 
as follows:  
 
(a) 270 troops in Songyo-ri XC 5524  
(b) 15 men with one machine gun (caliber unknown) in a cave on hillside XC 4623 
(c) 40 troops just west of Hongga-ri XC 6524 
(d) About 700 troops are believed to be located in the area of Changyon XC 8435. 
(e) 270 troops in Soktan-ni XC 8166. They are probably there to check guerrilla activity by 
ROK forces operating from Ung-do.48   
 
As this report showed, this target information contained an approximation of enemy numbers 
and their location. It also indicated the probable purpose of the enemy activities. This was the 
most detailed target information for the Task Group’s gunfire and air strikes, which had been 
previously unavailable. Based on this information, HMS Belfast carried out several direct 
bombardments on the enemy’s beach defensive positions and also conducted indirect 
bombardment using air-spotting from USS Bataan, CTE 95.11.49 In addition, HMS Belfast 
                                           
47 ADM 116/6218, HMS Kenya-Report of Proceedings 1 February to 14 March 1951, HMS Kenya, 5 April 1951, 
para. 5. 
48 ADM 116/6211, HMS Belfast-Report of Proceedings 22 February to 6 March 1951, HMS Belfast, 6 March 
1951, Appendix I. 
49 On 2 March, ships carried out a direct bombardment of a possible beach defensive position and troop concentrations. 
On 3rd, Belfast carried out four 6 inch indirect bombardments, against buildings reported by ROK Intelligence to contain 
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passed on information which might be useful for air strikes to USS Bataan, and the aircraft also 
conducted bombardments on the guerrillas’ targets.50  
 The issue of naval support for guerrilla raids was also discussed throughout this patrol period. 
In a meeting on 4 March, onboard HMS Belfast with Captain Kim (the Chodo-Sokto guerrilla 
leader), Captain Clair-Ford learned about the guerrilla leader and his agents’ previous mainland 
activities and was impressed by their considerable success. Therefore, after learning about 
further planned raids in the next few days, Captain Clair-Ford decided to support them. As HMS 
Belfast had soon to be relieved by HMS Kenya, he told Captain Kim to contact HMS Kenya to 
obtain naval and air support if required.51 At that time, Captain Kim’s guerrilla group was not 
controlled by any friendly authorities, which meant that CTE 95.12 would support guerrilla 
raids if required, not only under the ROK Navy, but also the uncontrolled groups.  
 Finally, during HMS Kenya’s patrol as CTE 95.12, the first gunfire support for the guerrilla 
raid was carried out. Following an urgent call from a ROKN craft on 8 March which was 
supporting a guerrilla landing on the mainland nearby Chodo, HMS Kenya proceeded to the 
area and supported with gunfire.52  
 
By early March, co-operation with the guerrillas became one of the main objectives of the Task 
Element. This can be confirmed by comments in Captain Brock’s final report of the Korean 
War. It stated that ‘During out last patrol, the main object, in addition to maintenance of the 
                                           
troops, using aircraft spotting. Next day, spotting aircraft were again available, and indirect bombardment was carried out 
by Belfast with air-spot of a locality recently reported to contain enemy troops: Ibid., Appendix III. 
50 Amongst the target information received on 28 February A. A. guns in the town of Changyon area (XC 8435) 
were attacked by USS Bataan’s Corsairs: Ibid., Appendix I. 
51 Ibid.,  




blockade and discouraging renewed mine-laying, have been […] supporting the ROK’s 
[guerrillas] in this area.’53  
 However, after several relationships with the guerrillas by ROKN liaison, some significant 
problems were also clearly revealed. Primarily, these problems accrued from lack of a 
communication system. At that time, most of the guerrillas were not equipped with a proper 
radio system, therefore communication between the guerrillas and blockade ships was only able 
to be conducted by ROKN craft. Therefore, the way of collecting up-to-date information from 
the guerrillas was to proceed to friendly islands such as Chodo, Sokto and Paengyong-do with 
a ROK naval vessel. If they were not able to contact guerrilla leaders on the islands, however, 
intelligence was unavailable.54 Therefore, to pass information directly, a guerrilla leader in 
Chodo requested the supply of a wireless radio in his meeting with the CO of HMS Belfast. 
Owing to the lack of radios in his Task Element, however, this request was not satisfied.55 
 Due to this reason, TG 95.1’s timely and effective support for guerrilla activity also became 
largely limited. In fact, the first gunfire support for the guerrilla raid was not carried out 
smoothly. As mentioned in Captain Brock’s report, this support was conducted ‘in the absence 
of more information and co-ordination’, thus ‘a blind preliminary bombardment in the dark 
would be useless, if not dangerous to our allies’.56  
 Naval air support for the guerrillas also caused a similar problem. From late February, CTE 
95.11 received emergency calls from ROKN craft requesting air strikes for guerrillas. The 
commander of USS Bataan also expressed his dissatisfaction in his Action Report as follows: 
 
Requests from naval surface forces on the west coast for air spot services and immediate 
strikes against coastal targets frequently have been received with insufficient details to permit 
                                           
53 Ibid., para. 4. 
54 ADM 116/6211, HMS Belfast-Report of Proceedings 12 to 21 March 1951, HMS Belfast, para. 12. 
55 ADM 116/6211, HMS Belfast-Report of Proceedings 22 February to 6 March 1951, Appendix I, para. 8. 




their being fulfilled promptly. Most frequently lacking are communications instructions, 
designation of the coordinating agency, strike clearance information, and time limitations.57  
 
Both cases show that guerrilla support was conducted without appropriate communication, thus 
ineffective and dangerous support ensued.  
 However, supply of communication systems and direct connection with the guerrillas was not 
a proper solution for this problem as this supply might cause various guerrilla to increase the 
number of careless emergency calls made. Since there was still no appropriate authority to 
control and screen the various guerrilla activities, setting up direct communication would 
essentially cause an increase in unwanted diversions of blockade ships away from their main 
mission in order to support guerrilla activities of doubtful value.  
 In fact, by early March 1951, most guerrillas were still operating without proper command 
and control. Although the ROK Navy controlled some of the guerrillas, it was not possible to 
expect its staff to do more than support the several hundred guerrillas on Paengyong-do and 
maintaining irregular contact with several guerrilla groups scattered on the islands. It had no 
proper resources to organise large numbers of irregulars under a unified command and control 
system. Although, from mid-February, a detachment from EUSAK earnestly commenced 
guerrilla reorganisation based in Paengyong-do, it was not until mid-March that this American 
organisation established the command system of large groups of guerrillas.58 Therefore, large 
parts of guerrilla activities were conducted without the Task Group’s knowledge, and their calls 
for gunfire support were also received without any previous planning, screening or co-
ordination.  
                                           
57 USS Bataan CVL 29, Action Report: period 15 January 1951–7 April 1951, 17 April 1951, pp. Part VI, 3–4. 
58 On 14 March, by joining of Captain Kim’s guerrillas on Chodo, this American guerrilla organisation had grown 
to about 3,000 strength. U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, 
Part IV, p. 78; for more information, see sub-chapter 4.3.  
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 The absence of authority was also problematic in that there were no proper means of 
controlling the guerrillas’ pursuit of their own private wars. As the guerrillas were North Korean 
irregulars with different motivations that were liable to engage in private conflicts, blockade 
ships needed to be very careful that any engagement of targets was not simply to support the 
private interests of guerrillas in carrying out rice raids or settling personal grudges against local 
North Koreans. In fact, there were some reports noting the guerrillas’ conduct in personal 
conflict, especially concerning rice raids.59  
 Under this situation, blockade ships’ direct communication with the guerrillas could do 
more harm than good. Even before setting up of any the communication system with the 
guerrillas, in fact, these uncoordinated requests caused blockade forces to be diverted from their 
main mission. As the CO of USS Bataan wrote, ‘apparently urgent requests have caused flights 
to be diverted from targets’ thus it ‘caused considerable inconvenience in the rescheduling of 
flights’.60 Diversions from the main mission were particularly frequent amongst ROK naval 
craft who maintained close contact with the guerrillas. This meant activities such as those 
concerning inshore blockades and anti-mine missions were often diverted from their primary 
duties.61 A more fundamental problem was that these activities conducted without Blockade 
Commanders’ knowledge essentially infringed the naval blockade, increasing the risk of 
possible accidents. 62  
   
                                           
59 HMS Kenya’s naval gunfire support on 8 March 1951 was for the guerrillas’ rice raid. ADM 116/6218, HMS 
Kenya-Report of Proceedings 1 February to 14 March 1951, HMS Kenya, para. 6. Other reports also mentioned 
their raids for ‘settling a grudge against the local money-lender’ and ‘local feuds against the gang leader’s mother-
in-law’: ADM 116/6211, HMS Belfast-Report of Proceedings 12 to 21 March 1951, HMS Belfast, CTG 95.1’s 
Comments, 5 April 1951; ADM 116/6231, Report of Experience in Korean Operations, July 1951–June 1952, Part 
3. 
60 USS Bataan CVL29, Action Report: period 15 January–7 April 1951, 17 April 1951, p. Part VI, 4. 
61  ADM 116/6211, HMS Belfast-Report of Proceedings 12 to 21 March 1951, HMS Belfast, CTG 95.1’s 
Comments, 24 March 1951. 




These limitations generated Admiral Andrewes’s prudent attitude towards close co-operation 
with the guerrillas. By watching several instances of co-operation, Andrewes was assured that 
without the establishment of proper authority to control and co-ordinate all the guerrilla 
activities, communication with the guerrillas might divert blockade ships’ attention towards 
these guerrilla activities which had doubtful value and motivation. In particular, he emphasised 
to his Task Group that the guerrillas must be involved only in programmed operations.63 In 
other words, he agreed with his Task Group’s co-operation with the guerrillas, if it was co-
ordinated with TG 95.1, and its purpose was compatible with their missions. Due to these 
fundamental problems the early stage of co-operation with the irregulars faced great challenges. 
 One of the interesting points was that, notwithstanding fundamental problems, CTG 95.1 
decided to continue direct relationship with these irregulars, albeit in a prudent manner. To the 
Blockade Commanders, it was imperative to maintain contact with the guerrillas who had 
potential value as a local intelligence team and raiding forces for the naval operation.  
 Fortunately, there was hopeful news for TG 95.1; the commencement of large-scale 
organisational changes amongst the guerrilla parties by the initiative of the EUSAK 
Headquarters. This initiative was to utilise them for behind line operations based in Paengyong-
do. Admiral Andrewes also recognised these changes.64 With the hope of establishing appropriate 
authority to control the activities of the various guerrillas, he watched these changes carefully. 
However, his position on this reorganisation was very clear; avoid exerting any influence that 
might cause TG 95.1’s deeper involvement.65 
 
                                           
63 ADM 116/6213, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 13 to 24 February, 1951, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 
19 April 1951. 
64 Admiral Andrewes recognised this organisational change at least during Captain Lloyd-Davies’s last patrol 
period. For more detailed information, see sub-chapter 4.4. 
65 ADM 116/6218, HMS Kenya-Report of Proceedings 1 February to 14 March 1951, HMS Kenya, 5 April 1951, 
CTG 95.1’s Comments, 5 April 1951. 
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4.3 Code Name ‘Leopard ’: Guerrilla Reorganisation under the EUSAK 
 
On 8 January, 1951, ten days after the report of the ROKN PF 61 regarding the activities of the 
guerrillas, the EUSAK headquarters in Taegu received a radio message from the CTG 95.7, 
charge of ROK Navy, stating that:   
 
Incomplete info indicates majority reptd [reported] 10,000 volunteers in Hwanghae Province 
West of Haeju and Sariwon are armed with Japanese rifles model 99 and 38. Russian rifles type 
unknown and some US Carbines. Contact has been ordered to ascertain approx nmbrs 
[approximate numbers] each types. Suitable dropping site for air drops. Additional information, 
related subject, does EUSAK control any stocks Japanese ammunition. Believe many 
serviceable rifle are available which might be used by volunteer groups if ammunition could be 
made available.66 
 
This message reported the existence and activity of voluntary irregulars with the request of 
ammunition supply. It contained very similar, but more specific information regarding the 
current situation of the guerrillas to the previously received report from the ROKN PF 61. 
However, the EUSAK headquarters’ reaction to this message was different compared to that of 
TG 95.1. EUSAK headquarters showed more interest in this rather cryptic message. Amongst 
the EUSAK staff who quickly recognised the guerrillas’ potential was Colonel John G. McGee, 
EUSAK G-2 staff and a veteran of guerrilla operations during the Second World War. Colonel 
McGee immediately sent a message to TG 95.7 asking about the weapons possessed by these 
guerrillas, the approximate number of these guerrillas and any other information that TG 95.7 
could supply.67 On the same day McGee was able to receive a reply stating that the guerrillas 
were armed with ‘700 Russian rifles, 80 US rifles M1, 20 US Carbine, 200 Jap [Japanese] 
                                           
66  U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, Supporting 
Document, p. 71. 
67 Ibid., p. 72. 
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Model Niti 9, and 100 Jap [Japanese] Model 38’ with a request for ammunition for ‘100 rds 
[rounds] per rifle’.68   
  
In fact, after the onset of war, Far East Command (FEC) had planned to organise unconventional 
warfare units to relieve the pressure on the UN forces from the NKPA. This was to be through 
guerrilla operations behind enemy lines. By the lead of FEC’s G-3 Miscellaneous Division, 
headed by Colonel McGee, a plan for guerrilla warfare was progressed. 69  Initially, he 
considered the use of North Korean refugees in South Korea because guerrillas should be 
familiar with the layout of the land around their operational area in North Korea. However, after 
his visit to the thousands of North Korean refugees in Taegu and Pusan, he was disappointed in 
that they were not willing to return to their homeland as guerrillas.70 The only remaining hope 
was to try to connect with anti-Communist activities in North Korea. However, their activities 
were not well known to UN Headquarters at that time. And, on August 1950, his plan for 
unconventional warfare was cancelled.71 
 The concern over guerrilla warfare was reignited in late 1950, as the front line temporarily 
stabilised around the 37th parallel. This was because of the EUSAK’s belief that the guerrillas’ 
amphibious raid on the rear side of the enemy would cause effective harassment on the 
concentration of the North Korean and Chinese Armies on the front line. In the situation where 
UN forces were badly outnumbered by the NKPA and CCF, a new attempt to relieve the pressure 
from the Communist forces was essential.72  
                                           
68 Ibid., p. 73. 
69 At that time, McGee was a head of FEC’s G-3. Malcom, White Tigers, p. 15. 
70  John H. McGee, ‘McGee letter to Colonel Rod Paschall’, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania, 24 March 1986, p. 4. 
71 Cho, The Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War, p. 132. 
72 Seibert, The Regulars, p. 189. 
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 Therefore, a message from the TG 95.7 that arrived early January was very timely in that it 
acted as an accelerator for the organisation of guerrilla units. McGee started to plan an operation 
for these poorly trained guerrillas. By 13 January, McGee quickly made a plan for 
unconventional warfare and reported to FEC through a memorandum, in order to deploy 
resources to these anti-Communists.73  
 On 15 January, FEC authorised the formation of the Attrition Section within the Miscellaneous 
Division (later 8086th Army) of G-3. For the first step of the guerrilla operation, McGee 
assigned Major William A. Burke as his executive officer, and then he ordered Burke to secure 
war supplies for the guerrilla operation. Led by Major Burke, an armour officer of FEC G-3, a 
US Army group headed for Pusan to scrounge rice, and capture ammunitions, weapons and 
radios for the guerrillas. These war supplies were loaded on the ROK Naval craft which headed 
for Paengyong-do. Burke supplied his shipments to the guerrillas on Paengyong-do for use in 
defending the island, not for their guerrilla operation because he was not able to contact forces 
on the mainland.74 However, he was able to collect specific first-hand information from the 
guerrillas on the island. On Paengyong-do, Burke conducted interrogations with his staff officer, 
and gathered information of the current situation on Paengyong-do. In particular, by contacting 
each guerrilla leader, they collected details on the strength, equipment, supply needs and other 
valuable information on each group.75 Simultaneously, Burke started searching for a guerrilla 
headquarters base amongst the islands on the west coast from which partisans could launch 
raids behind enemy lines. He was able to find an optimal place on Paengnyong-do.76    
                                           
73  U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, Supporting 
Document, pp. 65–6. 
74 Evanhoe, Dark Moon, pp. 38–9. 
75 U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, pp. 62–4. 
76 Malcom, White Tigers, p. 19. 
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 As McGee approved Paengnyong-do for the headquarters, the follow-up procedure was being 
conducted. Major Burke was assigned the commander of headquarters, named Task Force 
WILLIAM ABLE, and he assembled his staff containing five members; that is three officers, 
one staff sergeant and a private.77 Simultaneously, based on Plan ABLE, initially contrived by 
McGee and later revised by Burke, they outlined the operational plan for guerrillas. 78 
According to this plan, command and control over guerrillas would be handled by the EUSAK 
Headquarters in Taegu. Also, co-ordination with naval forces on the west coast for guerrilla 
support would be conducted by the FEC. To make up for the guerrillas’ lack of military 
experience, the establishment of bases for the training of intelligence gathering, demolitions, 
communications and basic infantry tactics were to be started on the offshore islands. It was 
planned that these guerrillas would be commanded by an American officer responsible for all 
guerrilla training and operations, as well as the use of all United Nations radio nets.79 Supply 
to the guerrillas was a self-help based system once the initial requirements had been supplied. 
Therefore, the guerrillas had to depend on themselves for their supplies, such as food and 
equipment, in the course of their operation.80 This plan also specified the main purpose for the 
guerrilla operation as follows:  
 
The first phase envisaged the training of partisan cadres on the secure island bases available. 
These cadres were then to be sent back behind enemy lines to form cell units that could 
organize other local dissidents. It was also anticipated that they would be able to gather 
intelligence and perform sabotage missions of a covert nature. The second phase of the plan 
contemplated the use of these partisans in conjunction with a UN offensive to the north in the 
spring of 1951. The interior partisan cells were to be sufficiently well organized by that time 
so that when supplied on a large scale they could expand into a strong force in support of the 
regular UN effort. Two types of units were conceived a ‘base unit’ and a ‘mobile unit.’ The 
base units were to train partisans and stage attacks from island bases and be capable of 
                                           
77 Evanhoe, Dark Moon, pp. 38–9. 
78 Regarding the full text of the Plan ABLE, see Appendix 5.   
79 ‘Copy of Operations Plan “Able” Prepared by Miscellaneous Division, G3, Eighth Army, 23 Jan 51’, in Cleaver 
et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, Appendix E., pp. 158–62. 
80 Ibid., p. 52. 
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infiltrating men to the enemy rear. The mobile units were to operate on the mainland behind 
the lines and be capable of supporting themselves in the interior.81 
 
Based on this plan, the EUSAK’s primary purpose did not directly coincide with the Blockade 
Commanders’ expectation that this organisation would act as a controller and co-ordinator of 
all guerrilla activities and became a valuable intelligence source for the naval blockade 
operation. As mentioned above, this American organisation’s main purpose was neither for 
introducing an additional intelligence agency nor for the proper co-ordination with TG 95.1. In 
particular, since the start of second phase of plan which intended to use the guerrillas for the 
support of the UN ground forces’ offensive operation, the guerrillas’ relationship with the 
blockade ships would be largely restricted. However, at least during the first phase of plan, the 
possibility was opened between the two groups for better co-operation, particularly in the 
intelligence supply and co-ordination with naval forces. During the guerrillas’ activities to form 
inland ‘cell units’, enemy intelligence was expected to be collected as a by-product. The need 
of co-ordination with friendly naval forces on the west coast for guerrilla support also 
essentially required closer relationship with TG 95.1.  
 
From early February 1951, Burke tried to contact local guerrilla leaders in earnest. During his 
short tour to the islands on the west coast, he was encouraged, as he found around 2,000 
guerrillas scattered on the island. He met some of their leaders and explained the Plan ABLE. 
Colonel McGee also visited Paengyong-do and met guerrilla leaders. There, he informed them 
that the ‘Eighth United States Army and its United Nations members were now preparing 
another advance into North Korea which would liberate their people’.82 He urged them ‘of the 
                                           
81 Ibid., pp. 40–1. 
82 McGee, ‘McGee letter to Colonel Rod Paschall’, p. 12. 
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need for guerrilla help in the form of raids, ambushes, information, assistance to downed airmen 
and support of the final liberating advance’.83  
 On 15 February, the date of arrival to Paenyong-do of the WILLAM ABLE staff, Burke was 
able to accomplish a tangible result. A guerrilla group of thirty-seven members from Sinchon 
led by Chang Jae Hwa agreed to be the first subunit of the EUSAK. They had been members 
of the intelligence corps of the ROK Navy since mid-January and had worked with them before 
they decided to work with the American organisation.84 Subsequently, twenty-six members 
from Changyon, led by Chang Sok Lin, became an additional subunit from 6 March.85 On 14 
March, one of the largest groups of up to 2,500 members led by Captain Kim Jongbyuk joined.86 
Almost two weeks later, another large group of 800 student guerrillas from Sunwi-do, Owha-
do and Kirin-do also became a unit of this new American organisation.87  
 Immediately following recruitment of the first guerrilla unit, 15 days of demolitions and 
communications training followed.88 After the start of the training, the guerrilla members 
suggested the names of the overall unit and the subunits respectively ‘Leopard’ and ‘Donkey’. 
As a symbol of a stealthy and speedy hunter, the name of ‘leopard’ reflected their desired way 
of operating.89 The origins of the Donkey relate to the donkey-shaped generator for the radio. 
A guerrilla member was responsible for this name which was based on a whim.90 As Burke 
approved these names, Task Force WILLAM ABLE changed their name to Leopard, and 
subunits became Donkey 1, 2, 3 etc.91  
                                           
83 Ibid.  
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 On 3 March, the first guerrilla unit was sent to the mainland with radio contact to obtain 
intelligence on enemy activities. 92  The American-led guerrilla base Leopard initiated its 
activities in earnest. 
 
4.4 The Development of Co-Operation with the Leopard Organisation 
 
TG 95.1 recognised the guerrillas’ organisational changes led by the EUSAK on Paengyong-
do, at least from mid-February. During Captain Lloyd-Davies’s last patrol in Korea, he supplied 
ammunition for guerrillas by the request from the EUSAK.93 He also tried to contact Major 
Burke to confer with him about the plan for deploying the guerrillas. Although he was not able 
to meet Major Burke who being in Pusan at that time, records show that TG 95.1 was well 
aware of the EUSAK’s plan for utilising the guerrilla.94 
 The Blockade Commanders formed a direct relationship with this American organisation right 
after the start of its first guerrilla unit’s activity. Based on the operational record of HMS Belfast, 
blockade ships collected intelligence from Leopard Headquarters for the preparation of a feint 
landing operation planned on 5 March 1951.95 However, except for this intelligence gathering, 
they did not show any further action for closer co-operation with this organisation. Their 
attitude towards this American organisation was one of prudent observation rather than being 
actively involved. As mentioned in a previous section, the Blockade Commanders tried not to 
                                           
92 ‘The Narrative of the Leader of Donkey 1, Mr. Chang Jae Hwa. 4 Nov 1952’, in U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 
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be deeply involved with guerrilla activities, and they were mindful of any of infringement of 
the US Army’s primary responsibility for these irregulars.96      
 It was the EUSAK Headquarters’ official request for naval support in early March for the 
guerrilla operation which caused the Blockade Commanders’ to become more actively involved 
in Leopard’s activity. On 8 March, a message received from the EUSAK Headquarter to CTF 
95 stated; ‘Request RN Officer your TF [TF 95] visit this HQ for conference on support 
friendly guerrilla activities Western Coastal area.’97 Via this message, arrangements were 
initiated for applying naval co-operation with the Leopard organisation.  
 Admiral Andrewes replied the next day stating that he wanted to hold a conference onboard 
HMS Belfast on 14 March and requested the EUSAK to send representatives.98 Concurrently, 
he arranged for the CO, HMS Belfast to make contact with representatives of the EUSAK and 
the ROK Navy, to improve and secure communications.99 During his patrol period between 12 
and 21 March, Captain Clair-Ford paid closer attention to Chinnampo-Haeju and the nearby 
islands to clarify the guerrillas’ activities, using special reference to the guerrillas’ 
command and organisational change.100 Simultaneously, on 14 March, he held a meeting 
onboard which was attended by Colonel McGee and Colonel Thompson of the 1st Corps, the 
CO of USS Eldorado (CTG 90.1) as well as officers from his own ship. In this conference, 
Captain Clair-Ford required as complete information as possible about the guerrilla groups on 
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the islands off the Hwanghae Province. As a result of this request, the current situation of 
friendly guerrillas in the west coast was given by Colonel McGee as follows: 
 
1) Area controlled by guerrillas now operating under control of EUSAK and CTG 95.7 
include all islands off the Hwanghae peninsula from Han Estuary to Sokto Island at the mouth 
of Taedong River. Three friendly groups are located on the peninsula. 
2) Strength is estimated as 12,000. 
3) Communication is by means of radio. One net from Paengyong-do to stations on Chodo 
and mainland. The other net from Island to EUSAK. 
4) Arms in hands of friendly guerrillas is estimated at approximately 1,000 rifles and a few 
crew served weapons.  
5) The guerrilla mission of initial covert small attrition actions against enemy supply system 
and subsequently, on arming, for an overt supporting effort to an attack of the Eight Army.101 
 
The conference also discussed the problem of liaison, communication and intelligence 
dissemination between the EUSAK, TG 95.1, I Corps and the ROK Navy and Marines. It ended 
with the following conclusions:  
 
The blockade fleet will periodically put ashore at Paengyong-do a boat to contact Major 
Burke and secure intelligence of the Hwanghae Area. If it becomes necessary a liaison officer 
from blockade fleet will be placed on Paengyong-do. The possibility of netting the Island 
Radio with the blockade fleet will be considered.102  
 
Through this conference, they were able to draw general agreements in regard to the way of co-
operation with the Leopard organisation. Unlike the Blockade Commanders’ previous 
relationships with the guerrillas, which had been maintained based on their personal discretion, 
the first step toward systemic co-operation was taken by the establishment of the American 
guerrilla organisation.  
 Based on this early co-operation system, their way of co-operation developed rapidly. In 
particular, from late March, meaningful results ensued in four different areas; intelligence 
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supply, guerrilla use for naval operation, naval support for guerrilla activity and co-ordination 
of guerrilla movement. Needless to say, these developments also directly influenced the pattern 
of western naval forces’ operation.     
 
  Intelligence Supply from the Leopard  
 
One of the most impressive accomplishments of the above-mentioned meetings was the 
improvement of intelligence supply from the guerrillas. Firstly, as an attempt had been made 
by the EUSAK to get an appropriate authority to control the activities of the various guerrilla 
groups, the process of collecting information became simpler and more systematic. Starting 
from the guerrilla party from Sinchon, most of the guerrillas, which were under the control of 
ROKN, gradually integrated into the command and control of the Leopard organisation.103 
Moreover, irregulars who were operating independently, such as Captain Kim’s guerrillas on 
Chodo, were also accepted under the control of this American organisation. Therefore, ships 
of TE 95.12 could gather intelligence covering a wide range of area from one resource, 
Leopard Headquarters on Paengyong-do, very effectively.  
 The amount and quality of intelligence received from Leopard also increased considerably. 
From early March, after a short period of training, Leopard’s Headquarters deployed 
guerrillas on the mainland to obtain intelligence. They employed a radio system which was 
netted with the high-powered radio on the Paengyong-do Base. This was in accordance with 
the order from Major Burke to concentrate on intelligence gathering during the initial stage of 
the guerrilla operation.104 Lack of experience and training in conducting traditional guerrilla 
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operations also led the guerrillas to focus on the relatively easy work of collecting 
information.105  
 As a result, from early April, the Task Element 95.12 received a large number of target 
intelligence reports from the Leopard Headquarters by signals or hand messages. For example, 
between 16 and 30 April during HMS Belfast’s patrol as CTE 95.12, more than sixty target 
information items were received covering the overall area of Hwanghae Province. This 
information covered intelligence on enemy’s offshore activities, such as floating mine laying 
and small boat movements, and also mainland activities such as troop movement, the location 
of enemy Battalion Headquarters and A. A. gun positions.  
 HMS Belfast conducted gunfire bombardments based on this target intelligence and also 
passed on information of possible interest to CTE 95.11, HMS Theseus and USS Bataan.106 
The Carrier Borne Air Liaison Officer of HMS Theseus made the following comments 
regarding the supply of Leopard targets: 
 
We are now receiving […] rather more intelligence information, from the ROK agents and 
naval patrols, of enemy activities, positions and movements, chiefly in the area West of a line 
from Haeju to Chinnampo. […] some of it is very useful, and justifies recces and strikes by 
us. Some of today’s targets were planned on this ROK intelligence material.107 
     
The CO of USS Bataan also expressed his satisfaction in his report about Leopard targets, 
saying that ‘intelligence received from ROK sources through CTE 95.12 has been exceptionally 
accurate and detailed’.108 His comments showed that it was not only the amount but also the 
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quality of intelligence which improved radically during this period. In particular, the Leopard’s 
timely intelligence supply increased in quality. The supply of radio equipment to the guerrillas 
and the establishment of communication system with the Leopard Headquarters largely reduced 
the time for intelligence delivery. This US captain’s following comments clearly showed this 
development; ‘At first this information was received several days late, but since the 
establishment of Major Burke on Paengyong-do it has been very timely’.109 
 Blockade ships’ endeavour to obtain the latest intelligence also improved intelligence supply 
from the Leopard. As the majority of target intelligence was usually passed directly by Major 
Burke or his staff officers’ hand messages, the blockade fleets tried to contact American 
officers on Paengyong-do as frequently as possible. During his patrol as CTE 95.12 from 10 
to 17 April, HMAS Warramunga instructed ROK craft under his command to concentrate on 
collecting up-to-date intelligence from Leopard officers.110 HMS Belfast, the subsequent CTE 
95.12 visited the Leopard base four times to contact with Leopard officers. As Captain Clair-Ford 
commented, to the Blockade Commanders, ‘It is essential to keep in close touch with this most 
valuable source of information.’111 
 
In fact, according to the EUSAK Headquarters’ plan for the Guerrilla Warfare, intelligence 
gathering was a by-product of guerrilla operations. Although there was an agreement between 
TG 95.1 and Leopard regarding the dissemination of intelligence, it was not the American 
officers’ duty to supply all the information acquired by their guerrilla agents. Moreover, the 
Leopard organisation was planned to use the guerrillas for the EUSAK’s premised offensive on 
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spring 1951. Therefore, when there was additional direction from the EUSAK, the Leopard had 
to shift their activity from current intelligence gathering to offensive operation.  
 The inauguration of this offensive phase, however, had to be delayed due to the CCF’s Spring 
Offensive between April and May 1951. Therefore, during this period, the EUSAK 
Headquarters made no additional directions requiring the guerrillas’ change of current 
activities. 112  Instead, interestingly, they directed the Leopard Headquarters to put more 
emphasis on the target information for the Naval Forces in mid-April.113  
 Therefore, the task of intelligence supply to the ships of TG 95.1 was left to American officers’ 
discretion who were controlling the guerrillas. Although it was not their duty to supply all the 
information gathered by their guerrillas, Leopard officers were very co-operative in supplying 
information for naval craft. This was largely due to each naval commander’s endeavours to 
build good relationships with Leopard officers. To collect the latest information available, ships 
of TEs needed to visit Leopard Headquarters frequently. When collecting this intelligence, they 
provided Leopard officers with special services such as warm baths, western-style meals, hot 
coffees and mail deliveries in recognition of Leopard’s efforts.114 These officers were living in 
poor conditions on the islands.115 At least to ‘get a cup of coffee and a decent meal aboard 
ship’, American officers preferred to supply intelligence to the blockade ships in person.116 
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 Based on this friendly relationship with Leopard officers, a more developed way of co-
operation in their intelligence supply was achieved from May 1951, involving Leopard’s supply 
of ‘After Bombardment reports’ for the British Task Group. It was not clear from when TG 
95.1 started to receive these reports from Leopard. Based on the operational records of Task 
Elements which mention these, it can be estimated that Leopard started to supply such to CTE 
95.11 from May and to CTE 95.12 from mid-June.117 These reports obtained by Leopard agents 
on the mainland contained brief information about the number of enemy casualties and number 
of houses and equipment destroyed by friendly bombardments.118  
 This report was only used when there were guerrilla agents close to target areas, to act as 
observers; and mainly these guerrillas were also the initial providers of target intelligence. Due 
to the fact that this target intelligence for naval gunfire was mostly obtained by guerrillas based 
on the friendly islands, and that they usually stayed on the mainland for a limited time, the 
results of gunfire bombardments were not reported frequently — even though the majority of 
target intelligence was supplied for the blockade fleets. However, in case of air strike targets, 
this was different. They were mainly obtained by guerrilla unit detachments on the mainland, 
and guerrillas had hiding places around the target areas. Therefore, they could more easily check 
the results of bombardments. Hence, regardless of the relatively small numbers, Task Element 
95.11 was able to receive ‘After Bombardment Reports’ quite regularly.  
 Pilots generally regarded these guerrillas’ reports as being effective; not only were they morale 
boosters, but they were also useful for training purposes to correct their previous mistakes. The 
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CO of USS Bataan wrote in his report about his pilots’ satisfaction over the Leopard’s ‘After 
Bombardment Reports’ as follows: 
 
Target information received from covert sources during this and previous operating periods 
proved to be both accurate and useful […] Covert sources often reported results of attacks on 
the targets they had recommended. These reports were always heartening to the pilots who so 
often never learned whether their efforts had been really productive. They also provided a basis 
for correcting mistakes in technique or arming which may have been made in executing 
attacks.119 
 
By the end of June, Leopard’s intelligence supply system became very stable. It set a standard 
for the validity of target information for the Task Group. According to Major Burke, all targets 
were to be reported every seven days, and therefore, any target more than seven days old from 
the date of the intelligence report was obsolete. If the enemy were still in their reported position, 
Leopard was to report the targets again.120  
 In addition to the stability, the amount of target information consistently increased. This was 
largely due to the considerable increase of enemy activity in the area from mid-June.121 An 
additional direction from the Eighth Army Headquarters on 22 June, which instructed the 
Leopard to place more emphasis on the intelligence supply for the Naval Forces, also caused 
increases in the number of Leopard targets.122 Faced with an upsurge of Leopard intelligence, 
blockade ships had to be discerning with respect to bombardment targets in order to use limited 
ammunition most effectively.123  
 The CO of HMS Cardigan Bay’s comments showed this development very clearly: 
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The excellent communication system which forms a part of the Leopard organisation proved 
invaluable in providing a wealth of up to date enemy intelligence. This enable air strikes and 
ship bombardment to be directed, not only at permanent targets, but also at enemy positions 
very shortly after they had been established.124 
 
Although the period of co-operation between TG 95.1 and Leopard was very short, they had 
been producing excellent results in their intelligence supply system. In particular, this enabled 
the naval forces’ active and effective attack against the Communist forces and allowed the 
maintenance of a close naval blockade, which were nearly impossible during 1950. Considering 
the intelligence related problem which this blockade naval forces had experienced during the 
first six months of the Korean War, the current intelligence gathering system was apparently 
invaluable and a satisfactory accomplishment for the blockade ships.  
 
  Guerrilla Use for Naval Operation 
 
TG 95.1’s co-operation with the Leopard organisation was not limited to passive intelligence 
gathering. Under the initiative of the Blockade Commanders, more active ways of utilising the 
Leopard agents were also planned and carried out.  
 From the end of April, TG 95.1 started to use Leopard agents more actively to collect 
information. For instance, on 21 April, the ROKN PC 703 fired four shots on a gun position on 
the mainland during her inshore patrol around the Monggumpo Peninsula. Because of bad 
weather PC 703 was not able to find the exact location of this gun position. Therefore, Task 
Element asked Leopard to send his agents to spot the gun. Leopard reported on 27 April that 
two large guns were at the base of the hill on the Monggumpo Peninsula at XC 593252. After 
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discussion with Leopard, this target intelligence was passed to HMS Glory, which relieved 
HMS Theseus for the first patrol as CTE 95.11.125  
 A more active guerrilla use for TG 95.1’s operation was conducted during late May. In the 
course of preparing Operation ASHCAN, a demonstration landing operation planned on 20 
May, Leopard agents were used not only to obtain enemy information, but also to spread 
rumours amongst the enemy. As the Chinese offensive started once again from mid-May, Rear-
Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, who succeeded Admiral Andrewes from early April as CTG 95.1, 
thought that a feint landing might play a very useful part in relieving pressure on the front 
line.126 Right after the approval from Admiral Martin, Commander Naval Forces, Far East, 
Admiral Scott-Moncrieff proceeded to the west coast to conduct the operations.127  
 His plan in the first place provided for the spreading of ‘vague and nebulous rumours’, through 
the Leopard organisation, of an impending landing. A conference was held onboard CTE 95.11, 
HMS Glory between the Element Commanders and Major Burke regarding guerrilla 
deployment, and it became clear that Leopard was to agree with CTG 95.1’s intention.128 
Therefore, Major Burke ordered his mainland guerrillas to spread this rumour.  
 During a preliminary bombardment on 20 May, pilots of HMS Glory reported an increase of 
flack around the planned landing area. They also reported that there was a new sign laid out 
near the selected area, reading ‘Welcome UN Army’.129 Leopard’s activities seemed to yield 
some practical results in terms of the enemy movement.  
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 After the end of this demonstration, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff wrote regarding the result of the 
feint landing that ‘It is clear at any rate that the enemy has decided to patrol this piece of coast 
more actively.’ He also wrote about the satisfaction of ‘admirable liaison with the Leopard 
organisation, should give us even more opportunities to harass him [the Communist forces].’130  
 Unlike the intelligence supply system which established a stable and regular based relationship, 
these more active attempts were, by their nature, conducted sporadically. This co-operation, 
however, was a significant step towards the development in the relationship between TG 95.1 
and the guerrillas insomuch as it went beyond passive intelligence collecting, with CTG 95.1 
starting to use the guerrillas more actively with satisfactory liaison with the Leopard 
Headquarters. This also allowed the western naval forces’ operation against the Communists to 
be more bold and active.  
 
  Naval Support for Guerrilla Activity 
 
As mentioned in sub-chapter 4.2, guerrillas’ uncontrolled and careless emergency calls for 
naval gunfire or aircraft support were problematic to the blockade ships before the 
emergence of Leopard. As these calls could not only harm to the naval forces’ routine 
operations but also lessened their effective support, the Blockade Commanders were 
dissatisfied with this disorganised and unscreened guerrilla support system.  
 In fact, due to their unpredictability, most of emergency calls from the guerrillas could not be 
discussed with the blockade ships in advance. Therefore, the improvement that could be gained 
in this area was quite simple; setting up a unified single communication channel in asking for 
and directing naval support. This was to reduce any unscreened emergency calls and 
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uncontrolled naval deployment. This was also for timely and effective naval support. Fortunately, 
this problem had largely reduced since the emergence of the Leopard organisation. 
 The Leopard Headquarters’ establishment of a communication system with each Donkey 
unit itself intensified the control of the guerrillas’ careless emergency calls. As each guerrilla 
unit’s radio system was directly net with their Headquarters, to ask for naval support, each 
guerrilla unit had to report to Major Burke’s staff on Paengyong-do. Due to this unified 
communication system for requesting naval commitment, each guerrilla’s careless emergency 
call could be primarily screened by the American officers. This also enabled more correct and 
timely information about the guerrillas’ emergency situation. This was due to the Leopard’s 
direct communication system with guerrilla parties on the mainland.    
 On top of that, an additional endeavour to have a specific procedure for naval support was 
made. On 17 March, Captain Clair-Ford established contact with the American Army 
officers at Techong-do. This was attended by Major Burke, Commander Lee, ROK Navy 
and Captain V. C. Begg, RN (D.8). In this meeting, the procedure asking for naval support 
was co-ordinated. They agreed that every request for naval support must be received by 
CTE 95.12 and then disseminated to appropriate ships of the Task Elements.131 This was 
to minimise the unintended blockade naval forces’ diversion from their main task, in 
particular, the ships of the ROK Navy patrolling the inshore area. 
 As a result of this meeting, Leopard’s call for support was immediately received, and on 19 
March, Major Burke asked HMS Belfast for an air strike on the mainland (Namha-ri). This was 
immediately passed to USS Bataan, CTE 95.11, who promptly launched the air strike. Almost 
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two hours after the request, Major Burke reported that the results were very satisfactory.132 The 
first successful naval support was made as a consequence of the consultation with the Leopard 
organisation. 
 
There was also a development of co-ordination concerning the naval support of guerrilla raids. 
Guerrilla raids conducted without consultation with the Blockade Commander were 
problematic before the emergence of Leopard. Unlike emergency calls, which were 
unpredictable, naval support for guerrilla raids could be planned with blockade ships in advance. 
However, during guerrilla raid support on 8 March 1951, naval support was carried out without 
any prior co-ordination, thus totally ineffective and dangerous support was conducted.  
 This problem was placed in a state of suspended animation until mid-June because there were 
few raids during the early stage of Leopard’s organisation. This was due to the guerrillas’ lack 
of experience and that the EUSAK’s instructions directed them to focus on intelligence 
gathering duties. This problem re-emerged from mid-June, as a number of small Leopard 
organised mainland raids commenced in earnest. As before, the problem was that these raids 
were conducted without prior consultation with the CO of TE 95.12. Although HMS Cardigan 
Bay heard by chance of two of these raids during its patrol period and was able to support one 
of them, such uncoordinated raids were not welcomed by the British Task Group.133  
 Therefore, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff instructed CO of HMS Ceylon (Captain G. A. Thring) to 
convene with Leopard Headquarters to confer as to the need of prior notification for intended 
raids. Ceylon anchored at Techong-do on 5 July 1951, and a meeting was held with Mounts 
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Bay, Whitesand Bay, PF 62 and Leopard’s representative (Captain Jacobsen). During this 
meeting Captain Jacobsen agreed with the requirements to ‘keep CTE 95.12 informed in 
advance of such operations so that any possible air and sea bombardment would not endanger 
his forces, and in order that such support as could be given by CTE 95.12 would be 
forthcoming’.134  
 As a result of this meeting, a properly coordinated guerrilla raid was immediately conducted. 
On the same day, HMS Whitesand Bay supported one of Leopard’s raids. It landed at night 
from junks and attacked a small village containing enemy troops. During this operation, HMS 
Whitesand Bay was able to fire at some targets indirectly, using spotting from the ROK Marines 
who carried portable W/T sets. Although there were some difficulties with the timing of the 
landing from junks, the guerrilla raid on the mainland was quite successful.135 Since the start 
of naval support of guerrilla activities from late February 1951, the first prior coordinated raid 
was conducted under gunfire support from the blockade forces. This also meant the 
establishment of a unique naval-guerrilla amphibious co-operation system in the west which 
was maintained during the remaining period of the war.  
 
  Co-ordination of Guerrilla Movements 
 
Unlike the above mentioned three co-operational areas, the co-ordination between the British 
Task Group and Leopard in regards to guerrillas’ intended inshore movements experienced 
difficulties with un-notified activities of craft by Leopard guerrillas. As mentioned in the 
previous sub-chapter, the Commanders of TG 95.1 had been watching the emergence of the 
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Leopard organisation with the hope that this American organisation would act as an authority to 
co-ordinate the various activities of the guerrillas. This was because a stable blockade on the 
west coast could not be accomplished without proper co-ordination with the irregulars’ 
movements.136  
 In spite of the Blockade Commanders’ expectation, however, the Leopard organisation was 
not able to work as a proper co-ordinator of guerrilla movements. This was mainly due to the 
Leopard Headquarters’ lack of control over their guerrillas. Although most of the guerrillas 
joined this American organisation spontaneously, it did not mean that they totally complied 
with the Leopard Headquarters’ instructions.  
 According to Donald A. Seibert, who was a former advisor of Donkey 3 and Donkey 13, 
American officers’ control could only be exerted through the leaders of the guerrillas. He wrote 
that ‘in no sense did I command the pack’.137 Each guerrilla leader recruited and led men from 
a particular region of North Korea with which he and they were familiar. Many members of the 
Donkey units, thus, had been friends before the war. This enhanced unit integrity and cohesion, 
but restrained the influence of US advisors because the guerrillas naturally associated 
themselves with their leaders. Therefore, most of the final decisions regarding their operations 
and activities were made by the respective leaders, and the US advisors could merely suggest 
operations or discourage ‘questionable operations’. The only penalty US advisors could impose 
was reducing supplies, such as rice, ammunition and clothing.138  
 American officers were not allowed to accompany guerrilla activities on the mainland before 
early May 1952, as US officers could not be sure of their safety due to the uncertainty of 
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guerrilla loyalty.139 Hence it was almost impossible for Leopard officers to have complete 
information on guerrilla activities. Their role in the guerrilla organisation was administrative or 
concerned with logistics, rather than commanding each Donkey Unit.140 Moreover, although 
they had information of guerrilla movements, these plans could easily be changed because of 
weather condition and the tide.141 Thus, even guerrilla movements reported to the Blockade 
Commanders, were easily changed without knowledge.  
 Due to the very nature of the guerrillas and their Headquarters’ broad control, there had been 
fundamental limitations to obtaining proper information of all guerrilla activities in the 
blockade area. The Blockade commanders also recognised the problems of the guerrillas and 
the Leopard organisation. This can be seen in the CO of HMS Cardigan Bay’s report on 4 July 
1951 as follows:  
 
This apparently chaotic state of affairs is due […] partly by the nature of guerrilla activities 
themselves. Leopard himself is doing what he can […] but the latter seems to be more or less 
inevitable [...] the majority of the activities of his large guerrilla force are necessarily 
controlled by broad directives which are implemented by the units concerned as and when 
circumstances permit.142  
 
Due to these fundamental problems in building a proper co-ordination system, as an indirect 
method to reduce expected unpleasant results, an alternative was tried; the introduction of 
identification procedures between the two groups.  
 In fact, there were some practical results achieved between these two groups regarding ways 
of identification. As mentioned in sub-chapter 4.1, uncoordinated activities were dangerous as 
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this situation increased the risk of possible accidents as it caused difficulty to the blockade ship 
and aircraft in identifying them as ‘friend or foe’.143 Therefore, in late May as a back-up plan 
for the co-ordination of guerrilla inshore movements, the Leopard organisation issued security 
passes for their guerrillas. This was to aid identification between the Leopard guerrillas and 
naval fleets when they encountered each other in the blockade area.  
 Usually, when the blockade ships spotted any unidentified craft during the patrol, they firstly 
ordered it to stop for inspection. If it did not respond and retreated, they would open fire.144 
However, when the craft stopped and complied with the naval staff’s inspection, it was not 
possible to identify whether they were the friendly guerrillas or the enemy. To the Blockade 
Commanders, thus, issuing security passes was a helpful measure to identify the Leopard 
guerrillas. Therefore, HMS Cossack obtained specimens of them from Leopard and shared 
these with all ships in the Task Element.145  
 In addition to that, an identification procedure for the aircraft of TE 95.11 was also 
introduced.146 Concerning small vessels, in accordance with the operational records of HMS 
Glory and HMS Ceylon, guerrillas needed to display ‘Red Panels’ as a recognition signal when 
they faced friendly aircraft. If there was no recognition signal, aircraft made a ‘warning burst 
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of five’ ahead of the craft, and then, after a further delay of ninety seconds, pilots conducted an 
attack.147  
 Even after the establishment of the Leopard organisation, due to the nature of the guerrillas 
and their relationship with American officers, it was not possible to have proper information of 
guerrillas’ intended movements within the blockade area. By introducing some identification 
procedures between the two groups, however, it was possible to introduce a minimal safety 
measure to reduce any possible naval forces’ attack against the friendly guerrillas.     
 
By early July 1951, the total strength of the Leopard organisation had grown to about 7,000, 
and there were fifteen Donkey Units under the control of Leopard Base. The number of 
Americans assigned to guerrilla related work grew to twenty-one officers and forty-four enlisted 
men. The American-led guerrilla base, Leopard completed its reorganisation as a unified 
authority of guerrilla operations for attrition warfare on the west coast.148 With this successful 
establishment and based on the friendly relationship with Leopard officers, the co-operation 
between the two groups became more stable. Thus, as one of the main missions of the western 





Over the period covered by this chapter, the relationship between the British Task Group and 
the guerrillas can be divided into two periods based on the following watershed, the emergence 
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of the Leopard organisation. Before the EUSAK headquarters started guerrilla organisation, the 
Blockade Commanders were reluctant to be deeply involved in guerrilla related work. 
Therefore, there was only limited room for co-operation based on intelligence supply by indirect 
methods. Although there was a gradual development from mid-February 1952, when the 
guerrillas were partly controlled by the ROK Navy, this experience rather clearly revealed 
several limitations in the issue of co-operation with the irregulars. After several direct co-
operations, the Blockade Commanders were assured that without establishment of proper 
authority to control and co-ordinate all the guerrilla activities, close relationships with the 
guerrillas might cause harm to the blockade ships’ routine operations. 
 Following the emergence of the Leopard, however, the co-operation with the guerrillas 
developed drastically. In particular, from late March to early July 1951, meaningful results were 
achieved in the intelligence collecting system, guerrilla use for naval operation, naval support 
for guerrilla activity and the mutual identification procedures. These developments also 
radically changed the western naval forces’ operation to be more active and effective than in its 
earlier period. From early and mid-1951, co-operation with the guerrillas became one of the 
most important aspects of the western naval forces’ operation.     
 To the Blockade Commanders, the first four months’ co-operation was, quoting Admiral Scott-
Moncrieff; ‘producing excellent results all round.’149 Although there was continued difficulty 
in co-ordinating the guerrillas’ un-notified activities within the blockade area and their possible 
conduct of private war, the benefits seemed much greater than the disadvantages.  
 However, this co-operation started without any confidence of the guerrillas’ reliability. 
Moreover, as the guerrillas were programmed to shift their current activity by the higher 
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command’s instruction, in terms of viable sustainability of co-operation, the two groups’ 
relationship was essentially unstable. From the beginning of the co-operation, there had been 
several potential limitations in the naval-guerrilla relationships. With these underlying problems 
emerging in the co-operation with the Leopard guerrillas, TG 95.1 faced a new war situation; 




The Collapse of Co-Operation with the Leopard Guerrillas:  
From the Start of Truce Talks to November 1951 
 
 
With the first meeting of the UN and the Communist side’s main truce delegations at Kaesong 
on 10 July 1951, an effort for a peaceful solution for the Korean War was started. The decision 
for truce talks, however, was truly unwelcome news to the anti-Communist guerrillas. To these 
anti-Communist North Koreans, the signing of a truce agreement directly meant the loss of their 
sole motivation to fight; liberation of their hometowns from the Communists. The decision for 
truce talks, therefore, became a significant turning point in Leopard guerrillas’ activity. 
 This chapter explores several challenges in the naval-guerrilla relationship which emerged 
since the beginning of the truce talks. For this purpose, this chapter firstly tracks the efforts, 
behind the battle line, to restore peace by cease-fire negotiation by the UN and the Communist 
sides. The final arrangement of the pursuit for cease-fire negotiations and its subsequent 
influence on the guerrilla activity will also be followed.  
 It then seeks to show drastic changes in the naval-guerrilla relationship from late July 1951. 
Rather than attempt to present a chronological account, it examines several problems that 
emerged within the Leopard organisation. Simultaneously, it examines the perspectives and 
responses of the Blockade Commanders regarding these challenges. Due to the close 
relationship with the guerrillas, new problems emerging within the Leopard directly influenced 
the blockade naval forces’ operation. By explaining these aspects, the chapter will address a 





5.1 The Start of Truce Talks and its Influence on the Leopard Guerrillas  
 
From the outbreak of the war to the time of the Communists’ spring offensive in 1951, each 
side experienced a see-saw war with front-line movements oscillating from the Pusan Perimeter 
to the Yalu. However, behind the battle lines, from the early days of the war, the UN and 
Communist sides made sporadic efforts to restore peace by cease-fire negotiations, particularly 
at a time when each side’s military situation was unfavourable. 
 Right from the initial conflict, the United Nations had made attempts for a peaceful conclusion. 
First of all, in 1950, as soon as North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June, the United Nations 
Security Council demanded that North Korea cease its hostile behaviour and withdraw its troops 
to restore the pre-war status quo. However, at the time of the deliberation of the Security 
Council, the Communist side ignored the Resolution of 26 June, and the North Korean 
aggression continued.1  
 Apart from this UN’s official attempt, the US government also tried to contact Moscow to 
persuade North Korea. On 27 June, President Truman sent his first direct communique to Stalin 
since the start of the Communists’ assault. In this telegram, he asked ‘the Kremlin to use its 
good offices to persuade Pyongyang to withdraw its forces from the South’. 2  However, 
Moscow declined this request by claiming that this conflict was a civil war between the two 
Koreas, thus, this should be resolved internally. 3  During the summer of 1950, to the 
                                           
1 The Resolution defined ‘North Korean Army’s military attack on South Korea as behavior destructive of peace’, 
and urged North and South Korea ‘to immediately stop hostilities’ and North Korea ‘to withdraw its army to the 
38th Parallel Line’: Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. III, pp. 13–14. 
2 U.S. Department of State, ‘United States Policy in the Korean Crisis’, in William Stueck, The Korean War: An 




Communist side, which was winning the war, there was little interest regarding the end of war 
by political measures.4   
 The Communist side made the subsequent official suggestion concerning the start of truce 
talks. On 2 October 1950, when the North Korean forces were retreating from the UN Forces’ 
counter offensive, A. Y. Vyshinsky, Soviet Foreign Minister proposed an armistice to the UN 
General Assembly under the name of ‘Immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign armed 
forces from the Korean Peninsula.’5 As the UN forces stood a good chance of defeating North 
Korea, Washington showed little interest in the Soviets’ suggestion. In addition, as this proposal 
had a caveat demanding ‘the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops’, the UN Forces could not 
accept it. Therefore, this proposal was voted down at the UN Political Committee, and, on 7 
October, a new proposal was adopted by the UN General Assembly ‘to establish Korea’s 
unified, independent, and democratic government’ under the supervision of the UN.6 As a 
result of this resolution, which virtually allowed the UN Forces to cross the 38th Parallel, the 
UN Forces continued across the line and marched northward.  
 In December 1950, following the invasion of Korea by CCF, the tide of battle changed again, 
and a cease-fire became one of the most significant issues to the UN side. To the UNC who 
wanted to have a cease-fire based on the 38th Parallel, it was necessary to start the truce talks 
before the CCF reached this line.7 Therefore, the United Nations General Assembly established 
the Three Persons’ Committee for Armistice. This included the Chairman of the UN General 
Assembly and representatives of India and Canada. The committee demanded that the CCF 
                                           
4 Kim Boyoung 김보영, ‘한국전쟁 휴전회담 연구’ [‘A Study on the Truce Talks During the Korean War’] 
(PhD Dissertation, Hanyang University, February 2008), p. 24. 
5  ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs (trans.) 외무부 (역), 소련의비밀외교문서 제 3 권, [Soviet Secret 
Diplomatic Documents Related to the Korean War, Vol. III] (Seoul: ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994), p. 
72. 
6 James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. III: The Korean War, Part 
I (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998), p. 104. 
7 Ibid., p. 167. 
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should cease military actions in all South Korean territory and to start cease-fire talks for 
establishing the Demilitarised Zone around the 38th Parallel. However, the CCF rejected this 
proposal by replying that without ‘withdrawal of all the foreign armed forces from South Korea’ 
and ‘withdrawal of the US troops from the Taiwan Strait’, a cease-fire would not be 
considered.8  
 
The first six months’ efforts to restore peace were not successful. Each side felt decisive victory 
was possible, in particular the Communist side, and both sides distrusted each other, with the 
consequence of continued fierce fighting and colossal human and material losses. In the course 
of the CCF’s Spring Offensive between April and May 1951, however, the two sides began to 
pursue political, rather than military, means to resolve the current conflict.9 
 During the months of April and May 1951, the UN forces encountered the Red Chinese Fifth 
Offensive forces, and withdrew thirty to sixty-five kilometres south of the 38th Parallel.10 
Despite being faced with a potential crisis, the UN’s superior firepower successfully countered 
the numerical superiority of the Communist forces. Thus, by the end of May, the allies had 
regained the initiative of the war, capturing the 38th Parallel for the third time. However, because 
both sides were embroiled in such an intense battle, the Communists as well as the UN forces 
paid with a great loss of human life. In particular, the loss for the Communist forces was very 
heavy. The UN forces suffered substantially less in its combat capabilities due to well organised 
delaying actions and superior fire and mobility. On the other hand, the Communist forces 
                                           
8 ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Secret Russian Diplomatic Documents related to the Korean War, Vol. IV 
(1994), p. 126; War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, 국방부전사편찬위원회, 미합동참모본부사 
한국전쟁 (상) [The History of US JCS; The Korean War, Vol. I] (Seoul: War History Compilation Committee, 
ROK MND), p.304 
9 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. II, p. 709. 
10 The Chinese advanced to the outskirts of Seoul in the April offensive, and in the May offensive, they exploited 
the breakthrough in the central eastern area up to the line of Soksa-ri and Hajinbu-ri: Ibid., p. 702.  
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suffered a heavy loss of 85,000 men, and more than 10,000 Chinese surrendered or were 
captured.11  
 The two camps, confronting each other in a situation similar to that of the pre-war days, 
became convinced that a decisive victory was impossible. As for the United States, not only 
was it pressured by Free World countries to bring about an early end to the war, but it was 
losing confidence of victory against the combination of Communist China, which could 
ostensibly mobilise almost unlimited human resources, and the Soviet Union, which provided 
material support. Accordingly, the US Government began to consider measures ‘to end the war 
under an appropriate armistice mechanism and return to the status quo ante bellum’.12 Judging 
that it would take two months for the Communists to recover, the UN trusted that the sixty days 
ahead would give them ample time to proceed with the negotiations in their favour, by taking 
advantage of the initiatives of the ground operations, the supremacy of the sea and the command 
of the air.13  
 As for Communist China, although it carried out a total of five offensives with enormous 
manpower, referred to as the ‘human wave’, it was unable to achieve its initial objective of 
driving out the UN forces from the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, the Communists came to 
realise that there was a limit to which they could secure reinforcements and logistical support. 
Therefore, Peng Dehuai, Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers Army, issued a 
directive to pull the troops back to the starting point for the Fifth Offensive.14  Then, the 
                                           
11  The Korea Research Institute for Strategy (trans.) 전략문제연구소 (역), 중공군의 한국전쟁사 
항미원조전사, [The CCF’s History of the Korean War] (Seoul: Sekyonsa Publisher, 1991), p. 160; Korea Institute 
of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. II, p. 703. 
12 Schnabel and Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. III: The Korean War, Part I (Washington 
DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1978), p. 477. 
13 War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, The History of US JCS; The Korean War, Vol. I, pp. 394–5 
14 This directive stated that ‘The frontline is overextended. Supply of rations and ammunition are met with 
difficulties due to lack of transportation. Troops are tied and southward advance at this point is impossible’: The 
Korea Research Institute for Strategy (trans.), CCF’s History of the Korean War, pp. 160–1.  
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Communists also assumed a defensive posture in order to recover the fighting power of their 
ground units.15 Accordingly, to the Communist Forces, the period of the truce negotiations was 
regarded to be beneficial for improving their unfavourable situation. 
 In conclusion, both camps decided that the following two months would be advantageous for 
making an effort for a peaceful solution. It was possible for cease-fire negotiations to proceed 
rapidly from then on.16 Through behind-the-scene contact initiated by the US, the Soviets 
agreed to achieve peace by armistice by recovering the ante-bellum situation.17 Thus, the 
pursuit for cease-fire negotiations was finally arranged. Both camps made policy decisions 
around June 1951 that the solution of the war was not through taking up arms but by negotiation 
and that the armistice conference would thus commence the following month. As a consequence, 
on 10 July 1951, the first meeting of the main truce delegations at Naebongjang, Kaesong, took 
place. On the UN Forces side, Admiral Joy headed four other representatives; and on the 
Communist side, Nam Il, the chief of staff of the NKPA headed four other representatives.18 
With the decision to start cease-fire negotiations, the UN ground forces’ operation also 
changed. Although hostilities continued, based on some tactically important points such as the 
Iron Triangle and the Soyang River, ground action continued to diminish, and the UN Forces’ 
operations were limited to the improvement of defensive positions and patrolling.19 Therefore, 
the EUSAK’s mission was limited to that of defending ROK territory against aggression from 
the Communist Forces. Only for this purpose was the EUSAK allowed to conduct military 
                                           
15 Ibid., p. 174. The Chinese had a plan to push southward by counteroffensive in August in case the UN forces 
declined to pull down south of the 38th parallel in armistice negotiations: ROK Ministry of foreign Affairs, Secret 
Russian Diplomatic Documents related to the Korean War, Vol. IV, p. 120. In the text sent by Mao Tse Tung to 
Kim Il Sung and Gao Gang who were visiting Moscow, Mao told them to take a defensive posture for two months.  
16 War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, The History of US JCS; The Korean War, Vol. I, pp. 394–
5. 
17 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. III, pp. 30–7. 
18 Ibid., pp. 51–2. 
19 A triangular area connecting P’yonggang-Ch’orwon-Kimhwa was given the modifier ‘iron’ to emphasize the 
advantage of the terrain for enemy defence and disadvantage for friendly offensive: Field Jr., History of United 
States Naval Operations, Korea, p. 408. 
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operations north of the 38th Parallel. In addition to that, the EUSAK was directed to focus all 
its efforts on inflicting enough damage on the Communists so that they would accept the US 
terms for peace.20 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, initial planning for the Leopard organisation was premised 
on using their irregulars for the EUSAK’s planned offensive to the north for spring 1951. It was 
to be established that a covert net of guerrilla groups within the enemy’s mainland would attract 
and organise the North Korean dissidents. This was to be deployed in conjunction with the UN 
forces’ offensive. Leopard’s units were to rise up, secure the Hwanghae Peninsula, and harass 
and interdict the retreating enemy.21  
 Since the start of the truce talks, however, the possibility of a planned UN offensive became 
more and more remote as the EUSAK was directed towards achieving a cease-fire along the 38th 
Parallel.22 This situation invoked a gradual indifference to Leopard and its operation in the 
EUSAK Headquarters. As mentioned in the previous chapter, except for several directives 
requiring special intelligence activities for the blockade naval forces, there were no other 
comprehensive plans directed from the EUSAK Headquarters during 1951. Moreover, there was 
not even any general reappraisal of guerrilla activities, or revised plans for future operations. 
Therefore, any plans for guerrilla operations had to be left in the hands of Leopard unit 
commanders and the guerrilla leaders.23 
 The EUSAK Headquarters’ indifference to their guerrilla organisation, ironically, expedited 
the development of co-operation between the TG 95.1 and Leopard. Leopard was able to 
maintain the first phase of their operation Plan ABLE which directed them to focus more on the 
                                           
20 Schnabel and Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. III, p. 48. 
21 Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 41. 
22 Ibid., p. 43. 
23 Ibid., p. 41. 
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intelligence gathering and sabotage missions. This naturally allowed significant scope for better 
co-operation with the friendly naval forces by early July 1951. Therefore, based on the friendly 
relationship with Leopard officers, the Blockade Commanders were able to achieve stable 
intelligence collecting and naval support system within a short period of time. 
 The decision for truce talks, however, became a significant turning point in Leopard guerrillas’ 
activity. To these anti-Communist North Koreans, the signing of a truce agreement meant that 
they would be left on the wrong side of the line. In fact, as mentioned in McGee’s letter below, a 
cease-fire agreement meant more than just isolation from their hometowns. As most had 
sought refuge on the west coast islands, it also meant they were unsure about their family’s 
safety at home. This concern is expressed in McGee’s letter written more than thirty years after 
the end of the Korean War. He wrote about his disappointment when he was told ‘never’ by the 
EUSAK Headquarters in reply to his question asking ‘when the counteroffensive would take 
place’, as follows: 
 
The answer ‘never’ to me immediately suggested the calamity of our Donkey Leaders, their 
unit members and probably family members had been forsaken by the United States, their 
Free World leader. A forsaking by a Cease Fire that was a sentence of them to death by a 
subsequent Communist methodically conducted extermination. A sentence that harked back 
to my now false promise of liberation at that joyous night of our meeting at the cove on 
[Paengyong-do]. A sentence that I was never permitted to defend them.24  
 
The major problem was that news of truce talks seriously affected the guerrillas’ will to fight. 
In fact, this news led to a significant deterioration in their morale. An operational history written 
by a veteran association of Donkey-3 and -4 mentioned their deep disappointment as follows: 
 
From late July, there has been some news regarding the start of the truce talk negotiation at 
Kaesong. At first we thought it was a rumour. However, when we heard that news was true, 
colour drained from our face through surprise […] We were very discouraged thinking about 
                                           
24 McGee, ‘McGee letter to Colonel Rod Paschall’, p. 21.  
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family members who will be remained in the horrible control of the Communist Government 
after the cease-fire was signed.25    
 
In addition to that, cracks were beginning to grow in the relationship between the UN forces 
and the Leopard guerrillas. As for the guerrillas, there was the sole motivation of liberating their 
hometowns from the Communists. This explains their spontaneous decision to conduct hazardous 
activities behind enemy lines. In that sense, a main reason for guerrilla groups’ participation with 
the American organisation was that they originally shared some common objectives. However, 
as UN forces officially began to discard their offensive plan to the north, the guerrillas’ reason to 
accept the Leopard Headquarters’ directives became weaker. With the start of cease-fire 
negotiations, a large number of the guerrillas transferred earlier lofty motivations to that of 
personal gains, when they began to consider their uncertain future. This created a wavering 
allegiance and increased the possibility of the ‘conduct of private war’. This, in turn, resulted in 
a significant control problem for Leopard officers with their agents.  
 A similar reliability problem with the guerrillas emerged involving UN forces. From the 
beginning of their relationship, there was no trust building between the guerrillas and the UN 
forces. Although there was a distrust of these former North Korean irregulars, in particular within 
the blockade naval forces, early relationships of co-operation had given beneficial results. Thus, 
the Blockade Commanders regarded their co-operation system with Leopard as very valuable as 
the benefits seemed much greater than the disadvantages. Since the start of the truce talks, 
however, there were growing doubts regarding the reliability of guerrilla activities. This could be 
seen in CTG 95.1 with the comment:  
 
                                           
25 The Veteran Association of White Tiger Unit, The History of the Guerrilla Warfare of White Tiger Unit, p. 151. 
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With the Peace Talks going on it is certain that there is a good deal of wavering allegiance, if 
only re-insurance for the future. This is particularly likely to be the case amongst the guerrilla 
agents who are likely to be left on the wrong side of the line.26   
 
A corollary of the UN forces’ decision to discard their plan to march toward the north was the 
ominous prospect of drastic damage in relations. In particular, in the course of experiencing the 
problems that emerged within the Leopard organisation, the drastic collapse of the naval-
guerrilla co-operation eventually ensued.  
  
5.2 Guerrillas Holding Back and Unsatisfactory Intelligence Supply 
 
The first case of influence resulting from the truce talk initiative, in terms of Leopard guerrilla 
and TG 95.1 co-operation, was one that affected guerrilla intelligence supply. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, an intelligence supply system, as developed with the Leopard organisation, 
was a most satisfactory achievement for the Blockade Commanders. Owing to the fact that there 
was no intelligence organisation for west coast Naval forces, and little contact and exchange of 
military information with the Higher Commands, TG 95.1’s dependence on Leopard 
intelligence rapidly increased within a short period of time.27 Bombardments were conducted 
based on Leopard defined targets, and enemy movements were exposed through Leopard 
reporting. Even the evaluations of their bombardments were partly conducted based on 
Leopard’s ‘after bombardment’ report. Therefore, any potential problem related to intelligence 
supply could significantly impede TG 95.1’s operations. Considering the fact that gathering 
information had been entirely conducted by the guerrilla agents, and the quality and quantity of 
                                           
26 ADM 116/6228, Korean War-Report of Proceedings No. 40, 15 August to 10 September 1951, the Flag Officer, 
Second-in-command, Far East Station’s Force, FO2FE/2960/11, 10 September 1951, p. 20. 
27 ADM 116/6231, Report of Experience in Korean Operations, July, 1951–June 1952, Part 3 (Intelligence). 
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intelligence was heavily dependent on their activity, it was predictable that once truce talks 
commenced, guerrilla information passed to allied naval forces would be impaired.  
 In fact, from late July, dissatisfaction emerged regarding Leopard’s intelligence. This included 
information supplied late, lack of target numbers and an overall lack of reliability. The first 
record of this problem concerned HMS Ceylon’s report covering dates between 28 July and 8 
August. It wrote that: 
 
I discovered […] that this source [Leopard] of intelligence was not so good as had been 
anticipated, due to the time lag caused by his agents having to return to the island, and also to the 
fact that they were engaged in various form of chicanery, not compatible with producing results.28 
 
Subsequently, HMS Mounts Bay mentioned an overall distrust in regard to the guerrillas’ enemy 
movement reports. This is exemplified by this report when she operated around Han area as 
CTU 95.12.2 as follows: 
 
They [Leopard guerrillas] produced a mass of very doubtful targets on the Northern shore 
and cross questioning made me wonder how much was genuine how much was staged for 
our benefit. They seemed to think the enemy, who kept themselves someway inland, were in 
constant fear of a landing from our ships. I suggested that if we sent in several boats in 
daylight we might get the enemy to expose himself and come under fire, but I was assured 
they would merely retire to the northward.29 
 
There were also complaints of unreliability concerning post bombardment intelligence reports 
on targets indicated by Leopard agents. HMS Mounts Bay reported that Leopard guerrillas over-
exaggerated damage inflicted on the enemy, as a result of her bombardments. The CO of 
Mounts Bay commented that ‘I found it hard to believe’.30 Pilots of HMS Glory also mentioned 
that they were doubtful of the reliability of post bombardment reporting by the guerrillas. On 
                                           
28 ADM 116/6213, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 28 July to 8 August 1951, HMS Ceylon, 8 August 1951, 
para. 7. 
29 ADM 116/6219, HMS Mounts Bay-Report of Proceedings, 1 to 14 September 1951, HMS Mounts Bay, 13 
September 1951, paras 4–5.  
30 Ibid., para. 6. 
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early September, the 804 Squadron historian wrote that ‘The only trouble with these targets is 
that by the time we get them they are a few days out of date. However, on several occasions good 
results have been reported.’31 Immediately following the commencement of truce talks, the 
intelligence-related co-operation that had been accomplished between the two groups started to 
rapidly deteriorate.  
 Therefore, in late August, to confer with the CO of Leopard regarding the recent problems of 
the guerrillas’ intelligence supply, HMS Ceylon proceeded to Paengyong-do. In this meeting, 
the CO of HMS Ceylon was told the reasons for the recent scanty and unreliable intelligence 
supply by the new Leopard Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott, who had recently relieved 
Major Burke. According to Leopard, this was largely due to the fact that many guerrilla 
agents had been ‘holding back’ in the belief that a truce talk agreement would be signed in 
the near future.32 In other words, guerrilla inactivity categorically caused problems in the 
supply of intelligence.  
In fact, between late July and early September, little Leopard guerrilla reporting on 
blockade ships took place. The only operational records of TG 95.1 reported were of active 
rice raids conducted by the guerrillas in the Ongjin Peninsula and a guerrilla raid on 26 
August, supported by HMS Morecambe Bay.33  Most of the history books written by 
members of the Veteran Associations of former Leopard guerrillas also rarely mention their 
                                           
31 This sentence was written on 3 September. On 8 September, the 804 Squadron historian also wrote that 
‘Most of today’s trips were Leopard targets and in one case where a headquarters building had been hit by rockets; 
a report came through that about sixty casualties were caused. How reliable these reports are nobody knows’: 
FAAM, Royal Naval Air Squadron, No. 804, Diary, 10/46-3/53. 
32 ADM 116/6213, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 16 August to 1 September 1951, HMS Ceylon, 1 September 
1951, para. 6.  
33 Regarding the comments on rice raids, see ADM 116/6218, HMS Kenya-Report of Proceedings 6 to 22 
August 1951, HMS Kenya, 29 August 1951, Appendix: Haeju Area - Intelligence Note. In regard to HMS 
Morecambe Bay’s support, see ADM 116/6213, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 16 August to 1 September 
1951, para. 26. 
148 
 
activities during this period.34 Only Donkey-14 and -15, operating on the North side of the 
west coast were still active for securing a base on the Taewha-do and Ae-do locations.35 
Considering the vigorous activities of the Leopard guerrillas before the start of the truce talk 
negotiations, it could be presumed that the guerrillas were relatively inactive. 
 Although Leopard had reported several times that this problem was in the process of 
being rectified, there were no noticeable changes for a couple of months, and CTG 95.1 
kept receiving negative reports regarding Leopard intelligence. 36  However, it was 
impossible for this naval Task Group to discontinue their relationship with the Leopard 
organisation, because there was no alternative intelligence source. As mentioned in the 
previous chapters, there were various friendly clandestine organisations operating on the west 
coast independently. However, it was still impossible to gain information from them.37 
These were mainly for intelligence gathering, such as the Special Activities Unit (SAU) and 
the Joint Advisory Committee, Korea (JACK) which operated under the control of the 5th 
US Air Force and the CIA. There was also a small intelligence organisation called 
Salamander, which operated from the island of Chodo. It supplied intelligence to the British 
                                           
34 Donkey-7 and -11 each recorded only one activity, Donkey-3, -4(White Tiger) mentioned only two small 
raids in the mainland, and Donkey-2 mentioned no operation. Suwol Unit Military History Compilation 
association, The History of the Guerrilla Warfare of Eunyul; The Veteran Association of White Tiger Unit, 
The History of the Guerrilla Warfare of White Tiger Unit; Lee (ed.), The Military History of the Student 
Guerrilla Unit; The Veteran Association of Kuwol-San Partisan Forces 구월산부대 전우회, 구월산 부대: 
대원의 체험기 [Kuwol-San Partisan Forces: Their Memoirs] (Seoul: The Veteran Association of Kuwol-San 
Partisan Forces, 2006). 
35 Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 43. 
36 During the patrol period from late July to early August as CTE 95.12 HMS Ceylon was told by Leopard 
Commander that ‘Leopard was in the process of rectifying this’: ADM 116/6213, HMS Ceylon-Report of 
Proceedings from 28 July to 8 August 1951, para. 7. During her subsequent patrol period, he was told by Lieutenant 
Colonel Ehrgott once again that ‘he was taking early steps to rectify this attitude’: ADM 116/6213, HMS Ceylon-
Report of Proceedings from 16 August to 1 September 1951, para. 6.  
37 ADM 116/6231, Report of Experience in Korean Operations, July 1952–April 1953, Flag Officer, Second-in-
Command Far East Station, 14 July 1953, Part 3 (Intelligence). On 4 August, CTG 95.1 commented in the HMS 
Cardigan Bay’s report that except Leopard and Salamander, ‘these organisations still show a reluctance to divulge 
information to our ships, preferring to remain mysterious and independent and accepting the risks involved’: ADM 




Task Group. However, it was not able to be a Leopard alternative because its intelligence 
was not only ‘unpredictable and irregular’, but it was also more focused on the extreme North 
Korean and Manchurian areas. These were outside the Task Group’s operational area.38 The 
Tactical Air Reconnaissance and Combat Air Patrol (TARCAP) of CTE 95.11’s aircraft, the 
only way of reconnaissance for a task group, was also an ineffective source of intelligence 
gathering. Owing to the enemy’s excellent camouflage skill, it was very difficult for pilots to 
find any targets for gunfire and air strikes.39   
 In the situation that there was no attractive alternative, TG 95.1 had to maintain reliance on the 
Leopard agents for intelligence. They knew that only Leopard guerrillas could handle and obtain 
valuable intelligence which, if properly processed and assessed, could be very useful for their 
operation. However, whilst choosing to continue this relationship, they assumed a very prudent 
attitude towards the intelligence provided. 40  This was exemplified by Admiral Scott-
Moncrieff’s report submitted on 10 September 1951 as follows:  
 
I am […] very sceptical of the quality of the targets being reported by the various agents […] 
It is of interesting to note that [...] a veritable stream of new targets were reported, followed 
by a report the following day of astronomical number of enemy killed by ships gunfire [...] I 
am afraid those reports both on targets and results achieved must be taken with more than a 
grain of salt [...] I have in mind, of course, the possibility of small scale raids, for 
corroborative intelligence purposes, if the military value is worth-while.41 
 
An interesting point was that, as mentioned above, CTG 95.1 decided to conduct an independent 
raid to capture prisoners using only forces under his command. In fact, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff 
had been reluctant to use his trained seamen or Royal Marine Commandoes for raiding on the 
                                           
38 ADM 116/6212, HMS Black Swan-Report of Proceedings, 17 to 24 June 1951, the Captain (F), Third Frigate 
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41 Ibid., p. 18. 
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mainland, due to the possibility of their becoming casualties. For instance, on 11 July 1951, 
HMNZS Rotoiti conducted a raid independently with some of her seamen to obtain prisoners. 
At that time CTG 95.1 criticised the CO of Rotoiti by commenting that ‘There have been few 
military targets in this particular area which would justify accepting casualties amongst United 
Nations forces.’42 Considering Admiral Scott-Moncrieff’s previous position, this decision to 
conduct an independent raid was significant in showing the extent of his low regard for current 
intelligence.  
 
5.3 The Taewha-do Incident: Conflict between Leopard Headquarters and Donkey-2 
 
In the early morning of 31 July, in heavy rain, HMS Ceylon proceeded to Paengyong-do to 
answer a signal from the Leopard Headquarters asking for assistance to transfer 300 mutineers 
under armed guard at Yukto island. When she arrived at Yukto, and after a meeting with 
American Officers, all mutineers had already been removed from the island. Half of them had 
departed to Inchon for interrogation whilst others had catastrophically drowned in the middle 
of a heavy storm.43   
 The mutineers were Donkey-2 guerrillas in Sokto; one of the largest and most active guerrilla 
groups, under the lead of Captain Kim. Although they were sentenced as mutineers by Leopard 
Headquarters, strictly speaking, they could be more appropriately explained as a consequence 
of a conflict between Major Burke, the Commander of Leopard and the Donkey leader. From 
late March, Donkey-2 had experienced severe shortages of supplies; in particular, medicines for 
first aid and drinking water. These necessities could not be acquired through guerrilla raids. 
                                           
42  ADM 116/6222, HMNZS Rotoiti, Assault on Observation Post and Suspected Machine Gun Post in the 
Chinnampo Estuary, 17 July 1951, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 17 July 1951. 
43 ADM 116/6213, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 28 July to 8 August 1951, HMS Ceylon, 8 August 1951, 
paras 6–10.  
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Therefore, Captain Kim had requested these supplies to be delivered to the Leopard 
Headquarters. However, except for some sporadic and mostly insufficient support from CTE 
95.12, no additional supplies from Headquarters were forthcoming.44  
 In April, after the loss of forty agents through typhoid, Captain Kim decided to visit the ROK 
Army Headquarters to ask for support. The problem was that this trip was conducted without 
prior approval of the Leopard Headquarters, and by accident, at the same place, he encountered 
Major Burke visiting the EUSAK Headquarters. According to Captain Kim’s memoirs Burke 
promptly recognised the purpose of Kim’s visit. Then he proceeded to become angry at Captain 
Kim and ordered his immediate return to Paengyong-do.45 After this, their relationship became 
strained, and on 6 May, Captain Kim was dismissed from his position as the leader of Donkey-
2 and summoned by the EUSAK Headquarters. Therefore, Donkey-2 had to operate without a 
leader for a while.46  
 In late June, when Captain Kim visited Sokto again, Donkey-2 members reselected Kim as 
their leader and reported this fact to their headquarters.47 Major Burke promptly declined this 
request by answering that ‘It is not permissible to select a soldier in active service as a guerrilla 
leader’. However, the Donkey-2 guerrillas ignored this. As a result of this conflict, the Leopard 
Headquarters decided to stop all of the supplies for Donkey-2. Facing starvation, these guerrillas 
decided to move north to find a new base, and they landed on Taewha-do, where Donkey-15 
was based.48  
                                           
44 ROK Army Headquarters, The Korean War and the Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 168–71. 
45 The Veteran Association of Kuwol-San Partisan Forces, Kuwol-San Partisan Forces, p. 92. 
46 Ibid., p. 93. 
47 According to the records written by the ROK Army Headquarters, Captain Kim visited Sokto to meet his family 
there: The ROK Army Headquarters, The Korean War and the Guerrilla Warfare, p. 171. However, Captain Kim 
wrote in his memoirs that he was ordered from the ROK Army Headquarters to ‘return to Sokto and re-secure the 
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was a rumour to deceive the Leopard Headquarters). The Veteran Association of Kuwol-San Partisan Forces, 
Kuwol-San Partisan Forces: Their Memoirs, pp. 92–3. 
48 ROK Army Headquarters, The Korean War and the Guerrilla Warfare, p. 171. 
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 Following this, the Leopard Headquarters identified Donkey-2 guerrillas as mutineers and 
ordered Donkey-15 to disarm them. More than 300 guerrillas, therefore, had to be primarily 
deported to Sokto under an armed escort. Amongst them, 149 guerrillas were sent to a Prison 
Camp in Pusan. Of the others, 171 guerrillas, were drowned in a junk in heavy storms as they 
were transferred from Taewha-do to Yukto.49 After this incident, the survivors had to distribute 
themselves over smaller islands such as Ung-do and Chongyang-do nearby Sokto, and took the 
policy of ‘lying low’. They remained under cover until early August 1951, when one of Captain 
Kim’s staff, who was in charge of the Operation in Donkey-2, reorganised these guerrillas and 
re-joined the Leopard organisation under the new name of Donkey-20.50  
 To the Commanders of TG 95.1, the fact that Donkey-2, one of their best partners during the 
early stage of guerrilla operations, was involved in a mutiny was surprising news. On one hand, 
they did not oppose Leopard’s decision on the matter, but equally, they regretted their former 
partner’s unfortunate outcome, in particular that of Captain Kim. This can be seen from the 
CTG 95.1’s report as follows:  
 
The garrison, and the landing force, led by the redoubtable Captain Kim, one of our earliest 
“Allies” in this line of business, are reported to have mutinied. Colonel Burke nipped this in 
the bud, and some 300 prisoners were removed from Sokto and reinforcements put in. The 
fate of the mutineer dose not bear much speculation, but it is a matter for regret that Captain 
Kim has already gone to join his ancestors. He was always in the forefront of the battle in the 
early days.51 
     
Regardless of the truth concerning the Donkey-2 guerrillas’ experience, their problem lay in the 
fact that the British Naval Commanders regarded this incident as a mutiny conducted by one of 
the formerly most helpful guerrilla units. Moreover, incidentally, this ‘mutiny’ immediately 
                                           
49 There were 173 guerrillas in this junk and only two of them were survived. Former Donkey-2 veterans called 
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followed the commencement of the cease-fire negotiations. As mentioned above, the origins of 
the Leopard Headquarters and Donkey-2 conflict took root before the cease-fire talks actually 
began, and thus the cease-fire talks cannot be claimed as being decisive in creating the conflict.  
 However, despite this moot point, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff recognised the incident as one of 
a series of outcomes resulting from truce discussions. His comments on this subject clearly 
supported the perception that the incident happened ‘because of their anxieties and uncertainty 
over their future in the event of a cease-fire’.52 Although this incident did not cause any 
immediate changes in their co-operation, with the intelligence supply problem, the Task 
Group’s distrust over the Leopard guerrillas rapidly increased within a short period of time.  
 
5.4 Double Agents amongst the Guerrillas 
 
Admiral Scott-Moncrieff commented in his report covering 15 August and 10 September, stating; 
‘I have for some time been sceptical of the reliability of these gentlemen’.53 Hence, from an early 
stage of co-operation there were some doubts concerning guerrilla reliability amongst the 
Blockade Commanders. In fact, to them ‘It would be very surprising if there were not large 
numbers of double and treble agents, working probably not only for the enemy but for more than 
one of our own agencies covering the area.’54 Although commanders of TG 95.1 fully recognised 
potential hazards in deploying these former North Koreans, as it was just speculative and not 
based on actual experiences, to a large degree they trusted the Leopard Headquarters’ ability to 
control the guerrillas’ activities. Therefore, there seemed to be no significant reluctance for the 
Blockade Commanders to share their future plans with the Leopard Headquarters and the 
                                           
52 Ibid.  




guerrillas. As could be seen in the case of Operation ASHCAN, a demonstration landing 
operation conducted on 20 May, TG, 95.1, it was not only sharing the feint landing plans with the 
guerrillas, but also using them to spread rumours of the so-called landing.55 They even selected 
bogus landing places based on the guerrillas’ recommendations.56  
 However, after the start of cease-fire talks, due to the events of several salient episodes, suspicion 
grew of double agent infiltration. Immediately after the Taewha-do Incident, the concentration 
levels of mainland enemy troops opposite Sokto was reported to HMS Ceylon. According to 
the report, enemy forces were arming junks on the Amgak Peninsula to invade Sokto. Because 
all civilians have been moved out of the area, there was no doubt that they were in fact enemy 
forces building up their numbers. As the enemy position was out of range of gunfire, HMS 
Ceylon asked HMS Glory to strike with her aircraft as a first measure. After such, two ROK 
craft were immediately directed to join HMNZS Rotoiti, the only ship in the area.57  
 Fortunately, there was no further enemy action. The Communist manoeuvres occurring 
immediately after the transfer of Donkey-2 guerrillas from Sokto to Taewha-do, however, was 
a problem to the Blockade Commanders. Considering the fact that Donkey-2 had been 
garrisoned on this island since March of 1951 and only small numbers of ROK Marine garrison 
forces remained after the guerrillas’ moved, meant that it was therefore the best opportunity for 
the Communists to re-capture this island. It seemed reasonable for the Blockade Commanders 
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to associate this episode with the influence of guerrilla double agents. In fact, CTG 95.1 also 
speculated this enemy movement ‘as a result of inevitable leakage of the Leopard guerrillas’.58 
 The increasing distrust of guerrilla allegiance reached its peak in the course of conducting a 
raid in late August. As the quality of intelligence supplied by Leopard had become unreliable 
since the start of the truce negotiations, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff decided to conduct small raids 
using Royal Marines and trained seamen. These raids were planned to obtain prisoners for 
corroborative intelligence purposes, because it was clear that much of the intelligence of troop 
movements and enemy intentions supplied by the Leopard guerrillas was unreliable and usually 
exaggerated.59  
 The first was conducted on the night of 25 and 26 August by ten Royal Marines and seven 
able seamen under the gunfire support from HMS Ceylon, Charity and HMNZS Rotoiti. 
However, the friendly raiding party had to withdraw without the necessary prisoners, due to 
strong enemy resistance.60  Accordingly, the task group planned an additional raid on the 
Mongumpo a couple of days later.  
 On the early morning of 30 August 1951, a large-scale landing party, consisting of two 
platoons of Royal Marines and one of stoker-mechanics, landed on Choni-dong near 
Mongumpo. The main purpose of this landing was to round up a number of Communist troops 
reported by Leopard in this area.61 Through deploying the large-scale landing, it drew enemy 
troops from the front line. This was an additional objective. In this raid, Lieutenant Colonel 
Ehrgott, Commander of the Leopard organisation was accompanied by an assault platoon.62   
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 With a covering of heavy bombardment from HMS Ceylon, Concord and HMNZS Rotoiti, the 
assault party proceeded inshore in a Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP). The 
bombardment was then lifted inshore, for the assault party to land on the beach. However, 
before they could get inland, heavy and accurate mortar and small-arms fire opened from the 
flanks and rear. The assault party also faced small grenade-type mines, and three of these were 
exploded. It seemed clear that the enemy determinedly held strong positions and were 
unharmed by the earlier bombardments from the blockade ships. According to HMS Ceylon’s 
record, there were also two or three mortars registered on the beach and mortar shells arrived in 
salvoes. As there was no reason to expect any opposition, the landing forces were embarrassed. 
Although, the assault party responded with their rifles, they received orders from HMS Ceylon 
to quickly withdraw. As a result of this landing fifteen casualties were suffered — one was 
seriously wounded, six others were cot cases, and eight were slightly wounded.63 
 The problem was that the landing place was selected based on the Leopard’s recommendation. 
In a meeting with Leopard officers at Paengyong-do on 29 August, the CO of HMS Ceylon was 
told that ‘It was not anticipated that there would be any enemy in the immediate vicinity 
of the beach since they were all reported as being well back’.64 However, what the allies 
experienced in the course of landing was not a peaceful beach, but an enemy ambush. There 
was no doubt that the enemy was prepared and waiting to attack. As a result of this landing, the 
Blockade Commanders felt assured that double agents existed amongst the friendly guerrillas. 
As CTG 95.1’s comments in his Report of Proceeding clearly showed:  
 
It is quite clear that advance information of the intended raid must have leaked out. The 
reliability of some of the agents employed by Leopard has recently became open to doubt, 
and this regrettable episode has confirmed it. The methods and speed of dissemination of 
target information also leaves something to be desired.65 
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After this episode, the Blockade Commanders became more prudent in their co-operation with 
the Leopard guerrillas. CTG 95.1 immediately issued a directive asking for raids to be 
discontinued, unless CTE 95.12 was satisfied that he was not being double-crossed.66 In addition 
to that, CTG 95.1 decided to be very chary when placing any reliance on guerrilla reports of enemy 
intentions or activities, and to be more prudent in the sharing of the Task Group’s future plan or 
intentions with them.67 He also stressed the importance of contacts with the US officers in charge 
and the need of reducing direct communication with dubious Leopard agents unless screened by 
the Leopard Headquarters.68 
 Therefore, to improve the liaison of the Leopard organisation with TG 95.1, and for a better 
evaluation of intelligence being passed to the blockade ships, CTG 95.1 arranged one Royal 
Marine officer to be stationed in Paengyong-do.69 Concurrently, he took actions to decrease 
any direct communication with the guerrillas. When HMS Cardigan Bay operated in the Han 
area, she recommended that the guerrillas should be supplied with a more portable W/T sets to 
improve target information. However, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff expressed a negative attitude 
by commenting that ‘If they do provide more sets, the objections of lack of security and duplicity 
have to be considered’.70 The Admiral even showed reluctance to communicate directly with the 
Leopard agents in the course of guerrilla spotting activity for gunfire bombardments.71  
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 The Leopard officers’ trust in guerrilla integrity was also severely reduced. As could be seen in 
HMS Ceylon’s report on 1 September 1951 mentioned below, they agreed that there were likely 
double-agents within the organisation and promised better control and supervision. 
 
On talking this over with Leopard we both agreed that the local ROK Guerrilla unit responsible to 
Leopard for producing intelligence in that area cannot be regarded as reliable, and may even be a 
traitor in that Leopard had previously encouraged him to get more and better intelligence of the 
beaches, which fact he may have divulged to the enemy. There is no doubt that the enemy was 
prepared to be attacked. Leopard is now of the opinion that he should organise very much better 
supervision of his ROK agents to the extent possibly of putting American or British specially trained 
troops ashore with them.72 
 
In particular, the new Leopard Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott’s was extremely distrustful. 
He even considered the possibility that enemy agents’ had infiltrated Paengyong-do. As a first step to 
rectify this situation, new passes for the guerrillas were issued. Old passes were regarded as a security 
problem for blockade ships, insomuch as the passes signed by the previous Commander, Major 
Burke, had been in circulation for a dubiously long time and had possibly fallen into enemy 
hands. Therefore, an initiative was set by the new Leopard Commander ordering the withdrawal 
of all such passes by 30 September 1951. Simultaneously, new passes were issued containing 
the signatory of Leopard’s Intelligence Officer, the thumb print of the bearer and a specifically 
designed notification mark. Specimens of these passes were immediately shared with blockade 
ships.73  
 Leopard’s target intelligence supply system was also changed. During Major Burke’s 
command, all target information was to be reported every seven days. Any targets more than 
seven days old from the date of the intelligence report, therefore, were regarded obsolete. If the 
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enemy were still in the reported position, Leopard would support the target again.74 However, 
because of the perceived shortage of reliable guerrillas, this seven days rule was changed after 
a meeting with Leopard to the following:  
 
a. Targets of mobile nature [troop concentrations] can be considered dead after 14 days 
from the date of the intelligence.  
b. Targets of a semi-mobile nature [guns, store dumps] can be considered dead after 28 
days. Apparently mobile guns are moved less often than infantry. 
c. Targets of permanent nature [ammunition factory, gold mines] can be considered dead 
only after their destruction.75 
 
Although several measures were conducted to rectify the problem of the reliability of the guerrillas, 
Leopard headquarters’ distrust did not improve. According to HMS Black Swan’s records regarding 
her meeting with the Leopard Commander, the latter said ‘he only has about five really reliable 
agents and that most of them are of the coolie class’.76  Within two months from the 
beginning of a cease-fire talk, the Leopard guerrillas faced a crisis of confidence from all of 
their friendly forces.  
 
5.5 The Guerrillas’ Conduct of ‘Private War’ 
 
By definition, ‘private war’ means ‘hostilities against members of another state that take place 
without government sanction’.77 Considering the fact that the Korean War was an international 
war conducted by various countries, and wartime operational control was transferred to the 
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hands of the C-in-C of UN forces; it would be more appropriate to change the words ‘without 
government sanction’ in this definition to ‘without the sanction of higher command’. 
 In judging the conduct of private war, the Commanders of TG 95.1 strictly applied this 
definition to their ships. On 11 July 1951, when HMNZS Rotoiti successfully attacked and 
raided an enemy gun position by landing two of her able seamen without prior permission from 
CTE 95.12, the CO of HMS Ceylon pointed out to Captain of HMNZS Rotoiti that he had 
conducted a ‘private war’.78 Almost two months later, HMCS Cayuga supported a guerrilla 
raid successfully in her patrol in the Yalu Gulf. Whilst Admiral Scott-Moncrieff agreed with 
the need of supporting this type of guerrilla raid, he considered HMCS Cayuga’s support as an 
example of a ‘private war’, as it was conducted without notification and permission of CTE 
95.12.79  
 In fact, Canadian Captains under TG 95.1 regarded this episode as RN commanders’ way of 
taking initiative from its Commonwealth partners, and expressed shared disagreements with the 
advice of RN Commander.80 However, regardless of genuine purposes and results, other than 
that of an emergency situation, operations conducted without a higher commander’s agreement 
were called ‘private wars’ by the Blockade Commanders.  
   
In fact, the expression ‘private war’ was most frequently used in describing the Leopard 
guerrillas’ activities. However, the Blockade Commanders’ definition of ‘private war’ in 
relation to Leopard guerrillas and blockade ships was quite different. As they were not members 
of the organisation’s higher command, it was impossible to know all of the directives ordered 
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by the Leopard Headquarters. This meant that TG 95.1 did not have appropriate information to 
decide whether the guerrillas’ activities were conducted with permission from their US officers. 
 Therefore, the Blockade Commanders used this expression to describe guerrilla activity 
carried out for private objectives. Unlike ships under their command, who were rarely diverted 
from their main missions, the guerrillas frequently conducted various activities seemingly with 
little relationship to their missions; such as conducting rice raids or hostility against civilians.81 
As mentioned by Admiral Scott-Moncrieff; ‘some of the guerrilla raids are for personal gain 
only. I had always been wary of this possibility and have constantly warned CTE against 
becoming involved in private wars’, hence activities, not required by their mission, but for 
private objectives, were deemed examples of ‘private war’ by the Blockade Commanders.82  
 Based on this definition, from an early stage, the Leopard guerrillas had a tendency to conduct 
private warfare. Although they were organised under the command of the US Army, they were 
inherently irregular forces, spontaneously gathered for their own objectives. Moreover, large 
number of the guerrillas were breadwinners for their family and refugees living on the islands 
with the guerrillas. They had to acquire rations, not only for their activities, but also for their 
families and dependants.83 Therefore, from an early stage, some guerrilla activities were for 
satisfying private objectives. 
 The EUSAK’s logistic support policy for their guerrillas also intensified their guerrillas’ 
pursuit of private gain. Since large quantities of supplies including food, ammunition and 
weapons were sent to Paengyong-do and other islands when each guerrilla groups had joined 
the Leopard organisation, supply to the guerrillas was determined by EUSAK’s initial plan that 
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‘the partisans would require little continuous logistical support, once basic requirements in 
equipment had been met’.84 Therefore, each Donkey unit was asked to capture a large part of 
their military supplies and food in the course of their activities.  
During the first few months of 1951, however, US officers began to realise that their logistic 
policy was impractical. It became clear that most of their Donkeys were not able to capture enough 
military goods, in particular food, in the course of conducting their main missions.85 Therefore, 
especially in case of rice, Leopard headquarters decided to supply additional supplies to their 
agents.86 However, the EUSAK’s regular supply was still insufficient for the guerrillas.87     
Due to the shortage of ration supply from the EUSAK, to support themselves and their 
dependents, the guerrillas had to continue private warfare.88 
 These guerrillas’ tendency to private war, whilst apparent from an early stage by virtue of its 
nature and the higher command’s policy, increased radically from the start of cease-fire talks. 
The possibility of the signing of a cease-fire negotiation, based on the 38th parallel, not only 
reduced motivation to fight, but also triggered anxiety as to an uncertain future. As the guerrillas 
were not officially integrated with any allied force, and their status was considered no more 
than a ‘private army of the Korean guerrillas’, their living situation after the end of the war 
became one of the main concerns.89  
 As for the first response to the possible armistice, the number of deserters increased amongst 
former students and breadwinners of families. Unlike the regular army, the Leopard 
Headquarters did not have any of their guerrillas’ lists, hence, there was not any way to control 
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or punish deserters. Therefore, to be a regular ROK army officer, or to find a job to support 
their family, large numbers of guerrillas left their islands.90  
 Much more important, it became clear that the abrupt change in the wartime situation heavily 
influenced the remaining Leopard guerrillas’ motivation and activity. Large numbers of 
guerrillas, including some of the Donkey leaders and cadres, discarded their early lofty motives 
and started prioritising their own interests. One of the most famous cases involved the 
corruption of a former Donkey leader. The leader of Donkey-4, named Chang Sok Lin, along 
with his unit, was regarded by the Leopard Headquarters and guerrillas as the finest and most 
able. His colleagues remembered him as a ‘powerful and strong man and full of spirit’ who 
‘had no love of material’.91 However, after the start of the truce talks, a very fine leader became 
radically corrupt. He put his family members into important positions within Donkey-4 and 
sequestered supplies from their Headquarters for his family. The guerrilla leader, once regarded 
as one of integrity, became greedy for material gain within a short period of time.92 Although 
he was killed by his Donkey members on 1 January 1952 as a result of his corruption, this story 
showed that even a respected guerrilla leader was prone to temptation and capable of changing 
his principles to suit his private interest.      
 Some of the guerrillas who had left families in their hometowns, endeavoured to bring family 
members to their islands. At that time, based on the Hwanghae Province, the Communist 
Government had conducted a search operation against the Leopard guerrillas’ families and 
sympathisers. As a result, large numbers of family members and sympathisers were deported 
to a province further north or punished.93 To the guerrillas, it was a race against time to move 
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their families to safe locations before the signing of truce talks and retribution occurred. 
Therefore, Donkey members passed landing plan details to their families through mainland 
agents in an effort to relocate these relatives on returning to the safety of the islands.94  
 Although transferring families from the mainland was an essential task for the guerrillas, this 
consequently increased each guerrilla’s burden to support them. As there was no additional 
food supply from the Leopard Headquarters for these family additions, rice raids became more 
necessary for each Donkey unit.95  
 In fact, from mid-August, large numbers of rice raids and similar activities had been witnessed 
in the island of Sunwi-do, Yongwi-do and around the Ongjin Peninsula.96 These activities, 
coinciding with the start of the rice harvest season, drastically increased. HMS Ceylon’s report 
showed it clearly as follows: 
 
On 11th October, on the way up the Route Cigarette two friendly raiding parties were observed 
returning loaded with rice and cattle. The season seemed to have opened with a swing, with 
raids being carried out up and down the coast.97  
 
The Blockade commanders also understood the need for rice raids by guerrillas who had family 
and other refugees to support. To some extent, they caused damage to the enemy’s rice supply 
system. 98  However, as mentioned above, the guerrillas’ excessive involvement in these 
activities, not only diverted them from their main mission, but also frequently disturbed the 
blockade ships’ operations. In fact, during this time, intelligence supply from the Leopard 
organisation became even more scanty and unreliable. The CO of HMS Ceylon was told by 
                                           
94 For example, during a landing operation carried out on September 1951, a Donkey unit on Chodo transferred 
twenty families in this event: Ibid., p. 228. 
95 Ibid., p. 183. 
96 ADM 116/6218, HMS Kenya-Report of Proceedings 6 to 22 August 1951, HMS Kenya, 29 August 1951, Haeju 
Area-Intelligence Note, para. 4.  
97 ADM 116/6214, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 5 to 17 October 1951, HMS Ceylon, 17 October 1951, para. 
25. 
98 CTG 95.1 therefore described these rice raids as ‘more or less justifiable’: ADM 116/6211, HMS Belfast-Report 
of Proceedings 31 August to 11 September 1951, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 15 October 1951.  
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Leopard officers in a meeting that this was due to increased guerrilla activity in rice raids.99 
Their increased uncoordinated movements and frequent emergency calls also were problematic 
to the ships of TG 95.1. In cases when raid intentions were unclear, supporting their emergency 
calls could often jeopardise the blockade ships’ main operation, diverting resources to private 
wars. These concerns were clearly mentioned in CTG 95.1’s comments that: 
 
It was always been necessary to be careful in deciding which raids to support, and which to 
discourage […] These may be more or less justifiable rice raids to feed the large numbers of 
refugees in the off-lying islands, or they may be in satisfaction of local feuds or personal 
prejudices as against the local money lender, or the gang leader’s mother-in-law.100 
 
Regardless of an agreement with the Leopard Headquarters in early July 1951 concerning the 
prior notification of intended guerrilla raids, owing to the upsurge of rice raids and their other 
private activities, the co-ordination system in naval support became chaotic again. 
 The Blockade Commanders’ dissatisfaction towards the guerrillas’ conduct of private war 
reached a peak in the course of supporting a large-scale guerrilla raid to capture Sinmi-do. 
Sinmi-do is the largest island in the Northern group of the Yalu Gulf, being eight miles long 
and four miles wide. At that time, most of the larger islands in the Yalu Gulf were captured by 
Donkey-15. From mid-May 1951(the start of operations from the island of Taewha-do) until 
the end of June, they captured twelve islands in the Yalu Gulf. Sinmi-do was an exception. 
Unlike others, there were around seventy enemy garrison forces on this island. This was 
assumed to be connected to the existence of a large warehouse containing large amounts of 
rice.101  
                                           
99 ADM 116/6214, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 5 to 17 October 1951, Appendix II. 
100 ADM 116/6211, HMS Belfast-Report of Proceedings 31 August to 11 September 1951, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 15 
October 1951. 
101 ROK Army Headquarters, The Korean War and the Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 263–5; Army Forces, Far East, 8086 
Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict, 1951–1952’, pp. 254–5. 
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 On 2 October, HMS Cossack was asked by the Leopard Headquarters to visit Taewha-do with 
Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott and his staff. Once there, they held a conference with the leader of 
Donkey-15, Kim Ung Soo. During this meeting, a plan to capture Sinmi-do was discussed. The 
CO of HMS Cossack was told that Donkey-15 would use Sinmi-do as an advanced base for 
future operations. After this meeting, HMS Cossack proceeded to Paengyong-do to confer with 
the CO of HMS Ceylon, and in this meeting they decided to support this raid.102 A further 
conference was held during the evening of 7 October, and it was decided to attack Sinmi-do in 
the early morning of 9 October.103 
 Covered by HMS Cossack, 800 guerrillas landed on the eastern side of the island in the early 
morning. Their primary object was capturing the high ground and then attacking the town from 
landward. At first, some success was achieved. The party secured a beach-head and advanced 
to the hills. HMS Cossack remained around Sinmi-do to provide gunfire support for more than 
48 hours, until daylight of 12 October, when success seemed assured, and she left for Sasebo. 
However, the Communists landed reinforcements over the mud-flats during the night, and on 
the arrival of HMS Ceylon that evening to continue the support, she found the guerrillas 
withdrawing. HMS Ceylon covered the withdrawal successfully during the nights of 12 and 13 
October.104 
 The problem was that, facing the reinforcement, the guerrillas decided to withdraw without 
the knowledge of HMS Ceylon and without active resistance against the enemy. More 
pertinently it seemed, their main motivation was to loot the warehouse. In fact, Donkey-15 had 
                                           
102 ADM 116/6214, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 5 to 17 October 1951, Appendix II. 
103 ADM 116/6217, HMS Cossack-Report of Proceedings 1 to 6 October 1951, HMS Cossack, 13 October 1951, 
paras 6–11. 
104 ADM 116/6228, Korean War-Report of Proceedings No. 42, 29 September to 16 October 1951, the Flag 
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raided this warehouse on 7 June. As a result of this raid, they were able to capture a large amount 
of rice bags.105 One of the main reasons for Donkey-15’s additional raid was that they expected 
large amounts of rice again.  
 HMS Ceylon was understandably disappointed with the guerrillas who had taken advantage 
of naval forces for their personal gain. It could be seen in the following records that: 
 
It is a great disappointment for him [the CO of HMS Cossack] that his carefully laid plans of 
cooperation and vast expenditure of ammunition have been partially wasted due to this 
precipitous withdrawal. Looking at the operation in the light of subsequent events, I am sure 
that the guerrillas ‘bit off more than they could chew’. I also know that they were very 
disappointed with the amount of rice and oxen to be looted […] I do not think that the guerrillas 
ever meant to hold the Island against opposition, and the lack of loot undoubtedly influenced them 
in deciding to leave.106  
 
After the raid, the CO of HMS Ceylon told the Commander of the Leopard organisation that the 
continual day-to-day support of Blockade ships for guerrilla raids was not a practicable exercise, 
thus it would only be applied to the initial stages of any raid.107 CTG 95.1 also stated to his Blockade 
Commanders; ‘It has been evident for some time that […] some of the guerrilla raids are for 
personal gain only. I had always been wary of this possibility and have constantly warned CTE 
against becoming involved in private wars’.108 
 
5.6 The Guerrillas Cry Wolf: Naval Forces’ Fruitless Demonstration 
 
                                           
105 ROK Army Headquarters, The Korean War and the Guerrilla Warfare, p. 265; Army Forces, Far East, 8086 
Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict, 1951–1952’, pp. 254–5. The official history of ROK 
MHCI wrote that this raid was conducted on 27 May. Cho, The Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War, p. 397. 
106 ADM 116/6214, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 5 to 17 October 1951, paras 46–7, 51. 
107 Ibid.  
108 ADM 116/6211, HMS Belfast-Report of Proceedings 14 to 24 October 1951, HMS Belfast, 25 October 1951, CTG 
95.1’s Comments, 16 November 1951.  
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From the first meeting of the main truce delegations on 10 July 1951, it was clear that there 
were great differences between the objectives of the two sides, and this suggested that the 
negotiations would not proceed smoothly. Therefore, it took five days to straighten out basic 
matters such as the establishment of neutrality in the talk site and the substitution of military 
police for armed troops in the area. The talks pertaining to agenda requirements started on 19 
July, and disagreement between the two sides meant that a more definitive agenda was 
eventually adopted on 26 July. However, when the negotiations entered practical discussion, 
the second agenda item, namely ‘the fixing of a military demarcation line between the two sides 
for the establishment of a de-militarised zone’ aroused conflict.109 
 At this conference, the Communists, who currently suffered a net loss of territory, insisted that 
the 38th parallel had to be the demarcation line. But based on the superior naval and air power, 
the UN negotiators, for their part, sought compensatory consideration and wanted a line north 
of the current front. Subsequently, this discussion evoked the relevant question as to which side 
actually controlled the territory of the Ongjin and Yonan peninsulas, south west of 38th parallel. 
It was considered important to emphasise that these areas, although actually held at the time by 
the Communists, were controlled by superior air and naval forces of the United Nations. 
Accordingly, in the evening of 24 July, Admiral Joy acting in his capacity as senior delegate at 
the truce talk negotiation issued a message to Rear-Admiral Dyer, CTF 95, requesting a show 
of strength in the Han River estuary, as close as possible to the neutral area around Kaesong. 
CTF 95, therefore, ordered Admiral Scott-Moncrieff that all activities on the west coast should 
                                           
109 ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval Operations, 
Korea, 1950–53, pp. 161–2. The agreed five-item agenda was as follows: 1) Adoption of agenda; 2) Fixing of 
military demarcation line between the two sides so as to establish a demilitarised zone as a basic condition for the 
cessation of hostilities in Korea; 3) Concrete arrangements for the realisation of cease-fire and armistice in Korea, 
including the composition, authority, and function of a supervisory organ for carrying out the terms of cease-fire 
and armistice; 4) Arrangements relating to prisoners of war; 5) Recommendation to governments of countries 
concerned on both sides. Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. III, pp. 68–9. 
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be subordinate to the requirements of this demonstration. HMS Glory, which was relieved by 
USS Sicily on 20 July, was ordered to join USS Sicily. At this time, both carriers concentrated 
their air operations on this area. All but one of the frigates and the ROK patrol vessels under 
the command of CTG 95.1 were also ordered to the Han River estuary.110  
 The fact of the matter was that, as the negotiations failed continually to establish a demarcation 
line, large numbers of blockade ships were operating dangerously in the Han Estuary for little 
profit. This was because the approaches to the Han River were shallow and included many 
islands surrounded by shifting mud-flats that dry at low water. There were no navigation marks 
existing and tidal streams ran at four to eight knots. Moreover, targets for bombardment, 
obtained mainly from the Leopard organisation, were generally unprofitable, and local enemy 
activities seemed non-existent at this time.111 
 Admiral Scott-Moncrieff was dissatisfied with this situation, as it diverted his ships from the 
Northern area of the Han River which he considered more important for blockade operations. 
He tried to withdraw some of the frigates from the Han area, however, it was not possible. 
Therefore, the mobile part of TE 95.12 was reduced from four ships to only two; namely one 
frigate and one destroyer.112 This could be seen in CTG 95.1’s comments as follows: 
  
Although the Kaesong Cease-Fire talk had been off for some time, I had been unable to 
persuade CTF 95 to allow me to withdraw even one frigate from the Han River. The original 
reason for our entry, it will be remembered, was to show the enemy that we controlled what 
little territory he still held below the 38th parallel and to impress upon the enemy negotiators 
at Kaesong our presence in the Han from the sound of our gunfire. However, I have always 
felt that this could be done adequately with one frigate and air support.113 
 
                                           
110 Field Jr., History of United States Naval Operations, Korea, pp. 411–12. 
111 ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval Operations, 
Korea, 1950–53, pp. 167–8. 
112 ADM 116/6212, HMS Black Swan-Report of Proceedings, 22 September to 1 October 1951, the Captain (F), 
Third Frigate Flotilla, HMS Black Swan, 8 October 1951, para. 3. 
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During this period, however, the requirements for patrol and commitments for gunfire support 
for Leopard guerrillas had greatly increased. From July, Donkey-15 earnestly started 
intelligence gathering activities and raids in the Yalu Gulf. Thus, to support their gunfire 
requirements, the blockade patrol ship quota in this area required strengthening. Requirements 
of gunfire support from Donkey units in the Hwanghae Province also increased, due to a heavy 
involvement in rice raiding and other offensive activities.114 In addition to that, incidental 
bombardments had also multiplied to at least one every other day on a remarkable variety of 
targets. This was mainly due to increased numbers of enemy troops in the Haeju and Chodo 
areas.115 Considering the fact that there was an appreciable mine-sweeping commitment in the 
Cigarette route, such heavy commitment of blockade ships reached an unsustainable level. The 
CO of HMS Black Swan, who was CTE 95.12 between 22 September and 1 October 1951, 
therefore described this situation in these terms; ‘it was therefore apparent that the adequate 
fulfilment of these many requirements would afford an interesting exercise in the construction 
of bricks with a minimum complement of Israelites.’116 
 During this time, that was one of the most demanding periods for TG 95.1’s ships, the Leopard 
guerrillas’ were conducting their personal imprudent activities. This naturally increased 
antipathy towards them. Whilst enemy troop numbers increased on the west coast, there was 
also a great deal of concern over the need for extra ship support to address security issues for 
the unstable islands in the Chodo and Haeju area. In fact, Leopard’s communications increased 
considerably, and appeared disproportionate to their importance in the general scheme.117 
                                           
114 During HMS Black Swan’s patrol period, there were seven requirements for gunfire support from Leopard and 
four of them were unco-ordinated emergency calls. Ibid., Appendix A: Narratives of Event-CTE 95.12. 
115 ADM 116/6217, HMS Cossack-Report of Proceedings 10 to 22 September 1951, HMS Cossack, 28 September 
1951, para. 5. 
116 ADM 116/6212, HMS Black Swan-Report of Proceedings, 22 September to 1 October 1951, paras 3–4. 
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 Such examples of calls that undermined and debilitated more important missions are as 
follows. On the evening of 29 September, HMS Black Swan received an emergency call 
from Leopard at the island of Yukto, asking for support against enemy forces threatening 
their islands. As it was thought that the enemy might try to cross over to Yukto at low 
water, HMS Black Swan and HMS Comus proceeded to this area and carried out 
bombardments against the reported concentrations of troops and gun positions. 
Complying with the request of Leopard guerrillas, patrols between Paengyong-do and the 
mainland were conducted each night until further notice. Therefore, HMS Comus carried 
out this additional patrol over the next two days, by which time, the anxiety seemed to be 
relieved.118 On 28 October, HMCS Cayuga was diverted for gunfire support by the request of 
Leopard and required to cover an evacuation in the Changsan-got area. When she arrived, 
however, she was told that this had already been completed during the night.119  
 Although the Blockade Commanders recognised the increase of enemy forces, they thought it 
was not an imminent threat to the friendly islands.120 They thus regarded these calls as ‘Cry 
Wolf’ situations, provoked by unnecessary jitters on behalf of the security of the respective 
islands.121 In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction in that these requirements diverted them 
from their main missions and added extra burden to the over stretched resource of blockade 
ships. Therefore, CTE 95.12 (at that time HMS Ceylon) visited the Leopard Headquarters and 
conferred with US officers in charge to determine as follows: 
 
a) What ship’s gunfire could do by night and by day with and without air spot. 
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b) That ships could not be at the constant beck and call of any Donkey who thought he might 
be attacked, although we were always prepared to help in case of actual invasion provided 
navigational circumstance allowed.  
c) That the use of Flash priority on so many occasions when it was not really necessary would 
lead to it losing its significance when there was a real emergency.  
d) That failure to answer signals had led to uneconomical employment of Naval Forces. 
e) That ships had blockade and other duties to perform besides supporting guerrillas.122  
 
In the course of this meeting, he was able to acknowledge that American officers had very little 
idea of what was going on regarding this issue. Therefore, he had to return from Paengyong-do 
comforting himself that Leopard officers would in the future use discretion before making 
signals.123  
 
5.7 Leopard Headquarters’ Haphazard Screening of the Guerrillas 
 
In mid-August, most of the US officers who had been working for the Leopard organisation 
were simultaneously relieved. Major Burke, the first Leopard Commander was also relieved by 
Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott. The Commanders of the task group regretted the departures, as 
they had been involved in a successfully developed co-operation system with the Blockade 
Commanders from an early stage. Moreover, it was over a period of time when operational 
conditions were very demanding. They were particularly sorry that Major Burke, a capable and 
a very level-headed officer, had been withdrawn.124 
 From the initial stage of co-operation there had been several problems in the guerrilla activities, 
such as the previously mentioned uncoordinated movements and conduct of private war. These 
problems nevertheless remained, despite the reorganisation under the command of American 
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officers in March 1951. However, when Major Burke was in command, his organisation worked 
very smoothly with TG 95.1, and his staff tried to sort ‘the chaff from the grain’ as much as 
possible.125 Although there was no development of trust with former North Korean irregulars, 
the co-operation system was satisfactorily developed. This was mainly due to the early 
American officers’ capability and endeavour.  
 Co-operation, however, significantly deteriorated once the truce talks commenced, and it 
reached its worst as time progressed to the end of 1951. Considering the fact that CTG 95.1 
described that ‘the Leopard organisation at its lowest ebb’ in mid-November 1951, it can be 
presumed that there was a deepening disillusionment of the Blockade Commanders with this 
organisation.126 
 Once guerrilla morale and allegiance rapidly deteriorated on the commencement of the truce 
talks, their credibility also significantly weakened. This happened within a short period of time. 
Had an appropriate assignment from Headquarters taken control, however, such a radical 
collapse of the relationship could have been avoided. In fact, the Blockade Commanders 
supported this notion to some extent, as the new Leopard Commander and his staff’s lack of 
ability arguably increased problems.  
 Unlike Major Burke’s officers, who were keenly involved in the establishment process of 
Leopard organisation and vigorously prepared the second phase of plan ABLE, the new Leopard 
officers were appointed when the EUSAK Headquarters became indifferent to this organisation’s 
activities. Therefore, the motives of US officers transferred to Leopard gradually became centred 
on their own self-interests, such as remaining in a safer location or minimising their length of stay 
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in Korea.127 This situation undermined the morale of the newly appointed Leopard officers who 
had relieved most of their predecessors in August 1951. This also impaired the level of 
supervision and control of guerrilla activities. 
 The new Leopard Commander also seemed less competent in controlling his guerrillas. 
Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott had experienced special operations during the Second World War 
in Greece. He had also worked under G3 of the Eighth Army before he was transferred to the 
Leopard organisation. Despite this experience, however, from an early time of his command, 
the Blockade Commanders’ evaluation of the new Leopard commander was generally 
unfavourable.128 Following the landing operation in the Mongumpo area on 30 August, the CO 
of HMS Belfast wrote of Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott; ‘although he was most co-operative, he 
seemed to be very highly strung and unable to concentrate for long on any one subject.’129 After 
his patrol as CTE 95.12 during late September, the CO of HMS Black Swan made an evaluation 
of Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott, stating that ‘the man himself did not appear to be as competent 
as Burke, and it was difficult to get any really hard and fast rulings.’130 
 In fact, from the early time of new American officers’ placement on the Leopard organisation, 
they revealed lack of control of their agents by showing that they had no important knowledge 
relating to guerrilla movements. On 8 September 1951, HMS Cayuga and three ROKN 
Minesweepers were engaged in the support of a large guerrilla raid in the Pungchon area, near 
the island of Chodo.131 A problem existed in the fact that it was conducted only through the 
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co-ordination of blockade ships, and not from any knowledge from Leopard Headquarters. The 
CO of HMS Belfast realised this in the course of a conference with Leopard officers at 
Paengyong-do almost a day before the raid. Although this raid was conducted under the 
auspices of the Salamander officer in Chodo, the CO of HMS Belfast expressed his 
disappointment that Leopard knew nothing about it.132  
 This event reinforced the Blockade Commanders’ belief that Donkey units operated under an 
inadequately loose control, and usually passed only their results of activities to their 
headquarters without sharing their plans. It meant that Leopard officers lost their capability of 
liaison regarding guerrilla activities. To the Blockade Commanders, the Salamander officer, 
who satisfactorily co-ordinated the previous guerrilla raid, was regarded as more appropriate 
for liaison, although his organisation was much smaller than Leopard, and he was only able to 
conduct local arrangement based on Chodo.133  
 A similar situation happened in the course of a meeting with Leopard officers regarding 
HMCS Cayuga’s unplanned gunfire support for the Leopard guerrillas on 28 October. In this 
meeting, the CO of HMS Ceylon was surprised that the Leopard Headquarters had very little 
knowledge of the guerrillas’ imprudent emergency calls in which they frequently asked for 
support. The US officers were rarely involved in the distribution of signals from each Donkey 
guerrilla unit.134  
 On 21 October, two Leopard junks were sunk near the island of Taewha-do by an attack from 
the aircraft of HMAS Sydney, at that time CTE 95.11. Ironically, this attack was conducted at 
the request of Leopard Headquarters, who considered these large numbers of junks in the area 
as intent on capturing Taewha-do and the adjacent islands. Although Leopard were 
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unquestionably confident that no friendly junks were in the vicinity area, a large number of 
guerrillas were killed by this unfortunate accident.135 In his comments regarding this accident, 
Admiral Scott-Moncrieff referred to Leopard as ‘funny parties’ who displayed a haphazard 
communication system.136   
 The Blockade Commanders’ doubt as to the ability of the new regime of Leopard headquarters 
to control their guerrillas was reinforced by a report from Lieutenant Dicketts. He was with the 
Royal Marines 41st Commando and was sent to Paengyong-do as a liaison officer at the 
beginning of October. Although it was not possible to find his original report, its summary was 
introduced in the CTG 95.1’s report as follows: 
 
Leopard has about 800 [8,000] agents spread out on the west coast. The only time Leopard 
sees these agents is when a representative of a group comes to Paengyong-do to get stores. 
The screening of them seems very haphazard and the information they send in is only what 
they think is required; there is no close supervision, and they are not trained observers.137 
 
In fact, this information was not so surprising to the Blockade Commanders. They had already 
acquired strong suspicions based on their previous experiences. They already considered the 
Leopard Headquarters’ as having poor control and inadequate procedures for screening agents. 
As a result of this report, the Blockade Commanders were clearly assured of this American 
organisation’s lack of control.  
 Admiral Scott-Moncrieff decided to treat information received from Leopard organisation 
with reserve.138 Moreover, he clearly disagreed with the blockade ships’ direct communication 
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with guerrilla agents on the various islands. Only emergency situations, such as the enemy’s 
imminent and obvious threat of invasion, were exempt from this policy.139 As the Admiral 
commented in the HMS Belfast’s report; ‘former cooperation which we have been at such pains 
to foster between Leopard […] [appears] to have been largely wiped out’. 140  Hence co-
operation with Leopard regressed from the initial stage.  
CTG 95.1 appeared to connect Leopard’s poor agent control partly to Lieutenant Colonel 
Ehrgott’s character and lack of ability. This could be seen in his records in the statement; ‘My 
personal views are that Lieutenant Colonel Erghott is unsuitable for this duty. I will go further 
and say that he appears to have lost his nerve’.141 The only optimistic news for the Blockade 
Commanders was that, in early November, Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott was relieved by Major 




From the early stage of their co-operation, there were risk factors in deploying former North 
Korean irregulars; these were primarily the lack of reliability concerning the guerrillas and their 
activities. The COs of TG 95.1 naturally realised these problems in the course of co-operation. 
However, to some extent, they overlooked these operational deficiencies partly due to the 
beneficial results gained by co-operation. They also trusted the American officers’ role as a 
control tower. Therefore, the west coast naval forces’ dependence on the Leopard organisation, 
in particular their intelligence supply, deepened within a short period of time.   
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 The relationship which had satisfactorily developed up until July 1951, however, rapidly 
collapsed once the truce talk negotiations began. The uncertainty of the guerrillas’ future 
undermined their motivation, and the increased possibility of a cease-fire only accelerated their 
failing morale and allegiance. Conversely, their propensity for ‘private war’ was strengthened. 
Moreover, Leopard Headquarters’ inadequate ability to control their agents, and its new 
leadership’s shortcomings as a controller and co-ordinator, accelerated these problems. As a 
result, these factors combined in various situations, and the Blockade Commanders’ distrust of 
this organisation reached a peak and the early co-operation, once established, was almost wiped 
out. Undoubtedly, this radically deteriorating naval-guerrilla relationship immediately caused the 
ineffectiveness, inactiveness and even great danger in the western naval forces’ operation.   
 By early November 1951, for the Blockade Commanders, little hope of redressing the situation 
remained, other than the prospect that a new appointment, relieving Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott, 
may improve matters. As a large part of current guerrilla-related problems emerged from their 
nature, however, the new Leopard commander’s role seemed to have limited influence. With 
the gloomy outlook of their future co-operation, the TG 95.1 and the Leopard organisation 
entered a phase of a totally new operational environment on the west coast; the start of island 





Island Warfare and Imposed Close Co-Operation with the Guerrillas:  
From November 1951 to November 1952 
 
 
From early November 1951, TG 95.1 and their allied forces faced drastic changes in the 
operational environment with the start of the Communists’ new offensive operation to recapture 
the west coast islands. As Admiral Scott-Moncrieff commented, it represented the beginning of 
‘the most critical period’ for the friendly forces on the west coast.1 This situation forced the 
British Naval Forces to shift their main mission from the blockade to the islands’ defences. This 
required a close relationship between the Naval Commanders and the guerrillas, the latter of 
which had reached their lowest ebb in terms of reliability since truce talks had commenced. 
From November 1951, to the end of the enemy’s offensive on the islands in late 1952, naval 
forces in the west had to act as ‘island defenders’ and also continue in their close co-operation 
with these unreliable irregulars.  
 This chapter outlines the changed roles of TG 95.1 and the guerrilla organisation since the 
start of the island warfare. Their changing relationship during the period is also examined. 
Faced with new challenges, the nature of the required roles is detailed, along with the respective 
co-operation between the parties albeit of diminishing credibility.  
 For this purpose, this chapter will seek to explore the course taken from the beginning of island 
warfare. A brief narrative is given of the UN Forces’ island use on the west coast before the 
start of the Communists’ offensive against the islands. And then, the chapter describes why 
they conducted the offensive operation; mainly focusing on the dispute in the truce negotiations. 
                                           
1 ADM 116/6219, HMS Mounts Bay-Report of Proceedings from 1 to 9 December 1951, HMS Mounts Bay, 10 
December 1951, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 21 December 1951. 
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It then discusses the process of island warfare and the UN Forces’ measures to defend the 
enemy’s offensive.  
Finally, this chapter examines the changing relationship between the two groups; TG 95.1 and 
the guerrilla organisations. It covers the complex situation, as perceived by the Naval 
Commanders, in relation to the guerrilla activities during almost one year of the action 
emulating the game of ‘Tom Tiddler’s Ground’ on a large number of small islands.2 
 
6.1 The Communists’ Preparation for the Offensive over the Islands 
 
During the first six months of the Korean War, the islands on the west coast were not considered 
very valuable to the UN Forces. Therefore, when they were forced to retreat from Chinnampo 
on the Taedong River in December 1950, and from Inchon on 5 January 1951, the UNC decided 
to abandon these previously occupied islands and withdraw. By the request of CTG 95.1, 
Admiral Andrewes, who pointed out the importance of at least retaining possession of several 
islands on the north side of the 38th parallel to provide vigilance against enemy mine laying, a 
number of small islands were able to be secured.3 The islands selected were Chodo, controlling 
the approaches to the Taedong River, Techong-do and Paengyong-do, which controlled the only 
inshore route on the west coast. This route had reasonably deep water and larger ships could 
get within gun range. Importantly, Tokchok-do controlled the approaches to Inchon. Therefore, 
                                           
2 ‘Tom Tiddler’s Ground’ is an old children’s game. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff used this terminology in his 
operational report to describe the way island warfare was conducted between the Communists and the friendly 
forces throughout 1952, on the west coast. ADM 1/23906, Korean Naval Operations-9 January to 8 February 1952, 
Office of the Flag Officer, Second-in-command, Far East Station, 104/FO2FE2/1209/1, 13 February 1952, p. 6. 
3 ADM 1/27288, Korean War-Report of Proceedings 45, 1–22 December 1951, office of the Flag Officer, Second-
in-command, Far East Station, FO2FE/2960/11, 23 December 1951, p. 7. 
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the Naval Commanders deployed a small number of ROK Marine garrisons to defend these 
islands.4 
 
Map 6.1 Four Garrisoned Islands on the West Coast (Early 1951) 
 
 
(Source. Basic map taken from Political Map of Korea at <http://www.nationsonline.org/ 
oneworld/map/korea-north-political-map.htm>) 
 
However, when the UN Forces started to fight back and the front line stabilised around the 38th 
Parallel, the exact value of these islands was soon appreciated. These islands were used as bases 
for large guerrilla numbers and several clandestine organisations. They were important as 
                                           
4 ADM 1/27269, Report of Experience in Korean Operations, January–June 1951, Flag Officer, Second-in-
Command Far East Station, 26 July 1951, Part I - Historical Survey, para. 26. 
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launching points of intelligence and for raiding operations. They became more significant when 
Fifth Air Force set up Shoran navigational Beacons and early warning radar on several islands 
such as Paengypng-do, Chodo and Yonpyong-do. The value of the islands as operational bases 
and guerrilla havens was highlighted by Fifth Air Force Headquarters as follows: 
 
All the islands are used in the intelligence penetration of the mainland. Many of the islands 
are bases from which resistance movements are supported and/or sabotage operations against 
enemy installations are launched. [...] The islands provide home stations for the native boats 
which attack enemy shipping along the NE and NW coasts of Korea. The islands provide 
havens useful for evasion and escape activity and bailout point for pilots in distress. The 
islands are a basic necessity in rescue work. One or two helicopters are maintained on alert 
at Paengyong-do; another is at Chodo […] There are D/F station on Chodo, Paengyong-do 
and Yonpyong-do which show the fighter aircraft the way home from the Chongchon and 
Yalu River areas. There are Shoran Beacons on Taechong-do [Techong-do] and Tokchok-to 
which guide the bombers to their targets in North Korea. There is early warning radar on 
Chodo and Paengyong-do.5 
 
Because of these characteristics, the numbers of friendly-held islands were increased. In 
particular, as the volume of Leopard agents expanded, each Donkey’s operational area also 
extended further north. Consequently, by September 1951, there were operations on most of 
the islands of the Yalu Gulf with the exception of Sinmi-do. In other words, the UN Forces 
actually occupied most of the west coast islands at that time. 6  Therefore, the Blockade 
Commanders supplied additional patrols and occasional bombardments on this northern area, to 
support Leopard and secure friendly islands.7   
   
To the Communist Command, various activities conducted on these islands were regarded as 
more than harassment. In particular, the guerrillas’ intelligence gathering, in regard to their 
                                           
5 Fifth Air Force Intelligence Summary, Vol. 2, Issue No. 3, February 20 1952, pp. 31–7, in Schuetta, Guerrilla 
Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 1950–1954, pp. 91–2. 
6 ADM 1/27269, Report of Experience in Korean Operations, January–June 1951, p. 8. 
7 ADM 116/6231, Report of Experience in Korean Operations, July, 1951–June 1952, Flag Officer, Second-in- 
Command Far East Station, 15 September 1952, Part 1 - Historical Survey, para. 30.  
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intended movements and frequent raids, could not be ignored. Moreover, the naval forces’ 
frequent bombardments on the Ongjin and Chulsan Peninsulas kept inflicting heavy damages 
on their troops and equipment.8  
 As there were only limited numbers of naval craft, and most of these were junks for mine 
laying, the Communists’ response to these UN Forces activities was also limited. Based on the 
blockade ships’ operational records, there were only two cases mentioning the Communist’s 
raids against the friendly held islands. One relates to the friendly islands of Yongmae-do on the 
Ongjin Peninsula and the other concerns Wolto on the Cholsan Peninsula. They occurred in 
April and September 1951 respectively. These could be considered as isolated incidents and 
were successfully repelled by the guerrillas and blockade ships. 9  The Communist aircraft 
activities were also of limited interference, because of the friendly air superiority. Several 
unidentified aircraft had approached the friendly islands by night and, from time to time, 
dropped a few bombs. However, the damage incurred was negligible.10 The sporadic shelling 
from the mainland gun positions against the friendly islands and the naval craft in offshore 
operations were no more than light harassment.11 It meant that without reinforcement of trained 
troops and equipment, appropriate for amphibious operation, there seemed no way of driving 
out the UN Forces from the islands.    
                                           
8 The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) 
중국 군사과학원 군사역사연구부, 국방부 군사편찬연구소 역, 중국군의 한국전쟁사 3, [CCF’s War 
History of Resist America and Assist North Korea] (Seoul: Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK, 
2005), p. 212; National Institute of Korean War History, Summary of Proceedings, Tenth Session, 6th Meeting at 
Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegation on Agenda Item 2, Military Armistice Conference, General Headquarters, United 
Nations Command Advice, 30 October 1951, p. 4. 
9 Regarding the enemy attack on Yongmae-do, see ADM 116/6211, HMS Belfast-Report of Proceedings 16 to 30 
April 1951, HMS Belfast, 4 May, Appendix I.; Regarding Wolto, see ADM 116/6228, Korean War-Report of 
Proceedings No. 41, 10 to 29 September 1951, the Flag Officer, Second-in-command, Far East Station’s Force, 
FO2FE/2960/11, 29 September 1951, p. 7. 
10 ADM 1/27269, Report of Experience in Korean Operations, January–June 1951, Flag Officer, Second-in-
Command Far East Station, 26 July 1951, Part I - Historical Survey, paras 52–4. 
11 Ibid.  
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 Therefore, on 27 September, 1951, Peng Dehuai requested research on the Dongbei Military 
Region. This was to determine an effective way of conducting an offensive over the west coast 
islands. On 6 October, as the Commander of Dongbei Military Region suggested that an 
amphibious operation plan be conducted by the 50th CCF Division performed with the aid of 
air support, they started an offensive plan in earnest. The Communist Command directed Chai 
Zēng Guo, Vice-Commander of the 50th Division to control the island offensive operation. 
Therefore, from mid-October, the 50th Division commenced the preparatory requisition of 
equipment and training of their troops.12   
 
6.2 The Truce Talks and the Beginning of Island Warfare  
 
Although the Communist Command decided to start an offensive operation on the UN Forces 
held islands, it was not clear when it would be ready to be carried out. However, its 
commencement date needed to be considered urgent; as the importance of recapturing islands 
drastically increased once the truce talks resumed.    
 By late August 1951, the conference turned negative. The Communists unilaterally broke off 
from the conference, claiming an alleged UNC violation of the neutrality agreement. According 
to the Communist side, UNC planes had bombarded the conference site of Kaesong at 23:20 on 
22 August, killing Communist delegations. Therefore, regardless of the truth of this accusation, 
the truce talks entered a period of suspension by late October 1951.13 
                                           
12 The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) 
CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea, Vol. III, pp. 212–13. 
13 The UNC liaison officer and his party who inspected the evidence on 23 August reported the whole affair 
‘nonsense’, and UNC also officially denied it. General Matthew Ridgway saw it as ‘an excuse to break off the 
negotiations, with the blame falling on the UNC’ and to suspend the conference ‘to strengthen their propaganda 
position, and to regain the initiative in the negotiations’. Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. 
III, pp. 95–100. The Communist side regarded this bombardment as an intentional provocation to delay the 
progress of the truce talks and to change the place of conference. The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), 
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 On 25 October, 1951, the truce talks resumed in a large tent set up at Panmunjom. This was 
after several meetings between liaison officers of both sides to determine a date and place for 
resuming the negotiations. Eventually, they were able to reduce issues in the dispute.14 During 
the following three weeks, both sides extracted a new security agreement for resuming the 
conference, and tents for the meeting were set up.15  
 At the resumed meeting, both sides showed considerable flexibility over the issue of the 
demarcation line. In their first meeting in Panmunjom on 25 October, the UN delegates 
proposed the following point; ‘The demilitarized zone is based on the line of ground contact 
and generally conforms to this line’. This meant that they would not continue with their prior 
position which asked for compensation in return of their superior air and naval forces.16 Next 
day, General Lee Sang Jo, one of the representatives of the Communist side replied that ‘When 
this proposal is compared with the one your side made previously, it is, indeed, a step forward’, 
and he agreed that the UN delegates proposal of a demilitarised zone should be based on the 
battle line.17  
 Although both sides agreed that the demarcation line should be negotiated from the 
perspective of where the current line of contact existed, there were several differences in each 
sides’ proposals. In particular, there were severe differences over the issue of how to deal with 
Kaesong, the former location of the truce talks.   
                                           
Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North 
Korea, Vol. III, p. 123. 
14 Panmunjom is a small farm village of Neulmun-ri, half-way between the front lines of the two sides. This was 
at a UNC requested conference in Panmunjom: Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. III, pp. 
104–5. 
15 Ibid., pp. 106–8. 
16 National Institute of Korean War History, Summary of Proceedings, Seventh Session, 1st Meeting at Pan Mun 
Jom, Sub-Delegation on Agenda Item 2, Military Armistice Conference, General Headquarters, United Nations 
Command Advice, 25 October 1951, p. 5. 
17 National Institute of Korean War History, Summary of Proceedings, Eighth Session, 2nd Meeting at Pan Mun 
Jom, Sub-Delegation on Agenda Item 2, Military Armistice Conference, General Headquarters, United Nations 
Command Advice, 26 October 1951, p. 1. 
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 In fact, Kaesong was important to both sides, not only from the point of view of military 
strategy, but it was also important politically. For the UN forces, the Kaesong area was a critical 
point to give more adequate security to Seoul, the capital of the Republic of Korea. This was 
possible as it constituted a good foothold against enemy attack. For the Communists, it was 
important for the defence of their capital, Pyongyang.18 Moreover, it was the historical capital 
of the old Korean Kingdom and the first major city to fall into the Communists’ hands in June 
1950. The occupation of Kaesong, therefore, was significant beyond its territorial size.19  
 In addition to that, the UNC thought that Kaesong should be under their control because they 
had to withdraw their battalion strength forces who had successfully marched to the south of 
Kaesong right before the start of the truce talks. With the assumption that this agreed site for 
the conference would be completely neutralised, the UNC decided this withdrawal.20 However, 
contrary to the allies’ expectation, Kaesong became Communist territory from the start of the 
negotiations and was free from any UN Force attacks during the truce talks. 
 Therefore, from the second meeting, Major General Henry J. Hodes, USA, one of the 
representatives of the Sub-Delegation on Agenda Item 2, strongly reasoned the need for 
Communist withdrawal from Kaesong. He argued that ‘if there had been no armistice 
negotiations, the Kaesong area would have been occupied by UNC troops. The only reason 
UNC troops are not in the Kaesong area is because it was declared a neutral zone about 1 July.’21 
                                           
18 Ibid., p. 4 
19 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. III, p. 244; Kim Boyoung 김보영, ‘한국전쟁 
휴전회담 초기 개성사건과 군사분계선 협상’ [‘The Kaesong Incident and the Negotiation of the Military 
Demarcation Line on the Early Truce Talks during the Korean War’] Military History Vol. 67 (June 2008), pp.321–
2. 
20 Schnabel and Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. III, Part Two, p. 28. 
21 National Institute of Korean War History, Summary of Proceedings, Eighth Session, 2nd Meeting at Pan Mun 
Jom, p. 4. 
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General Lee Sang Jo, NKA promptly refuted this, stating that General Hodes’s argument was 
‘only a conjecture’ and was based on their ‘unilateral necessity’.22 
 From the third meeting held on 27 October, the UN delegates suggested one more proposal to 
the Communist side for acquiring Kaesong. As compensation for the Communists to concede 
this area, they suggested that the UN Forces should withdraw from the islands north of the 38th 
parallel, which friendly forces occupied. This proposal can be seen in General Hodes’s 
comments during the meeting as follows: 
 
The United Nations Command holds areas north of the proposed demarcation line and 
numerous coastal islands off the coasts of North Korea. The total area of these holdings which 
should be eliminated in the interest of smoothing out the trace of the demarcation line 
approximates that of the Kaesong area. Thus, even disregarding what I said about now you 
occupied the Kaesong area, acre for acre, this exchange is fair and equitable. Moreover, as I 
pointed out early this equal exchange of real estate contributes to the symmetry of the two 
general areas under consideration which will lessen administrative problems.23 
  
This ‘bargaining on the demarcation line’ continued into the next day’s meeting. General Hodes 
proposed again the ‘trade acre for acre’ concept and that giving up friendly islands was ‘fair 
and equal to both sides’.24 Admiral A. A. Burke, USN, put more pressure upon the Communist 
side by stating that, if there was no appropriate compensation for the islands, the UNC would 
‘keep them during the military armistice’. The Communist side responded, saying that they 
were not ‘merchants’ and would not bargain territory.25  
 Faced with UN delegate negotiations, to secure Kaesong, the Communist Command ordered 
the 65th Division in charge of the Kaesong area, to strengthen their position of defence. This 
                                           
22 Ibid., pp. 4–5. 
23 National Institute of Korean War History, Summary of Proceedings, Ninth Session, 3rd Meeting at Pan Mun 
Jom, Sub-Delegation on Agenda Item 2, Military Armistice Conference, General Headquarters, United Nations 
Command Advice, 27 October 1951, pp. 5–6. 
24 National Institute of Korean War History, Summary of Proceedings, Tenth Session, 4th Meeting at Pan Mun 
Jom, Sub-Delegation on Agenda Item 2, Military Armistice Conference, General Headquarters, United Nations 
Command Advice, 28 October 1951, p. 3. 
25 Ibid., pp. 13–4. 
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was achieved by establishing strong defensive positions and deploying several brigades under 
the 64th Division to support the 65th Division.26 Simultaneously, to rule out any possibility of 
continuation in the UNC preferred trading of islands and Kaesong, the Communist Command 
directed operations to recapture the islands on the west coast.  
 This was performed from late October. With their policy of ‘from near island to far, one by 
one’ they planned a specific joint operation with the Air Force, and conducted landing drills. 
Concurrently, from 2 November, the Communists conducted air reconnaissance over the islands 
around the Yalu Gulf area by deploying LA-11 and MiG-15. Following this, on the night of 5 
November, their operation started by landing two infantry battalions on Tan-do, a small island 
on the north side of Taewha-do.27     
   
6.3 The Process of the Island Warfare during November, 1951 
 
Following the failed guerrilla landing in early October to capture Sinmi-do, Admiral Scott-
Moncrieff decided to restrict his ships’ entrance to the Yalu Gulf area, where there was a high 
risk of mining by sampans along the narrow channels. 28  In his view, any attempts to 
permanently hold the islands on the northern area were regarded as ‘more of a liability than an 
advantage’.29 Since it was more than likely that the Communists would reinforce themselves 
over the mud-flats, there seemed no advantage in holding them, other than for ‘prestige’.30 
Although there were several reports from Leopard and blockade ships, stating that there was a 
                                           
26 The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) 
CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea, Vol. III, pp. 209–11.  
27 Ibid., pp. 212–3. 
28 ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval Operations, 
Korea, 1950–53, pp. 190–1. 
29 ADM 116/6228, Korean War-Report of Proceedings No. 42, 29 September to 16 October 1951, the Flag Officer, 
Second-in-command, Far East Station’s Force, FO2FE/2960/11, 16 October 1951, p. 6. 
30 Ibid., pp. 6–7. 
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significant increase in Communist movements in this area, no friendly reinforcement was 
allowed to the Yalu Gulf.31 
 In fact, towards the end of October 1951, it was noticed that there was a tendency of Chinese 
troop infiltration into the Hwanghae area and the northern area around the Yalu Gulf. More 
accurately controlled fire and a stronger reaction from the enemy shore batteries was also 
reported by the blockade ships. 32  As mentioned above, it was an integral part of the 
Communists’ offensive operation, to recapture the islands. However, TG 95.1 was not fully 
ready to respond to the enemy’s offensive movements, because of a lack of reliable intelligence 
and a shortage of available ships.  
 In particular, the lack of reliable intelligence over enemy movements and intention was a 
significant problem. This was because it restricted the Blockade Commanders’ assessments for 
appropriate countermeasures. In addition to the deepened distrust over Leopard intelligence, 
the frequency of imprudent guerrilla emergency calls also compounded the difficulty in judging 
enemy intent. Moreover, intelligence from the higher command was also very limited. Even the 
fact that the islands had become a bargaining tool for negotiations was noted by CTG 95.1 from 
radio broadcasts.33  
 Therefore, the Commanders of TG 95.1 did not consider the Communist reinforcement as an 
imminent threat to the friendly held islands. Instead, the main measures were greater attention 
to enemy movement and keeping a close proximity to several important islands south of Chodo. 
The Blockade Commander’s position and regard to enemy reinforcement is described in the 
                                           
31 ADM 116/6214, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 22 October to 5 November 1951, para. 57. 
32 ADM 116/6228, Korean War-Report of Proceedings No. 43, 17 October to 12 November 1951, the Flag Officer, 
Second-in-command, Far East Station’s Force, FO2FE/2960/11, 12 November 1951, p. 6; ADM 234/385, Ministry 
of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval Operations, Korea, 1950–53, p. 194. 
33 ADM 1/23901, Korean Naval operations-10 November to 8 December 1951, the Flag Officer, Second-in-
command, Far East Station’s Force, FO2FE/21209/1/67, 9 December 1951, p. 2. 
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CO of HMS Ceylon’s report written during his patrol, between 22 October and 5 November as 
a CTE 95.12 as follows:     
 
On 2nd November, Ceylon proceed to Paengyong-do and his Intelligence Officer went to visit 
Leopard’s headquarters. The information he brought back showed that the Chinese are 
definitely moving into the coastal area North of Haeju and the North Koreans being moved 
out. I do not consider that this constitutes an immediate threat to the islands, but they have 
moved the inhabitants 1.2 miles inland, and they are better armed troops than the North 
Koreans. Therefore it is prudent to keep a close watch on them particularly regarding junk 
concentrations and new gun emplacements. I consider that ships should be in supporting 
distance of the more important islands.34 
 
 
It was imperative that the Blockade Commanders’ prudent attitude changed once the 
Communist’s offensive commenced on early November. During the early morning of 6 
November, HMS Belfast (at that time CTG 95.12) received a series of signals from Leopard 
reporting that a Communist landing had occurred on Kado and Tando. Subsequently, an air 
attack by several bombers on Taewha-do was also reported from the Leopard Headquarters.35 
Under the escort of sixteen LA-11s, nine TU-2s dropped bombs on Taewha-do that afternoon. 
According to the Chinese Official History, this bombardment was to consolidate the security of 
recaptured islands by inflicting damage on the guerrillas on Taewha-do.36  
 The CO of HMS Belfast at once ordered HMCS Athabaskan, which patrolled in the nearest area 
to the Yalu Gulf, to assist an evacuation of Leopard representatives and wounded guerrillas in 
Taewha-do. Owing to the impossibility of giving ships air cover in this area, the blockade ship’s 
role was confined to screening. HMS Belfast also proceeded to the north with the Leopard 
officers, to give HMCS Athabaskan support and to cover the approaches to the island from the 
west. A failure of the normal radio station, following the air attack, hampered the Athabaskan’s 
                                           
34 ADM 116/6214, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 22 October to 5 November 1951, para. 57. 
35 ADM 116/6228, Korean War-Report of Proceedings No. 43, 17 October to 12 November 1951, p. 8. 
36 The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) 
CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea, Vol. III, p. 213. 
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task. During the night, it was ascertained that Tando and Kado, a few miles north-east of Taewha-
do, were occupied by the Communists.37 As a result of the Communists’ first offensive, most 
islands in the Yalu Gulf were recaptured by them. The exceptions were Taewha-do, which was 
still in friendly hands, and a few of the smaller adjacent islands.38  
 Concerning these Communists’ assaults, the Commanders of TG 95.1 regarded them as clear 
evidence of ‘definite enemy offensive against our islands’.39  The EUSAK Headquarters also 
regarded this situation as an imminent threat to the friendly held islands. Therefore, they officially 
requested the UN Naval Command saying ‘Taewha-do should if possible be held and visited as 
frequently as possible by HM Ships’.40  
 As there had been additional indications of a possible enemy attempt of landing on Taewha-
do, from then on, the main interest beyond routine blockade duties on the west coast had to be 
the security of Taewha-do. The security of the main friendly islands further south, such as 
Chodo, Sokto and Paengyong-do, also became more significant. Therefore, to ensure a proper 
naval supply of the enemy’s potential threat against remaining islands, CTG 95.1 directed two 
destroyers, as well as a cruiser, to remain in the Blockade Element.41 In addition to that, regular 
nightly visits to the Taewha-do area, which had previously stopped in early October, resumed. 
During nocturnal visits, bombardments were also carried out on Kado and Tando and on the 
neighbouring Chorusan Peninsular by HMS Comus, HMCS Cayuga, HMCS Athabaskan and 
USS Edmonds. These bombardments were mainly part of boosting the morale of the Taewha-do 
garrisons; but sometimes they inflicted damage on the enemy build-up.42 
                                           
37 ADM 116/6228, Korean War-Report of Proceedings No. 43, 17 October to 12 November 1951, p. 8. 
38 Ibid., p. 1. 
39 Ibid., p. 8. 
40 Ibid., p. 10. 
41 ADM 116/6228, Korean War-Report of Proceedings No. 44, 13 November to 30 November 1951, the Flag 
Officer, Second-in-command, Far East Station’s Force, FO2FE/2960/11, 30 November 1951, p. 3. 




Towards the end of November, however, the Communists’ interest in Taewha-do appeared to 
be waning. No further reports of enemy build-ups were received from Leopard, and it was 
confirmed that the whole of the island of Tando, which was previously captured by the enemy, 
was cleared. Thus, CTG 95.1 considered, in consultation with the Leopard Headquarters, to 
reduce the frequency of nightly visits.43 At that time, the Leopard guerrillas were ordered by 
their higher command not to resist, but conduct evacuation plans if seriously attacked by the 
enemy. From the Blockade Commanders’ perspective, it meant that the guerrillas were not 
willing to secure Taewha-do anymore. The reason for continuously supplying sizeable naval 
commitment in this area became weaker. 44  Therefore, rather than focusing on defensive 
movements, the blockade ships’ operation gradually became more concerted towards 
supporting guerrilla raids in the southern area, such as Haeju and Mongumpo.45  Through 
interrogation of Chinese prisoners captured by guerrillas during their raid on Kado, it was 
disclosed that the Chinese intended to capture Taewha-do within the near future. However, the 
date was not known, and this information was not passed to Admiral Scott-Moncrieff before 
the enemy’s attack on this island.46 Thus, apart from routine night time patrols on this island, 
there was no additional directive for a stronger defence.47 
 It was somewhat of a surprise therefore, when a message was received by HMS Cockade from 
Donkey-15 in Taewha-do that a Communist landing was taking place. Late in the night of the 
                                           
43 ADM 1/23901, Korean Naval operations-10 November to 8 December 1951, the Flag Officer, Second-in-
command, Far East Station’s Force, FO2FE/21209/1/67, 9 December 1951, p. 1. 
44 ADM 1/27288, Korean War-Report of Proceedings 45, 1–22 December 1951, Office of the Flag Officer, 
Second-in-command, Far East Station, FO2FE/2960/11, 23 December 1951, p. 9. 
45 HMS Ceylon supported a raid in the Haeju area on 16 November, and HMNZS Hawea supported guerrillas in 
the Chodo area on 19 November. New batteries threatening Chodo were raided by guerrillas under the gunfire 
support by HMCS Cayuga on 24 November: ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), 
British Commonwealth Naval Operations, Korea, 1950–53, pp. 195–6.  
46 Ibid., p. 199. 
47 ADM 116/6214, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 13 November to 3 December 1951, Enclosure to the 
Commanding Officer, HMS Ceylon’s letter 2887/01. 
193 
 
30 November, an invading enemy force numbering about 1,000 landed, using collapsible rubber 
boats, on both the north-west and north-east coast of Taewha-do. They were backed up by junks 
and sampans, and it was a truly well-planned landing operation. 48  For the preliminary 
bombardment, on the afternoon of the same day, nine TU-2 bombers took off to attack Taewha-
do. According to the Communist’s record, only six of them could reach this island, and they 
conducted bombardments as they faced opposition from F-86s on their way.49 However, their 
attack was enough to undermine the garrison forces’ morale. As a result of this attack, a forest 
fire started, and a large number of casualties were inflicted on Donkey-15 guerrillas. 50 
Subsequently, the Communists’ landing on the northern beaches was conducted in three waves 
during the darkness of night. The first wave consisted of rubber boats, the second wave utilised 
sailing sampans, and the third wave landed from motor junks. The attack was heavily supported 
by artillery fire from the island of Kado.51    
 Although HMS Cockade, which was carrying out the nightly patrol in the area, immediately 
proceeded and engaged the enemy junks, due to the accurate fire from the enemy batteries on 
Kado, she had to withdraw out of range. When HMS Cockade closed this area again, it was 
impossible to distinguish between the enemy junks attacking and the friendlies evacuating. 
What was worse, at that time, was that all radio communications with the Taewha-do garrisons 
had by this time failed.52 As HMS Cockade could not acquire further information regarding 
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the situation and was unable to bring down supporting fire for the friendly forces, she decided 
to withdraw and she joined HMS Ceylon, CTE 95.12, who was closing the area from 
Paengyong-do.53  
 In the early morning of 1 December, with a CAP from CTE 95.11 and friendly Air Force, 
blockade ships closed Taewha-do to gather more information about the situation. By 
questioning inhabitants of the small neighbouring islands and the guerrillas evacuating toward 
the south, it was learnt that all of the major islands in the Yalu Gulf were captured by the 
Communists.54  
 Large numbers of guerrillas had tried to evacuate as soon as the landings took place. 
However, it was later known that only small numbers of guerrillas actually were able to 
evacuate to the Southern islands. During the first wave of enemy landing, some of the 
enemy approached the location where guerrilla junks were moored, and they dropped 
hand grenades as a part of their first assault.55 Therefore, amongst the approximate 
number of 1,200 guerrillas operating in the Yalu Gulf, only around 300 were able to 
evacuate successfully.56 The Chinese Official History records that, as a result of the offensive 
conducted in late November, they killed or captured 570 Leopard guerrillas.57 Considering the 
fact that many of the guerrillas were drowned or declared missing trying to evacuate, by this 
attack alone, Leopard lost almost 900 guerrillas. Therefore, one of the largest and most active 
guerrilla units, namely Donkey-15, had to retreat to Techong-do with only around 200 surviving 
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guerrillas.58 Another guerrilla unit in this area, Donkey-14 also lost most of its agents and had 
to be joined by Donkey-20 by the direction of Headquarters.59 As a result of this offensive, 
Leopard not only suffered their heaviest damage, but also lost all of their bases in the northern 
area. In particular, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff regretted that there were three British military 
personnel and one Leopard officer on the island and confirmed they failed to have escaped.60  
 After experiencing this enemy offensive, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff expressed his surprise that 
the Communists had the resources to carry out an attack, which was obviously a well-
planned and successful landing operation without any patrol ship detection. In particular, it was 
evident that they had even considered, in the course of planning, the fact that Leopard would 
try immediate evacuation by boat, when their island was attacked. Also, it was of interest to the 
allies, that the Communists had made effective countermeasures for such a reaction.61 Hence 
the enemy’s threat to the friendly held islands, which the Blockade Commanders had previously 
been inclined to discount, became imminent and real.62 
 
6.4 Naval Anti-Invasion Measures and Imposed Close Co-Operation with the Guerrillas 
 
A series of successful offenses conducted on the Yalu Gulf area were considered an especially 
meaningful accomplishment for the Chinese Forces. This was because it was the first joint 
operation between the Army and Air Force, not only in the Korean War, but also in the history 
of the People’s Liberation Army. Their Official History, therefore, evaluates this offensive 
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operation as one in which ‘its experience and lesson had been heavily influenced to the People’s 
Liberation Army’s future joint operation.’ 63  It also includes a comment that ‘the Island 
Offensive Operation was very helpful for the Communist delegates to be in the lead of the 
deadlocked Panmunjom meeting’.64   
 However, to the UN Forces, in particular to TG 95.1, it meant the start of the most critical and 
painful commitment for the islands’ defence. The Communists’ reaction over Taewha-do strongly 
indicated that concerted efforts were required to protect the more southerly islands.65 Coupled with 
the infiltration of the Chinese troops in the Hwanghae area, the concern over the safety of Sokto 
and Chodo, which were very close to the enemy’s strongly held shoreline, was radically 
increased. After the experience of the Taewha-do offensive, the existence of collapsible boats 
was regarded as a real threat. They were reported to be capable of carrying ten armed personnel 
and possible mortar provision. If their offensive was conducted when tide and ebb conditions 
were favourable for attack, it could be difficult to carry out an effective defensive operation 
with only naval and air commitments.66 An increasing threat from the installation of new 
enemy batteries on the Wolsa-ri peninsula, on the opposite side of Chodo and Sokto, also 
restricted the movement of friendly patrolling ships around this area. 67  Moreover, on 2 
December 1951, a directive was received from the UNC saying that the security of the friendly 
held islands was to be given the highest priority; even above blockade and escort missions.68 
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Establishing these measures for the safety of the islands became an imminent task for the 
Blockade Commanders.  
 The reason why the defence of these islands became such a major commitment was well stated in 
Admiral Scott-Moncrieff’s report, covering between 9 January and 8 February, 1952. He explained 
as follows: 
 
They have been used as a bargaining counter at the Peace Conference table at Panmunjom, and 
the enemy has an added inducement to try to capture them. […] they are used by UN forces for 
Shoran and radio beacons, radar early warning stations, air sea rescue bases, etc., and prior to 
November, were used extensively for the launching of covert operations. In the event of the 
resumption of a hot war, particularly in the air, they would be of great value.69  
 
The islands to be secured by direction of the UNC numbered six; Chodo, Sokto, Paengyong-
do, Yonpyong-do, Techong-do and Tokchok-do. 70  At Chodo there were some 50 Radar 
stations and also SAR personnel. A new early warning Radar station was in the process of being 
erected at that time. Although there were around fifty American military personnel, most of 
them were virtually non-combatants and were there for manning an AA defended radio station. 
Around two hundred Leopard guerrillas were the only defensive resources ashore.71 In Sokto, 
there were no important friendly facilities. It was regarded important, because it could be used 
as a stepping stone for capturing Chodo. However, the naval defence of this island, in particular, 
was complicated by its proximity to the enemy’s coast; in places 3,000 yards and at the most 
7,000 yards. Therefore, there were 100 guerrilla coast guards and a US Army advisor along 
with 230 ROK Marines. In addition to that, batteries of guns of various calibre had already been 
mounted and used.72 At Paengyong-do, where the Leopard’s headquarters was located, there 
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were a number of Air Force and Army personnel, together with a small number of guerrillas, 
but no garrison. In the case of Yonpyong-do, located on the opposite side of the Heaju area, an 
Air Force beacon unit had been established. At that time, other than about 200 Leopard 
guerrillas, there were no garrisons available.73 In Techong-do and Tokchok-do, where the level 
of enemy threat was relatively low compared to other islands, there were Air Force Shoran 
parties and Radar stations. However, there were no appropriate garrison forces.74  
 The anticipated method of Communist offensives was expected to be similar to that employed 
at Taewha-do. There were already enough troops and equipment in the Hwanghae Province. 
They were known to have large numbers of CCF in the area. In the Chinnampo Estuary, they 
had many junks and other suitable invasion craft, including rubber boats, such as those that 
were used at Taewha-do. These might be either self-propelled, launched from other junks, or 
moved without the use of outboard motors but on the ebb tide. Invasion by day or night was 
possible, but the most likely time was expected during darkness using the ebb of the tide.75 The 
possibility of an enemy joint operation with the Air Force was also a necessary consideration. 
As the Communists’ air potential was becoming more formidable, preliminary bombing on the 
islands or strafing of ships prior to invasion was predicted.76 In fact, during December, a 
considerable amount of enemy air activity had been reported around the Chodo and Sokto areas. 
Even though there was no serious damage, on the night of 7 December, Chodo was actually 
bombed by two enemy aircraft.77 Appropriate counter-measures for any further Communist 
operations was hence required, especially considering the fact that this form of attack might be 
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later combined with offensive action conducted by enemy shore batteries — a continual threat 
to the islands.78 
 To defend islands from the above-mentioned threat, it had been necessary to concentrate all 
available ships at night in the vicinity of Chodo and Sokto, and to a lesser extent round 
Paengyong-do. The CO of HMS Ceylon instructed available ships in the swept channels to be 
stationed during the night on various beats. This covered the north and south approaches to 
Sokto and the channels across to Chodo.79  
 This unit generally consisted of one frigate, three destroyers (two Commonwealth and one 
USN), one LSMR and four minor ROK craft. A US Rescue tug was also normally attached to 
respond in case of accidents.80 Inshore patrols, in shallow water, would be conducted by 
ROK patrol craft under the back-up of one frigate. Other warships were ordered to wait in 
the outer circle, in case of enemy approaches from Amgak and the Chinnampo estuary. 
Their watch was illuminated with star shells during the critical tides and moonless days. 
This defensive operation was named as SMOKING CONCERT.81 
 Due to additional commitments, it was necessary to increase the number of ships to be 
involved in this operation. Therefore, ship numbers in the Han River were reduced to just one. 
HMNZS Taupo, which had been operating on the East Coast, also ordered to join this 
operation.82 TE 95.11 was also asked to be involved. During this period, the primary task of 
carrier borne aircraft had been the detection and destruction of any enemy build-ups to attack 
the friendly islands. The mainland opposite Chodo and Sokto had received particular attention, 
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and, in this area, a permanent TARCAP was maintained by day. This was to deal with a number 
of gun and mortar positions which had fired on the UN ships and islands.83 
 Also, the possibility of an air attack could not be discounted, especially at dusk, after the naval 
aircraft of TE 95.11 had withdrawn. Therefore, it was agreed that a task of the Fifth US Air 
Force was to be to assist in an emergency situation when TE 95.11 were not available, by the 
request of CTE 95.12.84 The Air Force was also asked to provide a flare-dropping or 
searchlight-fitted aircraft to patrol the Taedong Estuary at night. It was subsequently 
discovered unofficially that this was available at short notice if required.85 
 
Although there were reinforced defensive movements of the naval forces and additional 
commitment from the Air Force, because of the lack of proper garrison forces, the 
shortage of intelligence regarding the present conditions, and difficulty of co-ordination with 
Leopard guerrillas and other clandestine organisations, the defensive operation could not 
properly ensure the safety of the vital islands.    
 Firstly, a significant problem was the fact that there were only limited number of regular 
troops available for the defence of these islands. Owing to their proximity to the mainland, it was 
almost impossible for naval patrols to detect all small ship movement toward the islands. The 
essence of the Naval Forces’ role to defend the islands, was to do their utmost in preventing 
landings. However, once any enemy forces were able to get a foothold, it was taken out of 
the Naval Forces hands. Therefore, at least in the more vitally important islands, garrison forces 
were needed to repel such landings.86 This presented a particular conundrum. Whilst requests 
                                           
83 ADM 1/23906, Korean Naval Operations-9 January to 8 February 1952, p. 2. 
84 ADM 116/6222, HMS Mounts Bay, CTE 95.12’s OP-PLAN 12-52, ‘Naval Anti-Invasion Measures for West 
Coast Islands’, para. 6. 
85 ADM 1/23906, Korean Naval Operations-9 January to 8 February 1952, p. 16. 
86 ADM 116/6231, Report of Experience in Korean Operations, July 1951–June 1952, Flag Officer, Second-in- 
Command Far East Station, 15 September 1952, Part 1(sea). 
201 
 
were made for the EUSAK to deploy the garrisons on the islands, the reply was that it could 
not supply such because it had no responsibility for these islands. Responsibility for the 
policy concerning irregular organisations rested with the C-in-C, Tokyo, but he had no 
combatant forces other than guerrillas. A suggestion that ROK Marines should be used was 
dispelled at that time by Admiral Martine, because of its implication for naval 
responsibility.87  
 On 19 December, the UNC clarified that the responsibility of island defence was firmly 
with the UN Navies and the guerrilla organisation. Consequently, it was decided to deploy 
additional ROK Marines. However, the number of reinforcement troops was only two 
companies, planned to be deployed respectively on Chodo and Sokto at that time. Due to 
the time required for military training of newly recruited ROK Marines, additional 
reinforcements were planned to arrive after mid-January. This meant that there were still 
shortages of garrison forces to safely secure the vital islands.88 Therefore, for most of the 
friendly held islands, the garrison role was still dependent on the guerrillas.  
 Although there were around 8,000 guerrillas scattered on the vital islands and in the 
vicinity of lesser important islands, they were not trained particularly for island defence, 
and their fighting capability was doubtful. In a conference at Paengyong-do with Major 
McKean, the new Leopard Commander concurred that ‘he really had no organised plans 
for the defence of the islands, and he very much doubted whether his guerrilla garrisons 
were capable of doing so’.89 Moreover, the previous directive of the EUSAK, G3, their 
parent organisation, was to withdraw if attacked and not to attempt to hold the islands. 
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Because of the contradiction between their garrison role and this directive, some definitive 
conciliation was needed between the naval requirement and the Army directive.  
 This came on the 14 December, as a result of a final conference for the Military Defensive 
plan. It was agreed that, if the enemy landed on vital islands that ‘on no account was an 
evacuation to take place as soon as the enemy landed’. In addition, Leopard Commander also 
promised that ‘if the enemy came in large numbers of small craft, and some were able to get a 
foothold, the main line of resistance should be held at all costs during the night.’ This was for 
joint counter-attack on the following day with Naval Air and gunfire. 90  However, to the 
Blockade Commanders, the fact that they had to largely depend on the garrison of guerrillas, 
considered ‘of doubtful fighting capacity or loyalty’, still remained an uneasy prospect.91  
 The second problem was the lack of intelligence available to the defensive naval forces 
regarding the Communist build-up and movements. For immediate and effective response 
against the enemy offensive, prompt up-to-date enemy intelligence was imperative. Therefore, 
some of the communication system with the main intelligence source, guerrilla organisation, 
had to be changed. Direct communication with the guerrillas had been restricted since early 
October. Hence, for direct communication between all ships of TE 95.12 and each of the 
Donkeys on the islands, the Donkey Net frequencies were organised. This radio 
communication system included all Donkey units on the west coast, and it relayed traffic and 
information to the Commanders of Task Element. However, this communication system was 
frequently congested and had little security.92 As a means to overcome these problems, all 
ships of TE 95.12 were provided with portable type SCR 300s for emergency inter-
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communication. At that time, a number of Donkey agents ran their own SCR 300 nets, 
and it was thought that in an emergency, direct communication would reduce time for 
naval support work.93  
 However, regardless of the communication system, the guerrillas’ intelligence supply 
was severely limited as they directed their efforts to island defence. Although a large 
proportion of naval air effort was devoted to continuous air patrols in the area, due to the 
Communists’ excellent camouflage skill and mobility, it was virtually impossible to detect 
enemy movement by aircraft. Air patrols only sufficed in keeping the enemy quiet.94 
There had been an improvement in passing on certain top secret information by CTF 95, of 
which the source or reliability was never stated. Furthermore, except in verbal discussions, no 
qualifying information was ever passed on. Thus CTG 95.1 was very unsatisfied in that he was 
not even able to assess the strength or reality of the current enemy threat.95 He also regretted 
the fact that the conduct of naval operations and much effort had to be based on dubious 
guerrilla information.96 
 The last problem related to the difficulty in recognising and co-ordinating with the 
various clandestine organisations, including the Leopard agents. Identification of friendly 
small craft moving on the west coast was always a source of difficulty. As a result of 
great efforts to improve recognition and co-ordination, some form of identification of 
craft was secured, in addition to some limited co-ordination with the Leopard 
organisation. However, it transpired never to have been satisfactory. 97 The need for 
stricter co-ordination and more precise identification of craft was drastically increased 
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due to the imminent threat to the islands. In view of various reports of numbers of beached 
enemy junks in the Hwanghae area, all friendly movements had to be disclosed and their 
recognition signals clearly identified to the Naval Commanders. This was necessary in order 
to avoid casualties through friendly fire and to continue rigorous defensive operations.98  
 The above-mentioned communication system, the Donkey Net, was also useful to supply 
information on intended junk and sampan movements. It was agreed that each Donkey 
advisor would inform Donkey Net Guard, who would then promulgate the information to TE 
95.12. This person was in charge of relaying all traffic and information between the Task 
Element and each of the Donkeys.99  
 In the vital island area, the recognition procedures for small craft were also simplified to 
improve identification. For example, a series of six white flashes on a directional lamp meant 
‘Do not fire on me’ and three red lights meant ‘Enemy in sight’. When friendly forces were 
evacuated from the friendly islands, to distinguish them from the enemy, ‘Very lights’ were 
used. This was in the form of ‘two green Very lights followed by a single green Very light 
after a short interval’. Based on these measures, efforts were made to prevent any un-
identified junk movements at night, especially from Sokto.100   
 
One of the interesting points was that TG 95.1 formed closer relationships with the Leopard 
guerrillas, who were regarded as an unreliable party by the Naval Commanders in the course 
of preparing defensive measures. As mentioned in a previous chapter, after a series of 
episodes since the start of the truce talks, the relationship between these two groups had 
drastically deteriorated and reached its lowest point by the end of October. Therefore, the 
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Commanders of TG 95.1 decided to discontinue any direct communication with the local 
guerrilla agents and treated any information from them with a certain level of scepticism. 
They also regarded the guerrillas’ frequent calls for naval demonstrations as ‘Cry Wolf’ situations, 
and asked them to be more prudent when using emergency signals.   
 Following the start of the Communist offensive to capture the friendly islands, and after 
several directives received from the UNC for their defence to be given the highest priority, 
relationships were required to change again. The value of the Leopard guerrillas became 
much more important, as they were the only force and intelligence source available. For a 
more effective defensive operation, an additional mission that required closer co-operation 
with this unreliable party was imposed on the Naval Task Group. 
 Moreover, within this changed operational environment, the guerrillas’ frequent 
emergency signals reporting enemy build-ups and requesting naval demonstrations, were 
not regarded as ‘Cry Wolf’ any more. The CO of HMS Belfast commented that ‘though some 
of it [intelligence] may be inaccurate, I would rather have it coming through [...] than 
the deadly silence’. So, rather than interrogate reliability, active intelligence supply of 
enemy movements and timely emergency calls thus became more important.101 The 
guerrillas’ activities, that were once criticised by the Naval Commanders and often provoked 
by their nervousness towards the security of the islands, became essential. 
 To the guerrilla organisation, facing the imminent threat of the Communists, to secure their 
base and themselves more safely, they had to make more active and close relationships with 
the naval forces. Therefore, by gaining more immediate emergency support from the UN 
naval and air support, communication was possible without long delays. Moreover, co-
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ordination with the Task Element ships was also drastically developed in an effort to reduce 
any unreported movement. With the Leopard officers’, who were directed to share the 
responsibility of the island defensive operation with the naval forces, adopting a very co-
operative attitude, communication and co-ordination with the guerrilla organisation 
developed radically in a short period of time.102    
 
6.5 Tom Tiddler’s Ground on the West Coast  
 
As mentioned above, the UNC continued ‘bargaining on the demarcation line’ from late 
October to gain Kaesong from the Communist side. However, the UN side’s demand for 
Kaesong was not supported by President Truman and the US JCS. To them, the UN Delegation’s 
stand on this issue was regarded as ‘backing and filling over a seeming trifle’.103 They worried 
the UNC’s strict attitude toward Kaesong might breakdown any agreements which had been 
made in the truce talks. Therefore, on 14 November, the JCS directed General Matthew 
Ridgway, C-in-C, Far East, to proceed on this issue based on the principle of the line of 
contact.104 As the Communist side had already agreed this idea, subsequent conferences were 
begun to decide ‘the demarcation line based on the present line of contact with minor 
adjustments’.105  
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 On 27 November, the UN and the Communist side ratified an agreement regarding the basic 
principles of the Military Demarcation Line.106 This meant that the UN side would not demand 
Kaesong any longer if it was under the Communist Control. On the same day, both sides also 
agreed that all armed forces should withdraw within a certain number of days from the signing 
of Armistice, ‘from the other side’.107 However, each side showed clear disparity in their 
definition of ‘other side’. The Communist side argued that this withdrawal should be conducted 
‘with the demarcation line as the dividing line’. This meant that the UN forces would be forced 
to evacuate from the islands on the rear side of the extended demarcation line right after the 
signing of Armistice.108 However, the UN Delegation argued that the withdrawal should be 
conducted ‘from the territory controlled by the other side’, thus certain islands currently 
controlled by the allied forces also should be regarded as friendly areas.109 
 During the subsequent sub-Delegation meetings during early December 1951, the UN side 
showed a clearer position to control islands currently in the friendly hands even after the 
armistice. On ninth session of the sub-Delegation meeting on Agenda Item 3 held on 12 
December, the UN Delegation replied ‘Yes, these islands are not your islands’ to the Communist 
                                           
106 The results of agreement are as follows: 1) The principle is accepted that the actual line of contact between 
both sides […] will be made the military demarcation line and that at the time specified in the signed armistice 
agreement both side will withdraw two kilometers from this line so as to establish the demilitarised zone for the 
duration of the military armistice; 2) If the military armistice agreement is signed within thirty days […] the 
military demarcation line and demilitarised zone shall not be changed, regardless of whatever changes may occur 
in the actual line of contact between both sides; 3) […] if the military armistice agreement is not signed within 
thirty (30) days after the two Delegations approve in the plenary session […] the sub-delegations shall revise, 
immediately prior to the signing of the military armistice agreement, the above military demarcation line and the 
demilitarised zone in accordance with the changes which have occurred in the actual line of contact between both 
sides …: National Institute of Korean War History, Summary of Proceedings, Thirty-Seventh Session, 31st Meeting 
at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegation on Agenda Item. 2, Military Armistice Conference, General Headquarters, 
United Nations Command Advice, 30 October 1951, Enclosure 1: Proposed Agreement on Item 2 for Plenary 
Session. 
107 National Institute of Korean War History, Transcript of Proceedings, 28th Session, 2nd Meeting at Pan Mun 
Jom, on the armistice proposal. General Headquarters, United Nations Command Advance, 27 November 1951, 
pp. 4–6, 8. 
108 Ibid., pp. 5–6. 
109 National Institute of Korean War History, Record of Events, Twenty-ninth Session, 3rd meeting at Pan Mun 
Jom, Military Armistice Conference, General Headquarters, United Nations Command Advance, 28 November 
1951, p. 12. 
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side’s question ‘Do you […] still intend to retain certain islands from which your armed forces 
will not withdraw?’110  
 However, from the twelfth session held on 15 December, the UN Delegation changed their 
position and suggested that they were willing to ‘withdraw from our own islands that are in 
your territorial waters.’111 This abrupt change was once again made by instructions from the 
JCS requiring General Ridgway to accept the Communist’s requirement of the offshore islands 
issue. By giving concessions to the Communists, the American government intended to gain an 
advantage on more critical issues, in particular, rehabilitation of the Airfield in North Korea.112  
 However, the Communists firmly rejected this offer. To them, any ban on the rehabilitation of 
the airfield was an unacceptable offer as this was regarded as intervention in North Korea’s 
domestic affairs. 113  Furthermore, although the UN delegation agreed the principle of 
withdrawal from the islands in Communist waters, the UNC still showed its will to hold several 
offshore islands on the rear side of the extended demarcation line.114 After a series of meetings 
with the UN side during early December 1952, the Communists re-confirmed that the island-
related issue still remained as a possible bargaining chip for the UN side.115 This fact was also 
mentioned by Admiral Scott-Moncrieff: ‘When an alternative line was settled on 27th November, 
                                           
110 National Institute of Korean War History, Transcript of Proceedings, Ninth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, 
Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference, General Headquarters, United Nations 
Command Advance, 12 December 1951, p. 12.  
111 National Institute of Korean War History, Transcript of Proceedings, Twelfth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun 
Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, Military Armistice Conference, General Headquarters, United Nations 
Command Advance, 15 December 1951, p. 6. 
112 Schnabel and Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. III, Part Two, pp. 50–4; during the 
meetings on Agenda Item 3, the UN Delegation argued that rehabilitation of the airfields on both sides would be 
denied for the purpose of insuring against the recurrence of hostilities. For more information regarding the 
negotiation on Agenda Item 3, see Kim, ‘A Study on the Truce Talks During the Korean War’, pp. 111–37. 
113 Schnabel and Watson, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. III, Part Two, p. 54  
114 In their meeting on 15 December, the UN Delegation argued that ‘We have agreed to withdraw from our own 
islands that are in your territorial waters. But that is not enough for you. You want us to withdraw from our own 
islands which are neither in your rear nor are a threat to you. […] Some of these islands have never belonged to 
you at any time’. National Institute of Korean War History, Transcript of Proceedings, Twelfth Session, Meeting 
at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, p. 6. 
115 The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) 
CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea, p. 336. 
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the islands became bargaining counters again for various other points of agreement.’116 Thus, to 
rule out any advantage for the UNC in the negotiations, the Communist forces’ assault against 
the friendly held islands in the area further south continued.  
 
To the Communist Forces, however, conducting offensive operations on the UN Forces’ held 
islands on the opposite side of the Hwanghae area was not as easy as in the Yalu Gulf. Unlike 
the defensive condition of Taewha-do area, where only limited naval and air supply was 
allowed, around the vital islands and, in particular, the Chodo and Sokto area, there were well-
prepared defensive positions maintained by the UN Forces. This characteristic contributed to 
the fact that it was very difficult for the Communists to conduct successful direct offensives on 
the vital islands. Therefore, rather than attempting daring direct attacks on major islands, such 
as their policy ‘from near island to far, one by one’, they were more inclined to capture more 
inshore small islands first, which had little defensive forces.117  
 The UN Forces, regardless of each islands’ tactical importance, were not allowed to let the 
Communists permanently hold any of the islands on the coast of Hwanghae Province. Although 
by the direction of the UNC, six islands were selected as strategically vital, this did not mean 
that the UN Forces were indifferent to other islands. The large number of small islands could 
potentially be used as stepping stones for capturing the vital islands. Hence, if possible, it was 
also necessary to secure these less important islands. Even the several small islands close to the 
mainland needed to be denied to enemy capture, as such occupation would threaten the friendly 
mine sweeping activity around the inshore area. 118  The minor islands were also used as 
stepping stones for amphibious operations and intelligence activities for friendly guerrillas; 
                                           
116 ADM 116/6231, Report of Experience in Korean Operations, July 1951–June 1952, Part I, para. 33. 
117 It was not clear whether the Communist Command actually intended to capture the vital islands. The Blockade 
Commanders were also unsure about their intention.  
118 ADM 1/23906, Korean Naval Operations-9 January to 8 February 1952, p. 5. 
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another reason why their value could not be overlooked. Therefore, a second round of island 
warfare was developed, as Tom Tiddler’s Ground for small and less important islands between the 
major islands and the mainland.  
 
From mid-December, a Communist offensive towards the islands opposite Hwanghae Province 
was initiated. In the early morning on 16 December, the enemy tried to capture Chongyang-do, an 
islet four miles south-east of Sokto, by landing around seventy troops.119 This islet was used by 
the friendly forces as landing places for shore fire control parties and guerrilla operations. This 
small island was also important in that it would be a useful stepping stone towards the southern 
approach to Sokto.120 From the request of the guerrillas on Sokto, HMS Ceylon, Constance, 
Alacrity and HMCS Sioux proceeded into this area and conducted bombardments toward the 
expected enemy positions. Simultaneously JML 309 was sent to evacuate refugees on this islet. 
In the afternoon, a heavy air attack on enemy positions followed. As a result of continued 
bombardment, it was reported that the enemy evacuated at around 19:00, and Chongyang-do 
was recaptured by the guerrillas.121   
 Early next day, Ungdo, another islet nearby Chongyang-do, was also invaded by around 700 
enemy troops. Unlike the case of the previous day, the Communists continued to secure the 
islet despite continued naval and air bombardments for more than a week. Thus, by the request 
of the Leopard officer on Sokto, a guerrilla raid named Operation CHEERFUL was planned. 
The object of this operation was to recapture Ungdo using guerrillas from Sokto under naval 
and air support. Although prior to guerrilla landings, a considerable softening up process took 
                                           
119  ADM 116/6214, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 8 to 20 December 1951, HMS Ceylon, 22 
December 1951, Appendix I: Chronological Summary of Events. 
120 ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval Operations, 
Korea, 1950–53, pp. 202–3. 
121 ADM 116/6214, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 8 to 20 December 1951, Appendix I: Chronological 
Summary of Events. 
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place with naval bombardments and air strikes, the guerrillas were repelled with heavy 
casualties after facing fierce and effective mortar resistance from the enemy.122  
 From late December 1951, when most of the naval commitments were focused in the Chodo-
Sokto area and small number of nearby islands, the Communists simultaneously attacked the 
islands in the Ongjin Peninsular and Haeju areas. On 23 December, the small islands Yukto and 
Chodo, near the Haeju area, were captured by enemy landing troops.123 The islands of Taksom, 
and Yuksom, near Yonpyong-do, were also captured on the next day.124 On 26 December, 
another small island in the Yonpyong-do area named Sosuap-to, was reported to be captured 
by 300 enemy troops. Taesuap-to, about one mile south of Sosuap-to, was also captured by the 
enemy on 28 December.125 During a similar period, a number of islands on the South of the 
Ongjin Peninsula; Sunwi-do, Ohwa-do, Yongho-do and Changin-do also fell to the 
Communists. This Communist threat continued towards other UN-held islands, such as Mahap-
to, Mudo and Wollae-do, and within three weeks of enemy offensive, more than ten islands 
were captured by them.126  
 
Map 6.2 Islands on the West Coast (Naval Operational Area) 
                                           
122 ADM 116/6211, HMS Belfast-Report of Proceedings, 22 December 1951 to 8 January 1952, HMS Belfast, 8 
January, Appendix I: Chronological Summary of Movements and Events. 
123 This Chodo is a small island on the opposite side of the southern Hwanghae area.   
124  ADM 116/6211, HMS Belfast-Report of Proceedings, 22 December 1951 to 8 January, Appendix I: 
Chronological Summary of Movements and Events. 
125 ADM 116/6224, HMNZS Taupo-Report of Proceedings from 11 to 31 December 1951, HMNZS Taupo, 9 
January 1952, paras 10–11. 




(Source. Basic map taken from Political Map of Korea at <http://www.nationsonline.org/ 
oneworld/map/korea-north-political-map.htm>) 
 
Because of these simultaneous attacks, in the Ongjin and Haeju areas, and also because of a 
strong indication that additional offensives would follow, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff decided to 
issue new directives to the Blockade Commanders to improve the effectiveness of the naval 
forces’ defensive operation. During his stay on the west coast from 23 December 1951 
throughout January 1952, he clearly realised that the defence of the islands was a prolonged 
213 
 
high-priority commitment.127 Therefore, under the Command of CTE 95.12, ships of Task 
Element were organised into four task units. Each of the defensive task units was given a daily 
patrol area and a wider area of responsibility. The new organisation of Task Element 95.12 was 
as follows: 
 
TU 95.12.1  Sokto-Chodo Unit. Patrol area, code name CIGARRET, from Sokto to  
             Choppeki Point.  
TU 95.12.2  Peongyong-do Unit. Patrol area, code name WORTHINGTON, from Choppeki  
           to approximately meridian 125°15′E, including Wollae-do, Yukto and Kirin-do. 
TU 95.12.3  Han Unit. Patrol area, code name GUINNESS, Han estuary, but frigates not to  
           proceed beyond Fork anchorage. 
TU 95.12.4  Haeju Unit. Patrol area, code name BRICKWOOD, from Worthington area to  
           the eastward.128  
 
This reorganisation invoked more immediate responses, in particular in the southern area, but 
recapturing the Communist held islands and defending additional threats were not easy tasks. 
Experiencing the enemy offensive, the Leopard guerrillas, the only available landing forces, 
suffered heavy casualties. Based on several remaining records, it is clear that Donkey-1, who 
had to move to Kirin-do from Yongho-do whilst under enemy attack, suffered the loss of more 
than seventy guerrillas.129 Donkey-11, who shared the same island with Donkey-1, suffered 
even greater numbers of dead and wounded. After the withdrawal to Paengyong-do, only 
around 270 guerrillas remained from amongst 700.130 Donkey-21, who participated in the 
Operation CHEERFUL, lost more than fifty of their guerrillas.131 Owing to these heavy losses, 
it was very difficult to expect any guerrilla counterattack before regrouping. Moreover, after 
experiencing such heavy damage, the Leopard Headquarters issued a direction stating that 
                                           
127 ADM 1/23910, Korean War-Report of Proceedings 47, 9 January–4 February 1952, Office of the Flag Officer, 
Second-in-command, Far East Station, FO2FE/2960/11, 4 February 1952, p. 1; ADM 234/385, Ministry of 
Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval Operations, Korea, 1950–53, p. 220. 
128 Ibid. 
129 U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, p. 53. 
130 Cho, The Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War, p. 355. 
131 ROK Army Headquarters, The Korean War and the Guerrilla Warfare, p. 283. 
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‘Except for the vital islands, if there are enemy attack on the guerrilla held islands, immediately 
report this information to the Headquarters and Task Unit Commander, and then withdraw 
without any trial to secure them’.132 Rather than defend these less important islands by using 
their guerrilla forces, who had little training for garrison roles, it was a new policy to inflict 
heavy damage on the enemy landing troops by bombardments through air strikes and gunfire. 
 Between late December 1951 and late January 1952, therefore both the attacks on enemy 
captured islands and the primary defensive activities against additional threats had to be 
conducted mainly by the UN naval gunfire and air strikes. Each blockade ship’s defensive and 
harassing activities were conducted during the night-time. During these dark periods, they took 
up defensive stations on the enemy lines of approach, between them and the mainland. This line 
was illuminated by star shell. Concurrently, periodical harassing bombardments were carried 
out against the enemy held islands and their concentration areas. Also, further inshore areas 
were patrolled and harassed by the ROKN Craft.133 By daylight, the ships usually had to 
withdraw out of the immediate range of shore batteries and mortars.134 Therefore, except for 
emergency situations, day-time harassment was conducted by the aircraft of CTE 95.11, which 
at that time entailed HMAS Sydney and USS Badoeng Strait.135  During this period, the 
guerrillas’ main role was reporting enemy movements on both islands and mainland and 
recapturing islands with no or little enemy resistance. An example of the UN Forces’ response 
can be seen in the process report on the recapturing of Sosuap-to, as follows:  
 
On the evening of the 27th the island of Sosuap-to, in the Haeju estuary, north of Yongpyong-
do, was attacked and captured by the enemy during the night. The local guerrilla agent on 
this island escaped to Taesuap-to and reported the situation calling on HMNZS Taupo for 
assistance. HMNZS Taupo bombarded the island and next day USS Badoeng Strait’s aircraft 
                                           
132 Ibid., p. 240. 
133 ADM 1/23906, Korean Naval Operations-9 January to 8 February 1952, p. 5. 
134 Ibid.  
135 Ibid., p. 2. 
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carried out air strikes and attacks on junks in the vicinity causing a great many casualties. In 
fact subsequent reports indicated that some 300 enemy and 700 civilians had been killed in 
the original attack and counter-attacks. Friendly forces re-occupied Sosuap-to the next night 
and this island is now safely held.136 
 
During late January, however, the enemy’s advances in this area became less active. Several 
islands in this area, such as Mahap-to and Mudo, were reported to be under a continuous threat, 
and enemy build-ups on the coast line of the mainland were constantly being reported, yet, 
during this period, no additional island had fallen into enemy hands.137 It was also reported that 
the Chinese troops in Hwanghae Province were replaced by the North Korean Army, namely, 
the 23rd and 26th Brigades during this time.138  
 The Communist forces’ inactivity and their replacement of troops in the Hwanghae area were 
followed by agreement from both sides on several issues pending under Agenda Item 3 in late 
January 1951. Due to the differences of the two sides’ viewpoints in regard to the restoration 
of the airfields, the sub-Delegation meetings on this item had been significantly obstructed until 
early January.139 However, since instructions from the US government on 10 January directed 
that ‘the discussion of the airfield problem should be postponed until the other issues in Agenda 
items 3, 4, and 5 have been agreed upon’, the UNC decided to discuss other issues first, which 
had little differences of opinion, except for the airfield issue. As the Communist side agreed to 
the UNC’s changed negotiation strategy, on 27 January, the status of inshore islands issue 
gained a de facto ratification by both sides.140   
 According to the ‘draft Armistice Agreement’, agreed by the Staff Officers under Agenda Item 
3, the UN forces mainly withdrew from the friendly held islands on the western and northern 
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side of the Hwanghae and Kyong-gi Provincial line. It was also agreed, however, that the UNC 
‘shall retain control of, and may continue to occupy, the islands of Paengyong-do, Techong-do, 
Sochong-do, Yonpyong-do, and U-do’.141 Accordingly, one of the troublesome issues of the 
truce talks, ‘the status of inshore islands’ was resolved.142 Undoubtedly, this situation also 
weakened the motivation of the Communist forces’ continuation of an active offensive against 
the UN forces’ islands.  
 Regardless of the Communist forces’ changed posture, TG 95.1 had to maintain their 
defensive operation on the west coast. In addition to that, it was an imperative from the 
Blockade Commanders that the enemy should never permanently occupy the inshore islands. 
Although it seemed not very plausible, there was however some possibility that the Communists 
would use them as stepping stones to capture the vital islands. Moreover, such possession would 
restrict friendly activities and threaten inshore minesweeping operations.143  Therefore, from 
early February, steps were taken by HMS Ceylon, at that time CTE 95.12, to recapture the islands 
in the southern area. The Leopard guerrillas on the Haeju area and the Swanny Force were also 
involved this operation.  
 However, before the start of this operation, very interesting situations were reported by the 
guerrillas. As a result of investigation of each island, it was confirmed that the enemy had 
withdrawn from the small islands of Yuk-som and Changjae-do.144 It was also reported that they 
had withdrawn from Sunwi-do, Yongho-do and Changnin-do on 2 February. Two days later, 
                                           
141  Meeting of Staff Officers on Details of Agreement of Agenda Item 3, Held at Pan Mun Jom, General 
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Mudo was re-occupied by the guerrillas without opposition.145 On 6 February, Pado and Wido 
were reported clear as well.146 
 Another interesting situation in relation to the enemy also came about in the same period. 
From the night of 3 February, they initiated attacks on the small islands by capturing Yukto. 
In spite of the presence of HMCS Athabaskan and LSER 401 around this area, under the 
fire cover from their shore batteries, the enemy successfully landed troops. The Leopard 
guerrillas on this island at once evacuated, and the island passed into enemy hands. However, 
on 5 February, Yukto was reported clear of the enemy, and the guerrillas then reoccupied 
it.147 A similar situation occurred at Mahap-to a few days later.148 On 18 February it was 
also reported that the enemy had recaptured Yongho-do, Pado and Wido — from which they 
had withdrawn almost two weeks previously.149  
 In this area, the Communists seemed to adopt the policy of periodically occupying the small 
inshore islands off the south and west coasts of the Ongjin peninsula. They only remained in 
them for a day or so, and then returned to the mainland. Any friendly guerrillas who might be 
based in these islands were evacuated as soon as the enemy was seen approaching, and returned 
after they left. This strange enemy activity pattern was well explained by Admiral Scott-
Moncrieff as follows:  
 
These islands in the South are therefore a kind of Tom Tiddler’s Ground, where either side can 
occupy them at will, but neither one is prepared to expend a great effort to hold them. Only if 
our main islands are threatened do we allow the enemy to tie us down.150 
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During this time of Tom Tiddler’s Ground, it was clarified, in the course of recapturing the 
islands, that the enemy’s main intention was to raid the islands and try to capture the guerrillas. 
After this, the intention was to mine the beaches but not necessarily to hold them.151 Therefore, 
based on the fact that there was no attempt by the Communists to invade any of the vital islands, 
and because they were largely replaced by North Koreans, CTG 95.1 tentatively concluded that 
the enemy did not have ‘sufficient forces to do more than raid the smaller islands close 
inshore’.152  
 In fact, until late 1952, there was continuous Tom Tiddler’s Ground between the UN Forces 
and the Communists without any actual attempt to capture the important islands. This was 
particularly active on the Ongjin and Haeju area which has a large number of small islands and 
which had been used for guerrilla bases. However, due to the uncertainty of the Communist 
intention, TG 95.1 had to continuously be involved in this toilsome commitment until late 1952.   
 
6.6 The Change of the Guerrilla Organisation during the Island Warfare 
 
During December 1951, when the UN Forces on the west coast endeavoured to respond to the 
Communists’ changed offensive movement, the guerrilla organisation underwent a command 
and control realignment. On 10 December 1951, responsibility for the guerrillas was handed 
over from G3, EUSAK to the 8240th Army unit of the Far East Command, Liaison Department, 
Korea [FEC/LD (K)].153 This meant that the responsibility of the guerrilla operation was 
transferred from the EUSAK to a theatre-level agency that was in charge of intelligence 
activities.  
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 At the same time, for the purpose of co-ordinating all behind-the-lines activities, including 
intelligence supply and the guerrilla operation, an additional theatre-level organisation was set 
up. It was named as the Combined Command, Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK).154  
 However, these changes were not so welcome to the field officers, who commanded Leopard 
guerrillas and the guerrillas themselves. To the Leopard officers, instead of reporting to just one 
staff level, as they had been done before, they had to report any intended operation and its 
results not only to FEC/LD (K), their new parent organisation, but also to CCRAK. This also 
meant that they had to conduct operations under the influence of these organisations’ directions. 
To the guerrillas, although it was not clear whether they realised the influence of this change, it 
meant that they were no longer regarded as a viable operational force. Unlike the EUSAK who 
intended to use the guerrillas for a counteroffensive, as these theatre-level organisations mainly 
dealt with clandestine operations, it could be expected that there would be some changes in the 
pattern of the guerrilla activity.155  
 
In addition to the higher command and control level change, another significant change was 
concurrent within the guerrilla organisation. On December 1951, for the purpose of relieving 
the overburdened Leopard responsible for all of the west side of North Korea’s costal area, it 
was decided to establish an additional overall unit, code-named ‘Wolfpack’ on the west coast.156 
In fact, the division of this area into two separate organisations had been considered from mid-
1951. This was owing to the logistical and administrative problems of several southern Donkey 
bases a long distance from Paengyong-do.157 Once island warfare had commenced, it was 
finally decided to divide the area under Leopard responsibility. 
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 The reorganisation related to the guerrillas operating in the southern area of Hwanghae 
Province, and in particular, the middle of Sunwi-do, in the Haeju area, to the mouth of the Han 
River. In this area, four Donkey units had been operating under the loose control of the Leopard 
Headquarters. There were also around 1,000 guerrillas under the command of the ROK 1st 
Division that had operated on Kangwha-do, a large island at the mouth of the Han River. This 
entire area was transferred from Leopard to Wolfpack.158 
 The new organisation became official on 1 January 1952, under the command of Major 
Richard M. Ripley. Starting with the ROK Army guerrillas on Kangwha-do and some part of 
Donkey-5 on Kydong-do, Wolfpack gradually formed its organisation. Later, the remaining part 
of Donkey-5 and other Donkeys on Haeju area, such as Donkey-8, -12 and -13, also joined this 
organisation. As the Wolfpack Headquarters, Kyodong-do, a small island at the Han Estuary 
was initially designated. However, in early spring this shifted to Kangwha-do because of better 
lines of communication with the mainland. The guerrillas on these southern islands dropped 
their previous names and were designated as ‘Wolfpacks’ and a number.159 The Wolfpack 
organisation was as follows: 
 
Table 6.1 Organisation of Wolfpack (April, 1952) 
 
Unit Location Numbers Previous Organisation Date of Joined 
Wolfpack-1 Kangwha-do 850 
5816 guerrilla Unit 
(ROK Army 1st Division) 
December 1951 
Wolfpack-2 Kyodong-do 
(Vicinity small islands) 
1,250 Donkey-5 December 1951 
Wolfpack-3 Yongmae-do 600 Donkey-13 March 1952 
Wolfpack-4 Sosuap-to, Mudo 117 Donkey-8 May 1952 
Wolfpack-5 Taesuap-to 170 Donkey-12 February, 1952 
                                           
158 ROK Army Headquarters, The Korean War and the Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 279–332. 
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Wolfpack-6 Yonpyong-do 138 Donkey-5 December 1951 
Wolfpack-7 
Songmo-do, Choma-do, 
Kal-do and Mudo 
500 Donkey-5 April, 1952 
Wolfpack-8 Sunwi-do 400 Donkey-5 April, 1952 
 
(Sources. Frederick Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951–1954’, p. 70; ROK Army 
Headquarters, The Korean War and the Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 279–332; ADM 116/6215, HMS 
Concord-Report of Proceedings, 14 to 29 March, 1952, HMS Concord, 29 March, 1952, Appendix B. 
Wolfpack Organisation; Cho, The Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War, pp. 419-487.) 
 
The eight Wolfpack units were assigned to take over the east and south side of the Ongjin 
Peninsular, whilst Leopard was able to concentrate operations on the farther north side of North 
Korea.160  
 
From the early stage of Wolfpack’s establishment, the Blockade Commanders fully recognised 
the organisational change within the guerrilla organisation. This fact was mentioned in the CO 
of HMS Belfast’s report on 8 January 1952, as follows: 
 
Major Mause [Major Richard M. Ripley], US Army has taken over control of the Han River 
and all islands West as far as, and including, Mudo from the Leopard organisation. The old 
‘Donkey’ is the above area are now called ‘Wolfpacks’. Communications with the new 
‘Wolfpack’ organisation were not wholly straightened out by the time we left, but, as a result 
of your conference with Major Mause, it should be working smoothly shortly.161  
 
As mentioned above, by early January 1952, the islands were not yet ready to change to the 
Wolfpack organisation, and the Donkey set-up was still in existence. Contrary to the CO of HMS 
Belfast’s expectation, it took a relatively long time for this new guerrilla command to settle 
down. Because of the Communists’ intense offensive toward the small islands on the south of 
Ongjin Peninsula, they were heavily involved in the defensive operation. As they also needed 
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some time to recover from damage; their transition continued up until March 1952, when five 
of their units initiated an active operation with six American officers.162 
 
6.7 The Task Group Commanders’ Mixed Evaluation of Leopard and Wolfpack Activities 
 
From early February 1952, after more than ten days of extremely low temperatures, ice had 
formed in the northern side of the operational area. Before mid-February, the Chodo and Sokto 
areas had become fairly well covered with ‘pancake ice’, which made the position of the ships 
somewhat precarious and prevented boat work. 163  The ice, although a foot thick or more, 
remained tumbled and broken, hence it was unsafe for potential invaders to walk on it.164 
Fortunately, this situation provided the defenders some opportunity to experience a peaceful 
period. Although this situation in fact isolated Sokto, Chodo and smaller islands in their vicinity, 
it also made any enemy invasion impracticable throughout the period.165 Towards the end of 
February, as the ice reached its worst state, it even stretched to the Ongjin Peninsular.166 As a result 
of conditions, the Communist activities covering the overall area of Hwanghae Province were 
hampered until the end of this month.  
 In fact, their inactivity continued throughout this cold period. Other than a feint raid against 
Mudo on 26 February, the Communists had not launched any attacks on the friendly-held 
                                           
162  ADM 116/6215, HMS Concord-Report of Proceedings, 14 to 29 March 1952, Appendix B: Wolfpack 
Organisation; ROK Army Headquarters, The Korean War and the Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 279–332. 
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islands, although several firing incidences from shore batteries on friendly patrol ships were 
recorded. However, any damage was negligible.167  
 It was not only the Communists, but also the guerrillas who were restricted during this period. 
However, this lack of activity was apprehended by the Blockade Commanders, as it was largely 
due to harsh weather conditions; ice and snow handicapping the movement of agents.168 The 
ice on the inshore area heavily restricted any sampan movements towards the mainland from 
landing or picking up the guerrillas. Another feature was that all of the habitants of Hwanghae 
Province that dwelt in and around the coastal area defence zone were removed. They were taken 
almost 2 km from the coastal area as a precautionary measure. Therefore, any guerrilla activities 
on the snow would offer a very easy means of tracking for the enemy forces. Due to these 
prevailing conditions, only limited ambushes and intelligence activities by mainland agent cells 
were feasible.169    
 
The thaw started around the end of February, and, by the first week of March, nearly all of the ice 
had disappeared in the Chodo-Sokto area. Therefore, the channels around Sokto became navigable 
again, and all patrol routes opposite Hwanghae Province could be used once more.170 With the 
increasing temperatures, so the expectancy of the Communist raids on the UN-held islands grew.  
 Unlike the situation at the end of 1951, TG 95.1 was suitably prepared to respond to any 
Communist offensive. As mentioned above, during January 1952, there was an additional 
reinforcement in the garrison forces. Therefore, not only Chodo and Sokto but also the other 
several vital islands such as Paengyong-do and Yonpyong-do had been reinforced by the ROK 
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Marines, and the responsibility for the defence of these islands, which was under CTG 95.1, 
had been assigned to TE 95.15. This was a new sub-element responsible for vital island garrison 
tasks and commanding the ROK Marine and, if required, guerrilla forces. For this duty, Colonel 
W. K. Davenport, CTE 95.15, US Marine Corps, commanded a small number of US Marine 
Corps personnel to be assigned to each of the main islands as Island Defence Commanders.171 
With a continual heavy commitment in UN naval and air defensive activities, a stable defensive 
readiness to protect the vital islands was maintained.172  
 The defensive changes required Leopard and Wolfpack guerrillas to become more active. 
In particular, the Commanders of TG 95.1 expected a large increase in guerrilla supplied 
intelligence on the vital islands, because large numbers of them were relieved from garrison 
tasks as a result of the island defence forces’ reinforcement.173 Guerrillas of the Chodo and 
Sokto islands, due to their relatively close proximity to the mainland, were especially expected 
to be more active. Unlike Paengyong-do and Yonpyong-do, being respectively nine and seven 
miles from the mainland, Sokto and Chodo are only three and five miles respectively. This 
expectancy was not due to distance alone, but also by virtue of the fact that the numbers of 
Leopard Donkeys were more concentrated in this area; being six out of a total of twelve 
units.174  
 However, it soon transpired that these expectations were only partly correct; at least to the 
Blockade Commanders. From March, increasing guerrilla activities were reported in several 
areas of Leopard and Wolfpack involvement. However, unlike previous relationships with 
the guerrilla organisation, the Commanders of TG 95.1’s had differing opinions concerning 
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the two guerrilla groups’ activities; as discussed in the remainder of this chapter. This was 
particularly so amongst the Task Unit Commanders who had continual close relationships 
with these two guerrilla organisations.  
 As mentioned above, Task Element 95.12 was reorganised into four task units, to improve 
their defensive operations since mid-January 1952. Each Task Unit ship co-operated mainly 
with guerrillas within their designated patrol area; that is, TU 95.12.1 with Leopard in the 
Chodo-Sokto area, TU 95.12.2 with Leopard in the Paengyong-do area, and TU 95.12.4 with 
Wolfpack in the Haeju area. The fourth, TU 95.12.3, patrolled the Han estuary. This area 
contained a large number of Wolfpack guerrillas in Kangwha-do and Kyodong-do, but very little 
contact was made with them. Due to the low level of enemy threat against the islands in this 
area during this defensive operation, only intermittent visits of a frigate were allowed in the 
Han area.175 As most of the blockade ship’s movements in each area were heavily influenced 
by the local guerrillas’ activities, these activities were subsequently constantly evaluated by the 
COs of the Task Units.   
 An interesting point was that clear, distinctive and fairly consistent evaluations of these three 
groups of guerrillas acting in different areas began to emerge. To the COs of TU 95.12.1, the 
Leopard guerrillas’ activities in the Chodo-Sokto area could be briefly described as poor 
intelligence supply and short of offensive activities although there were continued active 
movements toward the mainland. In the case of the Leopard guerrillas in the Paengyong-do 
area, they were reported to be very inactive during the earlier period of 1952. However, since 
July, more active and successful movements were gradually reported by CTU 95.12.2. On the 
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other hand, the COs of TU 95.12.4 showed high satisfaction with the Wolfpack guerrillas’ 
overall activities in their area. 
 
Leopard Guerrillas in the Chodo-Sokto Area 
 
During March, there had been a relatively low level of enemy threat on the mainland opposite 
the Chodo-Sokto area. There had been several attacks by the enemy on the two islets, Hodo and 
Chongyang-do, near Sokto. However, it was not in the Naval Commanders policy to hold them 
because they were of a walkable distance from the mainland during low ebb. Therefore, except 
for spasmodic bombardments by friendly patrol ships, or TARCAP aircraft, when the enemy 
were seen in these islets, no additional commitments were provided to these islets.176 It meant 
that the guerrillas in this area could conduct their own activities without the heavy burden of 
garrison roles. Moreover, despite the low level of enemy threat, as there had been continued 
Communist movements in that area, target intelligence for TU 95.12.1 should be forthcoming 
from the guerrillas as before. 
 In fact, from early March, increasing guerrilla activities were reported again by the ships of 
Task Unit within this area. However, unlike the expectation of the Blockade Commanders, there 
was actually no intelligence supply from Leopard. During her patrol as CTU 95.12.1, between 
27 February and 16 March, HMS Cossack reported the activities of Leopard guerrillas in the 
Chodo-Sokto area as follows: 
 
It is worthy of comment that despite the large number of what were assumed to be agents 
who were landed almost nightly on the mainland from Chodo not one single target was 
provided by intelligence sources the whole time Cossack was in this area.177 
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This situation continued during April and May. Therefore, ships in this area had to rely on 
several intelligence reports by TE 95.11’s aircraft patrolling around this area.178 The problem 
was, without any exception, that a shortage in intelligence supply remained up until the end of 
November 1952. An interesting point was that there had been a constantly active guerrilla 
movement reported by the friendly naval forces. The report of the CO of HMS Mounts Bay, 
who was the last CTU 95.12.1 covering the period to be discussed in this chapter, showed this 
problem clearly. His comments were as follows: 
 
No local intelligence was received whilst I was in the area. The same state of affairs obtained 
during my last patrol as CTU, and is most unsatisfactory. There are nightly friendly 
movements of all sorts proceeding in and out of Chodo, but nothing of local interest ever 
seems to emerge, and one has neither targets to shoot at […] nor any idea of what is going 
on ashore.179  
  
It was not only the intelligence supply which had yielded poor results for the blockade ships, 
the Leopard’s offensive activity during the covering period was also very inactive. In particular, 
based on the operational records of TG 95.1, it was very surprising that there had been no 
guerrilla raid reported to the Task Unit Commanders up to mid-June. Moreover, even the first 
raid recorded, that of 26 June by guerrillas on Chodo, gave the impression of inadequate co-
ordination with CTU 95.12.1. The biggest problem was that the guerrillas acquired the ROK 
craft’s support in this area without the knowledge of CTU 95.12.1’s command.180 
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 A more surprising fact to be noted was that, since this poorly co-ordinated raid, there were no 
further records with regard to Leopard guerrilla raids on the Chodo-Sokto area. Considering the 
fact that, regardless of their reliability, these guerrillas in this area were one of the most active 
agents to the Blockade Commanders in 1951, this called into question their purpose and was a 
source of dissatisfaction to the friendly Naval Commanders. Needless to say, TU 95.12.1’s lack 
of co-operation with the guerrillas inevitably caused its blockade ships’ inactiveness.  
  
Leopard Guerrillas in the Paengyong-Do Area 
 
In and around Paengyong-do, another Leopard area of responsibility, no direct enemy threats 
had been made by mid-July on any of the friendly held islands. Except for a reported threat to 
invade the island of Mahap-to on 29 May, this area had remained quiet.181 The problem was 
that the guerrillas in this area were also very inactive during the same period. Their lack of 
intelligence reported by CTU 95.12.2 is shown in the CO of HMNZS Taupo’s report, as follows: 
 
It became apparent at the beginning of April that what little enemy was reported in my area 
was in the Wollae-do area and therefore the Worthington destroyer was on future given that 
area for her patrol. The area Kirin-do, Changin-do and Sunwi-do had been devoid of any 
intelligence for fourteen days and it was considered a waste of the destroyer’s time and 
capabilities to make her patrol in that area.182 
 
However, unlike Leopard in Chodo-Sokto, who demonstrated disparity between their active 
movements and lack of reported results, there were several comprehensible reasons for the 
guerrillas in the Paengyong-do area. This situation was not only caused by the lack of enemy 
movements, but also by the fact that the guerrillas were undergoing internal problems. To the 
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guerrillas, enemy inactivity meant few targets to report and little opportunity to conduct raids. 
Moreover, large number of the guerrillas in this area had to concentrate on regrouping rather 
than their main tasks for a while. Of the six Donkeys remaining in TU 95.12.2’s patrol area, 
Donkey-1, -4, -5, -10, -11 and -13, three Donkey units (-1, -11 and -13), that had suffered heavy 
casualties during the previous enemy offensive, had to retreat to Paengyong-do to recover and 
regroup. It was around late April that they were able to initiate operations.183 In case of Donkey-
4, which had been in a state of turmoil since the assassination of its leader on 1 January 1952, 
it was able to restart its operation in earnest from early May 1952.184 Considering the fact that 
the other two Donkeys were operationally based on Paengyong-do, a relatively long distance 
from the nearest point of mainland, it was very unrealistic to expect much active movement 
from them.185    
 From mid-July, in the Paengyong-do area, an area that had been relatively quiet over the 
previous four months compared to the other two areas, enemy activity began to increase. After 
the redeployments of several Donkey units from Paengyong-do to the smaller islands and their 
restart of activities, the Communist reinforcement and their recommencement of offensive 
movements followed. In fact, the number of bombardments on friendly patrolling ships from 
enemy batteries placed on the southern side of Choppeki point increased significantly. Moreover, 
on 16 July, the island Changin-do was captured by around 160 landing enemy forces. Even though 
this island was recaptured by the guerrillas several days later, the enemy’s active movements 
continued for a while.186  
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 In the same period, increasing guerrilla activities in this area began to be reported gradually to 
the ships of TU 95.12.2. Due to increasing enemy troop activities, guerrilla activities also 
increased as a countermeasure. In particular, guerrilla raids, which had never been conducted 
during the early part of 1952, resumed in earnest. The first raid was conducted on 10 July. 
Under the gunfire support of HMS Belfast, Amethyst and USS LST 883, and air strikes from 
the aircraft of USS Bataan, a guerrilla raid was launched to destroy enemy batteries on the 
Ongjun peninsula. This raid was quite successful in that one of the enemy gun positions was 
destroyed and about 60 North Korean casualties were inflicted.187  
 Four days later, on 14 July, a very well co-ordinated and successful guerrilla raid was achieved 
by Donkey-4 on Wollae-do. Under the command of the Leopard advisor, Lieutenant Ben S. 
Malcom, 120 heavily armed guerrillas conducted an amphibious raid on the mainland opposite 
their island. It was regarded as a model raid by the friendly Naval Commanders in as much as 
the guerrillas not only landed punctually, in accordance with the planned time, but they also 
completed the evacuation on schedule and achieved their overall objectives. As a direct result 
of this raid, seventy-three casualties were inflicted on the enemy and several guns were put out 
of action. In the course of the raid, HMS Belfast, Amethyst and LST 883 supported with naval 
gunfire and air strikes from USS Bataan’s aircraft, and this resulted in more reported enemy 
casualties, numbering around 200.188  
 Other successful raids continued in this area, as on the night of 14 August, when about 100 
guerrillas led by an American officer made a raid on the Ongjin Peninsula. This was under 
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gunfire support from HMCS Rotoiti.189 On 30 August, under the naval gunfire and TARCAP 
air support, an additional two raids were conducted; on the Ongjin Peninsular and on Changin-
do. Although their results were not as successful as the previous raid, CTU 95.12.2 positively 
evaluated that, in the course of both raids, intercommunication between the ships, the American 
shore controller and the aircraft was good.190 After experiencing some raids with ships of TU 
95.12.2, CTE 95.12 (at that time HMS Newcastle) also wrote his of satisfaction regarding the 
well co-ordinated guerrilla raids in this area, as follows: 
  
At the moment [...] the ships acting more and more in support of the guerrillas; playing the 
role of half-back […] The co-operation between the Task Unit Commanders and the guerrilla 
leaders is still improving; we are now kept much more in the picture and the raids are jointly 
planned before execution.191  
 
From September, as the autumn harvesting period started, Communist activity in the west coast 
area drastically decreased. This was because of the Communist forces’ main concern of 
harvesting and securing their supply route. Therefore, the number of targets for guerrilla raids 
also decreased.192 In fact, the guerrillas’ offensive operations were not as active as the previous 
month, with only three more raids reported up until the end of November. The first raid was 
conducted on 27 September, followed by another on the night of 19 October; each of which 
were conducted on the Ongjin Peninsula using gunfire support.193 During the night of 28 
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October, one more raid was then conducted on the mainland opposite from the guerrillas’ 
situation on Mahap-to.194 Even though there was a notable decrease in activity during these 
last three months, Leopard guerrillas’ operations in the Paengyong-do area were much more 
energetic than those of the guerrillas in the Chodo-Sokto area, in particular, following the 
redeployment of several Donkey units to the smaller islands and the restart of enemy activity. 
And, with the increase of guerrilla activities, the ships of TU 95.12.2’s operation also became 
more active.    
 
Wolfpack Guerrillas in the Haeju Area 
 
From mid-March, the Communist threat against the islands held by the Wolfpack guerrillas 
recommenced. On 15 March, an enemy attack on Yongmae-do was reported to HMS Concord. 
Although they were repelled by the TU ships’ immediate support, enemy troop concentrations 
on the mainland opposite Yongmae-do were continually being reported. 195  Concurrently, 
imminent threats against Mudo were also reported. Therefore, on 17 and 25 March, HMS 
Concord conducted bombardments on the reported enemy build-ups.196 During April, these 
Communist offensives continued along with threats against the small islands in and around this 
area.197 In the spring of 1952, the Wolfpack guerrillas and the ships of TU 95.12.4 faced much 
more active enemy movement than those in the other two areas. 
 Such concerted Communist movements required a suitable guerrilla response, and in fact, 
from early March, several reports of useful intelligence were supplied by Wolfpack guerrillas. 
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During 15 and 17 March, when the enemy conducted raids to capture Yongmae-do and Mudo, 
the Wolfpack guerrillas in this area showed very effective movement. Immediately the enemy’s 
build-up was made, it was immediately reported to CTU 95.12.4, at that time HMS Concord, 
and based on their information, bombardments were carried out. Subsequently, reports of 
enemy casualties were supplied by the guerrillas, and from the resulting pre-emptive attacks, 
the enemy threat were successfully repelled.198  
 A most satisfactory point was that the Wolfpacks were even qualified to provide information 
when bombardment should commence; that being between 0800 and 0900, or 1700 and 1800, 
when the troops were gathered for meals.199 After this operation, the CO of HMS Concord 
expressed a positive evaluation of this organisation: ‘The Wolfpack guerrillas appeared to be 
both energetic and effective. They supplied a continual flow of intelligence’.200  
 The Communists’ active offensive movement in the Haeju area continued into late March and 
throughout April, and hence, the Wolfpack’s intelligence reports also continued. On 29 March, 
enemy troop concentrations opposite Yongmae-do and Chomi-do were reported.201 On 13 
April, there was also an enemy raid conducted on Yongmae-do.202 Following this, on 26 April, 
enemy build-ups were reported on the opposite site of Mudo and Taesuap-to.203 All of these 
enemy threats were successfully repelled before they could materialise using intelligence 
supplied by the Wolfpack guerrillas. After conducting operations from 20 April to 12 May as 
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the CTE 95.12 in both Leopard and Wolfpack areas, HMS Belfast reported the contrasting 
activities of Leopard and Wolfpack as follows: 
 
Wolfpack agents here [Haeju area], as always, have been prolific in intelligence and, though 
some of it may be inaccurate, I would rather have it coming through, to be assessed for what 
it is worth, than the deadly silence experienced in the Chodo area.204  
 
The Wolfpack guerrillas’ active intelligence supply continued through the latter period of 1952. 
So plentiful was it that in August, HMS Concord, at that time CTU 95.12.4, was able to 
comment that their intelligence supply was so continuous that it ‘has now reached a stage where 
the list of targets is so large thus careful scrutiny is necessary before engaging a target’.205 HMS 
Mount Bay, who operated in both of the Leopard and Wolfpack areas during her patrol in 
November, also commented on the stark contrast between the two entities. She clearly 
recognised Leopard’s lack of activity and intelligence after the short service experienced in the 
Haeju area as CTU 95.12.4, when compared to the activities and results achieved by the 
Wolfpack guerrillas.206 It was undeniable that, after March, Wolfpack’s intelligence activities 
for the blockade ships were clearly superior to that of guerrillas in other areas.   
 During the same period, Wolfpack also showed energetic offensive activities, and from late 
March to the end of November, large-scale raids and numerous small-scale raids were carried 
out by the guerrillas. Their first guerrilla raid since independence was carried out on 11 March. 
Under gunfire support from HMS Cossack, a successful raid was conducted near the small 
island of Chodo, within the Haeju area.207 An additional raid followed on 21 March, when 
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under the support of AMC 309 and aircraft from HMS Glory, a guerrilla attack on the north 
bank of the Han River was conducted. As a result of this raid, they inflicted twenty-five enemy 
casualties without any friendly damage.208  
 Further Wolfpack raids continued into April and May, including a small-scale raid on 24 April 
on the Haeju area. Under the support from HMS Whitesand Bay, there were five very successful 
raids carried out to inflict casualties and to capture prisoners.209 Amongst them, the latter two 
raids were more successful.210 The first raid was conducted under the naval direction of HMAS 
Bataan on 19 May, and the second was under the naval direction of HMS Whitesand Bay six 
days later. Both operations were planned by Captain George Lamm, US Army, who 
commanded the guerrilla forces in this area, and he was supported by HM Ships and aircraft 
from HMS Ocean and USS Bataan.211 As a result of the first raid, 150 enemy were killed or 
wounded, and one Chinese Communist Forces prisoner captured. Additionally, an air spot from 
HMS Ocean destroyed one complete command post killing 40 CCF, one mortar and three 
machine guns.212 The later raid also inflicted heavy damage, which according to the Wolfpack’s 
report, resulted in 120 enemy troops being killed. 213  After experiencing these Wolfpack 
activities, the CO of HMS Belfast even commented that ‘This area was full of activity, thanks 
to the drive and enterprise of the Wolfpack organisation hereabouts’.214  
 During June, under constant enemy threat, Wolfpack’s active raid policy continued, and four 
successful guerrilla raids were carried out up to early July. The first was on 14 June, and was 
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supported by HMCS Athabaskan, followed by another on 19 June, which was supported by 
HMS Amethyst.215 The third on 29 June, was conducted by Wolfpacks from Yongmae-do under 
the support from HMS Ceylon, Amethyst and Comus, and the last was carried out on 5 July 
against the enemy troops on the northern side of Mudo with close co-operation of HMS Comus, 
PC 703 and aircraft from HMS Ocean.216 In these cases, no prisoners were taken, but heavy 
damage was inflicted on the enemy troops. 
 However, the Wolfpack Guerrillas’ offensive operation was restricted from mid-July to early 
September because of the Communists’ heavy reinforcement. Since June in the Haeju area, 
there had been continued enemy build-up and construction of defensive positions on the west 
bank of the estuary. These reinforcements in this area consisted of increasing the construction 
of trenches and gun emplacements, and increasing the numbers of troops. 217  CTG 95.1 
considered this a direct result of the series of successful guerrilla raids made in the Haeju area, as 
these activities could easily prompt enemy counter actions.218 It was also due to the Communist 
forces reinforcement in this area to strengthen their defensive position against the prospect of 
additional large-scale landing operations by UN forces.219 Due to this greater need for alertness 
and preparation to fire at any approaching ships, the guerrillas’ amphibious activities needed to 
cease during this time.220  
 The Wolfpack’s offensive operation restarted from mid-September. As mentioned above, with 
the autumn period begun, the Communist troops’ main focus was shifted to harvesting and 
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securing their supply route. Therefore, other than occasionally reporting troop concentrations 
on the coast, the remaining period was generally peaceful with no significant threats made on 
the friendly islands.221  
 During September, however, due to decreased enemy movements and a shortage of landing 
craft, guerrilla activities were relatively fewer and less significant in comparison to those 
performed between April and June. However, despite this comparative lull and unfavourable 
situation with regards to landing craft, three guerrilla raids were carried out, each assisted by 
Naval gun and Air support.222 Their movements were continued the following month, with 
three Naval and Air supported guerrilla raids on nearby Taesuap-to, Mudo and a small city in 
Haeju respectively.223  
 As a result of these continued Wolfpack guerrilla offensives, CTU 95.12.4 recommended the 
provision of a Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM) or similar craft to support Wolfpack’s intruder 
junks.224 As mentioned above, from early September, the Wolfpack guerrillas had experienced 
a shortage of landing craft. In a single gale on 3 September, Wolfpack lost more than 10 junks. 
Hence, to encourage their amphibious operation, the CO of HMS St. Brides Bay made the 
exceptional requisition of one landing craft.225 Considering the fact that there was only one 
LCM allocated in the Wolfpack area, and this was for the purpose of the US personnel’s 
evacuation and prohibited for Wolfpack operational use, this infers that the Task Unit 
Commander was highly satisfied with guerrilla activities.226 Based on the operational records 
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of the blockade ships, it could be concluded that the Wolfpack guerrilla’s offensive activities 
were more active than those of the Leopard guerrillas in the other two areas during the same 
period. With the energetic activities of the Wolfpacks, the ships of TU 95.12.4 experienced the 
busiest time in the west during overall 1952.       
 
 Higher Commands’ Direction: The Reasons for Each Guerrilla’s Different Activities  
 
An interesting point to note is the relationship between the level of enemy activities around the 
inshore area and the number of reported guerrilla activities, in particular, in the Pangyong-do 
and Haeju area. It shows that little enemy activity invoked less guerrilla derived intelligence 
and offensive operations correspondingly. For example, one of the main reasons for guerrilla 
inactivity in the Paengyong-do area during the early period of 1952 was the lack of enemy 
movements. This is similarly reflected in the Wolfpack guerrillas’ activity in that there was a 
decrease in offensives through September and October, due to reduced enemy threats.   
 However, in cases when there was heavy enemy reinforcement on the coastal area and the 
mainland, guerrilla activity was also largely restricted due to the difficulty of manoeuvring. For 
this reason, Wolfpack guerrillas showed relatively little record of movements from mid-July to 
early September. 
 However, the lack of activity of the Leopard guerrillas in Chodo-Sokto area could not be 
explained by this logic. Regardless of enemy activities in the coastal area, there was a consistent 
shortfall in their relationship with the ships of TU 95.12.1. Unlike Leopard units on Paengyong-
do area, Donkeys on Chodo-Sokto area had no severe internal problems, hence, they continued 
activities. That is why the Commanders of TU 95.12.1 shared similar opinions as expressed in 
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their reports, as follows: ‘It was not be fully appreciated that the local intelligence units on 
Chodo-Sokto provide virtually no local intelligence.’227 
 A point to be considered is that, at least during March and April of 1952, there had been a 
large amount of target intelligence supplied from the guerrillas in this area to Task Element 
95.11. According to the operational records written by CTE 95.11 and Carrier-borne Air Liaison 
Officers, continuous target intelligence was supplied by the Leopard guerrillas during March.228 
Therefore, after this patrol period, the CO of HMS Glory commented that ‘greater success’ was 
achieved owing to the ‘good targets reported by Leopard’.229 During April, there was also a 
continued target supply from these guerrillas.230 Considering the fact that there was very little 
Donkey unit activity in the Paengyong-do area until late April, most of the targets for TE 95.11 
seemed to be reported by the guerrillas in the Chodo-Sokto area. 
 At that time, most of the targets supplied by the Leopard guerrillas, such as the villages or 
buildings which contained enemy troops, were on the mainland which could be attacked only 
by naval aircraft. This fact was also commented on by HMS Cossack, in that the targets reported 
by the guerrillas in the Chodo-Sokto area were not within the range of her ships and could only 
be reached by air strike.231 It meant that, rather than operating inshore and in nearby coastal 
areas, the guerrillas in Chodo and Sokto tried to infiltrate deeper mainland territory and report 
this intelligence to TE 95.11 through their Headquarters.  
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 In fact, according to an ORO study, in July 1952, almost 1,000 Leopard guerrillas were 
reported to have infiltrated the mainland. This was almost 30 percent of its total strength.232 By 
mid-1951, most of the guerrilla activity apparently changed to the ‘commando-type shallow-
penetration hit-and-run raids launched from the islands’, and large numbers of guerrillas on the 
mainland retreated to the islands during the Communist forces’ offensive operation against friendly 
islands between December 1951 and January 1952.233 This meant that the Leopard guerrillas 
infiltrated the mainland very actively during spring of 1952; and, in particular, the guerrillas from 
Chodo-Sokto area who had more than 2,000 men under their Donkey Units were more keenly 
involved.234  
 In addition, as mentioned below, the number of guerrilla activities conducted on the mainland 
largely increased from spring 1952. Considering the fact that there were very little Wolfpack 
guerrillas operated on the mainland throughout 1952, it seemed clear that these mainland 
activities in 1952 were largely conducted by the Leopard guerrillas, in particular, by guerrillas 
in the Chodo-Sokto area.235 
 
Table 6.2 Number of Reported Mainland Activities by the Guerrillas 
 
Year 1951 1952 
Month 8 9 10 11 12 1* 2* 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Intelligence 
Activities 
2 1 0 0 0 - - 9 10 33 56 41 51 88 
Attacks on Civil  
Administration 
1 0 2 3 0 - - 0 0 4 8 13 20 31 
Attacks on  
Transport & 
Facilities 
8 5 8 7 2 - - 0 2 5 19 30 28 37 
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241 
 
* Records of January and February of 1952 not available. 
(Source. Frederick Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951–1954’, p. 181) 
 
Based on the ORO study’s classification, ‘Intelligence Activities’ included ‘escorting of agents, 
reconnaissance, and patrols’ and excluded the guerrillas’ target intelligence supply. ‘Attacks on 
Civil Administration’ included their raids against the Communist party and the police stations. 
‘Attack on Transport and Facilities’ included the guerrillas’ assault on the Communist vehicles, 
rails, roads and bridges.236 All these types of activities were usually conducted on the mainland 
for special purposes. A possible explanation of their constant movements from these islands 
without proper co-operation with the ships of TU 95.12.1 might be inferred from these records; 
owing to the guerrillas’ large infiltration of the mainland for a different type of special activities.  
 Based on the records in Table 6.2, it is important to note that the radical increase of the numbers 
had been started since the emergence of new theatre-level commands of guerrilla activity. The 
question arose as to the high possibility of new instructions from their new parent organisation, 
FEC/LD (K), regarding the activity of Leopard guerrillas in this area. If so, this meant that, 
unlike the EUSAK Headquarters who had been largely indifferent to their guerrilla activity, the 
new higher command seemed to be more active in using their own resources for its purposes. 
 
An additional possible reason for the Chodo-Sokto guerrillas’ lack of relationship with TU 
95.12.1 also seemed to be related to the directions of another theatre-level organisation, 
CCRAK. As mentioned above, CCRAK was a higher organisation that was in charge of the co-
ordination of all behind-the-lines activities. One of its main roles was to disseminate all of the 
collected information from each clandestine agency to the friendly forces as a type of weekly 
intelligence report; hence no agents existed to carry out intelligence gathering. As a new theatre-
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level intelligence organisation, to conduct its role properly, its first action was to take control 
of intelligence dissemination, which had been conducted independently by various clandestine 
organisations. Therefore, undoubtedly, owing to this organisation’s influence, Leopard and 
Wolfpack’s intelligence dissemination policy was also required to be changed.237  
 In fact, on 15 March, the Leopard Headquarters directed their guerrillas regarding the 
regulation of intelligence dissemination as follows:  
 
All information obtained will be sent direct to this Headquarters either by radio or hand 
carried. Under no circumstances will information of any kind be furnished to any other 
organisation such as ROK Army, ROKMC, ROK Navy, HID, or any other organisation 
operating in this area including other American agencies. Any infraction of this rule will be 
reported to this Headquarters immediately.238 
 
It is not clear whether this instruction was directed by CCRAK as it has not been possible to 
find any document containing this instruction. Some of the Blockade Commanders’ comments, 
however, supported the high feasibility that there was a direct connection between the above 
instruction and CCRAK. 
 After experiencing such constant lack of intelligence from the Leopard guerrillas on Chodo 
throughout March and April (this was despite having large movements toward the mainland), 
the CO of HMS Cossack decided to determine the reason for such a lack of intelligence. In the 
course of direct contact with some of the Leopard guerrillas, he gained first-hand knowledge 
that ‘intelligence was in fact forwarded to higher commands, but it certainly never reached the 
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Task Unit Commander until it came out in the printed Weekly Intelligence Summaries’.239 
Although the CO of HMS Cossack did not write the name of higher commands, possibly due 
to the lack of the interviewed guerrillas’ knowledge, this showed that the guerrillas were 
directed to supply their intelligence directly to the higher command. 
 Admiral Scott-Moncrieff’s comments revealed more obviously that this situation might be 
caused by CCRAK. His comments in the HMS Cossack’s report showed this fact, as follows:  
 
It is unfortunate that the output locally and the freedom of dissemination of raw intelligence 
has not been as good as it was previously. This may possibly to the result of new directives 
from CCRAK. The falling off in the output of raw intelligence is most noticeable in the case 
of Salamander and Leopard, but the co-operation between ships and the organisations in the 
Haeju [Wolfpack] area remains good.240  
 
Based on these comments, it was highly possible that the Leopard guerrillas’ lack of co-
operation and intelligence supply were caused not only by FEC/LD (K)’s instructions, but also 
by CCRAK’s regulation of intelligence dissemination. 
 
A remaining question is that, even if it was due to higher command’s instructions, why was it 
the Leopard guerrillas in Chodo-Sokto area who were directed to infiltrate the mainland and to 
be regulated in intelligence dissemination?  
 In fact, it was not only the Chodo-Sokto but also several Donkey units based on Paengyong-
do who were directed to infiltrate the mainland for special operations. For example, according 
to the operational records of Donkey-15, in mid-March, when guerrillas regrouped in 
Paengyong-do, they received a special order from a FEC/LD (K) Colonel (Frederick B. 
Alexander Jr.) to ‘infiltrate into the Chongju area and destroy the enemy raider system and 
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capture their raider operation manual’. Therefore, they concentrated on this mission up until 
early June, but without any significant accomplishment.241 Donkey-10’s case was also similar. 
During their stay in Paengyong-do, they were trained to infiltrate the mainland and make a base, 
particularly in the Kuwol Mountain area. Because of the difficulties moving through the land 
route, they had to undergo airborne training. This mission was accomplished around October 
1952.242  
 In addition, it seemed most of the clandestine organisations under CCRAK’s influence were 
instructed to change their intelligence dissemination policy. Based on the above-mentioned 
comments of Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, two of three organisations who had supplied 
intelligence to the Blockade Commanders changed their position after the CCRAK’s 
instructions. It was only Wolfpack which continued with its good intelligence supply. It meant 
that the direction of intelligence dissemination regulation was not only sent to Leopard, but also 
to the other clandestine organisations on the west coast. Thus, it seems more proper to change 
the question to why did only Wolfpack conduct constant and active intelligence supply to the 
Blockade Commanders.  
 In fact, this seemed mainly related to the operational environment of the Wolfpack guerrillas. 
Unlike the Chodo-Sokto and some parts of Paengyong-do areas, where a relatively low level of 
enemy threat had been faced, the Haeju and Ongjin areas were exposed to continued enemy 
offensive movements against the islands. Since the direction from the UNC, on 19 December, 
which placed the responsibility for the defence of the islands on the UN naval forces and the 
indigenous forces under the influence of FEC/LD (K) and CCRAK, island defence had been 
regarded as the first priority also by the two organisations’ officers. It meant that the importance 
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of the island defence took precedence over the new instructions such as ‘infiltration to the 
mainland’ and ‘regulation of intelligence dissemination’. 243  Therefore, the Wolfpack 
organisation, which had been faced with imminent enemy threats should be regarded as an 
exceptional case of these instructions.  
 In addition to that, the characteristics of the Wolfpack’s intelligence also influenced this 
difference. In fact, during this period, most of the target intelligence supplied by the Wolfpack 
guerrillas was transferred as emergency calls. As there was a continued enemy threat against 
the small islands, any evidence of enemy troop concentrations was directly reported to CTU 
95.12.4, and he called for air support from the patrolling TARCAP. 244  As this urgent 
information had to be delivered immediately, Wolfpack’s target intelligence rarely reported to 
CCRAK. Considering the fact that the Commanders of TE 95.12 regarded the ‘Weekly 
Intelligence Report’ received from CCRAK as ‘no more than background information’, it 
could be argued that it contained no useful information for the Blockade Ships’ primary 
commitment; the islands’ defence.245  
 On the other hand, the Leopard guerrillas in areas of relatively low enemy threat and with 
proper garrison forces, such as Chodo, Sokto and some areas of Paengyong-do, seemed more 
required to follow the CCRAK’s instruction. There is additional evidence that the CCRAK 
officers regarded Donkeys in these areas as suitable for intelligence gathering. During early 
June, a plan to raid the mainland using ROK Marine Corps troops from island garrisons was 
suggested by CTG 95.1. He thought this would assist the defence of the islands by forcing the 
enemy onto the defensive and boosting the morale of the Korean Marine Corps. However, in 
the course of planning a raid, this plan was objected to by CCRAK. Their grounds for objection 
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were very meaningful, in that they argued that ‘such activities would make the coast too hot for 
their requirement for intelligence activities, but no objections were raised to raids further south 
in the Choppeki area’.246 As a result of CCRAK’s comments, two points are considered; first, 
Chodo, Sokto and Paengyong-do were main areas for CCRAK’s intelligence activities. 
Secondly, large parts of the small islands in the Paengyong-do area including Kirin-do, Ohwa-
do and Sunwi-do, and all of the Wolfpack area, where it was necessary to be more alert against 
the enemy threat, were insignificant in terms of its intelligence operation.  
 Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that the Blockade Commanders’ negative evaluation of 
Chodo-Sokto guerrillas was not due to their actual inactivity but because of the lack of actual 
chances of co-operation. Under the instructions of two theatre-level agencies which controlled 
the guerrilla activity, they were directed to operate on the mainland and to be more prudent in 
sharing their collected intelligence with the naval forces. By virtue of the combined effect of 
enemy activities and newly emerged high-level directives, the Wolfpack and Leopard guerrillas 
were engaged in different types of operations. The consequence of this was that the 
Commanders of TG 95.1’s gave mixed appraisals of the two guerrilla groups. And, owing to 
the naval operation’s high sensitiveness to guerrilla activities, this also caused a large difference 
in each TU’s activities in the west coast.    
 
6.8 Conclusions  
 
Following the November 1951 Communist offensives in the Yalu Gulf area, very active steps 
were needed to be taken by the UN Forces to protect the more southerly vital islands. In particular, 
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as the UNC placed island defence responsibility on the UN naval forces, the blockade ships 
were thus continuously and heavily involved in this defensive operation. Owing to this 
unusual situation, which required a naval defensive task, around sixteen ships of TG 95.1 
were tied up in this static commitment, and thus lost their facility for other duties.247 Even 
though there were no major fleet actions, however, to the western naval forces, this period of 
naval campaign was the most critical and strategically important commitment.  
 During this critical period, ironically, the interdependence between the TG 95.1 and the 
guerrilla organisations became deeper. To the Blockade Commanders, it was essential to make 
closer relationships with the guerrillas for effective defensive operations. As there were no other 
alternatives to supply useful information of enemy activity on the west coast, the Commanders 
of TG 95.1 had to depend largely on the guerrilla organisations. In particular, due to the 
imminent threat from the enemy, the Blockade Commanders prioritised promptitude of 
intelligence over reliability.248 Moreover, at least during the early stage of island warfare, with 
only small numbers of available garrison forces, the Naval Commanders were obliged to use 
guerrillas as island defenders. These guerrillas also strongly needed naval and air support, 
without which, it was impossible to secure their bases inshore. Therefore, based on the direct 
communication system between the two groups and the reorganisation of TE 95.12 into four 
sub-units, they were able to construct closer relationships within a short period of time.  
 From March 1952, however, when enemy activities recommenced mainly in the Haeju area, 
and the guerrilla organisation underwent a command and control realignment, the relationship 
between ships of TG 95.1 and the guerrillas became more complicated. Unlike the previous 
relationship with guerrilla organisations, the Commanders of TG 95.1 evaluated guerrilla 
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activities differently, based on the different operational areas. In particular, there was a large 
difference in perceptions of the Wolfpack guerrillas and those of Leopard in Chodo and Sokto. 
Even though there had been a positive evaluation concerning Wolfpack guerrilla activities in the 
Haeju area, the Donkeys in Chodo-Sokto were deemed disappointing owing to their total lack 
of activity.  
 In fact, this dichotomy was influenced by the different levels of enemy threat in the respective 
areas and two higher commands’ directions. However, to the Commanders of TG 95.1, who 
were allowed to access only a limited part of higher level intelligence, this variance in guerrilla 
group activity across different areas was somewhat incomprehensible. With these mixed 
Blockade Commanders’ perspectives regarding each regional guerrilla groups’ activity, the 
most critical and demanding period for the UN forces on the west coast was closed. And, albeit 
one of diminished credibility and mixed evaluation of guerrilla activities, the naval-guerrilla 





Chapter 7  
Alienation from Co-Operation: From December 1952 to the End of the War 
 
 
During the last eight months of the Korean War, operational uncertainty prevailed in the west 
coast area. As a war of attrition had persisted for over a year along the 38th Parallel, the need to 
break this stagnant situation increased for both the UNC and the Communist Command. As 
both sides fully realised the impossibility of a decisive victory, they planned and conducted 
different types of movements on the west coast. One hope was to effectively progress the 
currently dormant truce talks, whilst another was to effectively counter any expected enemy 
activities. In particular, by late April 1953, when the signing of the truce was imminent, the 
west coast operation was ordered to be oriented for post-war preparations.    
 Therefore, the operations in this area were largely influenced by both sides conducting their 
new operational plans and also preparing for armistice negotiations. These situational changes 
inevitably directed the Blockade Commanders’ and the guerrillas’ main concerns toward these 
new missions, which had little in common with the previous relationship. Thus, regardless of 
the intention, these situational changes resulted in a more distant relationship between both 
groups.   
 This chapter outlines the changed relationship of TG 95.1 and the guerrilla organisations from 
December 1952 to the end of the Korean War. In particular, it explores the events which 
influenced the lack of co-operation and inactiveness of these two groups from the beginning of 
the winter season of 1952.  
 As a first step, the Communist forces’ defensive movements on the west coast and the 
guerrillas’ winter reorganisation are both briefly described. Following this, the reasons why 
these changes caused poor co-operation between the two groups is discussed; mainly focusing 
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on the objectives of the guerrilla reorganisation. Finally, the accelerated progress of the truce 
talks and its influence on the west coast operation are discussed. By focusing on the process of 
their alienation from co-operation, this chapter will reveal the underlying limitations in the 
naval-guerrilla relationship which emerged not only from the nature of the irregulars, but also 
from the American guerrilla organisations’ separate objectives.  
 
7.1 The Start of Winter and Inactivity on the West Coast 
 
From late October 1952, the temperature of the northern west coast dropped enough to bring 
the first snows. By November, it became so cold and snowy that the guerrilla movement was 
gradually restricted.1 It was from mid-January that the weather conditions reached their worst.2 
Because of bad ice conditions in the Haeju Estuary, it was difficult for frigates to navigate most 
of its channels. In the Chodo and Sokto areas, close packed ice around the channel reduced the 
ability of surface ships to operate there.3  
 At the start of winter, most of the forces in and around the west coast were largely inactive. 
From December 1952, the Communist forces stopped any offensive activities against the 
friendly held islands. The CCF, who were present in the Paengyong-do area, also withdrew 
from the coast, except for a few detachments.4 Whilst during January 1953, a large number of 
Communist troop deployments were reported in the Hwanghae Province, the west coast still 
remained calm and peaceful, apart from several isolated cases of enemy gunfire from the 
mainland against Chodo-Sokto and Chanjae-do on 23 December 1952 and 3 January 
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respectively. 5  Even in the Haeju area, where there had previously been the most enemy 
offensive activities, it remained very peaceful. This situation was well described by the CO of 
HMS Cardigan Bay, who operated in this area, as follows: 
 
I had been led to believe that the present time, the Haeju area was the “hot spot” of the coast. 
I was therefore expecting an interesting and active eight days to finish up with. Actually, the 
total ammunition expenditure for the whole TU was two star-shell used investigating a ghost 
echo. The enemy fired nothing at all.6  
 
As this operation was his first patrol in the Haeju area since September 1952, the changed mode 
of Communist activity caused embarrassment. 
 The guerrillas’ activities were also largely reduced. This inactivity did not only apply to 
Leopard, who had maintained poor relationships with the Blockade Commanders during 1952, 
but also to the Wolfpack guerrillas. Unlike the pilots of TE 95.11, who had received target 
intelligence from Leopard and Wolfpack during the winter, this situation was much more 
prominently reported by the COs of TE 95.12. 7  In fact, between late December 1952 to 
February 1953, except for sporadic intelligence regarding enemy movements and also of 
information on intended landings of Leopard on 30 January, there were no additional records 
of guerrilla activities reported to the blockade ships.8    
 It was undoubtedly true that adverse Korean winter conditions caused a very unfavourable 
environment for military activities, and in particular, in the coastal area. The ice-ridden sea and 
                                           
5 Regarding the records of the Communist Forces deployments, see ADM 116/6220, HMS Newcastle-Report of 
Proceedings, 7 to 20 January 1953, para.17; regarding the Communists’ gunfire shelling against Chodo-Sokto area, 
see ADM 116/6210, HMS Birmingham-Report of Proceedings, 17 December 1952 to 2 January 1953, HMS 
Birmingham, 2 January 1953, para. 4; and regarding the shelling against Changjae-do, see ADM 116/6216, HMS 
Crane-Report of Proceedings, 31 December to 7 January 1953, HMS Crane, 8 January 1953, para. 6. 
6 ADM 116/6212, HMS Cardigan Bay-Report of Proceedings from 18 to 26 February 1953, HMS Cardigan Bay, 
26 February 1953, para. 2. 
7 The CO of HMS Glory wrote that the main air effort was directed against troop concentrations and stores during 
his patrol, and these targets were mainly reported from the 1st PIR (Leopard) and 2nd PIR (Wolfpack): ADM 116/5946, 
HMS Glory-Report of Proceedings, 19 to 29 January 1953, HMS Glory, 3 February 1953, p. 2. 
8 Regarding the Leopard landing operation on 30 January, see ADM 116/6210, HMS Birmingham-Report of 
Proceedings, 24 January to 5 February 1953, HMS Birmingham, 5 February 1953, para. 10. 
252 
 
piled snow made most sea based operations impossible. For example, the former Donkey-4 
advisor commented that, ‘Winter reduced partisan operations by at least 80 percent’. 9 
Nevertheless, even despite weather restrictions, considering the fact that there had been very 
active movements on both sides between November 1951 and February 1952 in island warfare, 
the cold weather itself was not enough to explain such low activity.  
 In fact, both sides used the winter season as a preparatory period for future operations. For 
example, most of the winter was needed for the Communist forces to complete large-scale troop 
redeployment and reinforcement to improve their defences along the west coast. Similarly, the 
Leopard and Wolfpack organisations also underwent additional reorganisation which involved 
drastic changes of troop composition.  
 
  The Communist Forces’ Preparation for the Counter-Landing Operation 
 
Since the successful amphibious landing operation at Inchon in September 1950, the 
Communist Command had been concerned at the prospect of additional large-scale landing 
operations by UN forces.10 In particular, after the stabilisation of the line of contact around the 
38th Parallel, this concern regarding UN forces’ landing gradually increased. The Command 
considered that the UNC would play an adventurous card to break the current static situation, 
and the most obvious way was to conduct another ‘Inchon like’ landing operation.11 The most 
viable landing places were considered to be in the Yalu and the Cheongcheon River areas on 
the west coast.12 Unlike the inland of the east coast, which has a very steep geographical 
                                           
9 Malcom, White Tigers, p. 164. 
10 The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) 
CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea, p. 526. 
11 Ibid., p. 520. 
12 Ibid., p. 527. 
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configuration, the west coast is mainly of low hills and ridges. This would allow an easier 
approach to the rear side of the Communist forces on the front line. Moreover, there were large 
numbers of beaches and UN-held islands, which could be useful for the landing operation. This 
meant that the overall west coast area was very unfavourable in terms of effective defences 
against an UN force amphibious landing.13  
 To respond to this potential threat, from September 1951, the Communist Command set up a 
Combined Command Organisation for the coastal defensive operations. This was under the 
command of the Northern-Central Combined Operations Headquarters and deployed additional 
forces to the west coast. However, the coastal defensive condition was still considered to be 
unsatisfactory. The Communists were not able to fully concentrate on the coastal defence until 
the summer of 1952 due to the unstable defensive positions along the front line.14  
 It was around the late autumn of 1952 that the Communist forces initiated in earnest their 
large-scale reinforcements in the coastal area. This positional change was directly related to the 
Communists’ confidence of their front-line defence, consequently gained in the course of their 
autumn campaign. From July 1952, the Communist Command engaged in a continuous large-
scale military build-up in troop strength and fire power. They increased the strength of the 
ground forces from 910,000 men (as in early July) to 1,008,900 men by September.15 Their 
artillery fire power was also largely increased. Using provision from the Soviet Union, the 
Communist forces employed additional field guns, and their artillery delivery capability rose 
                                           
13 U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, pp. 30–1; The 
Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) CCF’s 
War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea, pp. 545–6. 
14 Ibid., p. 526. 
15 The Korea Research Institute for Strategy (trans.), CCF’s History of the Korean War, pp. 221–2.  
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from 8,000 rounds to 43,000 rounds a day. 16  Moreover, during the long period of static 
operations, the Communists were able to improve their logistical situation greatly.17  
 Based on these reinforcements, the Communist forces were able to secure advantageous 
outposts on the line. In particular, after the successful defence of the UN forces’ offensive for 
Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge conducted during October and November 1952, the Communist 
Command came to regard their primary task as consolidating the front-line defence and this 
was largely accomplished.18 The battles for Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge, indeed, were the 
fiercest contests of the year and the last offensive operations undertaken by the EUSAK in 1952. 
Nevertheless, in the 42 days of bloody fighting, the UN forces were not able to make any 
progress in these areas where they were faced with strong Communist defences.19   
 The increased Communists confidence in front-line defensive readiness allowed them to 
accelerate coastal defensive reinforcements, in particular, around the west coast. For the first 
measure, on 23 November 1952, Peng Dehuai ordered the reinforcement of west coast defences. 
The full-scale strengthening of defence in this area started from late December as a result of the 
directive from Mao Zedong on 4 December 1952. In a meeting for the Chinese Voluntary 
Forces’ Operational direction during 1953, Mao instructed as follows: 
 
It is highly possible that the enemy would conduct large-scale landings on the West Coast 
with around five to seven Army divisions […] The time could be this coming spring, or 
possibly earlier. We have to not only deploy around five army corps in this area, but also fix 
and fortify defensive facilities. In particular, there should be four army corps who have a 
                                           
16  ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs (trans.) 외무부 (역), 소련의비밀외교문서 제 4 권, [Soviet Secret 
Diplomatic Documents Related to the Korean War, Vol. IV] (Seoul: ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994), p. 
172. 
17 According to an ROK Army intelligence report, by late autumn 1952, the Communists’ supply status improved 
and was better than at any other time since the Chinese troops’ intervention. War History Compilation Committee, 
ROK MND, The History of US JCS: The Korean War, Vol. II (Seoul: 1991), p. 254. 
18 The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) 
CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea, p. 526. 
19 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. III, p. 472. 
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wealth of operational experience in Korea […] The enemy landing on the West Coast must 
be denied at all costs.20 
 
As a consequence, a large-scale military build-up proceeded in terms of troop numbers and 
quality, fire power and the construction of defensive facilities. As a result of the Communist 
Army troops’ redeployment, four Chinese Army Corps — 38th, 39th, 40th and 50th — were 
moved from the front line to the west coast. Considering the fact these army corps were 
experienced from the very earliest stage of the Korean War, this redeployment constituted a 
high level of qualitative reinforcement in the area’s troop strength. In terms of numbers, this 
redeployment increased troop strength by around 23,000, with additional supplies of field guns 
and artillery. In particular, there were increased fortifications using mines and barbed wire for 
beaches and defensive positions.21   
 An important point to note was that the Communist forces’ large-scale build-up was not for 
an offensive operation against the friendly held islands but totally for defensive purposes. In 
particular, this defensive movement was mainly for responding to a UN force large-scale 
landing rather than to counter guerrilla operations. Rather than showing aggressive activities, 
therefore, the Communists focused mostly on their troop redeployments and fortifying 
defensive positions along the west coast during winter.     
 
The Reorganisation of the Guerrillas 
 
On September 1952, as decided by the FEC, the last theatre-level command and control change 
was performed in regard to guerrilla operations. In an attempt to establish a single theatre-level 
                                           
20 The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) 
CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea, p. 523. 
21 According to the records of Chinese Official History, from early January to late April 1953, around half million 
people were employed daily for the construction of these defensive facilities: Ibid., pp. 543, 546–7. 
256 
 
agency to co-ordinate and control all behind-the-line activities in Korea, the FEC gave CCRAK 
operational control of FEC/LD (K). In other words, all responsibility for the guerrillas was 
transferred from FEC/LD (K) to CCRAK.22  
 Subsequently, in early October, the FEC decided to increase guerrilla strength within a short 
period of time by an intensive recruiting program. By July 1953, this quadrupled the number of 
guerrilla forces from around an original 9,000 to about 40,000. For the first step of this large 
expansion, it was planned to recruit around 11,000 new guerrillas by mid-March 1953.23 At 
the time of that decision, Leopard and Wolfpack maintained the bulk of guerrilla forces, 4,600 
and 4,100 respectively. As a result of this programme, however, Leopard and Wolfpack 
guerrillas almost doubled by the end of 1952.24 This recruitment attempted to address the more 
comprehensive use of guerrilla forces to break the rear and front Communist defences in the 
current stalemate, and also to pressurise them towards a cease-fire agreement.25  
 Based on these guerrilla related changes, from late November 1952, a significant 
organisational change was also carried out within Leopard and Wolfpack. This task involved 
incorporating the guerrilla organisations into the US Army command structure, such as 
regiments and battalions. This was an effort by the FEC to get a better grasp of the largely 
expanded guerrilla forces and their operations.26 From this time, the official title of the guerrilla 
changed to ‘partisan’ and their section of FEC/LD (K), was given the title of ‘United Nations 
Partisan Forces, Korea’ (UNPFK). The names of Leopard and Wolfpack were also changed, 
becoming ‘regiments’. Therefore, Leopard was re-designated as the 1st Partisan Infantry 
                                           
22 Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, pp. 64–6. 
23 Malcom, White Tigers, p. 175; Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 77. 
24 Ibid., p. 76. 
25 Steve A. Fondacaro (Major, US Army), ‘A Strategic Analysis of US Special Operation during the Korean 
Conflict, 1950–1953’ (MA thesis of the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 
US Military Academy, 1988), pp. 70–1; Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 62. 
26 Malcom, White Tigers, p. 177.  
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Regiment (1st PIR) and Wolfpack became the 2nd PIR. During the early part of 1953, as a 
consequence of the increased numbers, the 5th and 6th PIR were separated from the 1st and 2nd 
PIR.27 Simultaneously, each Donkey and Wolfpack were re-designated with the appellation 
‘Partisan Infantry Battalion’.28   
 For the sake of appearance, these organisational changes seemed to reflect merely the strength 
of reinforcement and a related cosmetic name change. However, the implications were not so 
simple. It was the FEC’s decision that it would more actively involve the guerrillas’ in future 
activities by making them more physically defined and manageable. As with the Leopard 
guerrillas’ activities in the Chodo-Sokto area during 1952, these organisational changes would 
possibly cause a distraction to intelligence collection and the guerrillas’ close co-operation with 
the blockade ships.    
Moreover, it delayed guerrilla operations and time was lost in their resurrection. This was 
because these reorganisations involved a large-scale rotation of American officers and major 
guerrilla recruitment and training. According to the ORO study, more than thirty American 
officers and forty-five enlisted men were newly appointed for guerrilla operations at the 
reorganisation stage.29 Based on this comment of the CO of HMS Cardigan Bay, made in early 
February 1953, after his first west coast operation that ‘I found all the Americans I had 
previously known ashore had been relieved’, most guerrilla advisors seemed to be relieved 
during this period.30  
                                           
27 The 5th PIR was separated in the area of west side of former Wolfpack area, and a 6th PIR added in the 
northern area of previous Leopards. These tasks were completed by April 1953: Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan 
Warfare in Korea’, pp. 67–8. 
28 As a result of this change, Donkey-4 became 4th Partisan Infantry Battalion: Malcom, White Tigers, p. 177. 
29 Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, pp. 73–4. 
30  ADM 116/6212, HMS Cardigan Bay-Report of Proceedings from 28 January to 9 February 1953, HMS 
Cardigan Bay, 9 February 1953, para. 6. 
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 A salient problem was that a large number of Americans assigned to the guerrilla organisations 
had neither the experience nor the training necessary for the demands of unconventional warfare, 
and thus began their duty without any proper foundation. Although there were predecessors 
who learned well, they never had an opportunity to pass on what they learned to the new comers 
before the end of their duty. Each new guerrilla advisors had to start from the beginning and 
relearn lessons that were essential for the clandestine operation.31 Therefore, it took a greater 
length of time than was desirable for the new American recruits to smoothly control and co-
ordinate their agents’ activities. 
 The drastic expansion of the guerrilla strength also restricted their activities for a while. This 
was largely due to the way of recruiting. Due to the limited number of available refugees on the 
islands and their reluctance to join, large numbers had to be recruited from the South Koreans. 
To fill this requirement of a large number within a short period of time, more than 600 recruiters 
had to be employed. They travelled throughout South Korea and persuaded young men, 
promising money, food and clothing.32  
 A clear problem was created through such an aggressive expansion. Significant numbers of 
the South Korean recruits were pimps, thieves, and other undesirables who signed up because 
they thought that by doing so they could avoid dangerous front-line duty.33 In fact, large 
numbers of the new recruits were not mentally or physically ready to conduct guerrilla activities. 
This situation required long periods of training for the new recruits.34 Therefore, for the new 
American officers and recruits, it was necessary to utilise most of the winter season to prepare 
the tasks ahead.  
 
                                           
31 Malcom, White Tigers, p. 144. 
32 Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 76. 
33 Evanhoe, Dark Moon, p. 163. 
34 Malcom, White Tigers, p. 175. 
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During this totally inactive period, TG 95.1 also underwent the organisational and operational 
changes necessary to respond to the changing operational environment. By the direction of 
Admiral E. G. A. Clifford, the new CTG 95.1 who relieved Admiral Scott-Moncrieff in late 
September 1952, on 1 January 1953, a new Task Unit organisation came into force as follows: 
 
Table 7.1 New Task Unit Organisation (1 January, 1953) 
Old Name Duty New Name 
CTE 95.11 Carrier Force CTU 95.1.1 
CTE 95.12 Inshore Cruiser CTU 95.1.2 
CTU 95.12.1 Chodo-Sokto Area CTU 95.1.4 
CTU 95.12.2 Paengyong-do Area CTU 95.1.5 
CTU 95.12.4 Haeju Area CTU 95.1.6 
CTE 95.15 Island Defence CTU 95.1.3 
 
(Source. ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval 
Operations, Korea, 1950–53, p. 253.) 
 
This change was to alleviate the pressure on the cruisers who had to command each Task Unit 
during the previous island defensive operation.35 Simultaneously, the permanent TARCAP, 
which had been supplied in the Chodo-Sokto area by naval aircraft, was directed to be flown 
only if required.36 Considering the fact that the previous systems were maintained to effectively 
defend the friendly islands, this latest Task Unit organisational and operational change reflected 
a new CTG 95.1 perspective regarding the current west coast situation; that is no more imminent 
Communist threat against the UN-held islands.37  
 The Blockade Commanders also assumed a lack of winter guerrilla activity; not only due to 
the cold weather, but also due to the organisational changes and the American officer 
                                           
35 ADM 1/24856, Korean War-Report of Proceedings 59, 28 December 1952 to 14 February 1953, Office of the 
Flag Officer, Second-in-command, Far East Station, FO2FE/2960/13, 5 January 1953, p. 2. 
36 WO 281/1046, NO. 63 Carrier Borne Ground Liaison Section, HMS “Glory”: War Diary for the period 
November to December, 1952, p. 1 (Dec). 
37 ADM 1/24856, Korean War-Report of Proceedings 59, 28 December 1952 to 14 February 1953, p. 2. 
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replacement process. This fact is very well commented by the CO of HMS Newcastle (CTE 
95.12) as follows:  
 
The guerrilla reorganisation and new blood, coupled with the rapid rotation of the officers of 
the guerrillas has put us back in some measure as the winter weather has prevented us from 
carrying out our usual frequent visits and consultation with these officers.38  
 
However, he expected that the close relationship with the guerrillas would be restored in the 
near future in stating that, ‘With the advent of spring, we shall regain the complete personal 
touch we had last summer and autumn with these various organisations’.39 
 
7.2 Phase I and II: The Start of Special Missions of the Guerrillas 
 
The thaw started from late February around the Haeju area. By mid-March 1953, all ice on the 
blockade ship’s operational channels had completely disappeared, hence, inter-island 
movement was again quite free.40 With the advent of improved spring weather conditions, large 
numbers of enemy deployments toward the coastal area were conducted. Activity had been 
reported opposite Sokto and was particularly noticeable in the Paengyong-do area, opposite the 
islands of Yukto and Wollae-do, and in the Choppeki Point region.41 Unlike the spring of 1952, 
however, rather than conducting offensive landings against the UN forces’ held islands, the 
Communists tended to concentrate more on conducting harassments by using their shore 
                                           
38 ADM 116/6220, HMS Newcastle-Report of Proceedings, 5 February to 3 March 1953, HMS Newcastle, 2 
March 1953, para. 33. 
39 Ibid. 
40 ADM 116/6210, HMS Birmingham-Report of Proceedings, 28 February to 20 March 1953, para. 21. 
41 ADM 116/6220, HMS Newcastle-Report of Proceedings, 21 to 30 March 1953, HMS Newcastle, 30 March 
1953, para. 1. 
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batteries and night-time air bombardments.42 To the Blockade Commanders, their activities 
seemed to constitute a coastal defence, and not an offensive operation.43  
 Increasing guerrilla movements were also reported from the Haeju area, where the thaw 
initially began.44 From late February, the un-notified guerrilla movements in this area were 
found by the Blockade ships.45 As the reorganisation of the guerrilla forces seemed largely 
completed, and with improved weather, the Blockade Commanders expected an increase of 
intelligence supply and offensive activities from what was formerly Wolfpack’s area. 46 
Contrary to this expectation, however, there was no intelligence from the guerrillas.47 This 
situation continued over March 1953, and the lack of guerrilla intelligence is reflected in the 
CO of HMS Whitesand Bay’s comments:   
 
The apparent complete inactivity of the Wolfpack [2nd PIR] in the area was a strange contrast 
to 9 months ago. At the same time there were each night many friendly movements from the 
front line islands but no intelligence was received.48 
 
At that time, the Blockade Commanders thought this was just a temporary problem. They 
regarded this as due to a new American officer’s long absence from the responsible area. 
According to the records of HMS Whitesand Bay and HMS Cardigan Bay, the new Wolfpack 
officer, Lieutenant Colonel Todd frequently visited Kangwha-do, where his Headquarters was 
                                           
42 ADM 1/24856, Korean War-Report of Proceedings 61, April and May 1953, Office of the Flag Officer, Second-
in-command, Far East Station, 2FE/960/2, 8 July 1953, p. 1. 
43 ADM 116/6220, HMS Newcastle-Report of Proceedings, 21 to 30 March 1953, para. 7. 
44 ADM 116/6210, HMS Birmingham-Report of Proceedings, 28 February to 20 March 1953, HMS Birmingham, 
20 March 1953, para. 5. 
45 ADM 116/6212, HMS Cardigan Bay-Report of Proceedings from 18 to 26 February 1953, HMS Cardigan Bay, 
26 February 1953, para. 5. 
46 ADM 116/6210, HMS Birmingham-Report of Proceedings, 28 February to 20 March 1953, para. 5. 
47 Regarding the lack of guerrilla intelligence, the CO HMS Cardigan Bay commented as follows: ‘During this 
patrol we were spared even that excitement as we received no intelligence whatever. I got the impression that all 
the Partisans on the neighbouring islands were hibernating’: ADM 116/6212, HMS Cardigan Bay-Report of 
Proceedings from 18 to 26 February 1953, HMS Cardigan Bay, 26 February 1953, paras 3–4. 
48 ADM 116/6225, HMS Whitesand Bay-Report of Proceedings from 28 February to 7 March 1953, Whitesand 
Bay, 11 March 1953, Appendix A: Part I, Operational.   
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located, for the reorganisation. Therefore, over March, the guerrillas in this area had to conduct 
their operation without any proper control or co-ordination from their CO.49  
 To the Blockade Commanders, this type of situation was not an unusual experience. For 
example, almost four months previously, they had experienced a very similar situation in the 
Haeju area. At that time, there had been very active and satisfactory continued co-operation 
with Wolfpack guerrillas. However, a very significant guerrilla movement plan was made which 
required sharing intelligence with the Blockade Commanders; but the latter had no knowledge 
of such a plan. On 10 October 1952, for better access to the mainland, Wolfpack-8 moved their 
base from Chumun-do to Sunwi-do. The problem was that this movement was carried out 
without the effective dissemination of information, and it transpired that an aircraft from HMS 
Ocean regarded them as enemy junks attacking Sunwi-do. By chance, CTU 95.12.2, at that 
time HMS St. Brides Bay, heard of this operation and refused permission for HMS Ocean to 
bomb the junks. It was later known that this information was not passed because of the senior 
officer of this area, Captain George Lamm’s absence from the area. He was in Seoul at that 
time, and it was not till after his return that the co-operation became smooth again.50 
 Therefore, as the CO of HMS St. Brides Bay commented that ‘The current reorganisation of 
the Wolfpacks into Partisan Regiments has temporarily reduced our own activity but […] this 
will not remain the case for long’, the Blockade Commanders thought that this problem would 
be solved from April with the new US officers earnestly commencing their tasks and 
subsequently re-building relationships.51 There were several instances to prove that this would 
not remain the case for long. From late March, increasing friendly activities were gradually 
                                           
49 ADM 116/6212, HMS Cardigan Bay-Report of Proceedings from 18 to 26 February 1953, para. 4; ADM  
116/6225, HMS Whitesand Bay-Report of Proceedings from 28 February to 7 March 1952, Appendix A: Part I, 
Operational.   
50 ADM 116/6222, HMS St. Brides Bay-Report of Proceedings, 6 to 16 October 1952, 17 October 1952, para. 7. 
51 ADM 116/6222, HMS St. Brides Bay-Report of Proceedings, 27 March to 13 April 1953, HMS St. Brides Bay, 
18 April 1953, para. 3. 
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reported in the 1st PIR area.52 On 1 April, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Todd, the 
Headquarters of 5th PIR was activated in the Haeju area.53 And early that month, in a meeting 
with the new CO of the 1st PIR, Lieutenant Colonel Perry, an agreement was made to establish 
closer co-operation.54  
 In fact, to some extent, the Blockade ships’ co-operation with the guerrillas grew more active 
from mid-April. Since the meeting with the 1st PIR officers, requests for naval gunfire support 
for the guerrilla organisations had increased. According to the operational records of the TG 
95.1’s ships, between April and early May 1953, seven naval gunfire supports for guerrilla raids 
had been conducted.55 In particular, the guerrilla activity focused more on the large-scale raids. 
According to the blockade ships records, three out of four raids conducted during early May 
were large-scale which involved more than 150 guerrillas.56  
 The problem was that these raids never accomplished satisfactory results; a fact recognised in 
a report by the CO of HMS St. Brides Bay who supported three guerrilla raids during May. It 
states:    
   
The plain fact is that the partisans are neither equipped nor trained to carry out landings more 
than a handful of men. However, their terms of service are not conducive to aggressiveness 
                                           
52 ADM 116/6219, HMS Mounts Bay-Report of Proceedings from 8 to 27 April 1953, 27 April 1953, paras 9, 12. 
53 ADM 116/6225, HMS Whitesand Bay-Report of Proceedings from 13 to 26 March 1952, Whitesand Bay, 30 
March 1953, Appendix A: Part I, Operational.   
54 ADM 116/6225, HMS Whitesand Bay-Report of Proceedings from 6 to 22 April 1953, HMS Whitesand Bay, 
24 April 1953, Appendix A, para. 3. 
55 The first guerrilla raid was conducted on 15 April by the 1st PIR on Kirin-do, and the second one was conducted 
on 19 by the 1st PIR on Sunwi-do. Both of them were supported by HMS Whitesand Bay: ADM 116/6225, HMS 
Whitesand Bay-Report of Proceedings from 6 to 22 April 1953, para. 4; on 19 April, HMAS Culgoa supported a 
guerrilla raid on Kanjuce peninsula: ADM 116/6220, HMS Newcastle-Report of Proceedings, 18 April to 3 May 
1953, HMS Newcastle, 3 May 1953, Enclosure: Chronological Summary of Events; three more raids were carried 
out respectively on 4, 8 and 10 May. All of these were supported by HMS St. Brides Bay: ADM 116/6222, HMS 
St. Brides Bay-Report of Proceedings, 28 April to 11 May 1953. HMS St. Brides Bay, 12 May 1953, Appendix I, 
paras 10–22; the last raid was conducted on 17 May by the support from HMS Sparrow and USS Bairoko: ADM 
116/6222, HMS Sparrow-Report of Proceedings from 9 to 26 May 1953, HMS Sparrow, 1 June 1953, Enclosure 4: 
Operation SWANBUT. 
56 The guerrilla raids on 8 and 10 May were conducted by an estimated 150 guerrillas respectively: ADM 116/6222, 
HMS St. Brides Bay-Report of Proceedings, 28 April to 11 May, Appendix I, paras 10–22; the last raid on 17 May 
was conducted by 410 guerrillas: ADM 116/6222, HMS Sparrow-Report of Proceedings from 9 to 26 May 1953, 
Enclosure 4: Operation SWANBUT. 
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on the face of resistance. It is believed that their role of keeping large numbers of enemy 
troops deployed on the coast and of collecting intelligence would be better conducted by 
sticking to minor operations.57  
 
In fact, the ineffectiveness of the large-scale guerrilla raids was fully realised by the Blockade 
Commanders and the guerrillas during the last two years of co-operations. Due to the guerrillas’ 
relatively poor combat capability and equipment, their raids had largely focused on small sized 
attacks that maximised the element of surprise. Other than in recapturing islands, or performing 
rice raids which by nature required large numbers of troops, most raids used relatively small 
sized units. Hence to the blockade ships, supporting consecutive large-scale raids was regarded 
as a very unusual and largely ineffective commitment. 
 Regardless of active guerrilla raids, however, there was no clear increase in the intelligence 
supply from the guerrilla organisations. As HMS Mount Bay, who operated in the 1st PIR area, 
commented; ‘The reluctance of the PIR to disclose future operations […] to the CTU continues’, 
the US officers showed rather an uncooperative attitude in sharing their intelligence and future 
plans.58 As a single theatre-level agency which had taken the operational control of the guerrilla 
activity since late 1952, CCRAK’s regulation of intelligence dissemination to the western 
located naval forces seemed to be continued during 1953.  
 The lack of intelligence supply also applied to the guerrillas in the Haeju area. The CO of 
HMS Newcastle wrote on 3 May after his visit to Yonpyong-do, the island of the 5th PIR’s 
Headquarters that, ‘If the same energy and care is put into the operational side as has been put 
in to the administrative arrangements, the 5th PIR should become an excellent weapon.’59 He 
                                           
57 HMS St. Brides Bay-Report of Proceedings, 28 April to 11 May 1953, Appendix I, para. 20.  
58 ADM 116/6219, HMS Mounts Bay-Report of Proceedings from 8 to 27 April 1953, 27 April 1953, para. 11. 
59 ADM 116/6220, HMS Newcastle-Report of Proceedings, 18 April to 3 May 1953, HMS Newcastle, 3 May 
1953, para. 18. 
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went on to blame the American officers, who seemed more concerned about island cleaning 
than their main operations including intelligence supply.60  
 An interesting point was that, unlike the ships of Task Units, the pilots of TU 95.1.1 had 
continuously received large numbers of target intelligence reports during the spring of 1953. 
This fact was well documented by the operational reports of HMS Glory as follows:  
 
Since HMS Glory started operating in Korean waters an effort has been made to work up a 
close liaison with the Guerrillas […] Far more information is now being received from the 
Partisan as a result, and few targets are rejected, as results of strikes leave little doubt of their 
authenticity and value.61  
 
As most targets for the naval aircraft were troop concentrations or supplies on the mainland, 
the continued and satisfactory intelligence supply meant that there were large numbers of 
guerrilla activities in this area during the spring. Except for the conduct of large-scale raids, an 
almost similar situation, which had occurred amongst the Leopard on Chodo-Sokto area during 
1952, reoccurred in 1953 in the overall guerrilla areas. 
 The ORO study shows that the number of mainland guerrillas largely increased during their 
reorganisational period. In July 1952, there were an estimated 1,000 on the mainland, but this 
number increased to 1,618 by mid-February 1953.62 Significantly, reported activities of interior 
units increased by approximately 25 percent during the first three months of 1953.63 This meant 
that the guerrillas had conducted a large part of their activities, not on the inshore or coastal 
areas, which largely needed the blockade ships’ support, but on the mainland.  
 
                                           
60 Ibid.  
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pp. 3–4. 
62 Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 68. 
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It seems impossible to imagine that the guerrillas’ mainland-centric activities were purely 
decided by themselves. The Communists’ defensive build-up during the winter to counter the 
UN forces’ landing operation inevitably increased the danger of the guerrilla activities on the 
mainland. On top of that, the Communist Command directed additional measures to eliminate 
any clandestine activities in this area. They regarded the UN’s clandestine activities at that time, 
in particular intelligence gathering, as the UNC’s preparatory tasks for an impending landing 
operation.64 Thus, from February 1953, the Communists started ‘the Month of the Counter UN 
Agent’ along the coastal areas. In close relationship with the local Communist cadres and 
citizens, it required all of its defensive forces and security police in this area to conduct 
additional tasks to defend any infiltration and activity of these agents. According to the 
Communists’ records, as a result of these activities, they were able to capture sixty-six agents 
and 653 defectors between 1 and 10 March 1953.65 Under these circumstances, it is likely that 
the choice of increasing guerrilla mainland activities was via a directive from the higher 
command, and not by their own volition. 
 The guerrillas’ mainland-centric activities were more likely related to their organisational 
changes. After the decision in October of 1952 to increase guerrilla strength, an extension to 
their operational area was also decided. Therefore, as they were largely relieved of the burden 
of island defence on the west coast from late 1952, the guerrillas’ infiltration of the mainland 
became more actively directed. This direction was applied not only to the former Leopard, but 
also to the Wolfpack guerrillas.66    
 Subsequently, there was a general review of command objectives for this operation. It was in 
mid-January 1953 that FEC started their new plan for guerrilla deployment during that year. By  
                                           
64 The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) 
CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea, pp. 518, 564. 
65 Ibid., pp. 564-6. 
66 Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 64. 
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the direction of General Mark W. Clark, C-in-C, Far East, three plans were outlined to use 
guerrilla operations more actively and comprehensively. These operational plans covered two 
phases; the first, from 28 January to 15 March and the second, from 15 March to 15 September.  
 Phase I of the plan essentially directed the guerrillas to infiltrate the mainland, with further 
instruction for them to organise cellular groups in the Hwanghae Province. They were also 
required to conduct continuous harassment of the enemy, to cause the Communists to employ 
large numbers of troops as a counter-guerrilla operation. The plan then emphasised the defence 
of two islands, namely Kangwha-do and Kyodong-do, which had been garrisoned by 2nd PIR. 
These islands were located on the left side of the EUSAK, therefore this mission was intended 
to defend the EUSAK’s left flank.  
 Phase IIA, restated almost the same missions as those introduced in Phase I. The exception 
was an emphasis on increasing an operational area within the interior of North Korea. Both 
Phase I and IIA were based on the assumption that the EUSAK would continue an active 
defensive role. Phase IIB assumed the EUSAK general offensive from late summer.67  
 In addition to the above-mentioned plans, a number of special operations were also instructed 
during the first four months of 1953. For the purpose of conducting psychological warfare, a 
leaflet campaign was carried out. The guerrilla agents, therefore, distributed leaflets behind 
enemy lines to encourage defection amongst the North Koreans.68 Moreover, another special, 
very ambitious series of operations was directed by FEC, involving the objectives of 
assassinating Communist officials, penetrating POW camps and capturing MiG aircraft.69 
 An overlying prominent point of these plans, regardless of their phases, was that the higher 
command was consistently directing the guerrillas to infiltrate the mainland and conduct 
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operations there. Guerrilla activities on the inshore and coastal areas were largely neglected, 
except for the defence of Kangwha-do and Kyodong-do, located out of the blockade ships’ main 
operational area, and raiding operations to employ more enemy troops from the front line.  
 Thus these direct instructions from FEC meant that each guerrilla organisation was strongly 
pressured in relation to infiltrating the mainland. With the CCRAK’s continued regulation of 
intelligence dissemination, FEC’s new guerrilla operational plans largely caused a lack of 
naval-guerrilla co-operation, and in particular, a lack in the supply of intelligence for the 
blockade ships. It also explains why there were continued large-scale guerrilla raids regardless 
of their poor performances. The guerrilla raids were encouraged by FEC to relieve pressure on 
the front line, and probably, the larger the scale of such raids, the greater the approval, as it 
might drag greater numbers from the Communist front line. Regardless of the Blockade 
Commanders’ intention, and possibly irrespective of the plans of the guerrillas themselves, 
during the spring of 1953, their co-operation became largely inactive. 
 
7.3 The Impending Armistice Agreement and the Preparation of Operation PANDORA 
 
Until early 1953, the Truce Negotiation had reached stalemate due to a dispute on the issue of 
Prisoners of War (POWs) exchanges. From the early stage of the truce talks, the Communists 
consistently insisted that the exchange of POWs should be conducted based on Article 118 of 
the Geneva Convention. This states that ‘Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated 
without delay after a cessation of hostilities’.70 Thus this meant that all POWs of both sides 
should be exchanged soon after the signing of an armistice agreement without any further 
                                           
70 Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, Part IV. Section II, 
Article 118: Release and repatriation, p. 136. 
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condition. The UNC, however, argued that this exchange should be carried out based on the 
principle of voluntary repatriation, due to the fact that large numbers of Communist prisoners 
captured by UN Forces did not want repatriation. The UNC thought that prisoners should have 
a free personal choice to return to their original unit or to join an opposing unit after the cease-
fire. 71  Because of this dispute in terms of POWs exchange, and voluntary or enforced 
repatriation, the Truce Negotiation recessed from 8 October 1952.72 
 It was in early March 1953 that a turning point was reached in this totally stagnated negotiation. 
On 5 March, the Soviet Premier Stalin suddenly died of a cerebral hemorrhage. His death 
directly influenced the Communists’ stance on the truce talks. Due to internal problems 
following the death of Stalin, the new Kremlin leaders did not want to continue the war.73 
Chinese leaders also readily agreed with the Kremlin’s stance. In fact, as the economic situation 
in China had grown worse owing to the prolonged involvement in the Korean War, Peking also 
hoped to get the negotiations going again.74 Needless to say, the Pyongyang Government, 
whom had expressed the wish for immediate cease-fire since early 1952 to its Communist 
partners, welcomed this decision.75   
 On 28 March, the Communist Command announced that they were willing to exchange the 
sick and wounded prisoners either before resuming the armistice negotiation or prior to the 
signing of a cease-fire agreement.76 This was in response to the UNC’s request of 22 February 
1953, requiring an immediate exchange of the sick and injured prisoners. Accordingly, on 6 
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April, both sides resumed the meeting at Panmunjom for the so-called ‘Little Switch’, and they 
agreed that this repatriation would commence from 20 April.77 Thus, up to 3 May, the UNC 
released 6,670 POWs, and in return, the Communist side repatriated 684 POWs. 78 
Simultaneously, both sides agreed to resume plenary sessions from 26 April. By early June, the 
prolonged debate regarding the repatriation of POWs reached an agreement. The only critical 
issue to be settled before the signing of the truce talks was a renegotiation of the military 
demarcation line to reflect changes in the military situation since November 1951.79 At this 
stage, for both sides, an armistice agreement seemed highly probable.  
 
Regardless of an impending cease-fire, there seemed little change in the front-line situation. 
During this period, the UN forces had to continue an active defence against a Communist 
summer offensive that commenced from mid-May.80  However, at least to the UN Forces 
operating on the west coast, the increased possibility of an imminent armistice agreement forced 
them to shift their attentions to pertinent post-war questions, such as the preparation for the 
evacuation from the northern islands.   
 As mentioned in Chapter six, as a result of an agreement regarding the territorial water 
demarcation line on 3 February 1952, the UNC mainly withdrew from the friendly held islands 
on the western and northern side of the Hwanghae and Kyong-gi Provincial line. The exception 
being non-withdrawal from five islands; namely, Paengyong-do, Techong-do, Sochong-do, 
Yonpyong-do and U-do. This evacuation had to be completed within five days after the signing 
                                           
77 Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. III, pp. 529–32. 
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of the armistice agreement.81 Those to be evacuated included the previously defended and 
garrisoned islands of Chodo and Sokto, and seventeen minor islands which were held by the 
guerrillas and which, in many cases, held inhabitants and refugees who wished to leave before 
the Communists took over. It was estimated that a total lift of 45,000 people, including guerrilla 
forces, and 2,300 tons of material, would need mobilisation within a short period of time.82 
This situation particularly caused drastic operational changes and demands for two groups; that 
is TG 95.1 who had to plan and control this large-scale evacuation and the guerrillas who were 
forced to evacuate.   
 To the Blockade Commanders, completing this large-scale withdrawal within five days was 
not an easy task, and they therefore prepared an evacuation plan from early February 1952. As 
the UNC decided to withdraw from the majority of islands on the rear side of enemy territory, 
the CO of HMS Ceylon, CTG 95.12, conducted a brief investigation to identify possible 
evacuation problems. 83  By late March 1952, a draft evacuation plan named Operation 
PANDORA and its complementary local plan TRIX were prepared.84 However, except for 
some minor corrections in the draft version and a meeting to check its progress, there had been 
relatively little concern paid to this plan due to continued enemy activities on the west coast 
and scepticism regarding an early armistice agreement.85  
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 It was in early May 1953 when this operation became imminent. After the decision on ‘Little 
Switch’, a conference was held between the commanders of PIRs and the Blockade 
Commanders to determine immediate requirements in the event of an armistice. 86 
Subsequently, during the patrol period of HMS Birmingham as CTU 95.1.2 between 6 and 20 
May, an evacuation inventory for all islands concerned was recorded covering equipment and 
personnel.87 During the latter part of May, several discussions with the PIR Commanders and 
Garrison Commanders were carried out to make up the detail of the local evacuation plan.88 As 
a result of continued meetings and co-ordination with friendly forces in this area, on 1 June, the 
final draft plan was produced.89     
 With Operation PANDORA an impending prospect, the Blockade Commanders needed to be 
fully preoccupied with this large-scale plan after mid-May 1953; this had little in common with 
the previous tasks of the blockade and island defence. However, the ‘evacuation clock’ moved 
quicker than originally supposed during June.    
 On 5 June, the UNC announced an instruction to the effect that ‘the armistice terms forbade 
any civilian to cross to the UN side of the armistice line who had not been resident south of it 
prior to 25 June 1950’.90 Effectively, this directive meant that the evacuation of the guerrillas 
and their dependants, refugees, and all the inhabitants who wished to move, had to be completed 
before the signing of the cease-fire. Therefore, an earlier than originally expected evacuation 
was commenced.  
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The first evacuation began in the night of 9 June. With the signing of the POWs agreement 
of 8 June making a possible armistice imminent, the Commanding General of CCRAK 
(Brigadier General Stuart, USA) directed each PIRs Headquarters to begin the evacuation, 
starting from the outer islands.91 On the 10 June, the 6th PIR, located on Chodo-Sokto and 
further north, began to withdraw using their own boats. The next day, the 1st PIR in the 
Paengyong-do area, and the 5th PIR in the Haeju area, also started to leave their small islands. 
Simultaneously refugees and inhabitants were also moved. Initially, they were instructed to 
gather on the larger islands such as Paengyong-do, Techong-do and Yonpyong-do, and this first 
phase mobilisation was conducted within a short period of time.92 Therefore, by 16 June, other 
than the so called ‘stay-behinds’ and the small patrol units assigned to observe enemy activity, 
the guerrillas were completely evacuated from the outer islands.93  
 Although this evacuation was conducted by fishing junks under the command of PIR 
Commanders and LSTs, all loading and landing of individual craft needed to be closely 
supervised by each Task Unit ship. Therefore, all of the ships of TG 95.1 needed to be involved 
in this evacuation. For this, CTG 95.1, Admiral Clifford, stayed on the west coast and assumed 
the duties of Officer in Tactical Command west coast to establish a proper controlled 
operation.94  
 
During the same period, the operational direction of CCRAK in terms of guerrilla deployment, 
also drastically changed. This was to prepare for the post-war period. Thus, in late April, a 
directive was issued for CCRAK to stop recruiting guerrillas, and also to streamline their 
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numbers by getting rid of any incompetents.95 Subsequently, their command objective was also 
modified, in that they were not told to execute the Phase IIA plan, which required mainland 
infiltration and harassing the enemy. Instead, the plan was to exercise more effort in placing a 
small number of covert groups in Communist territory in a hope of retaining ‘stay-behind’ 
assets after the signing of an armistice.96 Therefore, groups of volunteer guerrillas from each 
PIR were selected. Consequently, on 26 May, the first ‘stay-behind’ groups of 124 guerrillas 
began their operation, and for the same purpose, an additional 82 guerrillas infiltrated almost 
two months later for post-truce contingencies.97 
 However, for the guerrilla organisations, the most significant change to their activities was the 
impending evacuation from their islands. As preparing for the large-scale withdrawal became 
the primary task, the guerrillas were largely diverted from their main missions. Moreover, these 
withdrawals from the smaller islands needed to be conducted mainly by fishing junks lent by 
the local civilians as a large number of guerrilla bases were in inshore areas that severely 
restricted the approach of friendly LSTs and blockade ships. Therefore, each PIR had to 
commandeer a large number of ships within a short period of time.98 An immediate logistic 
supply for a large-scale withdrawal was also needed. In particular, because of the day-to-day 
uncertainty of an armistice, the lack of adequate water for relocated guerrillas needed to be 
solved prior to starting the evacuation operation. Because these requirements needed to be 
procured by the American officers in charge, greater attention was paid to preparing for the 
evacuation, rather than performing their normal activities.99           
                                           
95 By May 1953, the guerrillas’ strength reached its highest at 22,227, and it was decided to decrease this to 20,000 
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 In the course of this preparation, the guerrillas’ inactivity became very apparent. As mentioned 
in Chapter 5, for guerrillas originally from North Korea, the prospect of an early truce meant 
that their voluntary war would terminate without any definite outcome. Their post-war 
disposition was also obviously of great concern in that there was no clarified agreement between 
the UNC and the ROK Government regarding their future legal status. 100  Therefore, the 
commencement of preparing an evacuation plan understandably meant these men experienced 
another significant drop in morale. This fact could be seen in the ORO study as follows: 
 
In this period the imminence of the cease-fire and the June evacuation of forward islands, 
along with the ambiguity of partisan status, led to serious concern about partisan morale. In 
late June partisan headquarters requested special morale surveys. The number of criminal 
incidents, the number of AWOLs [Absent Without Official Leave] and desertions, the number 
of complaints from partisan leaders, and the number of partisans refusing to participate in 
raids were considered serious problems.101  
 
This situation caused a rapid decrease in guerrilla activities. According to the ORO study, even 
though their total strength was at its greatest, with around 22,000, an approximated 30 percent 
decline in activity was reported.102 Needless to say, a lack of co-operation with the Naval 
Forces was also continued. Even the naval gunfire support, which had continued during the 
previous period, also largely decreased.103      
 
During this transitional period, the Blockade Commanders’ main concerns in their relationship 
with the guerrillas also significantly changed. Unlike on the previous occasion, they paid 
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relatively little attention to the guerrilla activities and their intelligence. Therefore, even though 
there was continuous guerrilla intelligence regarding a high possibility of enemy invasion on 
Sunwi-do and Yongmae-do in early June, there was no gunfire support provision made for the 
guerrillas.104 The Naval forces’ main concern seemed clearly directed toward the evacuation 
plan. 
 Moreover, their perception of the guerrillas also drastically changed. For a long time, the 
guerrilla had been regarded by the Blockade Commanders as unreliable partners. However, as 
there was no real alternative to support such naval force missions like the ‘west coast blockade’ 
or ‘island defence’, they had to continue close co-operation with the guerrillas. Facing an 
imminent truce and preparing Operation PANDORA, however, the usefulness of these irregular 
forces largely decreased and their unreliability became more prominent. To the Commanders 
of TG 95.1, the guerrillas were largely perceived as armed former North Koreans who might 
resist the evacuation.  
 In fact, from the early stage of planning the large-scale evacuation, the Blockade Commanders 
were worried that the guerrillas would become ‘armed bandits’, ‘pirates’ or ‘persons carrying 
on with their present activities’, and this provoked unfortunate incidents stemming from this 
belief.105 Therefore, the Blockade Commanders requested the guerrillas’ disarmament once the 
armistice agreement was signed, and the American officers in charge consented to this.106 
 It follows that, in the course of conducting the preliminary evacuation of mid-June, the 
Blockade Commanders’ main fear of guerrilla resistance became very palpable. Hence, in 
situations where no proper security forces existed to suppress such contingencies, the Blockade 
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Commanders’ approach was very cautious in dealing with the guerrilla evacuation.107 Rather 
than forcing them to comply with the UNC’s decision of evacuation, American officers and the 
Blockade Commanders explained to the guerrilla leaders about the withdrawal plan in order to 
convince them.108 The following records clearly showed the Blockade Commanders’ approach 
to the guerrillas when there was resistance.      
 
In the evening of 14th June, lifts were assembled at Sosuap-to and Taesuap-to and it was 
reported that, though the latter island was quiet, the Sosuap-to garrison was in a disturbed 
condition — vehemently refusing to consider evacuation. I ordered the Naval beach party to 
be withdrawn to prevent any incidents and the same facility was offered to United States 
personnel, who however elected to remain. On 15th June arrangements were made to evacuate 
Taesuap-to, and although the partisan loaded their arms into their boats and had dismantled 
their defences, they declined to move until ordered by their leader, who was absent….. 
Accordingly I landed early pm and a conference was assembled of the island leaders, or their 
representatives, at the Headquarters of the 5th PIR. It was carefully explained to them that 
they were to remain in being on the islands further south, that their dependents were to come 
with them [...] Evacuation was then agreed upon.109 
   
In particular, the CO of HMS Newcastle’s above-mentioned comments of ‘I ordered the Naval 
beach party to be withdrawn to prevent any incidents’ clearly shows the Blockade Commanders 
position toward the guerrillas during this period. Facing the impending armistice, their former 
operational partner became potentially a very troublesome one that may disturb the naval forces’ 
final mission in the Korean War.  
 Even in the course of conducting this evacuation, however, it became clear that the 
guerrillas still remained as one of the naval forces’ main concerns. As the largest of the 
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friendly forces to be evacuated from the northern islands, the success of Operation PANDORA 
still depended on these irregular forces’ co-operation. 
 
7.4 Delayed Armistice and Redeployment of the Guerrillas  
 
To the ROK Government, that the conditions of the truce had been progressed without their 
prior consultation was unacceptable. In particular, as to the agreed repatriation of the POWs, 
this Government maintained their position that ‘the anti-Communist non-repatriates should be 
released upon the armistice agreement’. 110  This directly countered the agreement on the 
exchange of POWs, which stated that, rather than release them immediately, those prisoners 
who had not been repatriated should be delivered to the Neutral Nations Repatriation 
Commission, thus officially allowing the Communists’ representatives access to them and the 
opportunity to convert them to Communism.111  
 To express their opposition to this controversial armistice condition, the ROK Government 
decided to release anti-Communist prisoners without any consultation with the UNC. On 18 
June, by the direction of President Syngman Rhee, a total of 27,388 anti-Communist prisoners 
were released from UN prison camps.112 The Communist Command promptly reacted by 
calling off a planned staff officer meeting for detailed work on the demiltarised zone. This 
incident immediately diminished any prospect of an early armistice.113 
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As the armistice was eventually postponed from 18 June, the UNC instructed the reoccupation 
of the outer islands to prevent them falling into enemy hands.114 Therefore, steps were taken 
to redeploy a small number of guerrillas to the outer islands. They were provided with boats so 
that they could make patrols and withdrawals freely.115  
 Regardless of the guerrilla redeployment, however, the Blockade Commanders’ main concern 
was still directed toward the evacuation issue. Although most of guerrillas and their dependents 
had been withdrawn by mid-June, there were large numbers of refugees, inhabitants and 
equipment still remaining on the islands. Therefore, as CTG 95.1 wrote in his report, stating 
that ‘Though the armistice was eventually postponed […] the evacuation during the preliminary 
period continued, and this did much to relieve final task’, the Blockade Commanders regarded 
this time as an additional preparatory opportunity for the main evacuation.116 Hence, during 
this period, they continued Operation PANDORA with a slow tempo.    
 This directive overrode any concern with guerrilla activities. This fact is substantiated by the 
CTG 95.1’s report of proceedings covering the period between 1 June and 7 August. 
Interestingly, in this report, there were no comments in regard to guerrilla activity, other than 
their evacuation from the outer islands during the preliminary period. Although there were 
several remarkable guerrilla activities conducted during this period, including their 
redeployment and co-operation with naval forces to recapture several islands, these were 
omitted in his report.117 Considering the fact that the guerrilla activities and their co-operation 
with the blockade ships was one of the main recorded topics of this report, it appears that any 
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280 
 
concerns over their activities were considered insignificant, by the Blockade Commanders, in 
relation to the evacuation.118  
 However, the continued progress of the evacuation did not mean that the Blockade 
Commanders were uncooperative in guerrilla activities. In fact, right after the redeployment of 
the guerrillas, the CO of HMS Newcastle re-constituted CTU 95.1.2 to resume the regular patrol 
of all previously held islands.119 This meant that the blockade ships were ready to conduct co-
operation with the guerrillas when required. Since the evacuation of each PIRs’ Headquarters, 
however, the former co-operation system had largely regressed. As there was no system 
remaining on the northern islands to co-ordinate guerrilla activities, this task had to be 
conducted by the Island Defence Commander, who unfortunately was not in close touch with 
the guerrillas. Therefore, even the most simple communication task with the guerrillas became 
difficult. As the CO of HMS Cossack commented, ‘the former arrangement has lapsed’.120 The 
two groups’ relationship largely regressed to that which had existed in early 1951. 
 The guerrillas also seemed less active. This might have been not only due to deteriorated 
morale, but also due to the reduced number of guerrillas redeployed and their sole purpose of 
temporally securing the islands. Therefore, except for a few intelligence reports regarding an 
imminent enemy threat, there were no others from the guerrillas. 121  Even the targeting 
intelligence, which had been satisfactorily supplied to the CTU 95.1.1, also largely decreased. 
This fact is well documented by the CO of USS Bairoko stating that ‘The evacuation of the PIR 
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from positions, on friendly held islands along the coast, considerably reduced the source of 
fresh and accurate target information’.122 
 If there had been active Communist activities to recapture the empty islands, equally, there 
might have been a return to active co-operation with the guerrillas, as they reoccupied the outer 
islands. However, the Communists’ will to recapture the islands was not very strong. 
Immediately after the guerrilla evacuation from the outer islands, Sunwi-do and Yukto were 
occupied by the Communist Forces. However, except for the defensive reinforcement of these 
two islands, the Communists remained quiet; their guns did not fire on any UN ships, nor did they 
show any activity in the coastal area.123 They deemed it was not worthwhile to recapture the 
small islands, considering it likely that they would return into their hands in the near future. 
Therefore, the guerrillas’ redeployment to the outer islands, other than the two above mentioned 
islands, was conducted quite peacefully.  
 The guerrilla raids to recapture them were also less than enthusiastic. The guerrillas from 1st 
PIR conducted raids under naval and air support to recapture Sunwi-do on 29 June and Yukto 
on 2 July respectively. However, faced with strong defensive enemy positions, they decided to 
withdraw. Following this, except for several gunfire harassments, no additional raids to 
recapture these islands were conducted.124 Considering their operation during 1952 involving 
continual bombardments and harassment up until the recapturing of the islands, their activities 
seemed little more than a temporary stay prior to imminent withdrawal. 
 Between late June and mid-July, the delayed armistice agreement gave one more opportunity 
for co-operation between the ships of TG 95.1 and the redeployed guerrillas. In fact, it was the 
last viable instance that the two groups were potentially able to conduct co-operation during the 
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whole of the Korean War. However, the shared belief that the armistice was just temporally 
postponed made it impossible to retrieve any effective level previously attained. With the 
inactivity of the Communist forces in this area, both sides were preparing post-war plans based 
on their own priorities, and this last opportunity for co-operation passed without a fruitful result.     
   
7.5 The Signing of the Cease-fire and After 
 
Right after the release of the anti-Communist prisoners of war on 18 June, the US Government 
decided to dispatch the Assistant Secretary of State immediately to South Korea. This was to 
persuade the ROK Government not to further endanger the armistice.125 Therefore, between 
late June and early July 1953, conferences between the ROK and the US continued.  
 It was on 11 July that the US representatives were able to draw up a final agreement with the 
ROK Government for a truce. By promising to accept large parts of the ROK’s requirements, 
including i) the signing of the mutual defence pact guaranteeing a prompt and automatic 
American commitment upon Communists’ reinvasion, ii) the provision of long-term economic 
assistance and iii) continued support for ROK military reinforcements, the US representatives 
honoured the ROK Government’s pledge not to disrupt the armistice.126  
 Simultaneously, the UNC sent a letter to the Communist Command requesting that the truce 
talks were resumed and seeking assurance of the ROK Government’s co-operation in signing 
the armistice agreement. As the Communist side responded positively to this suggestion, from 
10 July, the plenary conference reconvened at Panmunjom.127 In particular, from 19 July, the 
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Communists showed a co-operative attitude for an immediate cease-fire, and delegates started 
to discuss the final preparations for the truce. 128  Finally, on the morning of 27 July, the 
armistice was signed with a cease-fire to be effective at 22:00 the same day.129       
 
On 25 July, the CO of HMS Birmingham received a message from the Naval Command at 
Sasebo indicating that the signing of a truce agreement was imminent.130 It was the signal for 
the final west coast island evacuation; the Commonwealth Naval Forces’ main consideration 
since May 1953. Since June, there were no substantial changes to the numbers of the islands 
that had to be evacuated. The only change in the finalised armistice terms was that the period 
allowed for evacuation from behind the truce lines was increased from five to ten days, until 6 
August. Regardless of this modified term, however, it was decided to keep the original five-day 
period because of LST commitments.131  
 Because of the limited time for the evacuation of the disaffected North Koreans to the south, 
the withdrawal of these redeployed guerrillas and refugees from the outlying islands was 
ordered to be completed first. The final evacuation was very easily and smoothly carried out, 
with the small groups of guerrillas on the outer islands able to use their own transport. It was 
also aided by the fact that the main body of guerrillas and refugees, who were the most 
troublesome, had already left. Only the more disciplined with arms remained, but under proper 
leadership. As four LSTs had been retained for this operation, the evacuation was expected to 
be completed within five days.132  
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 Under the direction of HMS Birmingham, the operation proceeded smoothly. The evacuation 
started on 26 July with guerrilla elements in the Haeju area. The guerrillas in the Paengyong-
do and Chodo-Sokto area were also evacuated by 27 July. Therefore, before the armistice’s 
effective time, all of the outlying guerrillas had been completely evacuated.133 Subsequently, 
the regular unit, with their associated equipment, commenced their evacuation from Sokto and 
Chodo, the two vital islands which were to be handed over to the Communist side.134   
 By 1 August, it was reported that the evacuation of the west coast islands was completed.135 
With the completion of PANDORA, the ships of TG 95.1’s major mission during the Korean 
War was finished. Their relationship of almost two and a half years with the guerrillas also 
neared closure. 
 
After the completion of the evacuation, HMS Birmingham and HMCS Iroquis had to remain in 
the Chodo area to provide radar surveillance for two control officers from Tactical Air Defence 
Centre in Chodo. They were evacuated on 6 August.136 Subsequently, HMS Ocean took over 
as the Officer in Tactical Command. In order to remind the Communists that UN naval forces 
were still on the alert, during August, air and surface patrols were continued outside the three-
mile limit of the Communist coast. She conducted three more patrols in Korean waters up until 
16 October.137 
 Regardless of the signing of an armistice, the British Commonwealth Naval forces remained 
within a close distance of the Korean coastal waters until mid-November 1953. This force 
included an aircraft carrier, cruiser and ships of the destroyer and frigate squadron. As there 
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was no recurrence of hostilities, Rear-Admiral Clifford decided to haul down his flag as Flag-
Officer, 2nd in Command, Far East Station, at Hong Kong on 18 November 1953. With this 
event, the deployment of the British Commonwealth Naval forces in the Korean War was 
considered at an end.138   
 
As a result of the evacuation, the guerrillas’ co-operation with the Naval Forces terminated. 
However, their operations continued by early 1954. Owing to the possibility of the Communist 
side’s violation of the Armistice agreement, the UNC decided to operate the guerrilla forces for 
some further time.139 Therefore, rather than breaking up these irregulars, a provisional unit was 
to be made to administer and to control them. Based on an agreement between the FEC and the 
ROK Government, on 16 August, the 8250 ROK AU was formed under the direct control of the 
ROK Minister of National Defence.140  
 During the autumn and the winter of 1953, most of the guerrillas continued their mission on 
Kanghwa-do and Kyodong-do; two islands on the left side of the EUSAK. This was to defend 
the ground forces’ left flank. Concurrently, they were trained to initiate unconventional warfare 
by amphibious and airborne operations against the North Korean targets. Several hundred 
guerrillas, who were ordered to infiltrate North Korea from late May 1953 for a ‘stay-behind’ 
mission, also continued their activities to recruit underground members. 141  Although this 
covert mission was officially closed by late February 1954, the guerrillas reported back that 
they had successfully recruited around 600 underground members amongst the North 
Koreans.142   
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 The de facto breakup of this guerrilla unit was decided in early 1954. On 8 January 1954, the 
ROK government issued an order which required the 8250 ROK AU to be integrated into the 
ROK Army up until 24 February 1954. 143  According to a direction known as Operation 
QUICKSILVER, guerrillas with two years of service in the Korean War or who were 
inappropriate for military service were to be honourably discharged and given some incentives, 
such as blankets and 90kg of rice.144 Others were ordered to be enlisted in the ROK army for 
at least two years. They were given an army rank based on their previous career and position in 
the guerrilla organisation.145  
 As a result of this decision, by early March, 9,657 guerrillas were transferred into the ROK 
Army.146 In fact, large numbers of former North Korean guerrillas wanted to continue their 
unconventional operations in regular ROK organisations. As a group of fighters who 
experienced the guerrilla operations against the Communist forces, the guerrilla members 
wanted to continue special operations, as a counter-insurgence force against the Communist 
guerrillas in South Korea or an intelligence agent unit operating on the islands such as 
Paengyong-do.147  
 Contrary to the guerrillas’ hope, however, they were directed to be broken up and scattered 
throughout the ROK Army. To the ROK government, they were no more than unreliable North 
Korean refugees or irregulars who were ‘easy to desert and join bandit groups’.148 Thus, it was 
ordered to place ‘no more than five to seven’ former guerrillas in any ROK Army company and 
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that they should be from different guerrilla units.149 Due to the ROK Army’s suspicions about 
their motives, the guerrillas had to be scattered as individual regardless of their experience or 
careers. With this decision made, the anti-Communist guerrillas’ operation as a voluntary 
irregular force in the Korean War ended.  
 
7.6 Concluding Comments 
 
From late 1952, the Communist forces’ threat against the UN-held islands on the west coast 
was largely relieved. As the guerrilla organisations and the Communist forces in this area used 
the following winter season as a preparatory period for future operations, following this, 
operational inactivity prevailed in the west. With the advent of spring, when the guerrilla 
activity recommenced, however, the naval-guerrilla relationship significantly changed once 
again. 
 As FEC decided to use the guerrilla forces more actively in breaking the current stalemate of 
the cease-fire agreement, most guerrillas were directed to infiltrate the mainland more actively 
and conduct operations there. Therefore, except for several amphibious raids, guerrilla activities 
on the inshore and coastal areas were largely neglected, and this immediately caused a lack of 
co-operation with the blockade naval forces. A similar situation to that involving Leopard in 
the Chodo-Sokto area in 1952 was occurring again on a much larger scale. Also, this clearly 
revealed an underlying limitation of the American guerrilla organisations as a co-operation 
partner; that of very limited viability for sustainable close co-operation due to different 
objectives from the naval forces.  




 From early May 1953, as the signing of the truce became more imminent, the Blockade 
Commanders’ main concerns also had to be directed toward post-war preparation, that of the 
evacuation from the northern islands. As this new mission had little in common with the 
previous relationship with the guerrilla organisations, the naval forces’ heavy commitment in 
this evacuation task resulted in a more distant relationship between the two groups. Also, in the 
course of conducting this final mission, it became clearer that even after almost two years of 
co-operation, the guerrillas were still perceived as unreliable by the naval forces. 
 Faced with an impending armistice agreement, the two groups’ relationship, which had been 
maintained during the large part of the Korean War, naturally and rapidly disintegrated. And, 
with the signing of the armistice agreement and subsequent completion of evacuation, this 
relationship came to an end without any lingering connections. Despite such a futile conclusion, 
however, it was clear that even in the course of conducting the final evacuation mission, as 
the largest forces to be moved, the guerrillas remained one of the naval forces’ main concerns. 
This speaks volumes about the influence of the guerrilla forces on the naval operation. That is 
why, in spite of little attention in the current historiography, the latter part of naval operation 





Conclusion: Compelled Co-Operation with Unreliable Partners 
 
 
Since the publication of the James A. Field’s History of the US naval operations during the 
Korean War, perhaps, the academic analysis of UN naval operation during the Korean War has 
been dominated by this simplified description: ‘a year of violent and dramatic action’ followed 
by two years of ‘deadlock’.1 Due to this tedious and unspectacular image of static war, the 
latter part of UN naval forces’ operation has received relatively little academic attention 
compared to the earlier period.     
 It is undeniable that the latter part of UN naval operations in Korea was essentially a static 
war in that most fleets in Korean waters had to be engaged in various naval tasks within each 
designated operational area. As Admiral Scott-Moncrieff wrote in late 1951, ‘This loss of naval 
mobility’ was ‘a feature of this war’, this static image was one of the representative characteristics in 
describing the last two years of UN naval operation.2 However, the historiography overlooked the 
heterogeneity of naval operations between the east and west which was clearly revealed within the 
frame of ‘static war’. Therefore, the historiography fails to pay proper attention to the actual 
features and value of the west coast naval campaign.  
 What made the western naval forces’ operation more distinctive and important was the 
emergence of the several thousand of anti-Communist guerrillas and the following naval-
guerrilla co-operation. As the largest guerrilla forces controlled by the UNC during the Korean 
War, the start of their activity and the subsequent development of naval-guerrilla relationships 
naturally made the naval forces operation very sensitive to any guerrilla activities. This 
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consequently caused the western naval forces operation to be more complex, but more effective. 
In addition, this naval-guerrilla co-operation system became a key role in carrying out the 
various naval tasks in the west. Nevertheless, although often difficult and frustrating, working 
with the irregular groups was both strategically and operationally essential to the west coast 
naval campaign, and this naval-guerrilla relationship was of major importance during the latter 
part of the naval operation. This study has sought to show that for a more realistic picture of the 
latter part of the UN naval operation conducted on the west coast, it is necessary to examine it 
in terms of the naval-guerrilla relationships.   
 
To the Commanders of the western naval forces, the anti-Communist guerrillas on the west 
coast had been regarded as unreliable partners. This largely originated from the nature of the 
guerrillas; they were former North Korean irregulars who spontaneously gathered for their own 
objectives. Therefore, there had been the perception of doubtful reliability in respect of this 
irregular forces’ activity from the early stage of the relationship. However, owing to the 
intelligence-related problems which are mentioned in Chapter 3, it was imperative for the Naval 
Commanders to have a close relationship with these irregulars. Notwithstanding fundamental 
problems, the guerrillas’ potential value as a local intelligence team for the naval operation 
seemed highly desirable. Moreover, their amphibious raids, supported by naval air and gunfire 
support, also seemed very advantageous in that they would cause a large deployment of enemy 
troops from the front line. Therefore, from mid-February 1951, the naval blockade ships’ 
relationship with the guerrillas commenced, albeit in a tentative and prudent manner.   
 Notably, the naval forces’ co-operation with the guerrillas drastically gained some momentum; 
in particular after the establishment of the Leopard Headquarters. As this American 
organisation successfully reorganised large numbers of guerrillas under their unified command 
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and control, the Blockade Commanders’ initial worries of close co-operation with these 
irregulars were largely relieved. Due to this guerrilla reorganisation, the Blockade Naval Forces 
accomplished a very satisfactory co-operation system during the first four months. As 
previously quoted, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff’s comments confirmed that it was ‘producing 
excellent results all round’.3 Although there were understandably continuing difficulties in 
controlling any un-notified guerrilla activity and involvement in their privately motivated 
conflict, the benefits seemed much greater than the disadvantages. Based on the deepened naval 
dependence on the Leopard organisation, this unique naval-irregular relationship became one 
of the most important and distinguishing parts of the west coast naval operation within a short 
period of time. As this co-operation started without any confidence of the partner’s reliability, 
however, a potential risk remained in their relationship.     
 As for the American guerrilla organisation, which needed naval support for more effective 
operations, a close relationship with the naval blockade ships was welcomed. Significantly it 
was the EUSAK Headquarters, the parent organisation of these guerrillas, which initiated the 
request for this naval co-operation. However, its primary purpose did not directly coincide with 
the Blockade Commanders’ objective that this organisation would become a valuable 
intelligence source and act as both controller and co-ordinator of all guerrilla activities. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the Leopard Headquarters’ main purpose in the guerrilla reorganisation 
was to provide support for the EUSAK’s premised offensive in spring 1951. Therefore, this 
guerrilla organisation’s close relationship with the blockade ships, based on its initial plan, was 
intended to be maintained for only a limited duration of time. Through any directive from the 
EUSAK, the Leopard was programmed to shift their activity from the early phase of 
                                           




intelligence gathering and sabotage missions to a counter-offensive operation. In terms of viable 
sustainability of the co-operation with the Naval Blockade Forces, this American organisation 
was also fundamentally an unreliable partner.  
 It was thus somewhat of accidental result of the EUSAK’s delayed inauguration of counter-
offensive, which radically developed the two groups’ co-operation during the early days. Due 
to the CCF’s Spring Offensive between April and May 1951, and the subsequent UNC’s 
consideration of truce talks, the possibility of a planned UN offensive was remote. This situation 
invoked the EUSAK Headquarters’ towards gradual indifference to the guerrilla activity, and 
ironically, this indifference expedited the development of co-operation between the two groups. 
As the EUSAK did not direct additional guerrilla activity obligations, the Leopard was able to 
maintain the first phase of their operational plan, and this naturally allowed great scope for close 
co-operation with the friendly naval forces.  
 From such tentative beginnings, there was a real problem that the two groups’ relationships with 
each other might deteriorate operationally, exasperated by the higher command’s instruction to 
use the guerrillas for special purposes. With the problems accrued from the very nature of the 
guerrillas, this underlying limitation significantly influenced the drastic change in the two groups’ 
co-operation during the remaining operational period in Korea.  
 
The first crisis in the two groups’ relationship emerged immediately following the start of the 
truce talks in mid-July 1951. As for the guerrillas, the sole motivation was to liberate their home 
towns from the Communists. This was the only reason for their spontaneous decision to join the 
Leopard organisation and to conduct hazardous activities behind enemy lines. The decision for 
truce talks, therefore, became a significant turning point in Leopard guerrillas’ activity. In 
particular, news of the truce talks seriously undermined their will to fight and created wavering 
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allegiance. In addition, due to the increasing concern over their uncertain future, a large number 
of guerrillas exchanged their earlier lofty motivations to that of personal gain; thus this, in essence, 
increased their conduct of ‘private war’. The truce talks issue clearly revealed and intensified the 
guerrillas’ underlying problems, which had previously been somewhat overlooked by the friendly 
naval forces during the first four months of the successful co-operation period.   
 Undoubtedly, this situation resulted in growing scepticism amongst the Naval Blockade 
Commanders regarding the reliability of the guerrillas. In fact, from late July, they had 
experienced various situations which clearly showed the danger of co-operation with the 
guerrillas. After witnessing guerrillas in the ‘Taewha-do Incident’, an early example of wavering 
allegiance at least to the Blockade Commanders, their distrust of the guerrillas increased, and by 
late August they were convinced that double agents existed amongst the Leopard guerrillas. 
Increasing dissatisfaction over poor Leopard intelligence, their growing propensity for ‘private 
war’, and imprudent ‘cry wolf’ scenarios all intensified the Blockade Commanders’ 
disappointment in guerrilla involvement. Decisively, after sensing the new Leopard 
Headquarters’ inadequate ability to control their agents, the Blockade Commanders’ distrust of 
this organisation reached a peak. 
 Due to the on-going problems of reliability, the Commanders of the British Naval Task 
Group decided to discontinue any direct communication with the local guerrilla agents. They 
also treated any information from them with a certain level of scepticism. Therefore, the early 
successful co-operation system, once established, was largely wiped out within four months 
from the start of the truce talks. And, the challenges emerging from inside the guerrilla 
organisation resulted in inactiveness, ineffectiveness and even danger in the western naval forces’ 




However, regardless of the Blockade Commanders’ perception of the guerrillas, from 
November 1951, the Naval Task Group was required to establish an even closer relationship 
with this unreliable guerrilla organisation. As the friendly held islands on the west coast 
became used as UN Delegation bargaining counters at the cease-fire negotiations from late October, 
to rule out any advantage for the UNC in the negotiations, the Communist forces initiated an 
assault against the friendly held islands. 
 With a radical change in the war situation on the west coast, the defence of the friendly islands 
needed to be given the highest priority by the blockade ships. Faced with the imminent threat 
from the Communists, the Blockade Commanders had to develop a direct communication 
system with the guerrilla agents in order to expediently collect enemy information on inshore 
areas. Moreover, despite the perceived unreliability and doubtful capability, the Naval 
Commanders were obliged to use the guerrillas as a main source for island garrison forces. 
During this defensive period, similar to the start of the relationship, guerrilla co-operation was 
inevitable, as the blockade ships needed closer ties with this unreliable partner. 
 Whilst the enemy’s offensive on the islands continued until late 1952, from early February, 
the Communist forces’ actual threat against the important islands was significantly reduced. 
This activity diminished when the final agreement regarding the status of inshore islands was 
issued as part of the cease-fire negotiation in late January 1952. From then on, island warfare 
was conducted, as ‘Tom Tiddler’s Ground’, in that each side’s concerns were mostly focused on 
the small and less important islands that were situated between the major islands and the mainland. 
Simultaneously, the Communists’ main purpose of offensive was redirected to raiding the islands 
and trying to capture the friendly guerrillas. This meant that the enemy threat was more 
concentrated in the Haeju and Ongjin areas, which contained more small islands of guerrillas 
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inshore than in the Chodo-Sokto and Paengyong-do areas. Thus, guerrillas and naval ships in these 
areas had to be more actively and closely involved in the defensive operation.   
 This different level of Communist activity threatening each inshore area largely influenced the 
relationship change between the ships of the British Task Group and the guerrillas. This 
relationship, with the influence of the guerrilla organisation’s command and control realignment 
in late 1951, became particularly complicated. As mentioned in Chapter 6, as a result of this 
change, the responsibility of the guerrilla operation was transferred from the EUSAK 
Headquarters to FEC/LD (K) and CCRAK, theatre-level agencies who were in charge of 
clandestine activities. At the same time, for the purpose of relieving the overburdened area for 
which Leopard was responsible, Wolfpack was separated from the former guerrilla organisation.  
 An interesting point to be noted was that, unlike the EUSAK Headquarters, who had been 
largely indifferent to its guerrilla activity, the new higher commands of the two guerrilla 
organisations were more active in using their resources for their purposes. In particular, they 
were more active in directing the Leopard guerrillas in the Chodo-Sokto area and Paengyong-
do, as these locations were relatively light in defence. Under the initiatives of the two theatre-
level agencies, several Donkeys were directed to infiltrate the mainland for special activities, 
and to be more prudent in sharing their collected intelligence with the friendly naval forces. In 
particular, the Chodo-Sokto guerrillas, who suffered little damage in the course of early enemy 
attacks, were able to respond most actively to these higher command instructions.    
 To the Commanders of the Naval Task Group, who were allowed to access only a limited part 
of higher level intelligence, this variance in guerrilla group activity across different areas was 
somewhat incomprehensible. In particular, there was a large difference in perceptions in terms 
of the activities of Wolfpack guerrillas and those of Leopard in Chodo and Sokto. Even though 
there had been a high level of satisfaction concerning Wolfpack guerrilla activities overall, in 
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the Haeju area, the Donkeys in Chodo-Sokto were deemed disappointing owing to their total 
lack of co-operation. In particular, a commonly shared question of the blockade ships in Chodo-
Sokto area was why the guerrillas in this area demonstrated poor intelligence supply and a 
shortage of offensive activities, despite continual active movements towards the mainland. 
 In fact, the Blockade Commanders’ negative evaluation on the Chodo-Sokto guerrillas was 
not a consequence of actual inactiveness, but a symptom of few co-operation opportunities. Due 
to the disparity of main operational areas, there had been little contact made between the two 
groups. In addition, CCRAK’s regulations regarding intelligence dissemination to friendly 
forces also contributed to a lack of intelligence supply. On the other hand, Wolfpack guerrillas 
had to continue a close relationship with the naval forces to provide the security to their islands. 
Under the continued threat from the enemy, they were required to supply up-to-date information 
to the friendly naval forces and had to conduct pre-emptive attacks against enemy build-ups. 
By virtue of the combined effect of enemy activities and the newly emerged high-level 
directives, the Wolfpack and Leopard guerrillas were engaged in different types of operations.  
Owing to the naval operation’s deepened dependence on the guerrilla activities, this situation 
also caused a large difference in each TU’s activities in the west coast.    
 When the Commanders of the Naval Task Group were virtually compelled to ignore the 
problem of the guerrillas’ reliability and obliged to maintain a close relationship with them, the 
American guerrilla organisations gradually withdrew their co-operation with the naval forces 
to concentrate on their own objectives. 
 
From December 1952, the Communist forces stopped their direct offensive activities against 
the friendly held islands, and subsequently conducted large-scale troop reinforcements along 
the west coast. This enemy build-up, however, was totally for defensive purposes, to respond 
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to the threat of a possible large-scale UN force landing operation. To the naval blockade ships 
and the guerrilla forces on the west coast, this change in Communist movements clearly 
signified an end to island warfare. 
 Under the new operational environment, it was the American guerrilla organisations that 
immediately changed their activities; this significantly impacted on the relationship with the 
naval forces. In fact, from late 1952, FEC initiated the guerrilla reorganisation process by an 
intensive recruiting program to radically increase guerrilla strength and also to incorporate these 
organisations into the US Army command structure. This reorganisation process reflected 
FEC’s decision that it would be a more effective use of guerrilla resources to optimise size and 
manageability. In particular, this organisational change attempted to address the more 
comprehensive use of guerrilla forces in breaking both rear guard and front-line Communist 
defences in what was a current stalemate situation, and also to pressurise them towards a cease-
fire agreement. 
 This FEC intention of reorganising materialised with a new guerrilla operational plan covering 
the overall period of 1953. As mentioned in Chapter 7, an overlying prominent point regarding 
this plan was that the higher command was consistently directing the guerrillas to infiltrate the 
mainland and conduct operations there. They were also instructed to carry out a number of 
special operations, such as assassinating Communist officials, penetrating POW camps and 
distributing leaflets. Therefore, except for the amphibious raids, guerrilla activities on the 
inshore and coastal areas were largely neglected, and this immediately caused a lack of co-
operation with the friendly naval forces. A similar situation to that involving Leopard in the 
Chodo-Sokto area in 1952, occurred again in 1953; but on a much larger scale. An underlying 
limitation of these American guerrilla organisations was the unsustainability of relationships 
with the naval forces; a feature clearly revealed in the last year of the Korean War. Needless to 
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say, this situation limited the naval forces’ routine operations, which still had to largely depend 
on guerrilla intelligence for their west coast Blockade mission.    
By early May 1953, with the restart of the truce talks and the prolonged debate regarding the 
repatriation of POWs seemingly coming to a conclusion, an armistice agreement became highly 
probable. An impending cease-fire forced the UN Forces operating on the west coast to shift 
their attentions to pertinent post-war questions; that of the preparation for the evacuation from 
the northern islands. This situation particularly caused drastic operational changes and demands 
for Naval Blockade Forces whom had to plan and control this large-scale evacuation. As this 
evacuation, code named Operation PANDORA, was agreed to be completed within five days 
after the signing of the armistice agreement, the Blockade Commanders needed to be fully 
occupied with this operation from mid-May 1953.  
 Unlike previous missions which required close naval-guerrilla relationships, this new mission 
had little in common with past relationships with the guerrillas. In fact, during this transitional 
period, the Blockade Commanders’ position with the guerrillas significantly changed. As the 
Naval forces’ main concern was directed clearly towards conducting Operation PANDORA, 
they paid relatively little attention to the guerrilla activities. Moreover, in conducting the 
evacuation mission, to the Naval Commanders, the guerrillas came to be perceived as potential 
‘armed bandits’ or ‘pirates’ who might resist the evacuation.4 It became clear through this 
experience that, even after almost two years of co-operation, the guerrillas were still perceived 
as unreliable forces by the friendly navies.  
 An interesting point to note was that, even in the course of preparing the evacuation plan, 
the guerrilla issue still remained as one of the naval forces’ main concerns. Whilst preparing 
                                           
4 ADM 116/6214, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 1 to 12 February 1952, para. 11. 
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Operation PANDORA, the pattern of the relationship between the two groups had to be 
changed. However, as the largest of the friendly forces to be evacuated, the success of this 
naval mission largely depended on the guerrillas’ co-operation. 
 
With the signing of the armistice agreement on the morning of 27 July 1953, a cease-fire 
condition prevailed. On the same day, all of the outlying guerrillas were completely evacuated. 
Subsequently, the regular units, with their associated equipment, commenced their evacuation 
from the vital islands which were to be handed over to the Communist side. Finally, on 1 August, 
the evacuation of the west coast islands was achieved. With the operation of PANDORA 
successfully completed, the ships of the British Commonwealth and Allied Naval forces 
relationship with the guerrillas also came to an end.  
 In actual fact, it was only for the duration of six months that the naval forces had operated 
without any relationship with the anti-Communist guerrillas during the three years of their west 
coast operation. Essentially, the ships of the British Naval Task Group had to continue their 
relationship with the guerrilla organisations, although deemed unreliable, during the best part 
of the Korean War. Ironically, regardless of the Naval Commanders’ perception of these 
irregular forces, their relationship with the guerrillas was one of the most important factors in 
understanding the operations of the western UN naval forces in the Korean War. This is the 
reason that this research rests on the belief that a more realistic picture of the latter part of UN 
naval operation conducted on the west coast can be properly drawn when we pay more attention 
to this naval-guerrilla co-operation. 
 Overall it is considered that the guerrillas, who spontaneously participated in the clandestine 
activities behind enemy lines without proper compensation, conducted various activities which 
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deserved to be respected.5 However, for the Commanders of the Naval Task Group, owing to 
the nature of the guerrillas, it was difficult to build any direct trust with them. The American 
organisations which reorganised and controlled these irregulars were also, from a different 
perspective, an unreliable partner. Due to the difference of primary objectives for the use of the 
guerrillas, there was only a limited amount of manoeuvrability for close co-operation with the 
naval forces. It was the parent organisation’s early indifference, and also the tense war situation 
on the west coast, which improved and maintained the two groups’ close relationships for more 
than two years. The American organisations’ viability for sustainable close co-operations with 
the Naval Blockade Forces was thus inherently very limited.  
 However, due to the absence of an alternative partner to properly support the naval forces’ 
missions on the west coast, the blockade ships were deeply dependent on the relationship with 
the guerrilla organisations. In addition to the changes in the war situation, the naval operation 
during the latter two-year plus period on the west had been largely decided by the opportunities 
and challenges that emerged from the naval-guerrilla relationship. To the British 
Commonwealth Commanders and the Allied Naval forces on the west coast, a large part of the 
relationship with the guerrillas during the Korean War would be remembered as that involving 
a ‘compelled co-operation with unreliable partners’. And, perhaps, rather than ‘static warfare 
on shore’, this simplified description is a better concept to explain the extensive period of 
western naval forces operation in Korea.   
  
                                           
5 Regarding the result of their actions, see Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 16. 
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Appendix 1. British Commonwealth and Allied Ships that served under British Command
  
 
Note - Ships are listed alphabetically according to type. Short absences from the war area (minor       
defects, recreation, and so on) are not shown. ROK Naval craft operated on the west coast are not 
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1.5 Headquarters Ships 
 
 






Appendix 2. Naval Operation Commands During the Korean War 
 

















Appendix 3. UN Commanders in Chain of Command  







Appendix 4. Guerrilla Operation Command during the Korean War 
 
4.1 Organisation of EUSAK Miscellaneous Group and Guerrilla Units (July 1951) 
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Appendix 5. Copy of Operation Plan ABLE (23 January 1951) 
 
SUBJECT: Organization and plan for partisan operations in Korea. (Plan ABLE)  
 
1. MISSION: To establish in Korea, the cadre of partisan organizations that will perform covert-
type missions of sabotage and intelligence, and be capable in organization and training so that, 
when supplied on a large scale, it may be expanded into large forces that can be employed in 
conjunction with a major effort of UN forces.  
2. GENERAL PLAN: To establish at strategically located bases, a strong center which will be 
capable of:  
a. Providing for its own security.  
b. Operating a high-powered radio station for communications with central headquarters.  
c. Operating a radio net which-will ensure communications with partisan groups.  
d. Training partisan cadre in the following subjects:  
  (1) Intelligence  
  (2) Radio operation and maintenance  
  (3) Individual weapons  
  (4) Organization of the fighting groups  
  (5) Supply, airdrops  
  (6) Demolitions  
3. ORGANIZATION OF THE BASE.  
  a. The following chart shows the organization of the base. This organization will be modified   
depending on the tactical situation, should the need arise. Detailed discussion of each section 
and its responsibilities follows thereafter.      [Data not available]  
b. Commanding Officer: Responsible for the security of the key base by utilizing the ROK 
Marines, and in coordination with Naval forces operating in that area.  
C. ROK Marines: One hundred ROK Marines are assigned to the base for security purposes 
only. This security unit operates directly under the commanding officer. It should be noted that 
provisions have been made, in the TE for the base, to furnish crew-served weapons to augment 
individual weapons of this unit.  
d. Operations: To be commanded by a US officer who will be responsible for all training and 
employment of the partisan groups (on orders from central headquarters) as well as the 
operation of all US radio nets. This will be accomplished with US personnel, plus a group of 
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eight ROK Marines (separate from the security force) which will be utilized for small-arms 
training. The closest coordination will be exercised between this US officer and the 
commanding officer of the base. 
e. Communications: US operators will operate a high-powered radio station for 
communication to central headquarters and other stations as discussed herein. They will be 
responsible for conducting maintenance on all US radio sets used in the operation, as well as 
training key personnel in the partisan cadre in the operation and maintenance of radio sets used 
in carrying out their missions. The ROK Marines will operate a high-powered station, which is 
discussed under “Base communication nets” below.  
f. Training: This section is composed of US personnel and eight ROK Marines, and is 
responsible for training the partisan cadre in all subjects listed in 2d above, with the exception 
of communications.  
4. PERSONNEL ORGANIZATION OF THE BASE  
a. Personnel to occupy these bases will be assigned from the original table of organization 
submitted for the Attrition Warfare Section. ROK Marines are assigned through ROK Naval 
Headquarters, Pusan.  
b. US Personnel:  
  (1) One officer                    MOS 1542 Operations 
  (2) One officer                    MOS 0200 Communications 
  (3) Three radio operators            MOS 0740 Communications 
  (4) One radio operator              MOS 0766 Communications 
  (5) One powerman                 MOS 0166 Communications 
  (6) Two radio repairmen             MOS 0648 Communications 
  (7) One demolition instructor         MOS 3533 Operations 
  (8) One weapons 
  (9) Total US personnel                      11  
  c. ROK Personnel:  
    (1) ROK Navy, Commander, commanding officer of the base.  
    (2) ROK staff officers for commander.  
    (3) One hundred ROK Marines for security.  
    (4) Eight ROK Marines for assistant instructors.  
    (5) All ROK personnel will be supplied by the ROK Naval Headquarters, Pusan.  
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5. ORGANIZATION OF THE PARTISAN CADRE.  
a. The Korean Gun (county) is made up of a varying number of townships. It is planned that 
from each Gun a cadre of loyal partisans will be organized and will undergo training to perform 
covert acts of sabotage and gather information of enemy forces operating in their area, or in 
other areas wherein a mission may be assigned.  
 b. This partisan cadre will (under cover) organize loyal Koreans within their respective 
Guns into fighting groups, and train them sufficiently to be available for large-scale operations, 
upon being properly equipped.  
 c. Training of the partisan cadre will be the responsibility of the Attrition Warfare Section 
and will be accomplished on strategically located bases. Training and organization of the groups 
within each Gun will be the responsibility of the partisan cadre, under the supervision of the 
US operations officer who will remain on the base, This training will take place within the Gun 
proper.  
 d. Weapons and radios will be made available to the partisan cadre on completion of their 
training, to enable them to carry out their acts of sabotage and intelligence, but not to the entire 
Gun organization until such time as need arises.  
 e. The partisan cadre, once trained, will remain in their respective localities and begin 
operations without delay, on order from Central Headquarters. Contact will be established 
between this cadre and the base, by the communications net operated by the communications 
section.  
 f. The following is the organization of the Gun partisan cadre and the subjects in which they 
will be trained.  
  (1) Gun leader and four assistant leaders 
     Intelligence 
     Organization of the fighting group  
     Supply, airdrops 
     Small arms and crew-served weapons  
  (2) Assistant leader  
     Operation and maintenance of low-powered radio set  
     Small-arms instruction  
  (3) Two assistant leaders  
     Saboteur training, demolitions 
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     Small-arms instruction  
  (4) Total partisan cadre from each Gun-8 
6. BASE COMMUNICATIONS NET  
a. A high-powered radio station will be operated by US operators and will be in direct contact 
with the following station:  
  (1) Central Headquarters  
  (2) UN blockade vessels  
  (3) Other stations as deemed necessary  
b. Communications with partisan leaders (base to Gun).   
  (1) Two plans for the establishment of direct communication with the partisan leaders 
(cadre) are available. The adoption of either depends on distance involved, terrain, and seasonal 
weather conditions. The success of the operations depends on adequate communications; 
therefore when one plan is unworkable owing to condition described above, or mechanical 
failure, the other plan may be put into operation with a minimum of effort. In either plan, a 
system of prearranged visual signals will be available.  
  (2) Plan “one”: The partisan leaders are equipped with radios which will net with the high-
powered radio on the base. By using US operators on these sets (which will be located with the 
leaders in Gun) adequate communications will be established under the moot adverse conditions.  
  (3) Plan “two”: The partisan leaders are equipped with low-powered radio sets on which 
they received training and are capable of operating. A similar set will be available on the base 
for the establishment of direct communications.  
c. ROK communications net.  
  (1) The RCK Marines will normally establish a high-powered radio station on the base 
and, by using their own equipment, maintenance personnel, and operators, will be in direct 
contact with the following stations:  
    i. ROK Naval Headquarters.  
    ii. ROK Naval vessels on blockade.  
    iii. UN vessels on blockade, conditions permitting. 
d. Emergency: Should an emergency arise on the base, wherein fire support, evacuation, or 
other aid is needed without delay, the following means of communication, within the basic nets 
described, are available:  
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  (1) US operators will establish direct contact with control headquarters by means of the 
high-powered radio net. Central headquarters will contact COMET 159, who will contact, by 
direct communication, the jeep carrier (TF 77 or CTE 95.11) operation off the West coast. This 
method will give the desired method.  
  (2) US operators will establish direct contact with UN blockade vessels, by means of the 
high-powered radio net.  
  (3) ROK Marines will establish direct contact with ROK vessels. These ROK vessels will 
be an organic part within the defense plans of the base. Pre-arranged plans for fire support and 
evacuation will be drawn up under the direct supervision and orders of the commanding officer 
of the base. These plan will be rehearsed within the limits of secrecy from possible observation 
by enemy force.  
  (4) Naval vessels and friendly aircraft may be contacted by the following virtual means:  
    i. Blinker signal  
    ii. Signal flares  
    iii. Flags 
    iv. Panels 
e. To render close support to the base, and to make certain acts of sabotage more effective, 
direct communication between the partisan leaders, the base, and friendly aircraft is highly 
desirable.  
7. COMMUNICATIONS DIAGRAM  
  a. The diagram on the following page portrays graphically the communication net for the 
execution of operation plan ABLE. It must be kept in mind that this communication plan, as 
well as any established in the future for other bases, must be flexible.   [Data not available]  
8. TABLE OF EQUIPMENT FOR OPERATION OF BASE.  
a. The equipment listed below is not included in the original table of allowances for the 
Attrition Warfare Section. It is felt that this equipment will become standard for all bases, except 
in the following cases:  
  (1) Unforeseen changes in the tactical situation, resulting in need for additional weapons.  
  (2) Expendable items such as wire, ammunition, demolitions, and batteries.  
  (3) Gradual increase in US carbines and Ml rifles as additional partisan cadre is trained.  
  (4) Weapons to arm partisan groups. 
b. Ordnance  
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  (1) Weapons  
    i. Three ea LMG cal.30 M1917-AG  
    ii. Three ea automatic rifles, Browning cal.30 M1918-A2  
    iii. Two ea rifles, recoilless, 75mm M20  
    iv. Four ea carbines, cal.30  
    v. Four ea rifles Ml, cal.30  
    vi. Two ea projector, pyro, hand M9  
    vii. Sufficient magazines for carbines and BARs  
  (2) Vehicles  
    i. One ea 2.5 ton truck LWB 6x6 (for SCR 399)  
    ii. One ea 3/4-ton truck  
    iii. One ea l-ton trailer (for PE 95)  
  (3) Miscellaneous  
    i. One ea, set, demolition (1, 2, 5, or 7) 
c. Signal Corps  
  (1) One ea, SCR 399  
  (2) Two ea, receivers BC 342  
  (3) One ea, PE-95  
  (4) Two ea, PE-75  
  (5) Five ea, SCR 300  
  (6) Four ea, SCR AN/GRC-9  
  (7) Five ea, telephones EE8  
  (8) Five ea, wire W11O-B on DR 5  
  (9) Fifteen ea, battery BA 70  
  (10) Fifty ea, battery BA30  
  (11) Ten ea, flashlights  
  (12) One ea, panel set AP3OC  
  (13) One ea, panel set AP30D  
d. Engineer  
  (1) One carpenter equipment set 2, engineer platoon  
  (2) Five ea, compass, wrist, induction-damped  
e. Quartermaster  
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  (1) Three ea, tents, CP M1945, complete with poles and pins 
  (2) Three ea, stoves, tent M45, complete with burner  
  (3) One ea, outfit, cooking, small detachment  
  (4) Five ea, lantern, gasoline, leaded fuel  
  (5) Twenty ea, drum, gasoline, 5-gal  
  (6) Five ea, tubes, flexible, nozzle  
  (7) Ten ea, cans water, 5-gal  
  (8) Ten ea, cots, canvas folding 
 
WILLIAM A. BURKE  
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